2025 NATIONAL RISK  
ASSESSMENT OF  
MONEY LAUNDERING  
Observation period: 2020 – 2023  
Contents  
 
6.4.4. Audit profession, ...................................................................................................................123  
1. Introducꢀon  
Luxembourg’s first National Risk Assessment (NRA) of money laundering and terrorist financing was  
adopted in September 2018 (2018 NRA) and provided an assessment of Luxembourg’s situation  
concerning its money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks as of year-end 2017. In the course  
of 2020, the NRA was updated (2020 NRA) to reflect Luxembourg’s situation as of year-end 2019. It was  
adopted by the National Prevention Committee on money laundering and terrorist financing (NPC) on 15  
September 2020.  
To further enhance its understanding of higher risk sectors, the NPC conducted specific risk assessments,  
so-called vertical risk assessments (VRAs). In this respect, VRAs on virtual asset service providers (VASPs),  
legal persons and legal arrangements and on TF were carried out. These risk assessments are publicly  
available, in both English and French, on the website of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ)1 and of other relevant  
authorities and stakeholders.  
The fight against ML and TF shares a common legal framework. However, ML and TF have their own  
specificalities that are better taken into consideration when analysed in specific risk assessments. For  
instance, even if ML and TF can exploit the same vulnerabilities of a product or service, ML and TF differ  
in their nature, source and purpose. Additionally, as illustrated by the 2018 and 2020 NRA on ML/TF and  
the 2022 TF VRA, the level of ML threat level in Luxembourg differs from the TF threat level. A separate  
analysis allows for a better understanding of the particular drivers of each type of risks. This approach  
facilitates the implementation of more targeted and ultimately more effective mitigation actions.  
Taking this into account, the NPC decided to update the 2020 ML/TF NRA by carrying out two separate  
NRAs, one specifically on ML and the other on TF:  
The NRA on ML was carried out using quantitative and qualitative data related to years 2020 to  
2023. In April 2025 the NPC approved the publication of this ML specific update, hereafter  
referred to as the 2025 NRA of ML;  
The NRA on TF will be carried out subsequently, leveraging on the 2022 TF VRA methodology and  
using quantitative and qualitative data related to years 2021-2024.  
The ultimate goal of these risk assessments is to update the understanding of ML/TF risks and to allow a  
risk-based approach (RBA) at all levels.  
1 MoJ website, link.  
1
   
2. Execuꢀve summary  
This report consꢀtutes Luxembourg’s latest update of its naꢀonal risk assessment of ML2. This 2025 NRA  
was carried out under the direcꢀon of the MoJ and the NPC approved its publicaꢀon on 28 April 2025. It  
formalises Luxembourg’s common understanding of ML risks and forms the basis of the RBA at all levels,  
from policy makers and law enforcement authoriꢀes (LEAs) to supervisors, obliged enꢀꢀes and  
professionals, to ensure that ML prevenꢀon, detecꢀon and miꢀgaꢀon measures are commensurate with  
the risks idenꢀfied.  
As explained in the introducꢀon above, this NRA update focuses on ML risks. In terms of methodology, it  
follows the same approach as the previous NRAs conducted in 2020 and 2018. It consists of first assessing  
the inherent risk resulꢀng from the main ML threats to which Luxembourg is exposed and the  
vulnerabiliꢀes of the various (sub-)sectors covered by the Law of 12 November 2004 on the fight against  
money laundering and terrorist financing, as amended (2004 AML/CFT Law). Miꢀgaꢀon measures to  
reduce inherent risks are then taken into account to determine the residual risks.  
The main findings of this 2025 NRA are as follows:  
In terms of threats:  
o
o
o
ML of proceeds of foreign crimes is the most significant ML threat for Luxembourg, given  
its posiꢀon as a global financial centre. Fraud and forgery, tax crimes, corrupꢀon and  
bribery conꢀnue to be the main external threats;  
Exposure to domesꢀc ML, derived from the proceeds of primary offences commiꢁed in  
Luxembourg, is much lower given the country’s low level of criminality. Fraud and forgery,  
robbery and theſt as well as drug trafficking are the main domesꢀc threats;  
Although terrorism and TF are predicate offences to ML, the related threat will be  
considered in a separate specific NRA of TF, as explained in the introducꢀon.  
In terms of vulnerabiliꢀes:  
o
Within the financial sector, banks3, investment firms4, e-money insꢀtuꢀons (EMIs),  
payment insꢀtuꢀons (PIs), Specialised Professionals of the Financial Sector (PFSs)  
providing corporate services, VASPs5, and life insurance undertakings were assessed as  
having a “High” inherent risk level;  
o
Within the non-financial sector, the inherent risk levels for all legal and accounꢀng  
professions remain “High”, with the excepꢀon of the audit profession and bailiffs, which  
were assessed to bear a “Medium” inherent risk;  
2 The first NRA, adopted in September 2018, link, was updated in 2020, link.  
3 Excepted Custodians and sub-custodians (incl. Central Securities Depositories) that have a “Medium” inherent risk level.  
4 Excepted Investment firms authorized to carry out activities of dealing on own account, of underwriting of financial instruments  
and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis and of placing financial instruments without a firm  
commitment basis that have a “Medium” inherent risk level.  
5 VASPs were assessed in 2020 in a dedicated vertical risk assessment, link.  
2
         
o
With respect to legal persons and legal arrangements, the 2025 NRA leverages the  
approach and findings of the dedicated VRA (2022 LPs/LAs VRA)6. Legal arrangements  
were assessed as bearing the highest inherent risk, followed by Sociétés commerciales.  
As noted above, the miꢀgaꢀng factors put in place within and across sectors reduce the level of inherent  
risk to a level of residual risk.  
As a financial centre, Luxembourg contributes to internaꢀonal efforts and demonstrates its full  
commitment to the fight against ML and TF. Following the on-site visit for mutual evaluaꢀon of  
Luxembourg by the Financial Acꢀon Task Force (FATF) in November 2022, the FATF published on 27  
September 2023 its Mutual Evaluaꢀon Report of Luxembourg7, recognising that Luxembourg has “a solid  
anꢀ-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework and a good understanding of its money  
laundering and terrorist financing risks”8.  
6 MoJ, Legal persons and legal arrangements ML/TF vertical risk assessment, 2022, link.  
7 FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Luxembourg, Mutual Evaluation Report, 2023, link.  
8 FATF, Luxembourg’s measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, link.  
3
     
3. Luxembourg context  
The Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg (or “Luxembourg”) is a small, landlocked country in Western Europe  
bordered by Belgium, France and Germany. With an area of 2 586 km2, it is one of the smallest sovereign  
states in Europe.  
Luxembourg has been a sovereign and independent state since the adopꢀon of the Treaty of London on  
19 April 1839. The Grand-Duchy is also a founding member of the European Union (EU), OECD, United  
Naꢀons, NATO, UNESCO, the World Trade Organisaꢀon, and Benelux Union reflecꢀng its poliꢀcal  
consensus in favour of economic, poliꢀcal, and military integraꢀon. Luxembourg has always been  
commiꢁed to mulꢀlateral and internaꢀonal cooperaꢀon and considers itself to be a defender of  
internaꢀonal agreements and treaꢀes.  
Luxembourg is home to many European insꢀtuꢀons, including the Secretariat of the European Parliament,  
the Court of Jusꢀce of the EU, the European Investment Bank, the European Public Prosecuꢀon Office  
(EPPO), the European Court of Auditors and some Directorate Generals of the European Commission.  
Luxembourg-City is one of the three “capitals” of the EU along with Brussels and Strasbourg.  
Demographic structure  
On the 1 January 2024, Luxembourg counts 672 050 inhabitants. Although among the least populous  
countries in the EU, the number of habitants has increased by around 31% compared to 2011.  
In the beginning of 2024, people from EU Member States (other than Luxembourg) account for 37% of the  
resident populaꢀon and 77% of the foreign populaꢀon living in the Grand-Duchy. The Portuguese  
naꢀonality is the first foreign naꢀonality in the country with 90 915 persons (13,5% of the total populaꢀon)  
followed by the French (7,3%), Italian (3,7%) and Belgian (2,8%) naꢀonaliꢀes9. The most recent populaꢀon  
census in 2021 notes that almost three quarters (73,7%) of Luxembourg’s populaꢀon has a migratory  
background (i.e., with at least one parent born abroad)10.  
Similar to the situaꢀon described in the 2020 NRA, the unemployment rate remains low (around 5%) and  
44% of Luxembourg’s workforce are non-residents living in France, Germany or Belgium and commuꢀng  
to Luxembourg for work (227 799 out of 516 304 in November 2022)11. Luxembourgish, French and  
German are the three official languages. English is used in certain professional environments, notably in  
banking and finance.  
Luxembourg’s economy  
Luxembourg’s economy is open, dynamic and fast growing with a gross domesꢀc product (GDP) at market  
prices of EUR 79,309 billion in 2023, thus contribuꢀng to 0,46% of the total EU GDP in 202312.  
9 LUStat, Population by nationalities in detail on 1st January, link retrieved on 25 September 2024.  
10 STATEC, link. Note that data refers to the most recent population census in 2021.  
11 EURES, Labour market information, link.  
12 Eurostat, Gross domestic product at market prices, link retrieved on 17 February 2025.  
4
         
