OECD ¦ Sanctioning Foreign Bribery Through Multijurisdictional Resolutions

A new model for cross-border enforcement

Foreign bribery cases should not be handled as isolated national matters. The OECD’s 2026 paper on sanctioning foreign bribery through multijurisdictional resolutions (MJRs) shows a clear shift toward co-ordinated enforcement, where several authorities work together to investigate and resolve the same underlying misconduct. This approach is now central to the response to large transnational corruption schemes, especially when corporate conduct touches multiple countries, bank accounts, subsidiaries, and public contracts.

The paper traces this evolution back to the landmark Siemens resolution in 2008, when Germany and the United States announced co-ordinated non-trial resolutions on the same day. That case helped define a model that has since expanded into a wider enforcement practice. In the OECD’s dataset, 31 multijurisdictional cases resulted in 114 separate resolutions between December 2008 and March 2026, involving 12 jurisdictions and 74 companies or affiliated entities. The overall value of sanctions and confiscation exceeded USD 33.7 billion in constant 2024 dollars.

Why multijurisdictional resolutions matter

Foreign bribery almost always crosses borders. A company may be incorporated in one country, managed from another, use subsidiaries elsewhere, and channel payments through a different financial centre. A single authority often cannot see the full picture, gather the relevant evidence, or impose a response that reflects the full scope of the conduct. Multijurisdictional resolutions solve that problem by allowing authorities to align their investigations, divide responsibilities, and settle related proceedings in a coordinated way.

The OECD paper makes clear that these resolutions do more than increase enforcement efficiency. They also help avoid duplicative punishment, give companies more legal certainty, and improve the chance that victim countries receive restitution or compensation. In many of the cases reviewed, the resolution package included not only fines and forfeiture, but also compliance obligations, monitorships, and restitution payments to affected state-owned enterprises or treasuries.

Bastian Schwind-Wagner _Follow

"Multijurisdictional resolutions are reshaping foreign bribery enforcement by allowing authorities in different countries to act together instead of in isolation. The OECD’s findings show that this approach can improve accountability, reduce duplicative penalties, and deliver more balanced outcomes for affected countries.

The report also makes clear that legal flexibility, early co-operation, and workable non-trial resolution tools are key to making these cases succeed. As more jurisdictions adopt these mechanisms, global anti-corruption enforcement is likely to become faster, more coordinated, and more effective."

The dominance of non-trial resolutions

One of the strongest findings in the report is that non-trial resolutions are the backbone of multijurisdictional enforcement. Of the 114 resolutions reviewed, 113 were non-trial resolutions and only one was a trial-based outcome. The mechanisms used varied by country, but the general pattern is clear: negotiated resolutions are far more practical than full trials when several jurisdictions are trying to address the same conduct at the same time.

The paper groups these mechanisms into several broad types. Some are DPA-like (Deferred Prosecution Agreement), where charges are suspended or deferred subject to compliance with agreed conditions. Others are NPA-like (Non-Prosecution Agreement), where prosecutors agree not to file charges if the company co-operates and meets certain terms. There are also civil and administrative resolutions, as well as plea agreements or equivalent resolutions that involve an admission of guilt and result in a conviction. The important point is not that every country uses the same label, but that the tool exists in some form. The OECD’s findings suggest that having at least one workable non-trial mechanism is essential for effective participation in multijurisdictional resolutions.

How co-ordination works in practice

The report shows that co-ordination happens in different ways. In some cases, countries announce resolutions simultaneously. In others, one jurisdiction resolves first and another follows later, often using credit or offset arrangements to recognise payments already made elsewhere. In the OECD sample, 21 cases involved simultaneous resolutions, while 10 involved consecutive resolutions. Even in the consecutive cases, there was usually some degree of prior alignment.

The Airbus case is a strong example. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States reached co-ordinated resolutions in 2020, with the French and UK authorities working through a joint investigation team while the United States conducted a parallel investigation. The final outcome was a global settlement with total sanctions of about EUR 3.6 billion. The case illustrates how a joint structure can divide geographic priorities, preserve evidence, and make it possible to resolve a complex matter on a common timeline.

Other cases show a different pattern. In Glencore, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Brazil resolved in 2022, while Switzerland followed later and the Netherlands dismissed its case in parallel with the Swiss action. The OECD treats this as a co-ordinated sequence rather than a set of disconnected national decisions. This is an important distinction for financial crime practitioners, because it shows how resolutions can remain aligned even when the legal timing differs.

The role of legal frameworks

The paper also shows that the ability to participate in an MJR depends heavily on domestic law. Jurisdictions with flexible resolution tools are better placed to work with others. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, South Africa, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Singapore, Germany, Israel, Hong Kong (China), and Malaysia all appear in the dataset, but not all of them can use the same kind of mechanism.

