AMLA ¦ Report on Cooperation of Supervisory Authorities in AML/CFT Colleges

AMLA ¦ Report on Cooperation of Supervisory Authorities in AML/CFT Colleges

AMLA’s first look inside the AML/CFT colleges finds structures in place but cooperation unfinished

The Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) has published its first report on the cooperation of supervisory authorities in AML/CFT colleges. Between 15 November 2025 and 15 July 2026 AMLA staff sat in on 17 college meetings for cross-border credit and financial institutions. Colleges are generally organised in proportion to the risk of the groups they cover, and lead supervisors usually steer them well, but attendance, the timely exchange of documents, the risk focus of the discussions and the agreement on joint follow-up all fall short in roughly half of the meetings observed. The findings feed directly into the regulatory technical standard (RTS) AMLA must draft under Article 49(14) of Directive (EU) 2024/1640 (AMLD6), due to reach the European Commission in the first quarter of 2027.

What AML/CFT colleges are and where their rules come from

AML/CFT supervisory colleges are permanent cooperation structures that bring together the supervisors of a cross-border financial group from the different Member States in which it operates. They exist to share information, align risk assessments and coordinate supervisory action, so that weaknesses in one part of a group do not stay invisible to the authorities responsible for the rest of it.

So far the colleges have rested on the Joint Guidelines JC 2019 81, issued by the European Supervisory Authorities in December 2019 under the Fifth AML Directive. The guidelines govern the composition of a college, the cooperation and information-sharing arrangements between its members, mutual assistance and procedural questions. They stay in force until the RTS replaces them.

Article 49 of AMLD6, which applies from 10 July 2027, puts the colleges on a statutory footing. A college must be set up for credit or financial institutions, including groups, that have establishments in at least two Member States in addition to the Member State of the parent undertaking. The RTS will add the detailed rules and will apply no earlier than the same date. In substance, both texts largely preserve the Joint Guidelines.

Bastian Schwind-Wagner
Bastian Schwind-Wagner

"Colleges were meant to stop a group from showing each supervisor only its local face. AMLA found that in about half of the meetings it attended, members stayed away, risk assessments never arrived and nobody agreed what to do next, even where transaction monitoring and CDD weaknesses ran across the whole group.

With the CSSF leading 41 colleges for cross-border fund groups, Luxembourg is where the RTS will bite first. Groups should expect what a supervisor learns about one subsidiary to reach the others, and should make sure their group-wide risk assessment tells the same story in every jurisdiction."

AMLA’s seat at the table

Under Article 49 of AMLD6, AMLA may attend college meetings as an observer and must facilitate their work in accordance with Article 31 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 (AMLAR). From 10 July 2027, Article 31(1) AMLAR requires AMLA to ensure that colleges for non-selected obliged entities with establishments in several Member States are established and function consistently, and Article 31(2) gives AMLA staff full participation rights.

For the large majority of cross-border groups that AMLA will not supervise directly, the college is the main channel through which the authority can influence supervisory outcomes. AMLA calls the colleges a strategic tool for its indirect supervision mandate and intends to direct its resources to the colleges where its presence contributes most to convergence and to the mitigation of money laundering and terrorist financing risk.

Luxembourg leads the European college landscape

By July 2026, 28 national competent authorities in 23 Member States had established 285 AML/CFT colleges, 27 more than a year earlier. Most of the increase came from Luxembourg. Supervisors from Luxembourg, Germany and France act as lead supervisors in more than half of all colleges, which reflects the concentration of cross-border financial institutions in these three jurisdictions.

In Luxembourg the driver is the fund industry. The Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF) alone leads 41 colleges for cross-border investment funds and fund managers. Credit institutions still account for 46% of all colleges, while recent growth came mainly from collective investment undertakings and their managers, investment firms and payment institutions. Every sector recorded an increase over the year.

Most colleges are compact. Around 65% have between four and six permanent members, the lead supervisor included, while eight have more than 25, and size does not track sector. Nearly two-thirds of the colleges (184) include at least one Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as an observer, and 204 colleges (71.5%) involve the relevant prudential supervisor. Most colleges meet once a year and five meet twice, but 39 have no periodic meetings at all. Thirteen third-country observers have been onboarded by 15 supervisors across 46 colleges.

Meeting frequency does not always follow risk

The Joint Guidelines leave the frequency of meetings to the lead supervisor and the permanent members, on the basis of money laundering and terrorist financing risk. Of the 17 colleges AMLA attended, 82% concerned groups rated very significant, significant or high risk, and the rest medium-high.

Thirteen of the 17 colleges meet annually. Of the other four, one with a significant risk rating meets every 12 to 18 months and another every two years with the option of ad-hoc meetings. The two colleges with a very significant risk rating meet only every two years. Given the size and risk of those groups, AMLA considers that this frequency is not fully aligned with a risk-based approach.

Absent members, late minutes and an excluded FIU

The weakest results concern participation. In 7 of the 17 colleges, several permanent members neither attended nor sent their risk assessments to the lead supervisor in advance, so lead supervisors could not prepare a complete group-wide picture before the meeting. Minutes were circulated in only 9 of the 17 colleges, in some cases up to three months after the meeting.

In one college an FIU attending as observer was asked to leave the room so that a supervisor from another Member State could present, because that Member State’s national law does not allow information to be shared with foreign FIUs. When a college sends its intelligence component out of the room just as supervisory concerns are presented, it cuts the link between supervisory findings and suspicious transaction intelligence on which money laundering cases depend.