Table 1: EU27 vs. Luxembourg real GDP growth rate (change vs. base year), 2018 – 202313  
2018  
2,1  
1,2  
2019  
1,8  
2,9  
2020  
-5,6  
-0,9  
2021  
6,0  
7,2  
2022  
3,4  
1,4  
2023  
0,5  
-1,1  
2018 - 2023  
1,37  
EU27  
Luxembourg  
1,78  
In 2023, Luxembourg conꢀnued to have the highest real GDP per capita among the EU Member States,  
with approximately EUR 83 320, almost 3 ꢀmes above the EU average (EUR 28 930)14. This is partly due to  
the considerable number of non-residents being employed in the country. The laꢁer contribute to its GDP  
while not being part of Luxembourg’s resident populaꢀon.  
Luxembourg’s current account is heavily influenced by the importaꢀon and exportaꢀon of services  
(especially services related to financial and insurance acꢀviꢀes). Whereas the import and export of goods  
maintains an overall balance, it can be deducted from the figure below that Luxembourg is essenꢀally an  
export country of services.  
Figure 1: Annual current account of Luxembourg (in millions of euros; BPM6 methodology)15  
150,000  
100,000  
50,000  
0
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
Exports goods  
Imports goods  
Exports services  
Imports services  
Taking a closer look at Luxembourg’s key acꢀviꢀes, financial and insurance sectors account for the biggest  
share of Luxembourg’s economy with around 24% of the naꢀonal GDP being generated by the said sector.  
Other important sectors of Luxembourg’s economy are outlined in Table 2. A brief descripꢀon of key  
sectors, such as the Luxembourg financial and insurance sector, the informaꢀon and communicaꢀon sector  
as well as the transportaꢀon and storage sector, is provided below.  
Note that a descripꢀon of real estate acꢀviꢀes is included in secꢀon 6.3.1. Professional, scienꢀfic and  
technical acꢀviꢀes encompass legal acꢀviꢀes and accounꢀng, bookkeeping and audiꢀng acꢀviꢀes, which  
are described in secꢀons 6.3.5 and 6.4.  
13 Eurostat, Real GDP Growth Rate volume, link retrieved on 12 July 2024.  
14 Eurostat, Real GDP per Capita, link retrieved on 12 July 2024.  
15 LUStat, Annual current account of Luxembourg (in millions of euros ; BPM6 methodology), link retrieved on 12 July 2024.  
5
         
Table 2: Luxembourg economy breakdown (Gross value added per industry), 2020 – 202316  
Activities  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
Financial and insurance activities  
Professional, scientific and technical  
activities  
25,1%  
25,4%  
24,3%  
23,5%  
10,5%  
11,1%  
12,0%  
12,5%  
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor  
vehicles and motorcycles  
Real estate activities  
8,7%  
8,0%  
6,6%  
8,6%  
7,6%  
6,7%  
8,7%  
7,4%  
6,7%  
8,6%  
7,7%  
7,2%  
Human health and social work activities  
Public administration and defence,  
compulsory social security  
Construction  
6,5%  
5,6%  
5,5%  
4,5%  
5,6%  
3,7%  
5,4%  
4,3%  
6,2%  
5,4%  
5,2%  
4,2%  
6,2%  
3,9%  
5,2%  
4,2%  
6,3%  
5,7%  
5,0%  
4,2%  
6,5%  
4,1%  
4,2%  
4,8%  
7,0%  
5,7%  
5,1%  
4,5%  
4,5%  
4,3%  
3,9%  
5,5%  
Information and communication  
Education  
Transportation and storage  
Administrative and support service activities  
Manufacturing  
Other sectors  
Total activities (in EUR millions)  
58 889 (100%) 65 870 (100%) 70 568 (100%) 72 410 (100%)  
Luxembourg’s financial and insurance sector  
Luxembourg is an important financial centre in the EU, ranked 19th in the Global Financial Centres Index17  
and 5th worldwide as a green financial centre18. The financial centre is diversified with a core focus on  
banking (mainly corporate banking, depositary and custody services for funds as well as private banking),  
investment funds (primarily asset servicing), payment services, insurance (life, non-life and reinsurance)  
as well as capital markets (notably lisꢀng and post-trade services). Luxembourg acts as an EU hub and  
competence centre for internaꢀonal financial insꢀtuꢀons (FIs) in these areas19,20  
.
Banking acꢀvity: As of December 2023, Luxembourg counts 120 banks employing over 26 000  
employees. Corporate banking, wealth management services as well as private banking are core  
acꢀviꢀes for Luxembourg banks.  
Asset management: Luxembourg has been a first mover in the internaꢀonalisaꢀon of the  
investment fund industry that has occurred over the last 40 years. Today, fund iniꢀators from 67  
countries world-wide make use of Luxembourg undertaking for collecꢀve investment in  
transferable securiꢀes (UCITS) funds to distribute in 80 countries globally21.  
16 LUStat, Gross value added by activity (NaceR2)(at current prices) (in millions EUR), link retrieved on 12 July 2024.  
17 The Global Financial Centres Index 33, 2023, link.  
18 Global Green Finance Index 11, 2023, link.  
19 Luxembourg for Finance, Luxembourg: helping finance go global, 2023, link.  
20 Luxembourg for Finance, Homepage, link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
21 Luxembourg for Finance, Luxembourg: helping finance go global, 2023, link.  
6
             
