FATF ¦ IO10 TF Pre­vent­ive Meas­ures & Fi­nan­cial Sanc­tions

FATF ¦ IO10 TF Pre­vent­ive Meas­ures & Fi­nan­cial Sanc­tions

Immediate Outcome 10: Preventing Terrorists and Terrorist Financiers from Raising, Moving and Using Funds

Understanding and disrupting terrorist financing is central to reducing the risk of terrorist acts. Immediate Outcome 10 (IO10) of the FATF effectiveness assessment framework measures how well a country identifies terrorists, terrorist organisations and their financiers and deprives them of the resources and means to raise, move and use funds. IO10 combines targeted financial sanctions, risk-based measures for non-profit organisations (NPOs), law enforcement and supervisory action, and international cooperation. The objective is not only legal compliance but tangible reduction of terrorist financing flows through timely and proportionate measures.

Immediate Outcome 10
Terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers are prevented from raising, moving and using funds.
What effective implementation of IO10 looks like

An effective system under IO10 consistently identifies terrorist financiers and their networks, freezes and prevents the use of assets subject to designation, and applies risk‑based mitigation where funds might be raised or moved. This includes prompt implementation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) targeted financial sanctions regimes (notably those arising from UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions, and UNSCR 1373) as well as national or supra‑national regimes. Authorities must combine freezing and asset tracing with investigative measures that lead to seizure, prosecution or other measures that remove the capacity to finance terrorism.

Equally important is a calibrated approach to NPOs. Countries should understand the TF risks facing organisations in the domestic context and apply focused, proportionate, risk‑based measures so that legitimate humanitarian and civil society activities are not unduly disrupted or discouraged. Financial institutions, designated non‑financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) must understand and comply with obligations relating to targeted financial sanctions and TF risk mitigation; supervisors should monitor and enforce compliance through outreach, guidance and, where necessary, proportionate sanctions.

Core questions that shape assessments

IO10 assessment revolves around a set of core issues that capture both action and outcomes. Key questions include whether targeted financial sanctions under UNSCR 1267 (and successors) and UNSCR 1373 are implemented without delay; the extent to which funds and assets of terrorists, designated persons and those acting on their behalf are identified and prevented from being raised, moved or used; how effectively the country applies risk‑based measures to NPOs without undue disruption; and how well regulated sectors and supervisors understand and enforce targeted sanctions obligations.

Assessors look for evidence across legal, operational and supervisory dimensions: designation and asset freeze statistics and timeliness; results of investigations, freezes, seizures and prosecutions; outreach and supervision of NPOs and regulated sectors; and indicators that TF flows have been disrupted (for example, intelligence showing reduced fundraising success or shifts by terrorist groups to alternative methods).

Bastian Schwind-Wagner
Bastian Schwind-Wagner

"Terrorist financing is disrupted when timely targeted financial sanctions, focused investigations, and proportionate oversight of at‑risk organisations work together. Coordinated action by law enforcement, financial intelligence units, supervisors and NPO regulators is essential to prevent funds from being raised, moved or used for terrorist purposes.

To strengthen outcomes, countries need clear procedures for rapid designation and asset freezes, well‑resourced financial investigation capacity, and risk‑based engagement with NPOs and regulated sectors. Effective supervision, outreach and international cooperation close gaps that otherwise allow terrorist financiers to exploit cross‑border channels."

Key elements and practical measures

Timely implementation of targeted financial sanctions. A robust IO10 outcome requires clear procedures for identifying targets for designation, freezing and unfreezing assets, de‑listing and granting authorized use exemptions where UNSCRs permit. Mechanisms must ensure designations and asset freeze orders are promptly communicated to financial institutions, DNFBPs, VASPs and the public as appropriate. Effective use of UNSCR tools — such as listing, delisting and exemptions — should be supported by a legal and operational framework that minimizes delay between designation and asset control.

Investigations, asset tracing and complementary measures. Freezes and sanctions are necessary but insufficient on their own. Authorities should employ financial investigations, provisional measures (freezing and seizure), mutual legal assistance and prosecution when appropriate to convert intelligence and suspicions into concrete interruptions of fundraising and transactional capacity. Asset tracing and follow‑the‑money techniques that lead to disruption of networks and seizure of resources strengthen IO10 outcomes.

Risk‑based approach to NPOs. Countries must identify which NPOs are at risk of TF abuse and deploy four core elements for those not assessed as low risk: sustained outreach to NPOs, targeted risk‑based oversight or monitoring, effective investigation and information gathering, and strong international cooperation. For NPOs assessed as low risk, outreach proportional to that low risk is the appropriate approach. The aim is targeted mitigation that preserves legitimate charitable activity while closing avenues for misuse.

Supervision, compliance and sectoral understanding. Financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs need clear obligations, guidance and training on targeted financial sanctions and TF risk indicators. Supervisors and regulators must have tools to monitor compliance, conduct risk‑based examinations, provide outreach and apply remedial measures or sanctions that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Evidence of compliance activity includes the number and quality of suspicious activity reports, rejections of transactions linked to sanctioned persons, and supervisory enforcement outcomes.

Resourcing and coordination. The effectiveness of IO10 depends on competent authorities — law enforcement, financial intelligence units, counter‑terrorism agencies, supervisors and NPO regulators — having adequate resources and coordination mechanisms. Where resources are shared across functions, prioritisation of TF‑related activities should be clear. International cooperation and information sharing are especially important given the cross‑border nature of terrorist financing.