Third-country observers raise a separate difficulty. Their admission requires an assessment of the equivalence of the third country’s confidentiality and professional secrecy regime, and many supervisors are waiting for such assessments to be carried out at European level before inviting the observers they have already identified. AMLA concludes that low attendance, late minutes, missing risk assessments and these admission problems together hamper the identification of common risks.

Information exchange is spread across too many platforms

The Joint Guidelines require lead supervisors to ensure that college members can exchange documentation, risk assessments, meeting materials, supervisory findings, requests for information and follow-up actions securely and on an ongoing basis. AMLA made a secure platform available in January 2026. By July 2026 only six national competent authorities had a dedicated folder on it, covering 68 colleges. The others continue to use their own systems, and some members report that the resulting patchwork makes it harder to find the documents a college needs.

The quality of the discussion decides the value of a college

In 12 of the 17 colleges, lead supervisors actively steered the discussion, answered questions and summarised the cross-border risks identified. In the remaining five, some lead supervisors presented without inviting questions, and the tours de table were either long with little time for discussion or short with none.

In every college the lead supervisor presented on the parent undertaking, and about half also featured structured presentations from other permanent members. Where members gave only an oral update, it became much harder to draw conclusions on the main risks and measures from a group perspective. In 7 of the 17 colleges the obliged entity itself contributed nothing, although AMLA saw more effective exchanges where it did take part. Observers such as FIUs, prudential supervisors and third-country authorities presented in 10 of the 17 colleges, sometimes adding significant value on cross-cutting risks, planned expansions and turnover in the group’s AML function. In the other seven they contributed nothing.

Common risks identified, joint action missing

A college is meant to identify cross-border risks within a group and agree a common supervisory approach. In 8 of the 17 colleges, members did discuss common risks and actions, through bilateral follow-up between supervisors or through recommendations by the lead supervisor to monitor acquisitions, turnover of AML officers, improvements to risk frameworks, outsourcing, the supervision of agents or cash transactions.

In the other nine, no discussion of a common approach took place, even where group-wide issues such as the standardisation of the financial crime compliance function, high transaction volumes and deficiencies in transaction monitoring and customer due diligence (CDD) had been identified. These are the weaknesses through which illicit funds move between a group’s entities in different jurisdictions.

AMLA has limited visibility of how supervisors use college information in their own work. It does cite one case in which a supervisor launched an on-site inspection because of risks identified by a supervisor from another Member State and shared in an earlier college meeting – the clearest example in the report of a college leading to action on a cross-border risk.

What the RTS on colleges will change

The draft RTS builds heavily on the Joint Guidelines and pursues three objectives. The first is a risk-based approach to the frequency, format and intensity of college activity, together with common criteria and indicators for consistent risk assessments across establishments and the recording of action points, responsibilities and deadlines where appropriate. The second is greater standardisation and convergence, including conditions for the participation of third-country supervisors and a standard template for written cooperation and information-sharing agreements.

The third concerns mixed groups. Where a group includes both financial and non-financial obliged entities, the relevant non-financial supervisors must be identified and invited as observers, and the information circulated in the college should include indicators tailored to the money laundering and terrorist financing risks of each sector. AMLA states that its observations in the 17 meetings have been instrumental in shaping the draft.

A selection methodology and help with third-country equivalence

Building on the approach of the European Banking Authority, AMLA is developing a methodology to decide which colleges it joins and how it uses its powers under Article 31 AMLAR. Priority will go to colleges involving higher-risk institutions, significant cross-border groups and groups with identified AML/CFT weaknesses.

AMLA is also considering how to support lead supervisors with third-country observers. Under Article 49(11) AMLD6, a third-country authority may be invited where the institution operates establishments, branches or subsidiaries in that country, but only after its confidentiality and professional secrecy regime has been found equivalent and the college members have agreed. Because many national authorities rely on supranational assessments, a significant number of identified observers have not yet joined, and AMLA has not yet decided what form its support will take.

What obliged entities and supervisors should take from the report

For supervisors, the report previews the obligations the RTS will codify: attend, send risk assessments before the meeting, present in a structured form, circulate minutes promptly and leave each meeting with recorded joint actions. Luxembourg leads a disproportionate share of Europe’s colleges, so its fund sector is where these expectations will be tested first.

For groups, what a supervisor learns in one jurisdiction will increasingly reach the others. Weaknesses in transaction monitoring, CDD or the staffing of the AML function at one subsidiary can trigger supervisory action elsewhere, as the on-site inspection case shows. Groups that contribute their own data to college meetings, keep their group-wide risk assessment consistent across establishments and prepare for questions from FIUs and prudential supervisors will be better placed when the RTS applies from July 2027.

The information in this article is of a general nature and is provided for informational purposes only. If you need legal advice for your individual situation, you should seek the advice of a qualified lawyer.
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  • AMLA ¦ Report on cooperation - Supervisory authorities in AMLCFT colleges ¦ Link
Bastian Schwind-Wagner
Bastian Schwind-Wagner Bastian is a recognized expert in anti-money laundering (AML), countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), compliance, data protection, risk management, and whistleblowing. He has worked for fund management companies for more than 24 years, where he has held senior positions in these areas.