FATF ¦ R.31 Pow­ers of Law En­force­ment and In­ves­ti­ga­tive Au­thor­i­ties

Recommendation 31: Why Strong Investigative Powers Matter In Financial Crime Cases

Financial crime investigations move faster today than ever before. Money launderers, fraudsters and terrorist financiers use complex structures, cross‑border transfers and digital channels to hide their activities and assets. Against that backdrop, Recommendation 31 of the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) is a cornerstone: it deals with what powers law enforcement and investigative authorities must have to investigate money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing effectively. For compliance professionals, investigators, and policy makers, understanding Recommendation 31 is essential. It shapes how cases are built, what information can be accessed, and how quickly authorities can act to freeze, trace and recover criminal assets.

Core Principle: Access To All Necessary Documents And Information

At the heart of Recommendation 31 is a simple but powerful requirement: when investigating money laundering, related predicate offences and terrorist financing, competent authorities must be able to obtain all necessary documents and information for investigations, prosecutions and related actions.

“Competent authorities” typically include:

• Law enforcement agencies (e.g. police, financial crime units);
• Prosecutors;
• Specialized investigative bodies (e.g. anti-corruption or financial intelligence units where they have investigative powers).

The standard is not limited to what is convenient or easy to obtain. It is about what is necessary to understand the criminal activity, follow the money and present admissible evidence in court.

Compulsory Measures: Getting Records And Evidence

Recommendation 31 requires that authorities have powers to use compulsory measures where needed. Voluntary cooperation is helpful but not sufficient. When financial crime is involved, suspects often destroy, conceal or move evidence. The standard therefore expects that countries grant authorities the legal tools to compel disclosure and secure evidence.

These powers should cover at least:

• Production of records: Authorities must be able to require financial institutions, DNFBPs (Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions, such as casinos, lawyers, accountants, real estate agents) and any other natural or legal persons to provide relevant records. This can include account statements, KYC files, transaction data, contracts, invoices, company records and communications.
• Search of persons and premises: Where justified, investigators must be able to search offices, homes, vehicles and other premises, as well as individuals, to locate and secure evidence such as physical documents, devices, storage media or cash.
• Taking witness statements: Authorities need the power to question witnesses and record statements formally, which may later be used in prosecution. This applies to employees, managers, customers, counterparties, and other individuals who may have relevant knowledge.
• Seizure and obtaining of evidence: To prevent the destruction, alteration or removal of evidence, law enforcement must be able to seize documents, data carriers, devices and other items, and ensure they can be used as evidence in court under domestic procedural rules.

For institutions in the private sector, this means that recordkeeping and data retrieval capabilities are not only regulatory requirements but are directly linked to their ability to respond properly and lawfully to compulsory measures.

Bastian Schwind-Wagner_Follow

"Recommendation 31 underpins effective financial crime enforcement by ensuring that law enforcement and investigative authorities have the powers they need to obtain information and evidence. Without these tools, even the strongest preventive measures and reporting frameworks cannot translate into successful investigations and prosecutions. Robust legal powers, paired with timely access to data, are vital to tracing and recovering criminal assets.

For compliance and financial crime professionals, this recommendation explains why transparency, accurate recordkeeping and cooperation with authorities are non‑negotiable. It links everyday AML/CFT obligations with the practical needs of investigators who build cases against money launderers and terrorist financiers. Understanding Recommendation 31 helps institutions design controls that truly support enforcement outcomes."

Advanced Investigative Techniques For Financial Crime

Recommendation 31 goes further than basic investigative powers. It explicitly calls for a “wide range of investigative techniques” suitable for the investigation of money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing. Financial crime is often sophisticated; simple document requests are rarely enough.

The techniques highlighted include:

• Undercover operations: These can be used, for example, to infiltrate criminal networks, test the integrity of gatekeepers, or gather evidence on how illicit funds are moved and laundered in practice.
• Intercepting communications: With appropriate legal safeguards, investigators may need to intercept phone calls, emails, messages or other communications to uncover the structure of the network, identify facilitators and track instructions regarding transactions or asset movement.
• Accessing computer systems: Given the digital nature of modern finance, access to computer systems is crucial. This may involve seizing and examining laptops, servers, mobile devices, cloud storage, or even live access to systems, subject to legal safeguards and technical protocols.
• Controlled delivery: In some cases, authorities may allow illicit funds, goods or communications to move under their supervision, rather than intercept them immediately, in order to identify higher-level participants, broader networks and ultimate beneficiaries.

Countries are expected to make sure these techniques are available in law and actually used in practice, with adequate oversight and protections for fundamental rights. From a compliance perspective, institutions may sometimes find themselves interacting with law enforcement in the context of such operations, often under strict confidentiality.

Timely Access To A Wide Range Of Information

Time is a critical factor in asset tracing and disruption of financial crime. Recommendation 31 emphasizes that competent authorities should have timely access to a wide range of information, especially to support the identification and tracing of criminal property and property of corresponding value.

