24 November 2025
TI UK ¦ Opening Up Offshore Secrecy: Assessing Access to Beneficial Ownership Data in UK Overseas Territories
Corporate secrecy and the laundering of criminal proceeds
Beneficial ownership transparency is a central control against money laundering. When the individuals who ultimately own or control a company cannot be identified, legal entities can be used to conceal the proceeds of corruption, fraud, tax crimes, drug trafficking, embezzlement, sanctions evasion and other predicate offences.
The UK’s Overseas Territories sit at an important point in this system. Their financial centres provide legitimate services to international businesses, investors and high-net-worth individuals. They also administer large numbers of companies, trusts and investment vehicles whose activities may take place entirely outside the territory where they are incorporated.
That separation between legal registration and economic activity creates a significant enforcement challenge. Investigators may need to trace funds across several jurisdictions, identify nominee shareholders and directors, understand trust arrangements, and establish who ultimately benefits from assets held through layered structures. Without reliable beneficial ownership data, each step becomes slower, more expensive and more vulnerable to obstruction.
Previous research identified opaque vehicles registered in the Overseas Territories in 273 large-scale corruption and money laundering cases. The cases involved approximately $327 billion in diverted funds across 79 countries. The British Virgin Islands appeared in 92 per cent of those cases. Almost £6 billion was reportedly used to acquire UK property through companies registered in the territories.
These figures do not suggest that every company incorporated offshore is suspicious. They do show, however, that corporate secrecy can have consequences far beyond the jurisdiction in which an entity is registered. The underlying crimes are often foreign predicate offences, while the offshore company provides the ownership structure through which criminal proceeds are moved, invested or disguised.
From public registers to legitimate interest access
The UK Parliament called for public beneficial ownership registers in the Overseas Territories in 2018 through an amendment to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act. The territories subsequently made commitments to establish greater transparency.
Implementation has been slow. A 2022 ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union found that fully public registers could conflict with privacy rights. Although the ruling did not bind the UK’s Overseas Territories, several jurisdictions relied on it when moving away from public registers and towards legitimate interest models.
Under a legitimate interest system, access is restricted to applicants who can show that they need the information for a recognised purpose. The EU’s sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive provides a useful reference point. It presumes that journalists, academics and civil society organisations working to combat money laundering have a legitimate interest in accessing beneficial ownership information.
The model can provide safeguards for privacy, but its effectiveness depends on how it is designed. Narrow eligibility criteria, case-by-case applications, high fees, limited search functionality and restrictions on data use can make the register practically inaccessible. A system that exists formally but cannot be used efficiently by investigators, journalists or foreign enforcement authorities may offer little protection against illicit finance.
At the November 2024 Joint Ministerial Council, Overseas Territories without public registers committed to implementing legitimate interest access registers with the maximum possible degree of access and transparency, subject to privacy safeguards. The UK Government also maintained that public registers remained the long-term objective.
The assessment shows a wide gap between jurisdictions
The assessment of Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and Montserrat produced sharply different results.
Montserrat recorded the strongest accessibility score, at 81 per cent, while its beneficial ownership framework scored 73 per cent. The register became available in October 2024, was fully operational the following month and is free for public use.
The Cayman Islands scored 46 per cent for accessibility and 70 per cent for its underlying framework. Its register became operational in February 2025, but access is based on a specific legitimate interest assessed case by case. Applicants must explain how the information will assist in preventing, detecting, investigating, combating or prosecuting money laundering, related predicate offences or terrorist financing. Searches can be conducted by company name, but not by the name of an individual beneficial owner or controller.
The British Virgin Islands scored 26 per cent for accessibility and 73 per cent for its beneficial ownership framework. Its access model remains delayed, and legitimate interest access is expected to require an application costing $75 for a single request. Applicants must demonstrate a connection with the investigation, prevention or detection of money laundering, terrorist financing or proliferation financing.
Bermuda recorded the lowest accessibility score, at 22 per cent, and a framework score of 53 per cent. It has a central beneficial ownership register, but legitimate interest legislation and access arrangements remain outstanding. Delivery is expected in 2026, substantially later than earlier commitments.
Only a small number of UK Overseas Territories have established fully public registers. Gibraltar’s register has been publicly available since 2020, while Montserrat has also adopted public access. St Helena has made its register available on request. Other jurisdictions have selected restricted models or have not yet delivered the promised arrangements.
The British Virgin Islands presents the greatest systemic concern
The British Virgin Islands is a major centre for company incorporation, trust services and the administration of legal entities. It has more than 350,000 companies, despite a population of fewer than 40,000 people. Financial services generate more than half of public revenue.
That scale, combined with the international nature of the sector, creates exposure to proceeds generated abroad. Identified risks include corruption, fraud, tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing, particularly in transactions involving politically exposed persons.