Payment services: Leading internaꢀonal players in the payments sector have chosen Luxembourg  
as their hub to serve the EU payments market, oſten in connecꢀon to the development of e-  
commerce plaꢃorms.  
Insurance: Luxembourg’s stability and asset management ecosystem are significant draws for  
insurance firms, whose business is the management of risk. While Luxembourg’s insurance  
ecosystem tradiꢀonally focused on life insurance and reinsurance, post-Brexit the Grand-Duchy  
has increasingly taken on an important role as a major European hub for non-life insurance.  
Capital markets: Luxembourg is home to the Luxembourg Stock Exchange (LuxSE) and the  
Luxembourg Green Exchange (LGX). Luxembourg has also become a centre for all aspects of  
collateral managements including clearing, seꢁlement, custody and asset servicing. The Grand-  
Duchy is also a centre for securiꢀsaꢀon and structured finance vehicles.  
The acꢀviꢀes of the financial centre are also diversifying into the field of crypto assets, FinTech, sustainable  
finance and Islamic Finance. Luxembourg for Finance is the country’s agency for the development and  
promoꢀon of the financial centre.  
Luxembourg’s informaꢀon and communicaꢀon sector  
Luxembourg ranks 8th out of 27 EU Member States in the 2022 ediꢀon of the Digital Economy and Society  
Index (DESI). This index assesses the progress made in EU Member States in digital maꢁers22. Considering  
the Grand-Duchy’s geographical posiꢀon, it is intricately connected to an internaꢀonal fiber network,  
making it an ultra-low latency hub. With a well-defined ultra-high-speed broadband strategy, its naꢀonal  
very high-capacity network and 5G coverage are constantly increasing23.  
In 2023, Luxembourg reported the highest rates of household connecꢀon to the internet with slightly over  
99% within the EU. Luxembourg internet users are also among the most acꢀve ones within the EU, with  
over 99% staꢀng that they used the internet in the last 3 months (in comparison to 91% of the EU  
households). Consequently, the share of non-internet users is minimal with less than 0,5% (6% within the  
EU)24.  
Over 9 Luxembourg individuals out of 10 (91%) use a mobile device or a smart phone to connect to the  
internet, 65% used the laptop or tablet and 35% use a desktop computer. Furthermore, about one third  
indicated that they also used other mobile devices such as smart TV or smart speakers to access the  
internet. Most of them used these devices for texꢀng, video calls or instant messaging (82%).  
With respect to the use of eGovernment and the digital public services, Luxembourg is ranked 6th with  
over 70% of internet users having interacted with public authoriꢀes. Luxembourg also reported the highest  
rate of internet users having requested official documents or cerꢀficates (51% in comparison to an EU  
average of 18%).  
22 European Commission, Luxembourg in the Digital Economy and Society Index, link.  
23 Luxembourg let’s make it happen, Technological environment, link.  
24 Eurostat, Individuals internet use, link.  
7
     
The share of internet users for buying or ordering goods or services is also relaꢀvely high in Luxembourg,  
with over 80% internet users having bought or ordered something online. The EU average amounts to  
70%25.  
Luxembourg has also the highest density of Tier IV data centres in Europe. Note that Tier IV represents the  
highest industry standard for reliability and efficiency for datacentres26.  
It should also be noted that Luxembourg has developed a cybersecurity hub and is among the front-runner  
countries for its cyber-security commitment, both in Europe and in the world. The Global Security Index  
(2020) assessed that the Grand-Duchy ranks 13th worldwide and 6th in Europe for its cybersecurity  
commitment. Based on data from December 2019, Luxinnovaꢀon and the Luxembourg House of  
Cybersecurity esꢀmate that Luxembourg counts over 300 cybersecurity companies with around a quarter  
having cybersecurity as their core business27.  
Luxembourg’s transportaꢀon and storage sector  
Luxembourg is member of the Schengen Area and around 70% of the EU GDP is located within 700 km of  
Grand-Duchy28. Luxembourg has a global air-cargo connecꢀvity, a rail freight and a mulꢀmodal terminal in  
Beꢁembourg. Luxembourg has been ranked 26th out of 139 countries in The Logisꢀcs Performance Index29.  
Air freight: Luxembourg has an air-cargo network including more than 100 desꢀnaꢀons on six  
conꢀnents from the airport Cargo Centre. Luxembourg is the headquarters of Cargolux Airlines  
and is oſten a major European hub for other air-freight carriers (China Airlines, Emirates, Yangtze  
River Express, Silkway Airlines, Atlas Air et Qatar Airways)30. In 2022, Luxembourg transported  
969 105 tons of air freight and mail with almost 96% accounꢀng for internaꢀonal extra EU  
transports. In terms of transported freight (in tons), it ranks 6th among the EU31. In a similar vein,  
the distance bands of the Luxembourg Cargo airport and the desꢀnaꢀon/recipient airport is  
located over 2 000 kilometers away for 90% of the transported freight32. The figure below outlines  
the geographical distribuꢀon of the main partner airports (in terms of transported weight).  
Whereas the United States of America is the country with which Luxembourg has  
imported/exported most airfreight (over 1,2 million tons between 2019 and 2023), Luxembourg  
exchanges also a significant amount of airfreight with the Asian conꢀnent (over 2 million tons  
between 2019 and 2023), especially with countries such as China (about 762 000 tons), Hong Kong  
(about 345 tons) and Taiwan (about 327 tons).  
25 Eurostat, Digital economy and society statistics, households and individuals, link.  
26 Luxembourg let’s make it happen, Technological environment, link.  
27 Luxinnovation, Luxembourg Cybersecurity Ecosystem, link retrieved on 11 July 2024.  
28 Eurostat, Gross domestic product at market prices, link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
29 The World Bank, The Logistics Performance Indicator 2023, link.  
30 Single window for logistics Luxembourg, link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
31 Eurostat, Air transport statistics, link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
32 Eurostat, Freight and mail air transport by aircraft model, distance bands and transport coverage, link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
8
               
Figure 2: Freight and mail air transport routes between partner airports and airports in Luxembourg,  
2019 - 202333  
Rail freight: The Beꢁembourg mulꢀmodal plaꢃorm links Luxembourg and its neighboring  
countries to the rest of the Europe by road and rail with access to Italian, Spanish, Eastern  
European, UK and Scandinavian markets34. In terms of transported freight (in million tons),  
Luxembourg was situated in 2022 among the lower end of the scale of EU countries with a total  
of 3 464 million tons of transported freight via rail. It should be noted that 23% of transported  
freight (in terms of weight transported) were naꢀonal, 73% internaꢀonal and 4% transit35,36  
.
Almost all imports (1 495 million tons out of 1 503 million) were imported from the EU. More  
precisely, 996 million tons were imported from Germany (i.e. 66% of all imports), 315 million tons  
from Belgium (i.e. 21%) and 112 million tons from France (i.e. 7%). In 2022, the number of loaded  
wagons in the Grand-Duchy amounted to 31 58437.  
33  
Eurostat, Freight and mail air transport routes between partner airports and main airports in Luxembourg  
[avia_gor_lu__custom_12176738], link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
34 Single window for logistics Luxembourg, link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
35 Eurostat, Railway Freight Transport statistics, link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
36 LuStat, Freight Traffic, link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
37 LuStat, Freight Traffic, link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
9
           
Inland waterway freight: the port in Mertert has a total surface of 65 hectares and is specialised  
in the transportaꢀon of heavy materials such as oil, agrifood and construcꢀon materials38. In 2023,  
247 080 tons were exported (with almost 52% being steel products) and 542 193 tons were  
imported (with almost 70% being fuels/petrol products)39.  
Road connecꢀvity: Luxembourg is located in the centre of Western Europe and is a member of  
the Schengen Area. All major transport hubs (cf. above) are located directly at the road network  
from which the major European highways and major European ciꢀes are easily accessible40.  
Internaꢀonal business: partner countries  
Considering the limited size of the country and its geographical posiꢀon, internaꢀonal trade and business  
is a key component of Luxembourg’s economic landscape. Taking a closer look at the foreign direct  
investment (FDI) stocks, Luxembourg was a net foreign direct investor at the end of 2021, 2022 and 2023.  
Together with the Netherlands, Luxembourg accounted for the most important shares of the total inward  
and outward investment posiꢀons of the EU countries. However, for those two countries Special Purpose  
Enꢀꢀes play a significant role41, which underlines the importance of Luxembourg as a key hub for  
structuring cross-border investments and financial services. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the  
usage of those Special Purpose Enꢀꢀes in Luxembourg has gradually declined over the past few years42.  
Table 3: Net year-ending FDI posiꢀon of Luxembourg by partner (in millions of EUR), 2021-202343  
Year  
2021  
2022  
2023  
Outward FDI  
3 919 022,2  
3 746 404,7  
3 512 875,5  
Inward FDI  
3 113 984,1  
2 825 645,9  
2 592 596,3  
Net FDI  
805 038,1  
920 758,8  
920 279,2  
Both Luxembourg’s outward and inward FDI stocks were somewhat concentrated and top-ten countries  
accounted for about 75% to 80% of total stocks between 2021 and 2023.  
The following table lists top-ten inward FDI countries.  
38 Single Window for Logistics, Logistics infrastructure, link retrieved on 16 July 2024.  
39 LUStat, Activities of the Port Mertert (in tons), link retrieved on 22 January 2025.  
40 Single Window for Logistics, European Road Connectivity, link retrieved on 17 July 2024.  
41 Eurostat, Foreign direct investment stocks, link.  
42 Eurostat, EU direct investment positions by country, ultimate and immediate counterpart and economic activity (BPM6), link  
retrieved on 6 February 2025.  
43LuStat, Net year-ending foreign direct investment position of Luxembourg by partner according to the extended directional  
principle (in millions of euros ; 4th OECD benchmark definition), link (2021 and 2022 retrieved in September 2024 and 2023 data  
in February 2025).  
10  
               
