Ruling [CJEU] ¦ EU Sanctions Case-Law July to October 2026: Listings, Evidence and Remedies

What the EU courts said about sanctions listings between July and October 2026

Between mid-July and early October 2026, the General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union handed down a series of decisions on individual listings under the EU’s Russia/Ukraine and Belarus sanctions regimes, and an Advocate General delivered an influential Opinion on the evidence the Council needs before it lists anyone. This overview draws out the general legal points from eight of those decisions. The individual stories behind them matter less than what they say about listing criteria, ownership and control, circumvention, the burden of proof and the remedies open to those who win.

Eight decisions, one recurring question

Every one of these cases turns, in one way or another, on the same question: what does the Council have to show, and when, to keep a person or entity on a list? Since the Court of Justice’s foundational case-law, the answer in principle has been settled. The EU courts carry out an in-principle full review, the Council bears the burden of proof, and it must present a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence linking the person to the criterion relied on. What changes from case to case is how those principles apply to new criteria and new fact patterns.

Five of the decisions upheld the Council. Two annulled renewals of listings, in one case for the third time and in the other for the fourth. The Advocate General’s Opinion proposes setting aside a General Court judgment that had allowed a listing without any evidence file at all. Taken together, they give a fairly precise picture of where the courts draw the line.

Bastian Schwind-Wagner _Follow

"Read together, these decisions show a sanctions regime that is maturing in court. The criteria are broad and the judges accept that, but each listing still has to rest on real, current evidence, and the Council loses when it recycles reasons that a court has already rejected.

For compliance teams, the most useful lessons concern control and circumvention. A minority stake, a family foundation or a deal between two non-EU companies can all bring a person within reach of EU sanctions, and a transaction that never completed can still justify a listing if its purpose was to free frozen assets."

Facilitating circumvention: a criterion with teeth

In Case T-492/24 (judgment of 15 July 2026), an extended five-judge chamber of the General Court upheld the criterion that allows the Council to list persons who “facilitate infringements of the prohibition against circumvention” of the Russia sanctions. The applicant argued that “facilitate” was too vague and that facilitating circumvention amounted to complicity in a crime that only a criminal court could establish. The Court disagreed on both counts. “Facilitate” carries its ordinary meaning: making an operation aimed at circumvention easier, by helping or contributing to it through acts or omissions. Legal certainty does not require the Council to list every scenario in advance, least of all for complex legal and financial structures. And because restrictive measures are precautionary and not criminal penalties, the Council may target conduct that could also be a crime under national law without waiting for a conviction.

The facts are a textbook circumvention case. A listed person indirectly held, through a Russian holding company, a large block of shares in an EU-listed company, and those shares were frozen in an EU bank. A company set up by the applicant bought the holding company in Russia, under Russian law, for around EUR 70 million, with a view to having the freeze lifted and the shares sold to an EU bank. The seller and the buyer had identical minority co-shareholders, and evidence from the national competent authority indicated that the listed person was to receive part of the price.

Three points of the judgment deserve attention. First, a transaction between non-EU parties outside the EU still falls within the territorial scope of the circumvention prohibition in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 where its purpose is to unlock assets located in the EU. Second, circumvention covers activities whose “object or effect” is to defeat the measures, so the plan does not have to succeed; this one collapsed after the competent authority signalled that releasing the shares would breach the freeze. Third, the knowledge requirement is met where a person participates while aware that this may be the effect and accepts that possibility. Legal opinions, transparency towards the authorities and a contractual condition requiring sanctions compliance did not change that assessment, because a formally lawful operation can still be circumvention when taken together with the other steps.

The applicant later unwound the deal through a settlement before a Russian court. The General Court held that this did not make the listing obsolete straight away. Where the measures target a complex scheme to replace a listed person in a shareholding structure, a reasonable period may need to pass after the scheme has definitively ended, particularly when the vehicle created for it still exists.

When a family tie becomes an “association”

In Case C-399/25 P (judgment of 16 July 2026), the Court of Justice dismissed an appeal by the spouse of a listed businessperson who had been listed as an “associated” person. Being a family member is never enough on its own. What the Council must show, objectively, is common interests that go beyond the family relationship. Those interests need not be economic. Here the spouses had co-founded a large charitable foundation bearing their name, both held institutional roles and invested considerable effort in it, and the husband’s companies provided financial and logistical support. That was sufficient, and it made no difference that the foundation pursued no commercial aim and the work was voluntary. Shared interests that serve the public image of the family members were also accepted as going beyond the private family sphere.

For beneficial ownership and related-party analysis, the message is that charitable and philanthropic structures can be as relevant as companies when assessing who is connected with a listed person.

