Eurojust ¦ Key Developments in Judicial Cooperation 2025

Cross-border financial crime enforcement tightens as asset recovery and money laundering cases expand

Cross-border cooperation became an increasingly important feature of criminal enforcement in 2025. Eurojust supported national authorities through coordination meetings, coordination centres, joint investigation teams and a wide range of judicial cooperation instruments. Economic crime generated the highest number of coordination meetings, while money laundering was among the leading offences for newly established joint investigation teams.

The figures reflect a broader enforcement reality. Serious financial crime rarely remains within one jurisdiction. Criminal proceeds may be generated through fraud, drug trafficking, human trafficking, corruption or other predicate offences in one country, transferred through financial institutions in another and invested in assets or companies elsewhere. Effective prosecution therefore depends on the ability to connect the predicate offence with the laundering activity and to trace the proceeds across borders.

In 2025, Eurojust organised 653 coordination meetings. Economic crimes accounted for 258 of them, compared with 119 concerning drug trafficking and 102 concerning cybercrime. Sixteen coordination centres supported simultaneous operational actions, including arrests, searches, evidence seizures and asset-freezing measures. Eight of those centres concerned economic crime.

Money laundering investigations increasingly operate alongside the predicate offence

The separation between the underlying criminal conduct and the subsequent laundering of its proceeds is becoming less useful in complex investigations. Authorities are increasingly expected to pursue both tracks at the same time: establishing how the money was generated and proving how it was concealed, converted, transferred or integrated into the legitimate economy.

This approach is particularly important where organised criminal groups use legitimate companies to disguise illegal activity. A notable 2025 operation involving Hungary, Slovakia, Germany and Spain targeted a group accused of trafficking drugs worth at least EUR 175 million across the European Union. The group allegedly used companies involved in the trade and transport of legitimate goods to conceal its criminal operations. Authorities arrested 22 suspects and seized drugs, documents, communication devices and more than EUR 370,000 in cash. They also discovered an illegal cigarette production line.

The case illustrates why financial investigations cannot be treated as an accessory to the prosecution of the predicate offence. Corporate structures, logistics businesses and trade transactions may provide the mechanism through which criminal proceeds are moved and made to appear legitimate. They can also obscure beneficial ownership, create apparently lawful explanations for payments and complicate the identification of the individuals directing the operation.

For prosecutors, the evidential challenge is to establish the relationship between the criminal activity, the proceeds and the acts intended to disguise their origin. That often requires evidence from several jurisdictions, including company records, banking information, customs data, telecommunications material and information obtained through searches or asset seizures.

Bastian Schwind-Wagner _Follow

"Cross-border financial crime enforcement in 2025 placed greater emphasis on connecting money laundering with the predicate offences that generate criminal proceeds. Eurojust supported hundreds of coordination meetings and joint investigation teams, helping authorities pursue drug trafficking, fraud and other organised crimes while tracing, freezing and confiscating assets.

The figures also show the growing importance of digital and financial evidence. Faster access to electronic data, early jurisdictional coordination and effective use of freezing and confiscation orders will be essential to dismantling criminal infrastructure and ensuring that criminal proceeds do not remain available to organised crime."

Joint investigation teams give money-laundering cases an operational structure

Eurojust supported 412 joint investigation teams in 2025, an increase of 11% compared with 2024. Of the newly signed teams, 28 addressed money laundering, making it one of the most common crime types covered by new joint investigations. Drug trafficking accounted for 33 newly signed teams, followed by swindling and fraud with 27.

A joint investigation team can help authorities overcome the fragmentation that often weakens financial crime cases. Investigators can agree on common priorities, exchange information directly and coordinate investigative measures without treating each national proceeding as an isolated case. This is especially valuable when the predicate offence, the laundering arrangements and the assets are distributed among several countries.

Eurojust provided financial support to 199 active joint investigation teams in 2025. Funding was used primarily for translation and interpretation and for equipment. These practical resources can be decisive in complex money-laundering cases, where financial records, corporate documents and digital communications must be reviewed across different languages and legal systems.