This is broader than traditional banking data. It includes:

• Basic and beneficial ownership information: Authorities must be able to quickly find out who owns or controls companies, partnerships, trusts and other legal arrangements. Access to beneficial ownership registries or equivalent systems is central to piercing corporate veils and stopping criminals from hiding behind nominees or complex corporate structures.
• Information held by tax authorities: Tax data can be key to identifying undeclared income, mismatches between reported income and asset holdings, or patterns that point to money laundering or tax crimes as predicate offences.
• Asset registries: Law enforcement should be able to access registries for land and real estate, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, securities, and other assets. This helps in identifying what property a suspect owns or controls, and in valuing and prioritizing assets for freezing and confiscation.
• Citizenship, residency and social benefit registries: These records can confirm identities, track movements, show links between individuals and jurisdictions, and provide information relevant to risk and asset tracing.

In practical terms, this pushes countries to create clear gateways and technical access channels (often electronic) so that investigators do not face months of delay when trying to identify assets or beneficial owners.

Identifying Account Holders Quickly And Quietly

A persistent challenge in financial crime cases is figuring out where suspects hold accounts and financial products without tipping them off. Recommendation 31 directly addresses this by requiring countries to have effective mechanisms to identify, in a timely manner, whether natural or legal persons hold or control accounts.

This can include:

• Centralized bank account registries or retrieval systems, where authorities can search by person or entity and see which institutions hold their accounts.
• Other mechanisms that allow rapid querying across multiple financial institutions, subject to proper safeguards.

In addition, there must be mechanisms so that competent authorities can identify assets without prior notification to the owner. If suspects receive an early warning, they may move, sell or conceal assets before they can be frozen or seized.

For banks and other financial institutions, this means that legal frameworks may require them to provide information to authorities in ways that minimize the risk of tipping off customers. It also reinforces the importance of robust customer identification data and accurate account records.

Link With The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)

Recommendation 31 also underscores the role of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as a key information hub. When investigating money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, competent authorities must be able to ask for all relevant information held by the FIU.

This typically includes:

• Suspicious transaction reports (STRs) or suspicious activity reports (SARs);
• Cash transaction reports, where applicable;
• Analysis products, such as intelligence reports prepared by the FIU;
• Links between multiple reports involving the same customer, account, institution or pattern.

The relationship between FIUs and investigative authorities is crucial:

• FIUs receive reports from the private sector, analyze them and generate financial intelligence.
• Investigators use this intelligence to open or support cases, trace funds and identify additional suspects or assets.
• Investigative feedback can, in turn, help the FIU refine its analytical focus.

Recommendation 31 ensures that this information flow is not blocked at the moment when it matters most: during an active investigation.

Implications For Countries, Institutions And Compliance Teams

For countries, implementing Recommendation 31 is not just a matter of passing laws. They must:

• Give authorities clear legal powers to obtain information and evidence, use advanced techniques, and access key registries.
• Put in place practical tools and systems (such as centralized registries, secure gateways, and digital access to government databases).
• Ensure that procedures respect human rights, data protection and legal safeguards, with appropriate judicial or independent oversight.
• Train investigators, prosecutors and judges to use these powers effectively and responsibly.

For financial institutions and DNFBPs, Recommendation 31 translates into several practical expectations:

• Be prepared to respond efficiently and lawfully to compulsory orders, searches and requests for information.
• Maintain comprehensive, accurate and accessible records, including KYC information, transactional data and internal documentation.
• Understand that law enforcement may be using sophisticated techniques and that cooperation must be controlled, documented and compliant with local laws and confidentiality requirements.
• Align internal policies (such as tipping-off controls, information barriers and escalation procedures) with the legal needs of investigations.

For compliance officers, this recommendation is a reminder that the fight against financial crime is not limited to internal monitoring and reporting. Their work feeds into a broader investigative framework that depends on timely, accurate and complete information, backed by strong legal powers and effective coordination among authorities.

Conclusion: Recommendation 31 As A Foundation For Effective Enforcement

Recommendation 31 sits at the enforcement end of the anti‑money laundering and counter‑terrorist financing framework. Even the best preventive measures, risk assessments and controls will not deter criminals if authorities lack the tools to investigate, trace assets and bring cases to court.

By requiring broad access to information, strong compulsory powers, advanced investigative techniques, fast identification of assets and accounts, and seamless access to FIU intelligence, Recommendation 31 aims to ensure that countries can respond effectively to money laundering and terrorist financing threats.

For financial crime professionals, understanding this recommendation offers two key insights: why regulators insist on strong recordkeeping and transparency measures, and how those measures are used in practice to support real investigations that disrupt criminal activity and protect the integrity of the financial system.

Dive deeper

• FATF ¦ The FATF Recommendations ¦ Link
• FATF ¦ Luxembourg’s measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing ¦ Link