Indicators of effective outcomes

Assessors and practitioners look for tangible indicators that the TF environment has been disrupted: measurable reductions in successful fundraising by terrorist groups, demonstrable difficulties for terrorists to transfer funds, timely and sustained asset freezes, effective use of designations and de‑listings in line with UNSCRs, prosecutions or administrative measures that deter TF activity, and evidence that NPOs understand TF risks and have implemented protective measures. Supervisory statistics showing outreach, inspections, and sanctions in relation to targeted financial sanctions obligations further support a positive IO10 finding.

Common challenges and areas needing attention

Challenges that weaken IO10 results include delays in implementing UNSC designations and asset freezes; insufficient or poorly targeted oversight of at‑risk NPOs; limited capacity for complex financial investigations and asset tracing; inadequate understanding of TF typologies among regulated sectors; and weak supervisory enforcement. Another frequent gap is limited international cooperation or slow mutual legal assistance that hinders tracing cross‑border flows. Addressing these areas means strengthening procedures for rapid designation and freeze, investing in financial investigation capabilities, tailoring outreach to NPO risk profiles, and ensuring supervisors are equipped to enforce compliance.

Conclusion

Immediate Outcome 10 measures whether a country not only has laws on the books but achieves concrete reductions in the ability of terrorists and their supporters to access and use financial resources. Effective IO10 implementation rests on a combination of prompt targeted financial sanctions, intelligent financial investigations and asset tracing, risk‑based oversight of NPOs, well‑resourced and coordinated competent authorities, and strong supervisory and compliance frameworks covering financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs. When these elements work in concert — timely designation and freezing, proportionate NPO measures, effective supervision and cross‑border cooperation — countries significantly reduce terrorist financing flows and the associated risk of terrorist activity.


FATF Ratings Overview
Luxembourg ¦ FATF Effectiveness & Technical Compliance Ratings

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures

Luxembourg Mutual Evaluation Report, September 2023

This assessment was adopted by the FATF at its June 2023 Plenary meeting and summarises the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures in place in Luxembourg as at the date of the on-site visit: 2-18 November 2022.

Table 1. Effectiveness Ratings

Note: Effectiveness ratings can be either a High- HE, Substantial- SE, Moderate- ME, or Low – LE, level of effectiveness.

IO1 Risk, policy and coordination

Money laundering and terrorist financing risks are identified, assessed and understood, policies are co-operatively developed and, where appropriate, actions co-ordinated domestically to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

Substantial

IO2 International cooperation

International co-operation delivers appropriate information, financial intelligence and evidence, and facilitates action against criminals and their property.

Substantial

IO3 Supervision

Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate financial institutions and VASPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements, and financial institutions and VASPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive measures, and report suspicious transactions. The actions taken by supervisors, financial institutions and VASPs are commensurate with the risks.

Moderate

IO4 Preventive measures

Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate DNFBPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements, and DNFBPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive measures commensurate with the risks, and report suspicious transactions.

Moderate

IO5 Legal persons and arrangements

Legal persons and arrangements are prevented from misuse for money laundering or terrorist financing, and information on their beneficial ownership is available to competent authorities without impediments.

Substantial

IO6 Financial intelligence

Financial intelligence and all other relevant information are appropriately used by competent authorities for money laundering and terrorist financing investigations.

Substantial

IO7 ML investigation & prosecution

Money laundering offences and activities are investigated, and offenders are prosecuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

Moderate

IO8 Confiscation

Asset recovery processes lead to confiscation and permanent deprivation of criminal property and property of corresponding value.

Moderate

IO9 TF investigation & prosecution

Terrorist financing offences and activities are investigated and persons who finance terrorism are prosecuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

Substantial

IO10 TF preventive measures & financial sanctions

Terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers are prevented from raising, moving and using funds.

Moderate

IO11 PF financial sanctions

Persons and entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are prevented from raising, moving and using funds, consistent with the relevant UNSCRs.

Moderate

Table 2. Technical Compliance Ratings

Note: Technical compliance ratings can be either a C – compliant, LC – largely compliant, PC – partially compliant or NC – non compliant.

R.8 Non-profit organisations

PC – partially compliant

R.10 Customer due diligence

C – compliant

R.11 Record-keeping

C – compliant

R.13 Correspondent banking

C – compliant

R.15 New technologies

LC – largely compliant

R.16 Payment transparency

C – compliant

R.19 Higher-risk countries

C – compliant

R.23 DNFBPs: Other measures

C – compliant

R.27 Powers of supervisors

C – compliant

R.32 Cash Couriers

LC – largely compliant

R.33 Statistics

LC – largely compliant

R.34 Guidance and feedback

C – compliant

R.35 Sanctions

LC – largely compliant

R.36 International instruments

LC – largely compliant

R.39 Extradition

C – compliant


The information in this article is of a general nature and is provided for informational purposes only. If you need legal advice for your individual situation, you should seek the advice of a qualified lawyer.
Did you find any mistakes? Would you like to provide feedback? If so, please contact us!
Dive deeper
  • FATF ¦ The FATF Recommendations ¦ Link
  • FATF ¦ Luxembourg’s measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing ¦ Link
Bastian Schwind-Wagner
Bastian Schwind-Wagner Bastian is a recognized expert in anti-money laundering (AML), countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), compliance, data protection, risk management, and whistleblowing. He has worked for fund management companies for more than 24 years, where he has held senior positions in these areas.