Table 4: FDI posiꢀon (inward stock) by top-ten partner (in millions of EUR), 2021-202343  
2021-2023  
total share  
25,2%  
10,9%  
7,8%  
Partner country  
2021  
2022  
2023  
United States of America  
United Kingdom  
Netherlands  
Cayman Islands  
Ireland  
Canada  
Germany  
Belgium  
Bermuda  
820 715,1  
397 263,8  
246 893,1  
164 037,1  
210 519,7  
135 355,2  
135 409,6  
133 042,2  
132 996,7  
86 050,2  
765 789,8  
267 765,2  
237 920,9  
178 269,8  
160 915,9  
144 125,7  
124 131,2  
122 656,4  
137 755,7  
89 218,4  
563 558  
265 847,2  
181 157,2  
219 959,4  
159 566  
142 733,7  
144 003,7  
127 469,6  
62 431  
6,6%  
6,2%  
5%  
4,7%  
4,5%  
3,9%  
3,1%  
British Virgin Islands  
90 881,8  
All European countries (including the United Kingdom) accounted for around 40% of Luxembourg’s inward  
investments. In addiꢀon, the United States of America alone represented about 25% of the inward  
investment stock in 2021 and 2023, as shown in Table 4.  
The following table lists top-ten outward FDI countries.  
Table 5: FDI posiꢀon (outward stock) by top-ten partner (in millions of EUR), 2021-202343  
2021-2023  
Partner country  
2021  
2022  
2023  
total share  
15,94%  
14,42%  
12,41%  
8,33%  
United States of America  
United Kingdom  
Netherlands  
Switzerland  
Germany  
Ireland  
France  
Belgium  
Spain  
588 879,9  
687 066,0  
515 779,7  
327 766,8  
247 967,7  
240 253,8  
159 754,7  
125 543,1  
92 879,3  
615 588,8  
459 457,2  
455 645,1  
328 577,2  
200 158,2  
222 404,3  
176 928,0  
139 502,4  
118 651,3  
92 821,8  
576 406,5  
464 352,7  
415 043,9  
274 397,1  
224 456,2  
130 458,2  
184 460,6  
135 299,7  
120 284,7  
96 128,4  
6,02%  
5,31%  
4,67%  
3,58%  
2,97%  
2,59%  
Cyprus  
94 763,3  
On the other hand, Luxembourg’s outward FDI was concentrated towards European countries. The United  
States of America accounted for another 16% of the stock, as shown in the table above.  
11  
   
Insight Box 1: ML risks Luxembourg FDI countries  
Risk and context – FATF mutual evaluaꢀon reports (4th round)  
To obtain a more in-depth understanding of the general risk and context of Luxembourg’s key partner  
countries in terms of FDI, the FATF mutual evaluaꢀon reports of the United States, the United Kingdom,  
Ireland and the Netherlands, represenꢀng together approximately half of Luxembourg’s inward and  
outward stocks for the 2021-2022 period, were studied.  
All studied partner countries have been assessed to have effecꢀve AML/CFT regimes in place and  
provide good internaꢀonal cooperaꢀon. Fraud and drug trafficking are cited in all these FATF mutual  
evaluaꢀon reports as a key threat, followed by organised crime and human trafficking. The abuse of  
legal persons is also menꢀoned in all analysed reports as a key vulnerability.  
12  
 
4. Methodology  
This National Risk Assessment (NRA) was conducted by the MoJ using a structured and rigorous approach.  
The methodology used in the NRA was developed having regard to the methodologies developed by other  
jurisdictions, international guidance (e.g. FATF’s guidance, the EU’s anti-money laundering directives, EU  
SNRA, EBA opinion and reports), the World Bank and IMF approaches, and extensive consultation with  
public and private sector stakeholders. The approach combines qualitative and quantitative information  
and professional expertise.  
The NRA exercise takes a national perspective (i.e. it is based on the macro-level analysis described in the  
section 4.2 further below) to contribute to the understanding of ML risks at a country and sector level.  
The assessment focuses mostly on supervisory authorities, self-regulatory bodies (SRBs), the financial  
intelligence unit, law enforcement agencies and cross-agency committees, where applicable. The  
methodology also leverages outputs and insights from meso-level and micro-level analyses for collecting  
more granular inputs and data and enhance the macro-level view.  
Ahead of describing the approach in detail, the following definitions are introduced:  
Table 6: Methodology – Key definiꢀons44  
Term  
Definition  
Threat  
A threat, in general, is a person, group or activity with the potential to cause harm to  
the state, society or the economy. In the ML context this refers to criminal individuals,  
groups or entities and their facilitators seeking to conceal the illicit origins of funds  
through past, present and future ML activities (and not the predicate offences  
themselves).  
Vulnerability  
Consequence  
A vulnerability can be exploited by the threat or may support or facilitate its activities.  
In the ML risk assessment context, looking at vulnerabilities as being distinct from  
threats means focusing on, for example, the inherent features of a particular sector,  
a financial product or type of service that makes them attractive and feasible for ML  
purposes. Certain inherent characteristics of a country can also make it vulnerable to  
ML including a large financial, trade, or company formation sector. Vulnerabilities  
may also relate to a weakness in law, regulation, supervision, or enforcement.  
A consequence refers to the impact or harm that ML may cause and includes the  
effect of the underlying criminal activity on financial systems and institutions, as well  
as the economy and society at large. These consequences can be both domestic and  
international in scope, reflecting the far-reaching nature of ML activities. The  
consequences of ML may be short or long term in nature and relate to harm to  
populations, specific communities, the business environment and national or  
44 FATF, Money Laundering National Risk Assessment Guidance 2024, link.  
13  
     
Term  
Definition  
international interests. It can also undermine the reputation and attractiveness of a  
country’s financial sector.  
Risk  
Function of three factors: threat, vulnerability and consequence.  
Inherent risk  
Inherent risk is the extent of risk present without the consideration of any risk  
mitigation measures.  
Mitigating  
factor  
Risk mitigating factors are actions, controls or strategies implemented to manage the  
identified ML risks. Risk mitigating measures can include legislative, regulatory,  
supervisory, law enforcement, or other administrative actions taken to mitigate risks  
within the national AML framework.  
Residual risk  
Residual risk takes into account the impact of a country’s mitigation measures.  
4.1. Process and stakeholders  
The NRA exercise is conducted in two steps:  
the inherent risk assessment, encompassing the analysis of threats and vulnerabilities; and  
the residual risk assessment, encompassing the analysis of mitigating factors in place.  
The findings of the inherent risks and the impact of mitigating factors as well as the outcomes in residual  
risks are consolidated and jointly assessed. They constitute a key element to develop the national multi-  
annual AML/CFT Strategy.  
The NRA exercise involves defining the scope, granularity and approach up front, collating relevant  
national and international data and information, reviewing and refining hypotheses developed using  
expert opinion, iterating intermediate outputs with the relevant experts, and agreeing final outputs,  
outcomes and improvement measures resulting from the assessment.  
At all three steps of the NRA exercise, multiple public and private stakeholders were involved:  
Supervisory authorities:  
o
o
o
Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF)  
Commissariat aux Assurances (CAA)  
Administration de l’enregistrement, des domaines et de la TVA (AED)  
Self-regulatory bodies (SRBs):  
o
o
o
o
o
o
Ordre des Experts-Comptables (OEC)  
Institut des Réviseurs d'Entreprises (IRE)  
Chambre des Notaires (CdN)  
Ordre des Avocats de Luxembourg (OAL)  
Ordre des Avocats de Diekirch (OAD)  
Chambre des Huissiers de Justice (CdH)  
14  
 