The territory was added to the Financial Action Task Force’s increased-monitoring list in 2024. Concerns included the authorities’ limited focus on the use of BVI companies in money laundering outside the islands.
The legal framework has several positive features. The definition of a beneficial owner broadly follows international standards, with a shareholding threshold as low as 10 per cent. Reporting duties apply to companies, owners and trust and corporate service providers, and non-compliance can attract substantial penalties.
Access arrangements, however, risk undermining these strengths. Proposed tipping-off provisions could inform a beneficial owner that an application has been made for information about them and could give them an opportunity to object to disclosure. That creates a serious risk of asset movements, restructuring or other interference with an investigation.
The proposed system may also disclose only a limited part of the ownership chain. If users cannot see information relating to interests below a 25 per cent threshold, or the parties to trusts controlling companies, they may see only nominee shareholders or trustees rather than the person who ultimately benefits.
This is particularly important in cases involving corruption and fraud. A shell company may hold shares through nominees, while a trust controls the company and a separate individual receives the economic benefit. A register that stops at the nominee or trustee does not reveal the ownership structure investigators need to understand.
Bermuda’s sophisticated financial sector still requires effective ownership data
Bermuda is a significant international financial centre, with financial services and reinsurance accounting for approximately 49 per cent of GDP. Its corporate register is much smaller than those of the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, with around 16,000 legal entities.
The jurisdiction has generally performed well against international anti-money laundering standards. Its risk profile nonetheless includes money laundering linked to foreign predicate offences such as tax crimes, corruption, fraud and drug trafficking. Market manipulation and insider trading are also relevant risks. The reinsurance sector involves high-value and complex transactions, while trusts may hold substantial assets for internationally exposed clients.
Bermuda’s central register is managed by the Registrar of Companies and applies to a broad range of legal entities. Its design follows the Open Ownership data standard and is intended to map relationships between beneficial owners and companies, including complex structures.
The main weakness is delayed access. Legislation governing legitimate interest requests has not yet been delivered, leaving journalists, civil society groups and academics without a functioning route to the information. There is also uncertainty about how applicants will be assessed, whether approved users will receive repeated access, and whether their identities will be protected.
Another gap concerns trusts that control companies. Unless information about the parties to those trusts is available, the register may fail to identify the individuals who exercise control or receive economic benefits.
The Paradise Papers illustrated how Bermuda structures can feature in transactions connected to alleged corruption and the diversion of public resources. The investigation into Glencore’s dealings involving the Democratic Republic of the Congo alleged that offshore structures and loans helped obscure relationships surrounding mining licences. The case demonstrates why incorporation data alone is insufficient. Effective analysis requires visibility of control, financing and beneficial interests across the full structure.
The Cayman Islands has delivered a register, but usability remains limited
The Cayman Islands is one of the world’s leading offshore financial centres. It hosts more than 118,000 active companies, alongside investment funds, banks, insurers and related professional services. Financial services account for a substantial share of economic activity and government revenue.
The territory has addressed several elements of its anti-money laundering framework. The Financial Action Task Force removed it from increased monitoring in 2023 after identifying progress in addressing deficiencies.
The new beneficial ownership framework provides a basis for legitimate interest access. Journalists, civil society organisations and academics can apply for information, but they must establish a specific interest in relation to each entity. This differs from the EU approach, under which certain categories of users are presumed to have a legitimate interest.
The application process requires supporting documents and a narrative explaining the investigation. Requests must be submitted through a portal and paid for by international bank transfer. The fees are approximately $36 for a single request and $120 for multiple requests.
These requirements may be disproportionate for non-commercial users investigating complex networks. They also create a risk that applicants will need to know the name of a company before they can identify its connection to a person of interest. The inability to search by individual beneficial owner or controller significantly reduces the register’s investigative value.
The Cayman Islands’ role in the 1MDB scandal demonstrates the consequences of insufficient visibility. Cayman entities were used in structures through which billions of dollars were allegedly diverted from Malaysia’s sovereign wealth fund, disguising the origin, movement and destination of the money.
More recently, Cayman companies were identified in connection with a network linked to the Prince Group and its owner, Chen Zhi. The entities included wealth management companies and a vehicle involved in the acquisition of a London office block valued at £94 million. Such cases highlight the importance of linking corporate ownership data with sanctions information, asset records, court proceedings and suspicious transaction reporting.
Montserrat shows that public access is possible
Montserrat is a much smaller financial centre, with approximately 300 registered companies and a population of fewer than 5,000 people. Its principal risks relate to money laundering derived from sexual exploitation, fraud, human trafficking, migrant smuggling and drug trafficking. Banking, remittance services and real estate are among the vulnerable sectors.
The public register, launched in October 2024 and populated the following month, is free and accessible to everyone. It provides information about beneficial owners and directors, with additional filings and documents expected to become available.