The United States has the broadest range of tools, including DPAs, NPAs, plea agreements, and administrative resolutions. The United Kingdom relies on statutory DPAs with strong judicial oversight. France uses the CJIP (Convention Judiciaire d’Intérêt Public, or Judicial Public Interest Agreement), which also requires judicial validation. Brazil’s leniency agreements are administrative in nature and have become a major vehicle for multijurisdictional co-operation. South Africa’s newer Corporate Alternative Dispute Resolution (C-ADR) mechanism has also opened the door to co-ordinated resolutions. By contrast, some jurisdictions still lack a non-trial mechanism that is well suited to global settlements, which can make simultaneous resolution difficult or impossible.

The OECD is not suggesting that all countries need identical systems. Instead, it argues that countries need mechanisms that are compatible enough to allow practical co-ordination. The paper repeatedly shows that legal flexibility, rather than legal uniformity, is what makes these resolutions work.

Supply-side and demand-side enforcement are converging

Another major development is the growing role of demand-side jurisdictions, meaning countries where the bribes were received. In the early years after Siemens, multijurisdictional resolutions were mostly driven by supply-side countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, which enforced against companies headquartered in their territory. That has changed. Since 2019, most MJR cases in the OECD dataset have involved at least one demand-side jurisdiction.

Brazil is the clearest example. It appears in 15 of the 31 cases reviewed and frequently co-ordinates with the United States. South Africa is also emerging as a significant demand-side enforcer, particularly in cases involving state-owned enterprises and state capture-related conduct. This shift matters because it means affected countries are no longer passive recipients of foreign enforcement. They are increasingly active partners in the resolution process, and in some cases they are also pursuing the individuals who received the bribes.

Credits, offsets, and fairness

A recurring concern in global bribery cases is the risk of piling on, where multiple authorities impose overlapping penalties for the same conduct. The OECD paper shows that credit-granting and offset mechanisms are now one of the most important features of multijurisdictional resolutions. These mechanisms allow one authority to recognise money paid to another, helping to avoid excessive cumulative punishment while still preserving accountability.

The Airbus resolution is a strong example. The U.S. Department of Justice agreed to credit almost USD 1.8 billion against payments Airbus made to French authorities, provided payment conditions were met. In Goldman Sachs, the U.S. DOJ credited more than USD 1.6 billion to various foreign authorities, including payments to Hong Kong (China) and Singapore. In Odebrecht, the U.S. DOJ credited 80% of the fine against payments to Brazilian authorities. These arrangements matter because they make global settlements more workable and more equitable.

The paper also shows that restitution and compensation are not rare side issues. They appeared in 68% of the cases involving demand-side jurisdictions. In some matters, funds were repaid directly to harmed state-owned enterprises such as Petrobras, Eskom, or Transnet. That is a significant point for financial crime practitioners, because it shows that coordinated enforcement is increasingly being used not just to punish, but to repair harm.

Self-disclosure still matters

The OECD finds that voluntary self-disclosure continues to shape outcomes. Companies that come forward early, co-operate fully, and remediate quickly can obtain declinations, reduced penalties, or more favourable resolution terms. Standard Bank, SAP, and Balt SAS are examples where timely disclosure played a decisive role. By contrast, delays, partial disclosure, or overbroad privilege claims often reduced the credit available.

This is especially important in multijurisdictional cases, where the timing of disclosure can affect not only one investigation, but the ability of several authorities to co-ordinate with each other. A company that discloses early may create the conditions for a global resolution. A company that delays may lose that opportunity and face a more fragmented enforcement response.

Oversight, monitorship, and compliance

The paper also highlights the importance of post-resolution compliance controls. Many MJRs require companies to improve anti-corruption programmes, report back to authorities, and in some cases accept an external monitor. The United States imposed monitors in some cases, but often accepted self-reporting where remediation was strong. France and Brazil rely more heavily on structured oversight by public authorities, particularly the French Anti-Corruption Agency AFA (Agence Française Anticorruption) and Brazil’s CGU (Controladoria-Geral da União, or Office of the Comptroller General).

This is more than a technical detail. In large bribery matters, the real test is whether the company changes its conduct after the settlement. Monitoring frameworks are the bridge between punishment and prevention. They are also one reason why multijurisdictional resolutions can produce more durable reform than standalone fines.

What comes next

Multijurisdictional resolutions are becoming one of the main tools for enforcing foreign bribery laws in a global economy. They allow authorities to co-ordinate quickly, share responsibility, divide penalties fairly, and avoid duplicative sanctions. They also give companies a way to resolve complex exposure in a single global process, while still holding them accountable.

But the model is not yet universal. Some countries still lack the legal tools needed to participate fully. Others have procedures that make co-ordination slower or more difficult. The OECD therefore calls for broader use of non-trial resolutions, faster early contact between authorities, stronger co-operation channels, and better frameworks for credits and offsets. For financial crime enforcement, the direction of travel is clear: the future of foreign bribery enforcement is increasingly multijurisdictional, negotiated, and co-ordinated.

Dive deeper

• OECD ¦ OECD (2026), Sanctioning foreign bribery through multijurisdictional resolutions, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/48ff398e-en. ¦ Link