Ministries and administrations:  
o
o
o
o
Ministry of Justice (MoJ)  
Ministry of Finance (MoF)  
Ministry of Economy (MoE)  
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Development Cooperation and  
Foreign Trade (MoFA)  
o
o
o
Administration des contributions directes (ACD)  
Administration de l’enregistrement, des domaines et de la TVA (AED)  
Administration des douanes et accises (ADA)  
Cellule de renseignement financier (CRF)  
Investigative authorities  
Offices of the investigative judge of the Luxembourg and Diekirch District Court  
Judicial Police Service (SPJ)45  
Prosecution authorities:  
o
o
General State Prosecutor’s Office  
State Prosecutor’s Offices of the Luxembourg and Diekirch District Courts  
Asset management and asset recovery authorities:  
o
Asset Management Office (AMO)  
Asset Recovery Office (ARO)  
o
Others:  
o
o
o
Luxembourg Business Registers (LBR)  
Luxembourg Central Bank (BCL)  
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)  
For the inherent risk assessment, different stakeholders were engaged for the threat and the  
vulnerabilities assessment. For the threat assessment, the analyses were performed together with the  
prosecution authorities and the CRF, with additional inputs from other agencies. The vulnerabilities  
assessment primarily involved supervisors and SRBs as stakeholders, with additional information collected  
from other agencies, such as the LBR.  
The threat and vulnerabilities assessments followed similar stakeholder engagement processes. First, data  
requests were sent to the supervisors, SRBs and prosecution authorities to collect relevant data. Bilateral  
meetings and workshops were held with stakeholders to collect expert insights on the threat or  
vulnerability status in Luxembourg, identify additional data points to be collected and validate hypotheses  
on the levels of risk. Following the data and input collection, findings were summarised in an NRA text  
narrative and scorecards (further detailed in sub-sections below). They were reviewed by the stakeholders  
via written communication and additional bilateral meetings. This process allowed for increasingly  
granular analyses, with follow-up communications typically focusing on higher-risk areas.  
45 The SPJ is the department within the Grand-Ducal Police (PGD) in charge of executing most orders from the State Prosecutors  
and the investigative judges.  
15  
 
To understand the impact of mitigating factors on inherent risks, stakeholders specified above were  
involved. Similar to the inherent risk assessments, data requests were first sent to supervisors, SRBs and  
prosecution authorities, and customised data requests were sent to multiple stakeholders. Bilateral  
meetings were used to collect expert insights from stakeholders, identify areas for further analyses and  
additional data collection, and validate the outcomes of the analyses. The NRA text narratives and  
scorecards were iterated with the appropriate stakeholders to identify specific areas for further analyses  
and validate the final versions of them.  
4.2. Granularity and scope of the NRA  
The figure below illustrates and explains the different levels of granularity of different risk assessment  
types and links them to the “scope” of the NRA exercise.  
Figure 3: Different levels of granularity of risk assessments  
At the top, the macro-level analysis provides a high-level view of the main ML threats and vulnerabiliꢀes  
and thus supports the strategy determinaꢀon and resource allocaꢀon at the naꢀonal level across different  
supervisory, detecꢀon and prosecuꢀon agencies. This analysis assesses Luxembourg’s ML risk at the level  
of predicate offences for threats (e.g. drug trafficking, fraud and counterfeiꢀng) and at the sector-level for  
vulnerabiliꢀes (e.g. banking and insurance). The objecꢀve of this assessment is to compare ML exposure  
across threats and sectors to inform overall strategy and enable resource prioriꢀsaꢀon.  
The meso-level analysis is a mid-level risk assessment which is used as input for the macro-level analysis  
by providing more granular data and inputs. It uses aggregated micro-level data where applicable (e.g.  
reports on the insurance sector), naꢀonal surveys/quesꢀonnaire findings and agency expert opinion. The  
objecꢀve is to inform sector-specific strategy and enable resource prioriꢀsaꢀon within supervisors and  
LEAs.  
16  
   
Data inputs to the meso-level analyses include quanꢀtaꢀve data and qualitaꢀve informaꢀon gathered from  
naꢀonal data sources (some public, some confidenꢀal), and from agencies themselves (e.g. aggregaꢀng  
informaꢀon from AML/CFT quesꢀonnaires) along the dimensions of the assessment criteria. For instance,  
the size of the retail and business banking sub-sectors use data represenꢀng value of customer deposits  
by type and assets.  
Mulꢀple Luxembourg competent authoriꢀes have independently conducted meso-level analyses in the  
form of sub-sector risk assessments. The published versions of those risk assessments are used as inputs  
for the NRA: for example, the CSSF’s risk assessments on private banking46 and collecꢀve investments  
funds47. The sub-sector risk assessments include granular product or segment taxonomies within an  
analysed sub-sector, exposure to threats and subsequent vulnerability assessments. The risk assessments  
also include high-level descripꢀons of exisꢀng miꢀgaꢀng factors put in place both by the public and the  
private sector.  
The micro-level analysis is a detailed risk assessment wherein sectorial inherent risk is assessed at the  
product, service, enꢀty and technical levels, etc. (e.g. current accounts within retail banking most  
commonly used for ML) and threats are analysed at a granular crime level (e.g. different types of fraud  
across VAT fraud, online payment fraud, and their usage for ML). For example, supervisors use enꢀty-level  
risk assessments to determine the enꢀꢀes for which further supervisory off-site measures and on-site  
inspecꢀons will be performed. The objecꢀve of this assessment is to inform supervisory acꢀons and  
idenꢀfy specific enꢀꢀes/products which are higher risk.  
This NRA focuses primarily on the macro- and meso-analyses insofar as they contribute to the mulꢀ-annual  
naꢀonal AML/CFT strategy. The micro-analysis is not a focus of this exercise, as this is addressed by the  
rouꢀne supervisory and intelligence analyses. Moreover, the micro-analysis is for internal use of  
supervisors, intelligence and/or LEAs only.  
4.3. Scorecard approach  
The inherent and residual risk assessment leverage a scorecard approach. As such, there is a separate  
scorecard for the threat assessment, vulnerabiliꢀes assessments and the miꢀgaꢀng factors.  
The three assessments include the following steps, adjusted for their specificiꢀes, which are described in  
the respecꢀve secꢀons below.  
First, the taxonomy and the assessment criteria of the analysis are defined. For example, for the threat  
assessment, the taxonomy covers the predicate offences in Luxembourg, and for the vulnerabiliꢀes  
assessment, it includes the relevant sectors and sub-sectors. The assessment criteria for the threats,  
vulnerabiliꢀes and miꢀgaꢀng factors are defined, together with a raꢀng scale. For example, for the  
vulnerabiliꢀes assessment, criteria include exposure to high-risk geographies or risk profiles of clients.  
Second, available data and informaꢀon are collected against each criterion, which is used to form an  
understanding of the exisꢀng levels of threats, vulnerability or miꢀgaꢀon. The collected data and  
46 CSSF, Private Banking ML/TF Sub-Sector Risk Assessment 2023 update, link.  
47 CSSF, Collective Investment Sector ML/TF Sub-Sector Risk Assessment 2022 update, link; 2025 update, link.  
17  
     