The experience of completed teams also points to recurring risks. The exchange and use of evidence, the coordination of investigative measures and the alignment of prosecution strategies become more difficult as the number of participating countries increases. Early involvement of Eurojust, a clearly defined scope and regular coordination meetings can reduce those risks. Discussions about jurisdiction should also take place at an early stage, particularly where several countries could prosecute the same conduct.

Asset recovery is becoming a central measure of enforcement success

Financial crime enforcement is increasingly assessed not only by arrests and convictions but also by whether criminal assets can be identified, frozen, confiscated and ultimately disposed of or returned to victims. This is essential because organised crime is fundamentally profit-driven. If proceeds remain available to criminal networks, enforcement may have limited long-term impact.

Eurojust supported 723 cases connected with the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders under Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 in 2025. The cases resulted in the seizure or freezing of nearly EUR 1.2 billion in criminal assets.

The process covers several distinct stages. Authorities must first trace the assets and establish their connection with criminal conduct. They must then secure the assets before they can be moved or dissipated, obtain and execute the relevant confiscation orders, and arrange for their disposal or restitution. Each stage may involve a different jurisdiction and different procedural requirements.

Practical difficulties remain. National rules are not fully aligned, standard forms may not provide all the information required by executing authorities, and additional clarification may be needed before an order can be enforced. Timing is also critical. A freezing order that arrives after funds have been transferred or property has been sold may have little practical value.

Eurojust’s support can include obtaining missing information, coordinating the execution of freezing orders on a specific date and facilitating the restitution of frozen assets to victims. These functions are particularly important where the proceeds are held through layered ownership structures, dispersed bank accounts or assets located outside the jurisdiction investigating the predicate offence.

Fraud and cyber-enabled crime generate complex laundering trails

Online fraud continued to create significant cross-border challenges in 2025. One investigation involving Austrian, Estonian, Latvian and Finnish authorities concerned a criminal network that allegedly defrauded more than 3,000 victims of several million euros. The network operated a crime-as-a-service model, supplying telephone numbers from more than 80 countries and technical infrastructure for creating fraudulent social-media accounts.

Authorities arrested seven suspects, dismantled five servers and seized a system based on SIM cards containing 40,000 active cards. The case demonstrates how the infrastructure used to commit fraud can also support the movement and concealment of proceeds. Large-scale fraud may generate thousands of payments, often routed through accounts controlled by intermediaries, money mules or companies with no genuine commercial purpose.

Such cases require investigators to identify both the technical architecture and the financial architecture of the criminal operation. Digital evidence may show how victims were targeted and how the network operated, while transaction data may reveal the collection, layering and onward transfer of the proceeds. Without both elements, the prosecution may struggle to show who controlled the funds and what they knew about their criminal origin.

The growing use of encrypted communications creates an additional evidential dimension. Eurojust continued to monitor national case law concerning data obtained from encrypted communication networks, including Sky ECC and EncroChat. The legal treatment, admissibility and transmission of such evidence can differ between jurisdictions, making early coordination important.

European Investigation Orders remain a key route to financial evidence

The European Investigation Order (EIO) was involved in 6,711 Eurojust cases in 2025, including 2,751 new cases. This represented a rise of close to 7% from the previous year, and EIO-related matters accounted for nearly half of Eurojust’s cases.

For money-laundering investigations, EIOs can be used to obtain bank and company records, conduct searches, interview witnesses, seize evidence and carry out surveillance measures. Their practical value depends on precise drafting and a clear understanding of the executing state’s legal requirements.

Problems may arise where requests concern telecommunications interception, technical tracking devices or the recording of sound and images. The applicable safeguards and authorisation requirements may differ between Member States. Measures carried out in one country may later be challenged in another if the legal basis, procedural guarantees or chain of custody is unclear.

This matters directly to financial crime cases. A laundering prosecution may depend on evidence showing who authorised transfers, controlled a company, communicated with co-conspirators or directed the movement of assets. If that evidence is obtained through cross-border surveillance or digital extraction, procedural defects can affect its use at trial.