Montserrat’s approach demonstrates the practical advantages of public access. Journalists, civil society organisations, financial institutions, enforcement authorities and members of the public can consult the same source without first proving a case-specific interest. Wider use also increases the likelihood that inaccuracies and inconsistencies will be identified.
The system still has material weaknesses. It is not available through bulk downloads or an application programming interface, limiting machine-assisted analysis and network mapping. The framework is also unlikely to disclose the parties to trusts controlling companies. In addition, there are no explicit requirements for authorities or regulated entities to report discrepancies between register data and information obtained through customer due diligence.
Public access is therefore not sufficient on its own. Data must also be complete, current, searchable and supported by effective verification and enforcement.
Transparency must cover the predicate offence, not only the company
Beneficial ownership data is most valuable when it can be connected to the underlying criminal conduct. Money laundering is not an isolated event. It depends on proceeds generated by a predicate offence and on methods used to move, conceal, convert or enjoy those proceeds.
The relevant predicate offences vary by jurisdiction and case. They include bribery and embezzlement by public officials, fraudulent procurement, tax crimes, drug trafficking, human trafficking, investment fraud, market abuse and sanctions evasion.
A company register may reveal that an individual controls an entity, but investigators must still establish how the entity was used. Did it receive inflated procurement payments? Did it acquire property with funds stolen from a bank? Did it provide loans to a politically connected intermediary? Did it hold assets for a sanctioned person? Did it transfer funds through accounts in several jurisdictions to create the appearance of legitimate investment?
These questions require more than a name and a percentage interest. Investigators need access to ownership histories, control arrangements, trust relationships, filing records and changes in beneficial ownership. They also need to compare register information with customer due diligence, sanctions data, property records, court evidence and financial intelligence.
A partial register can therefore create false reassurance. If it identifies only the legal owner, nominee or trustee, it may confirm the appearance of transparency while preserving the concealment mechanism at the centre of the laundering scheme.
legitimate interest systems need strong safeguards and practical access
Restricted registers can support anti-money laundering efforts, but only if their design reflects how financial crime investigations are conducted.
Eligibility should include journalists, academics, civil society organisations, law enforcement bodies and other users working on money laundering and its predicate offences. Approved users should receive repeated access rather than having to submit a separate application for every company.
Applications should be assessed against clear and objective criteria. Decisions should be timely, reasoned and subject to appeal. Fees should be affordable, particularly for non-commercial investigations. Search tools should allow users to identify companies connected to individuals, not merely search for entities already known to them.
The information disclosed should cover the complete beneficial ownership chain, including relevant trust parties and controlling arrangements. Restrictions on reuse should not prevent users from analysing, comparing or publishing information for the legitimate purpose for which access was granted.
Privacy protections are important, especially where disclosure could expose individuals to a well-evidenced and exceptional risk of harm. Those protections should be narrowly defined, supported by evidence and applied transparently. They should not become a general mechanism for suppressing information about politically exposed persons, sanctioned individuals or suspected participants in financial crime.
Tipping-off rules require particular care. A system designed to protect a person’s privacy should not alert a suspected offender that investigators are examining their assets or ownership structures. Nor should it allow an individual to delay disclosure while moving funds or restructuring a company.
The UK Government faces a test of enforcement credibility
The assessment of the four territories indicates that formal commitments have not translated into consistent delivery. Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands have delayed legitimate interest access. The Cayman Islands has launched a system, but with restrictive and burdensome procedures. Montserrat has shown that public access can be implemented, although its register still needs better data coverage and technical functionality.
The choice between public and legitimate interest access should not obscure the central issue: beneficial ownership data must be usable by the people and institutions responsible for detecting financial crime.
For the UK Government, this is also a question of enforcement credibility. If Overseas Territories can repeatedly postpone commitments, narrow access or omit trust relationships from disclosure, the UK’s wider anti-money laundering framework becomes less effective. The result is a potential backdoor through which organised crime groups, kleptocrats and sanctions evaders can conceal assets, transfer criminal proceeds and acquire property or businesses.
Public registers remain the clearest long-term solution because they maximise scrutiny, support independent research and create stronger incentives for companies to keep information accurate. Where legitimate interest systems are used, they should meet at least the level of access and protection reflected in international standards.
Meaningful beneficial ownership transparency is not a technical administrative exercise. It is an essential part of tracing criminal proceeds back to their source, identifying the people who control illicit assets and preventing offshore structures from insulating predicate offences from investigation. Without timely, complete and affordable access, corporate registers risk documenting the legal form of a transaction while leaving its criminal beneficiaries hidden.
Dive deeper
- Transparency International UK (TI UK) ¦ Dirty Money, Opening Up Offshore Secrecy, Assessing access to beneficial ownership data in UK Overseas Territories ¦ Link
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