informaꢀon are transformed into a raꢀng against each criterion, which were formalised in the previous  
step. During this stage, analyses and findings are draſted into an NRA text narraꢀve.  
Third and final, the results of the analyses in the second step are aggregated to form a conclusion regarding  
the overall threat level, a sector’s overall vulnerability or the combined effecꢀveness of miꢀgaꢀng factors.  
The analyses are also finalised in text narraꢀves, which are presented in separate secꢀons in the NRA  
below.  
4.4. Inputs used  
This sub-secꢀon describes in detail what data and informaꢀon were used to conduct the NRA. The sources  
of data and informaꢀon leveraged can be broadly categorised into five groups: quanꢀtaꢀve data from  
stakeholders, publicly available quanꢀtaꢀve data, documents describing miꢀgaꢀng factors, expert inputs  
and judgement from stakeholders, case studies and typologies.  
Quanꢀtaꢀve data from stakeholders was collected through standardised data requests and through follow-  
up requests for specific data points. Standardised data requests were sent to different supervisors to  
collect data on vulnerabiliꢀes and miꢀgaꢀng factors and to prosecuꢀon authoriꢀes to collect data on  
threats and miꢀgaꢀng factors. Each data point in the data request could be mapped against a scorecard  
criterion for threats, vulnerabiliꢀes or miꢀgaꢀng factors. In some cases, addiꢀonal data was requested, for  
example, to further develop the understanding of parꢀcular higher-risk factors.  
Publicly available quanꢀtaꢀve data included both internaꢀonal and domesꢀcally available data sets. For  
example, internaꢀonal datasets from various sources were used, such as internaꢀonal insꢀtuꢀons  
(UNODC, OECD, European Commission, European Central Bank, Eurostat), and academia (including  
Organised Crime Porꢃolio). Domesꢀc data sources were used to complete internaꢀonal data sets (e.g. data  
provided by Parquet Général Staꢀsꢀcal Service, CRF Annual Reports, Grand-Ducal Police Annual Reports,  
STATEC datasets, BCL datasets, data from LBR).  
Documents describing miꢀgaꢀng factors were provided by stakeholders for the miꢀgaꢀng factors secꢀon  
in the NRA. Those documents included internal memoranda, describing AML/CFT supervisory frameworks,  
risk assessment policies, and other internal processes. Agencies also provided informaꢀon on published  
circulars, guidance, FAQs and other published materials.  
Expert inputs and judgements were used to enhance the analyses of threats, vulnerabiliꢀes and miꢀgaꢀng  
factors. For the threats assessment, interviews and dedicated workshops were used to receive expert  
inputs on high-risk predicate offences, understand any developments and determine where addiꢀonal  
data was needed. Similarly, for the vulnerability assessments, interviews were used to receive inputs on  
high-risk dimensions of different sub-sectors, understand the sub-sectoral developments over the past  
four years and idenꢀfy addiꢀonal data points to be collected. For the miꢀgaꢀng factors, interviews were  
used to collect addiꢀonal informaꢀon on miꢀgaꢀng factors in place, idenꢀfy key changes in the miꢀgaꢀng  
factors over the past four years and key future development areas.  
Case studies and typologies were collected from different agencies and public sources to enhance the  
vulnerability assessment of sub-sectors further. Typologies from public sources (e.g. FATF) were used to  
18  
 
illustrate the ML drivers of sub-sectors observed globally; and Luxembourg stakeholders provided  
anonymised case studies on previously observed suspicious behaviour by supervised enꢀꢀes or their  
clients.  
From the data limitaꢀons perspecꢀve, note that for cases where informaꢀon was missing, the assessed  
level of risk has been increased, in line with a conservaꢀve approach recommended by the FATF.  
4.5. Methodology for the threats assessment  
Threats are analysed within the inherent risk assessment component of the NRA; that is, in the absence  
of miꢀgaꢀng factors and controls for ML.  
Fundamentally, a threat analysis aims to idenꢀfy the main proceeds-generaꢀng offences that a country’s  
systems are exposed to (i.e. predicate offences, both domesꢀc and internaꢀonal) as well as the criminals  
perpetuaꢀng these offences (i.e. the perpetrators)48. Ulꢀmately, the objecꢀve of the analysis of threats is  
to understand the environment in which predicate offences are commiꢁed to idenꢀfy their nature and to  
assess the exposure to them. The threats assessment is conducted in three different steps:  
1. Taxonomy of predicate offences to analyse and criteria for scorecard are defined;  
2. Data and expert input are gathered for each criterion/offence to understand the threat level;  
and  
3. Findings are summarized in the NRA text.  
In terms of granularity for analysis, threats are assessed along a list of predicate offences in line with FATF  
crime categories49; these map to granular predicate offences (“infracꢀon primaires”) under Luxembourg  
law. Minor adaptaꢀons are made to beꢁer reflect Luxembourg’s reality (for instance, merging “fraud” and  
“forgery”). A list of predicate offences as defined by the Luxembourg Penal Code is included in Appendix  
A. The exposure to these threats is considered separately for domesꢀc and external offences. Although  
terrorism and TF are also predicate offences to ML, a dedicated risk assessment covers risks relaꢀng to TF.  
Similar to the 2020 NRA, three different criteria are considered to assess the exposure to the threats:  
The “likelihood” criterion assesses the level of criminality (e.g. crime rate, number of offences and  
convicꢀons).  
The “size” criterion assesses an esꢀmate of the proceeds generated (e.g. amounts seized, value  
generated, number of STRs) and of the complexity and characterisꢀcs of the laundering, i.e. form  
of proceeds (e.g. cash versus non-cash), ML experꢀse of criminals and geography (origin /  
desꢀnaꢀon).  
The “consequences” criterion helps to disꢀnguish the extent of different threats on financial  
systems and insꢀtuꢀons, as well as the economy and society more generally (i.e. human, social  
and reputaꢀonal impact). This is used for domesꢀc, but not for external offences.  
48 FATF, Money Laundering National Risk Assessment Guidance 2024, link.  
49 FATF, NRA Guidance, 2013, Annex I, link.  
19  
     
Figure 4: Overview of threat assessment criteria  
ML threats are assessed on a scale ranging from “Very Low” to “Very High”. The following assessment  
considers both the level of the external and the domesꢀc threat of ML, along the list of predicate offences.  
The external threat corresponds to the threat that foreign proceeds of crime are laundered in  
Luxembourg (i.e. proceeds of crime commiꢁed outside of Luxembourg). The overall risk level of  
the foreign threat is the funcꢀon of two factors with equal weight: the likelihood/probability of  
the threat and the size/proceeds of the threat.  
The domesꢀc threat corresponds to the threat that proceeds from predicate offences commiꢁed  
in Luxembourg are laundered in Luxembourg or abroad. The overall risk level of the domesꢀc  
threat is the funcꢀon of three factors with equal weight: the likelihood/probability of the threat,  
the size/proceeds of the threat, plus the consequences of the threat.  
Finally, it should be noted that this assessment is based on exisꢀng, publicly available informaꢀon,  
confidenꢀal informaꢀon and expert input. As availability and granularity of data per crime varies and  
considering the number of stakeholders involved in this evaluaꢀon process (and all located at different  
points within the enforcement and penal chain), the associated threat level is a combinaꢀon of  
quanꢀtaꢀve and qualitaꢀve informaꢀon. The assessment does, therefore, not follow a strict scienꢀfic  
approach, nor is it aiming for a scienꢀfic substanꢀaꢀon of results.  
20  
 
