
27 August 2025
Council of Europe ¦ Report on the emerging patterns of misuse of technology by terrorist actors
Report: How Terrorist Actors Misuse New Technologies — Patterns, Risks and Responses
Why terrorists adopt and adapt technology
Terrorist groups and individuals adopt new technologies when those tools help them meet basic needs: raising and moving money, communicating with supporters and adversaries, planning and carrying out attacks, and amplifying their actions for propaganda value. Decisions to adopt a specific technology are driven by internal factors such as strategy, organisation and individual skills, and by external factors such as available resources, relationships with other actors and the effectiveness of countermeasures. Strategic priorities — for example whether a group values secrecy or reach — shape whether adoption favors covert tools like encryption or open platforms that give wider visibility. Organisational form matters too: hierarchical groups may invest in long-term, complex programs, while loosely networked or individual actors rapidly exploit accessible consumer technologies. Examples illustrate these dynamics. Unmanned aerial systems attracted attention after their weaponisation in Syria and Iraq, but in Europe their operational adoption has been limited so far because of cost, technical challenges in reliably weaponising drones, and the presence of regulatory and detection measures. By contrast, the spread of virtual assets for fundraising has been driven largely by overseas groups signalling willingness to accept cryptocurrencies; volatility, conversion difficulties, traceability improvements and law enforcement success in prosecutions have constrained broad, sustained adoption for Europe-focused attacks.
How new technologies are changing the European threat picture
Technology amplifies a number of observable trends in Europe’s terrorist landscape.
First, online platforms remain central to radicalisation and recruitment. Major social networks, smaller platforms and messaging apps are all exploited: large platforms for reach when possible, and smaller or gaming-adjacent spaces where moderation is weaker or community ties are stronger. Gaming ecosystems and live-streaming channels can expose younger audiences and have been used for propaganda, grooming and normalisation of violence, though clear operational examples of large-scale radicalisation via mainstream games are still fewer than feared. The decentralised web and encrypted services provide storage and sharing channels for instructional material that can lower the bar for action.
Second, attack methodologies in Europe have tended toward ‘low‑tech’ modalities such as stabbings, vehicle attacks and arson, while technology plays a major role in planning, reconnaissance and dissemination. Instructional content — bomb‑making guides, CAD files, and 3D‑printable firearm designs — circulates online and has contributed to lowering the technical and logistical barriers for would‑be attackers, accelerating the diffusion of skills and components across ideological lines and complicating law‑enforcement efforts to prevent both acquisition and construction of weapons.
Emerging patterns in terrorist misuse of technology: evolving threats and targeted responses
Why technology matters in modern terrorist activity
The misuse of technology by terrorist actors continues to evolve, with both incremental and radical innovations reshaping how groups recruit, communicate, finance and execute attacks. Adoption is highly context dependent: internal factors such as strategy, structure and individual expertise interact with external drivers like relationships, resources and counter-terrorism pressure to determine whether and how a technology is used. The three core operational functions — resourcing, communication and attacks — remain the organizing lens to understand where technologies produce real operational advantages and where adoption stalls because of limitations (cost, complexity, traceability or countermeasures).
Patterns of adoption and two illustrative cases
Recent European-focused experience shows that not every promising technology becomes widely adopted. Unmanned aerial systems have been weaponized successfully in conflict zones but, to date, have only limited operational adoption in Europe because of costs, complexity, restricted access to specialist expertise and robust countermeasures. Virtual assets (cryptocurrencies and related tools) have become more visible in investigations and arrests but are not yet the dominant funding method in Europe: volatility, conversion challenges and growing traceability through public/private analytic capabilities blunt some of their early perceived advantages. Both cases demonstrate how internal (youthful, tech-savvy individuals; decentralized movements) and external (propaganda from foreign affiliates; availability of platforms and instructional material) drivers interact to produce measured, uneven uptake.
How technology is changing radicalisation, attack methodology and publicity
Mainstream platforms remain attractive for reach, but stronger moderation, legislation and private-sector detection have pushed extremist actors toward smaller or gaming-adjacent platforms, bespoke websites, the decentralised web and encrypted applications. Gaming ecosystems show specific vulnerabilities — appeal to younger audiences, livestreaming, community tools — while the availability of “how-to” material online lowers barriers for lone actors. New creative tools such as generative AI multiply options for producing multilingual propaganda, tailoring narratives and rapidly generating visual or audio content, increasing the speed and scale at which messages can be produced. At the same time, encryption, device proliferation and novel digital artefacts complicate lawful investigation and forensic work.
Attack technologies and instructional ecosystems
Although many European attacks remain “low-tech” in execution, technologies affect reconnaissance, planning, weapon acquisition and post-attack publicity. The spread of 3D-printed weapon designs and CAD files, combined with open-source instructional material, represents a growing risk — especially where actors cannot otherwise access regulated firearms. Instructional manuals and digital blueprints amplify capability diffusion across ideologies, and are often hosted across a mix of surface web, small platforms and dark-web outlets, complicating removal and takedown efforts.
Financing trends and technological affordances
Terrorist financing in Europe is still heavily shaped by self-funded, low-tech methods, criminal proceeds and legitimate income sources. However, virtual assets, peer-to-peer payment apps, crowdfunding, platform donations and other digital payment mechanisms are increasingly used — often to send funds to groups outside Europe. The evolving practices of external affiliates (for example certain Islamic State provinces) can drive adoption by sympathisers in Europe. Counter-financial investigation capabilities and prosecutions have constrained some uses of virtual assets, underscoring that traceability and legal action remain strong deterrents where enforcement is effective.
Lessons learned for countermeasures
Key lessons from practitioners include
- the need to shorten the detection-to-response cycle through structured horizon scanning and red-teaming;
- expand and systematise information sharing among states, the private sector, academia and civil society; and
- design outcome-focused, technology-neutral policies that aim to raise barriers to misuse rather than promise total prevention.
Multistakeholder forums, targeted capacity-building for smaller platforms, clearer strategic objectives and careful human-rights oversight are repeatedly identified as high-impact practices. Transparency, oversight and proportionality must guide responses to avoid chilling legitimate speech or civic action.
Recommendations for practitioners and policy makers
Promptly institutionalise regular horizon scanning and threat-foresight activities. Share anonymised trends and indicators across jurisdictions and sectors to close knowledge gaps. Build and fund multistakeholder mechanisms that include smaller technology providers, civil society and research bodies to exchange operational lessons and improve platform safety. Pursue technology-neutral legislation that defines harms and outcomes rather than platform-specific obligations. Strengthen safeguards and oversight to protect human rights while enabling targeted, evidence-led interventions.
Dive deeper
- Council of Europe ¦ Report on the emerging patterns of misuse of technology by terrorist actors (pdf) ¦ Link