IOSCO ¦ Statement on Rising Fraud Targeting Retail Investor Accounts at Market Intermediaries

IOSCO ¦ Statement on Rising Fraud Targeting Retail Investor Accounts at Market Intermediaries

IOSCO warns of rising fraud against retail investor accounts at intermediaries

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has published a statement warning that fraud aimed at retail investor accounts held with brokers, investment firms and other market intermediaries is growing in volume and sophistication. Based on a survey of member regulators and industry participants, it sets out what drives the trend, which schemes come up most often, which controls helped in recent incidents and what investors can do themselves. The statement creates no new IOSCO standards. It does show compliance, fraud and AML teams where supervisors expect their controls to hold.

A risk regulators and industry agree on

Regulators and industry respondents broadly agree that fraud remains a significant and growing risk. That includes schemes involving the misuse, hacking or unauthorised access to the systems and accounts of regulated, legitimate intermediaries. Online and retail-facing firms reported the sharpest increases.

Incidents are also more complex and more often cross-border. Industry respondents described large phishing campaigns and account takeover incidents hitting several firms at once, which suggests organised and coordinated threat activity. Regulators reported market manipulation schemes that made substantial illicit profits through coordinated promotion and trading – a compromised retail account can be used to manipulate a market as well as to steal from its owner.

Vulnerable and less sophisticated investors, self-directed online investors and investors active on social media are hit hardest. According to regulators, how much someone engages online says more about their exposure than their demographic profile.

Bastian Schwind-Wagner
Bastian Schwind-Wagner

"IOSCO’s statement confirms what many fraud teams already see: the attack rarely breaks the firm’s systems, it walks through the front door with the client’s own credentials or the client’s own instruction. The weak points are predictable – a changed bank account, a sudden withdrawal, a call to the service desk – and that is exactly where verification, cooling-off periods and behavioural monitoring belong.

For Luxembourg intermediaries and transfer agents, the more important lesson is organisational. The moment a fraud succeeds, the payout becomes a laundering transaction. Fraud prevention and AML compliance that look at the same event from separate systems will both see a legitimate client and both miss the case."

AI scales old typologies rather than inventing new ones

Respondents see artificial intelligence mainly as an accelerator of existing fraud typologies. The uses reported most often are AI-generated phishing and social engineering content, bots coordinating account takeover attempts, the creation or enhancement of synthetic identities, and impersonation through deepfakes and voice cloning.

What changes is the cost of a campaign. Marketing material, fraudulent websites, forged documents, synthetic audio and video and highly personalised messages can be produced quickly and cheaply, so fraudsters can launch and scale campaigns with far less time and effort. Respondents named AI-enabled fraud as the most significant emerging risk over the next 12 to 24 months, while conceding that its full impact is still hard to assess.

Speed and irreversibility favour the cash-out

Digital onboarding, instant payments and the growing involvement of crypto-assets make fraud easier to execute and harder to detect and reverse. Bank transfers and crypto-asset channels are the exit routes reported most often, and they have three things in common: speed, irreversibility and limited traceability.

For money laundering, the cash-out is where the case is decided. Once the proceeds have left the intermediary by instant transfer or through a crypto-asset on-ramp, the time available for a freeze or a recall is short, and the layering that follows typically runs through mule accounts and foreign platforms.

When the victim authorises the transfer

A growing share of losses comes from scams in which victims authorise the transaction themselves after being manipulated. These authorised push payment cases are hard to detect because the activity can look entirely legitimate: the real customer, on the usual device, giving a valid instruction. Strong authentication does nothing against them.

Fraud as an industry

Criminal networks increasingly stand behind these schemes, combining social engineering, digital platforms, AI tools, mule networks and fast cross-border movement of funds. Some work on a fraud-as-a-service model. Where overseas entities, foreign-hosted websites or crypto-asset networks are involved, identifying the perpetrators and recovering assets becomes much harder. In this model the predicate offence and the laundering of its proceeds are two stages of the same organised operation.

How the schemes reach the account

Typically, the fraudster first obtains access to the investor’s account or credentials at a legitimate intermediary and then uses it to misappropriate assets. Impersonation is the most common route in: fraudsters pose as regulators, law enforcement, advisers, intermediaries or banks, increasingly with AI-generated audio, video and images and with fake or cloned websites and apps. Phishing in its variants – by email, text message (smishing), QR code (quishing) or phone (vishing) – usually works by creating a false sense of urgency.

Account takeover, the result of social engineering, credential theft or malware, was named by survey respondents as one of the most frequently observed attack vectors. Identity theft and synthetic identity onboarding complete the picture. Here, fabricated identities that mix real and fictitious data are used to get through standard onboarding and verification controls.