Given Luxembourg’s open economy and large financial sector, the country is more exposed to ML offences  
commiꢁed by criminals abroad than domesꢀcally. Consequently, the naꢀonal exposure to each threat is  
calculated as a weighted average between domesꢀc and external exposure, with 25% and 75% weights  
respecꢀvely. For simplicity, the weighꢀng is assumed to be constant across predicate offences. The  
resulꢀng assessment is described in the threats assessment secꢀon of this NRA.  
4.6. Methodology for the vulnerabiliꢀes assessment  
For the (sub-)sector vulnerabilities a similar three-step approach is utilised as for the threat assessment:  
1. Sectors and sub-sectors subject to the analysis and risk assessment criteria are defined;  
2. Data and expert input are gathered for each criterion and information is translated into a  
vulnerability ranking; and  
3. Ratings are aggregated into a sub-sector rating and findings are summarised in the NRA text  
narrative.  
The vulnerabilities assessment involves sectors not mapped based on activity but based on supervisory  
set-up50. The detailed mapping tables for the analysed sectors are outlined in section 6.  
The criteria used in the scorecard for sectorial vulnerabilities include six dimensions and nine sub-  
dimensions:  
Structure (consisting of size and fragmentation/complexity);  
Ownership and legal structure;  
Products and activities;  
Geography (consisting of international business and flows with weak AML/CFT measures  
geographies);  
Client and transactions (consisting of volume and risk); and  
Channels.  
Quantitative data and qualitative information are gathered from national data sources (some public, some  
confidential) along the dimensions of the assessment criteria. The data and information gathered are then  
translated into an informed vulnerability rating on a scale of 1 to 5 against each criterion (5 representing  
highest impact of vulnerability to ML). Where data was missing, expert opinion is used to enrich the  
analysis. The criteria scorecard for the inherent risk scores, together with examples of indicators and data  
used can be found in Appendix B.  
The aggregate inherent risk score across each sub-sector/crime is calculated by averaging the scores  
against each criterion. Equal weighting is given to each criterion. The aggregate inherent risk score is then  
mapped to one of the five outcome levels, ranging from “Very Low” to “Very High”. The risk level  
outcomes are specified in the Appendix B. A separate vulnerability inherent risk outcome is assigned to  
each sub-sector following the scorecard approach described above. The resulting assessment is described  
in the vulnerabilities assessment section of this NRA.  
50 This is based on the legal framework of the supervisory set-up with authorities.  
21  
   
4.7. Methodology for miꢀgaꢀng factors and residual risk  
4.7.1. Methodology for impact of miꢀgaꢀng factors  
Following the inherent risk assessment, impact of miꢀgaꢀng factors is assessed. An effecꢀve system is one  
that “properly idenꢀfies, assesses and understands its money laundering and terrorist financing risks. […]  
A country also co-operates and co-ordinates domesꢀcally to develop AML/CFT policies”51. The aim of this  
part of the NRA is to establish an accurate, factual picture of the results and the effecꢀveness of the current  
AML/CFT framework to miꢀgate inherent ML risk and set up relevant insꢀtuꢀons and idenꢀfy  
improvement measures.  
A three-step approach is followed to assess the impact of miꢀgaꢀng factors:  
1. Definiꢀon of assessment criteria;  
2. Collecꢀon of data and informaꢀon for each criterion and translaꢀon into a raꢀng against each  
criterion;  
3. Aggregaꢀon of raꢀngs into a sub-sector raꢀng and translaꢀon of findings in NRA text narraꢀve.  
To assess the impact of mitigating factors, current practices are discussed with concerned entities along  
a common set of four dimensions: mandate, model, capabilities, and results. This intended to cover the  
full lifecycle of supervision, detection and enforcement: authorisation to act by relevant governmental  
bodies (mandate), set-up (model), resource inputs (capabilities) and outputs (results). The  
results/effectiveness dimensions are then used to inform the scorecard criteria, which include five  
different criteria and nine sub-dimensions:  
Market entry controls (including authorisation and breaches);  
Understanding of ML risks and AML/CFT obligations (including understanding of ML risks and  
AML/CFT obligations and regulation & information);  
Prevention/private sector controls (including ML controls in place and internal supporting  
structures);  
Supervision and enforcement (including level of supervision and enforcement); and  
Detection, prosecution and asset recovery.  
Please note that for the purpose of this NRA, the assessment focuses on vulnerabilities and mitigating  
factors related to ML. Nonetheless, preventive measures, supervisory actions or enforcement measures  
may tackle ML and TF simultaneously.  
The different criteria together with the relevant associated data and information input examples are  
described in Appendix B.  
51 FATF, Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT/CPF  
Systems, 2022, link.  
22  
     
4.7.2. Methodology for residual risks  
The residual risk assessment considers the level of ML risk after the implementation of mitigating  
measures. The residual risk outcomes are used to identify sectors where Luxembourg remains most  
exposed to ML risks. It thus serves as a basis to develop and prioritise strategic actions that can be  
undertaken to further strengthen Luxembourg’s AML/CFT regime and reduce ML risks. Similar to the  
assessment of the sectorial inherent risk, the residual risk is developed in conjunction with the concerned  
authorities.  
The inherent risk scores are determined using the scorecard approach described in the sub-section above  
on a scale from 1 to 5, ranging from “Very Low” risk to “Very High” risk. The scorecard dimensions for  
sectorial vulnerabilities include size of the sub-sector, fragmentation of the market, ownership/legal  
structure of the entities, products/activities, client/transaction volumes, client/transaction risks,  
geographies and international business as well as channels. Scorecards of inherent risk criteria are  
provided in Appendix B.  
Likewise, the mitigating factors impact scores are calculated using the scorecard approach. It takes into  
account criteria such as market entry controls, understanding of ML risks in the sector, rules setting and  
rules enforcement by the supervisors and detection and prosecution statistics. These criteria are also  
provided in Appendix B.  
As with the inherent risk assessment, a combination of research, data, expert judgement and bilateral  
discussions with concerned entities is used to assess the impact of the mitigating factors in place along  
each of the criteria in the scorecard, on a scale from 1 to 5. Luxembourg-specific data is collected from a  
wide range of sources such as annual reports (e.g. CSSF, CRF, CAA), statistics (e.g. STATEC) and non-  
publicly available data from agencies. When data is missing, the assessment is based on expert judgment  
which is formed through agency interactions. As with inherent risk, a lack of detailed statistics increases  
the risk assessment in line with a conservative approach.  
An overall score on the mitigating factors in place is obtained by averaging the scores across the criteria  
and “bucketing” these in 5 possible outcomes: an average score of 1 stands for an outcome of limited or  
no mitigating factors in place”; an average score of 2 stands for some mitigating factors in place”; 3 stands  
for “significant mitigating factors in place”; 4 for “high mitigating factors in place” and 5 for “very high  
mitigating factors in place”. The aggregated outcomes for mitigating factors correspond to a reduction in  
inherent risk of 0, -0,5, -1, -1,5 and -2, respectively.  
Finally, the residual risk score is assessed by taking the inherent risk score (1 to 5) and subtracting the  
mitigating factors outcome (i.e. reducing the score by 0, 0,5, 1, 1,5 or 2 points). This results in a residual  
risk score per sub-sector. An illustration of the residual risk calculation, together with an illustrative  
example, is provided in Appendix B.  
23  
 
5. Inherent risk – threats assessment  
An overview of the ML threat level per category including a breakdown per predicate offence is  
provided in the table below. Threats have been assessed along a list of predicate offences in line with  
FATF crime categories; these map to granular predicate offences under Luxembourg law. A full mapping  
table is provided in Appendix A. The overall threat assessment is based on a weighted average between  
external and domestic exposure, with 75% and 25% weights respectively. Given Luxembourg’s open  
economy and large financial sector, the country is more exposed to ML from criminals abroad than  
domestically. For simplicity, the weighting is assumed to be constant across predicate offences. The rest  
of this section provides a more detailed assessment per crime category, split into external and domestic  
exposure to ML.  
Table 7: Threats assessment, weighted average exposure  
Weighted  
External threat  
level (75%)  
Domesꢀc threat  
Predicate offence  
average  
exposure  
Very High  
level (25%)  
Fraud and forgery  
Tax crimes  
Very High  
Very High  
Very High  
High  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
High  
Very High  
Very High  
High  
Corrupꢀon and bribery  
Drug trafficking  
Parꢀcipaꢀon in an organised criminal group and  
racketeering  
High  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
High  
High  
Sexual exploitaꢀon, including sexual exploitaꢀon of  
children  
Cybercrime  
High  
High  
Medium  
Low  
High  
High  
Counterfeiꢀng and piracy of products  
Smuggling  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Low  
Low  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Low  
Insider trading and market manipulaꢀon  
Robbery and theſt  
Low  
High  
Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling  
Illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods  
Extorꢀon  
Medium  
Low  
Low  
Illicit arms trafficking  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Environmental crime  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Murder and grievous bodily injury  
Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage taking  
Counterfeiꢀng currency  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Very Low  
Very Low  
Very Low  
Very Low  
Piracy  
Low  
24  
   