Financial support through a shareholding

In the companion appeal, Case C-400/25 P (also 16 July 2026), the Court of Justice confirmed that “financial support” to Russian decision-makers can be attributed to a natural person who acts within or through a legal person that provides the support directly. The appellant held just over 10 % of a bank indirectly, through a structure he wholly owned, which made him its second-largest shareholder and part of a stable core of four shareholders holding close to 60 % for more than a decade. The bank itself had channelled very large sums to the circle around the Russian leadership. On those facts, the support could be attributed to him.

The Court also restated that criteria of this type contain no presumption of support: the Council must always produce evidence that the person concerned provided it. Once one listing criterion is upheld, errors in the assessment of other criteria relied on in the same act cannot lead to annulment.

Leading businesspersons: stakes, influence and activity in Russia

In Case T-358/25 (judgment of 9 September 2026), the General Court dismissed an action against the continued listing of a businessperson under the “leading businessperson operating in Russia” and “sector providing a substantial source of revenue” criteria. Its reasoning will matter for anyone who assesses large minority shareholders.

The Court held that neither criterion creates a presumption of interdependence between businesspersons and the Russian government, and that the Council does not have to prove such links in each case. What it must establish is that the person is “influential” in the economic sense the Court of Justice has defined (professional status, scale of activities, capital holdings or investments, positions in companies or any other relevant economic factor) and that he or she carries on activities in Russia. A stake of about 29 % that made the applicant the largest shareholder of a London-listed steel and mining group with major Russian operations, carrying the right to appoint up to three directors, was enough, even if he had never used that right and even if the stake were purely financial. Foreign incorporation of the parent did not help him: the Court observed that allowing a company with substantial Russian activities to escape the criterion merely because it is incorporated or also active abroad would make circumvention easy. A much smaller holding in another major Russian producer corroborated the finding.

The Court also dealt with the applicant’s argument that he could not sell his stake because of UK sanctions and the refusal of the share registrar and depositary to issue certificates. Those obstacles stemmed from UK law, not from the EU acts, and the EU regime is autonomous. A legal opinion commissioned for the litigation had limited probative value, especially where it referred to correspondence that was not produced. And the purpose of the measures is to increase pressure on the Russian government, not to induce the listed person to change his behaviour, so the claimed impossibility of changing his situation did not make the measures disproportionate.

On procedure, the General Court rejected the argument that the Council had unlawfully delegated its decisions to its working parties and to Coreper. With around 2,500 listings to review periodically, the Council may rely on the work of its preparatory bodies and adopt the acts by written procedure, as long as it remains the body that decides. The claim for damages failed because no illegality had been shown.

A May 2025 amendment to the Russia regime, not applied in this case, also deserves a mention: leading businesspersons who claim to have transferred ownership, control or economic benefit of their business interests after 24 February 2022 remain listed unless sufficient, recent and reliable information shows they no longer meet the criterion. For customer due diligence, divestment claims by listed persons therefore need hard evidence, not a press release.

“Benefitting from” requires a real benefit

Case T-799/25 (judgment of 2 September 2026) shows the limits of the family-member limb of the same criterion. The General Court annulled two renewals of the listing of the spouse of a leading businessperson, the fourth judgment in which it has annulled renewals of her listing. The criterion covers immediate family members “benefitting from” a leading businessperson. The benefit may be financial or non-financial and need not be undue, but it must be quantitatively or qualitatively not insignificant, and it must exist when the act is adopted.

The Council’s file showed the husband’s past and present positions, which the Court treated as mere context, and a single appearance by the applicant at a cultural event where she was presented as chair of a family-linked charitable foundation. That was not enough. The Council’s further argument, that her wealth came from selling shares she had acquired through family ties, failed because it did not appear in the statement of reasons, and the Council cannot substitute new grounds before the court. To avoid a gap between the annulment of the Council decision and that of the implementing regulation, the Court maintained the effects of the decision until the appeal period expires.

Relisting on annulled grounds and the limits of damages

Case T-807/25 (judgment of 7 October 2026) is the sharpest warning to the Council in this series. The General Court had already annulled three successive renewals of the applicant’s listing because the evidence did not show that he still met the criteria; his alleged role rested on a former position in a company and on the risk that he might act again. The Council then renewed the listing once more, nine days after the second annulling judgment, on identical grounds and with no new evidence.

The Court annulled the renewal. Under Article 266 TFEU, an institution must comply not only with the operative part of a final annulling judgment but also with the reasons that necessarily support it. Past functions alone cannot justify a listing unless there are serious and consistent indications that the person still has ties to the structure concerned. By relisting on the same basis, the Council perpetuated an illegality that undermines the rule of law. The Court went further and found a sufficiently serious breach: a normally prudent and diligent administration would have understood that it needed new grounds or new evidence.

Even so, the claim for damages failed. Under Article 340 TFEU, the applicant must prove both the reality and the extent of the harm and a sufficiently direct causal link. Saying that a listing is inherently damaging to one’s reputation is not enough without evidence that third parties actually changed their behaviour; the finding of illegality was itself full reparation for the non-material harm. Claims for earlier periods were barred by res judicata because earlier judgments had already rejected them, and legal costs were not substantiated. The Court also repeated that a freeze is a precautionary measure and does not breach the presumption of innocence.

