EC ¦ 2026 Rule of Law Report - Country Chapter: Belgium

Belgium’s anti-corruption challenge: stronger enforcement, slower reform

Belgium’s corruption risk profile remains mixed. The country still ranks relatively well in international perceptions, but the surface-level comfort that comes with a modest corruption score hides structural weaknesses that matter for financial crime enforcement. Investigations continue, yet several core safeguards that should prevent misconduct, detect hidden influence, and support prosecutions remain incomplete or unevenly applied. The result is a system that can respond to individual cases, but still struggles to build consistent prevention and deterrence.

A notable development is the plan to create a new dedicated financial prosecution section within the federal prosecution service, equipped with earmarked resources and specialised staff. That move acknowledges a reality financial crime specialists know well: complex fraud, bribery, organised social fraud, and economic crime cannot be handled effectively without focus, expertise, and capacity. Additional investigators are also being assigned to the federal police corruption unit, which should strengthen operational follow-up if coordination holds.

Prosecution capacity is improving, but clarity still matters

The proposal for a specialised prosecution section is a meaningful step because it brings institutional weight to serious financial and economic crime. It also reflects a broader concern that district-level handling of these matters can be too fragmented for cases involving layered corporate structures, cross-border transactions, or public-sector corruption. Earmarked resources are especially important in a landscape where incoming corruption cases remain substantial and many files still move slowly through the pipeline.

Even so, the scope of the new section is not yet fully clear. That matters. If the mandate is too narrow, or if it is limited to selected categories of cases, the impact may be diluted. Financial crime enforcement depends not only on headline announcements but also on whether the authority can pursue the full chain of conduct, from bribery and abuse of function to laundering and concealed beneficial interests. Strong structures can fail if they are built around a partial view of the problem.

Bastian Schwind-Wagner _Follow

"Belgium is making some progress in strengthening its financial crime response, especially through plans for a specialised prosecution section and added resources for corruption investigations. But the wider integrity framework still leaves gaps in lobbying transparency, asset verification, and revolving-door rules, which weakens prevention.

Procurement risk, police integrity, and organised crime-linked corruption remain persistent concerns. The core issue is not a lack of awareness, but the gap between identified risks and fully effective enforcement."

Police integrity remains a weak point

Belgium continues to face a basic integrity problem inside policing. The 176 local police zones do not all operate with the same standards, and smaller zones still appear to lack effective integrity policies. That is a serious vulnerability in any anti-corruption system, especially when criminal networks seek access to information, procurement, or operational data through compromised insiders.

There are signs that the authorities understand the issue. Mergers of police zones are being encouraged, and there is renewed discussion of integrity checks across a police career. A new integrity policy for the federal police is also under consideration. Yet the larger problem is not only policy design. Monitoring and enforcement are still too weak. Rules that exist on paper do not do enough if compliance is not checked, breaches are not followed up, and internal safeguards are not treated as operational tools rather than formalities.

That matters even more in a country where organised crime has been linked to corruption risks around ports, customs, police, municipal staff, and prison services. When criminal groups target institutions, corruption becomes an access point, not just a side effect.

Integrity rules for public officials are still incomplete

Belgium still has visible gaps in the integrity framework for ministers, ministerial offices, and members of parliament. There is no strong monitoring or enforcement mechanism to ensure that existing conduct rules are more than symbolic. Asset and interest declarations are filed on time at a high rate, but the system still lacks meaningful verification. That is a major weakness. A declaration regime without robust checking shifts all responsibility to the declarant and leaves the public with little assurance that the information is accurate or complete.

Lobbying transparency is another unresolved issue. There has been no progress on a broader reform that would create a real transparency register and legislative footprint covering both parliament and government. In practical terms, that means meetings, influence channels, and policy shaping remain harder to trace than they should be. For financial crime prevention, this is not a side issue. Hidden influence is often the environment in which procurement abuse, preferential access, and regulatory capture grow.

Gift rules and revolving-door safeguards also remain incomplete. Parliament is considering some limited clarification around gifts and travel, but there is still no clear, enforceable system that tells officials what is acceptable, what must be disclosed, and what is off limits. The same applies to post-office movement between public authority and private interest. Without clear cooling-off rules, the risk is not only misconduct but the appearance that access can be bought through future employment.

Whistleblowing is improving, but the framework is still being tested

Belgium is evaluating its whistleblower rules, and that is a necessary step. The system has improved, but its complexity is still a barrier. In financial crime matters, reporting lines only work if staff can understand them, trust them, and use them without fear. The early signs from the evaluation process suggest that protection has improved, yet the legal architecture remains dense enough to discourage use.

That matters because financial crime often surfaces first as an internal concern. Suspicious procurement patterns, false invoicing, bribery schemes, or misuse of public resources are frequently detected by people inside organisations before a formal investigation begins. A whistleblowing framework that is difficult to navigate leaves too much risk undetected.

Public procurement remains a high-risk area

Public procurement continues to stand out as a major corruption risk. Businesses still report concern that corruption can block access to tenders, and audits have identified structural weaknesses in procurement transparency, including the hiring of consultancies for government work. Those findings matter because consultancy arrangements can be used to obscure decision-making, blur accountability, and create soft channels for influence.

The risk is not just at federal level. Local and regional levels remain especially sensitive, and Belgium has started to address this through new transparency measures for local office holders in Flanders. That is a useful signal, but the broader challenge remains consistency. Where procurement oversight is fragmented, opportunities for manipulation increase. Where review bodies are not fully independent or decisions are hard to enforce, deterrence weakens.

Financial crime enforcement needs more than one reform

The strongest message from Belgium’s current trajectory is that no single reform will fix the problem. A dedicated financial prosecution unit helps, but it will not compensate for weak lobbying transparency, incomplete asset verification, patchy police integrity controls, and limited enforcement of conduct rules. These are connected failures. They allow risk to move from one institution to another.

The same is true for organised crime. Corruption linked to drugs, ports, customs, and local officials cannot be tackled solely through criminal investigations. It also requires cleaner internal controls, better career integrity checks, and stronger data access safeguards. When public officials can improperly access databases for criminal groups, the problem is no longer one of isolated misconduct. It is an institutional security failure.

The road ahead

Belgium is taking some real steps, especially in prosecution capacity and judicial digitalisation. But the pace of reform in anti-corruption governance is uneven. The country still lacks a coherent national anti-corruption strategy, and several key safeguards remain incomplete. For financial crime practitioners, the signal is clear: Belgium has the legal and institutional base to do better, but the enforcement culture still needs tightening.

The next phase will be decisive. If the new prosecution structure is given real operational scope, if integrity rules become enforceable, and if procurement and lobbying transparency are strengthened, Belgium could move from reactive enforcement to a more credible prevention model. If not, the current pattern will continue – good investigative work in individual cases, alongside structural weaknesses that keep the system exposed.

Dive deeper

• European Commission (EC) ¦ 2026 Rule of law report - Communication and country chapters ¦ Link