Synthetic identities are a customer due diligence problem as much as a fraud problem. An account opened under one looks like any other client relationship and can later receive and pass on fraud proceeds.

Where intermediaries are attacked

IOSCO accepts that many forms of fraud do not touch intermediaries’ systems and lie outside their reach. For the categories that do, it asks firms to stay vigilant and keep their fraud controls under review, because attackers keep changing their methods. Fraudsters most often target login and authentication, account opening and onboarding, changes to customer details or bank accounts, identity verification, transfer and withdrawal instructions, and interfaces with third-party systems. Online channels and call centres appear to be affected most.

Seven lessons from recent incidents

Respondents drew seven lessons from recent cases. Phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and enhanced identity verification remain critical against account takeover, and they work best when applied consistently at login, at profile changes and at withdrawal. Changes to customer details, banking information and withdrawal instructions are a frequent point of attack; enhanced verification backed by customer notifications, call-backs and cooling-off periods reduces that exposure.

Real-time monitoring with timely escalation limits losses. Behavioural analytics that combine transaction, contextual and device indicators can expose social engineering and customer-authorised transactions that would look legitimate on transaction data alone. Prevention works best as a layered, risk-based combination of authentication, transaction monitoring, onboarding controls and detection, and controls that depend mainly on the customer’s vigilance tend to fail against sophisticated social engineering.

The remaining lessons concern governance and resilience. Clear escalation procedures, management oversight and post-incident reviews help firms find and close control gaps. Many fraud controls depend on external providers, so firms should understand those dependencies and keep tested fallback arrangements. AI-assisted detection tools can help on the defensive side, provided they are subject to human oversight and regularly tested against new fraud techniques.

What investors are asked to do

IOSCO gives retail investors eight practical steps. Unsolicited calls, emails, text messages, QR codes, social media messages and invitations to investment group chats deserve extreme caution, even when they seem to come from a known contact, a firm, a regulator or a well-known person. Investors should check official registers to confirm that a firm or representative is authorised in their jurisdiction, and contact their firm only through details they obtained independently, for example from the official app or account statements. Fraudsters copy genuine firm names, logos, registration details and URLs.

Passwords and one-time codes should never be shared, and investors should use the strongest authentication their firm offers, such as multi-factor authentication or passkeys. Before moving funds or securities, they should stop and take time, especially when asked to move money out of an investment account, buy crypto-assets or invest in little-known or thinly traded securities, and talk the transaction through with a trusted person. Warnings from the national regulator and IOSCO’s International Securities & Commodities Alerts Network (I-SCAN) show whether a company has been flagged. Anyone who suspects fraud should contact their firm through its official channels without delay and report the matter to the regulator and law enforcement, since funds move quickly and are hard to recover.

Cooperation as a control

Fraud schemes today often span several products and jurisdictions, so timely information exchange matters. IOSCO describes the roles of regulators and intermediaries as complementary. Firms see account-level activity and their own operational weaknesses, and they can teach clients how to avoid scams. Regulators see patterns across the market, coordinate between firms and jurisdictions, issue guidance, disrupt unlawful activity and take enforcement action. Members reported public warnings, investor education, guidance to firms, thematic reviews, enforcement actions and disruptive measures such as website takedowns.

IOSCO encourages continued cooperation and information sharing among intermediaries, regulators, law enforcement, banks and payment providers, digital platforms and technology providers, as far as applicable law allows. It will keep supporting its members through its existing cross-border cooperation arrangements.

What this means for AFC teams

For Luxembourg intermediaries, transfer agents and fund distributors, the statement maps the points where fraud turns into money laundering: changes to bank details, redemption and withdrawal instructions, the onboarding of new investors and calls to the service desk. A suspicious change of payout account is a fraud alert and may also be grounds for a suspicious transaction report.

Fraud and AML functions that use separate data and separate escalation paths will each see a customer-authorised transfer that looks normal and let it pass. IOSCO’s emphasis on behavioural analytics, layered controls and post-incident reviews gives firms good reason to bring the two together.

The information in this article is of a general nature and is provided for informational purposes only. If you need legal advice for your individual situation, you should seek the advice of a qualified lawyer.
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Dive deeper
  • IOSCO ¦ OR/12/2026 IOSCO’s Statement on Rising Fraud Targeting Retail Investor Accounts at Market Intermediaries ¦ Link
Bastian Schwind-Wagner
Bastian Schwind-Wagner Bastian is a recognized expert in anti-money laundering (AML), countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), compliance, data protection, risk management, and whistleblowing. He has worked for fund management companies for more than 24 years, where he has held senior positions in these areas.