Notorious facts are no substitute for an evidence file

In Case C-228/25 P, Advocate General Biondi delivered an Opinion on 3 September 2026 that, if followed, would tighten the Council’s practice considerably. The case concerns a Russian telecommunications operator listed in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, the list of entities supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex that are subject to stricter export restrictions on dual-use goods and advanced technology. The Council had compiled no evidence file when it listed the company. When asked for its reasons, it simply pointed to the text of the criterion. Before the General Court, it argued that the company’s support for the military-industrial complex was a notorious fact, something “presumed known to all”, and the General Court accepted that.

The Advocate General considers this wrong in law. A presumption can shift the burden of proof only if the act expressly provides for it, and an alleged notorious fact that the act does not even mention cannot be treated more leniently than a presumption. A reason that merely repeats the criterion is no reason at all. Without any reference to a notorious fact and without any evidence file at the time of listing, the Council could not show that it had actually exercised its discretion. He also found that the company’s rights of defence were breached at the renewal stage: the evidence surfaced for the first time in the Council’s defence before the General Court, and the company learned only after the renewal that this was the basis for keeping it listed. The administrative procedure and the court proceedings, he warned, must not be merged into one. He proposes setting aside the judgment and annulling the initial listing acts.

Procedure: time limits and the burden of rebuttal

Case C-363/25 P (judgment of 16 July 2026) concerned a Belarusian property developer listed for benefiting from and supporting the regime. On time limits, the Court of Justice held that the period for bringing an action runs from individual communication to the person concerned, and that communication to a lawyer counts only if the power of attorney clearly and unequivocally authorises the lawyer to receive it. That is judged solely on the wording of the mandate, not on how the parties corresponded. A mandate limited to an earlier case did not qualify, so the General Court had wrongly declared the action out of time.

The appellant still lost, because the General Court had also examined the merits. Once the Council has produced a relevant body of evidence that a criterion is met (here, the development of a flagship project on land and terms granted by the regime), it falls to the listed party to prove the counter-facts it relies on. Adverse measures that the regime had taken against the company did not undermine the finding unless the company showed they actually affected the benefit it drew from the project.

Free movement of EU citizens on sanctions lists

Three of the cases involved listed persons who are also EU citizens. The Court of Justice in C-399/25 P and C-400/25 P, and the General Court in T-358/25, confirmed that a CFSP decision under Article 29 TEU can bar EU citizens from entering or transiting Member States other than their own. The Council is not bound by the conditions of the Free Movement Directive 2004/38/EC, which addresses the Member States. The limits come from elsewhere: a Member State may never refuse entry to its own nationals, and the restriction must satisfy Article 52(1) of the Charter. The periodic review of listings ensures that the essence of the right is respected, because the restriction is neither permanent nor aimed at ending citizenship rights. Refusals of entry under national implementing measures are a matter for national courts.

What compliance teams should take from this

For banks, fund administrators, corporate service providers and their sanctions teams, several practical lessons follow. Circumvention risk can arise from transactions entirely outside the EU when their aim is to unlock frozen assets inside it, and mirror shareholdings between buyer and seller are a strong red flag. A deal does not have to complete to be a problem. Ownership and control analysis must look beyond majority stakes: a significant minority holding with appointment rights, a seat in a stable core of shareholders or a shared family foundation can all be enough to connect a person with a listed party.

At the same time, the courts insist on evidence. Listings built on past functions, single public appearances or criteria repeated as reasons do not survive review, and the Council cannot keep renewing a listing on grounds a court has already rejected. That matters for firms too, because an annulment usually takes effect only after the appeal period and the Council may adopt a new listing in the meantime. Screening systems and asset freeze procedures should track not only additions and removals in the Official Journal but also the outcome of court cases and the date from which an annulment actually applies.

Dive deeper

• CURIA ¦ Case T-492/24 Beloglazov v Council, Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 15 July 2026 ¦ Link
• CURIA ¦ Case C-399/25 P Timchenko v Council, Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 16 July 2026 ¦ Link
• CURIA ¦ Case C-400/25 P Timchenko v Council, Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 16 July 2026 ¦ Link
• CURIA ¦ Case C-363/25 P Dana Astra v Council, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 16 July 2026 ¦ Link
• CURIA ¦ Case T-799/25 Pumpyanskaya v Council, Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 2 September 2026 ¦ Link
• CURIA ¦ Case C-228/25 P MegaFon v Council, Opinion of Advocate General Biondi of 3 September 2026 ¦ Link
• CURIA ¦ Case T-358/25 Abramovich v Council, Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 9 September 2026 ¦ Link
• CURIA ¦ Case T-807/25 Boguslayev v Council, Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 October 2026 ¦ Link