The Court of Justice of the European Union’s judgment of 18 December 2025 in Case C-325/24 also clarified aspects of the EIO framework. The ruling concerned the hearing of an accused person by videoconference or the temporary transfer of that person for evidentiary purposes. Although the case did not concern money laundering specifically, it reinforces the importance of interpreting judicial cooperation instruments consistently across the European Union.

Electronic evidence will affect future laundering prosecutions

At least 55% of investigations involve a cross-border request for electronic evidence. From 2026, the European e-evidence package introduces European Production Orders and European Preservation Orders. These instruments will allow competent authorities, subject to the applicable conditions, to seek preservation or production of electronic evidence directly from service providers offering services in the European Union, regardless of where the provider is established or where the data is stored.

Service providers will generally be required to respond within 10 days, and within eight hours in emergencies. Faster access may be especially important in laundering investigations involving online platforms, digital wallets, cloud accounts, messaging services and cryptocurrency-related records. Transaction histories, account identifiers, login data and communications may be volatile or quickly deleted.

The new framework will not remove the need for careful legal analysis. Authorities will still need to identify the correct provider, define the data sought with sufficient precision and respect applicable privileges, immunities and fundamental rights. The interaction between issuing and enforcing authorities will also remain important, particularly where the request affects freedom of expression or other protected interests.

For prosecutors and financial investigators, the practical lesson is clear: electronic evidence should be considered at the beginning of an investigation, not after the financial trail has gone cold. The preservation of data may be as important as its eventual production.

Jurisdictional choices can determine whether proceeds are recovered

Parallel proceedings create a substantial risk of duplication, delay and inconsistent decisions. In 2025, Eurojust facilitated consultations in at least 601 cases involving parallel proceedings. A significant number concerned online investment fraud carried out by organised criminal groups operating across several countries and targeting victims worldwide.

The choice of prosecuting jurisdiction can have direct consequences for money-laundering cases. A country may be well placed to prosecute the predicate offence but less able to recover the proceeds. Another may hold the principal bank accounts, corporate records or confiscable property. A third may have the strongest evidence concerning the laundering transactions.

Authorities therefore need to consider more than the location of the victims or the place where an individual was arrested. Relevant factors may include the location of the criminal proceeds, the availability of evidence, the number of victims, the seriousness of the conduct, the ability to confiscate assets and the capacity to prosecute the full criminal structure.

Early coordination can prevent competing proceedings and reduce the risk of breaching the ne bis in idem principle. It can also ensure that the laundering conduct is not separated from the predicate offence in a way that weakens the overall case.

Enforcement is shifting from individual transactions to criminal infrastructure

The cases and operational trends from 2025 show a clear movement towards targeting the infrastructure that enables financial crime. That infrastructure may consist of logistics companies, fraudulent online services, encrypted communications, nominee arrangements, bank accounts, money mules or assets held through third parties.

This approach is particularly relevant to money laundering because concealment is often distributed across several layers. The person committing the predicate offence may not be the person opening the account, purchasing the property or controlling the company used to receive the proceeds. A successful case must connect those roles through financial, corporate, digital and operational evidence.

Cross-border judicial cooperation makes it possible to pursue those connections more systematically. Joint investigation teams can combine national evidence, coordination centres can synchronise searches and freezing measures, and mutual recognition instruments can speed up access to evidence and assets.

The effectiveness of this model will depend on early financial analysis, precise use of cooperation instruments and a prosecution strategy that treats asset recovery as part of the case rather than a separate exercise. The enforcement priority is no longer simply to identify the offender. It is to identify the predicate offence, prove the laundering process and remove the financial benefit that sustains the criminal enterprise.

Dive deeper

• Eurojust ¦ Key Developments in Judicial Cooperation 2025, Extract from the Eurojust Annual Report 2025, ISBN 978-92-9404-572-0, DOI 10.2812/5836325 ¦ Link
• EUR-Lex ¦ Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders ¦ Link
• InfoCuria ¦ Case C-325/24 (Bissilli) ¦ Link