5.1. External exposure: money laundering of proceeds of foreign crimes  
Given its position as a financial centre and the low level of local criminality, ML of proceeds of foreign  
crimes is the most significant ML threat for Luxembourg. The magnitude, cross-border character and the  
diversity of funds and transactions being handled by Luxembourg’s (non-)financial sectors contribute to  
this exposure. In a similar vein, and considering the limited size of the domestic market, Luxembourg’s  
economy is internationally oriented with a significant share of businesses receiving and disbursing funds  
abroad (cf. section 3).  
ML of foreign crimes accounts for a significant share of mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests52. Across  
all crimes, the prosecuꢀon authoriꢀes received over 2 700 MLA requests requiring coercive measures and  
almost 4 000 MLAs requiring non-coercive measures on aggregate between 2020 and 2023. Those related  
to ML amounted to around 600 (with around 400 ML requests and around 200 addiꢀonal MLA requests).  
The following table summarises the level of likelihood/probability, size/proceeds and overall external  
threat level for every ML-related predicate offence.  
Table 8: External threat level overview  
Likelihood/  
probability  
Very High  
Size/  
proceeds  
Very High  
External threat  
level  
Predicate offence  
Fraud and forgery  
Tax crimes  
Very High  
Very High  
High  
Very High  
Very High  
High  
Very High  
Very High  
High  
Corrupꢀon and bribery  
Drug trafficking  
High  
Parꢀcipaꢀon in an organised criminal group and  
racketeering  
Medium  
Very High  
High  
Sexual exploitaꢀon, including sexual exploitaꢀon of children  
High  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Low  
High  
High  
Cybercrime  
Counterfeiꢀng and piracy of products  
Smuggling  
High  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Low  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Low  
Insider trading and market manipulaꢀon  
Robbery and theſt  
Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling  
Illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods  
Extorꢀon  
Illicit arms trafficking  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Environmental crime  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Murder and grievous bodily injury  
Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage taking  
Counterfeiꢀng currency  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Piracy  
Low  
Low  
Low  
52 Parquet Général Statistical Service.  
25  
     
5.1.1. Fraud and forgery  
Please note that this secꢀon should be read in conjuncꢀon with secꢀons 5.1.5, 5.1.8, and 5.2.1.  
A wide range of different categories of illicit acꢀviꢀes fall within the scope of fraud and forgery (see  
Appendix A). Nevertheless, the following two sub-secꢀons will elaborate on two relevant topics. The first  
tackles cyber-enabled fraud (CEF), a phenomenon that has rapidly evolved over the past few years. A  
second sub-secꢀon addresses fraud affecꢀng the EU’s financial interests, considering that the EPPO  
became operaꢀonal on 1 June 2021, and given that the EPPO has its headquarters and is operaꢀng in  
Luxembourg.  
5.1.1.1.  
Cyber-enabled fraud  
Pursuant to the FATF-Interpol-Egmont Group, CEF has increased significantly in recent years53. Although  
there is no complete esꢀmate of the global magnitude and scale of CEF, its consistent growth has generally  
been acknowledged in the past few years54.  
CEF can take many different forms, but it generally refers to fraud that is enabled through or conducted in  
the cyber environment and that involves (i) transnaꢀonal criminality such as transnaꢀonal actors and funds  
flows and (ii) decepꢀve social engineering techniques (i.e., manipulaꢀng vicꢀms to obtain access to  
confidenꢀal or personal informaꢀon). CEF and related ML are oſten executed by transnaꢀonal organised  
criminal groups or syndicates55.  
Digitalisaꢀon and the development of new technologies serve as key drivers underpinning the scale, scope  
and speed of CEF. Technical innovaꢀon and the conꢀnuing digital transformaꢀon have led to a significant  
evoluꢀon of the payments industry over recent years. As a result, more ciꢀzens (including vulnerable  
groups) are parꢀcipaꢀng in online acꢀvity. At the same ꢀme, digitalisaꢀon means jurisdicꢀons are  
becoming increasingly connected with informaꢀon and funds moving swiſtly across borders. These factors  
have fundamentally altered the criminal landscape and created an environment of increased threats from  
CEF. Generated proceeds are rapidly laundered through a network of accounts. These networks typically  
involve individuals as well as legal enꢀꢀes56:  
Individual money mules may be recruited by criminals via various means, including through job  
offers and adverꢀsements, as well as online social media interacꢀons. Money mules may be  
knowingly complicit in the laundering of funds or work unwiꢂngly (through decepꢀon), or  
negligently, and may also be offered incenꢀves or fees to handle the illicit funds.  
Shell companies are under the control of CEF criminals, and typically have recourse to strawmen  
or nominee directors. Individual money mules recruited may also be instructed to act as such  
strawmen, and open corporate accounts in a bid to further obscure criminal ownership.  
53  
The term cyber-enabled fraud covers: business email compromise, phishing fraud, social media and telecommunication  
impersonation fraud, online trading, online romance fraud, employment scams.  
54 FATF Interpol - Egmont Group, Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud, 2023, link.  
55 FATF Interpol - Egmont Group, Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud, 2023, link.  
56 FATF Interpol - Egmont Group, Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud, 2023, link.  
26  
           
Legiꢀmate companies, similar to individual money mules, may also be tricked into receiving CEF-  
proceeds (e.g. as an investment or business opportunity) and asked to either re-direct the funds  
or be refunded into a separate criminally controlled account. In some cases, legiꢀmate companies  
were observed to willingly accept such “business opportuniꢀes” parꢀcularly in ꢀmes of economic  
distress. The involvement of legiꢀmate companies provides an addiꢀonal façade to mask illicit  
acꢀviꢀes from detecꢀon.  
Usually, CEF related proceeds can be laundered quickly through a network of accounts, which oſten span  
across mulꢀple jurisdicꢀons and FIs. To layer the proceeds of crime, criminals were observed to use cash  
withdrawals in order to transport the funds cross-border and to reinject the funds by using trade-based  
ML techniques (e.g. ficꢀꢀous or false invoicing)57.  
The use of crypto assets, especially with regard to investment fraud, has become more prevalent. Factors  
such as the increase in value of certain crypto assets and growing media aꢁenꢀon around crypto  
investments are also contribuꢀng factors to the steady surge in investment fraud cases. With respect to  
investment fraud, Europol notes that Bitcoins are increasingly being converted to stable coins, most likely  
because they are less subject to price volaꢀlity. The involvement of non-compliant crypto service providers  
with insufficient levels of KYC in offshore jurisdicꢀons remains one of the main challenges in many  
cryptocurrency invesꢀgaꢀons as they oſten give rise to lengthy MLA procedures58,59  
.
As noted earlier, advancements in technology and digitalisaꢀon have given rise to the development of new  
and exisꢀng products and services. One of those services are, for instance, virtual IBANS (vIBAN). While  
vIBANs are used in many different legiꢀmate ways, such as facilitaꢀng and categorising payments from  
mulꢀple parꢀes, the FATF-Egmont report has flagged the abuse of vIBANs as a tool used for CEF-related  
ML60. Moreover, due to the intrinsic characterisꢀcs of vIBANs (cf. Insight Box 2), LEAs are faced with  
difficulꢀes in idenꢀfying and tracing of illicit funds transiꢀng through vIBANs.  
Insight Box 2: Virtual IBAN  
What is a virtual IBAN?  
Virtual International Bank Account numbers, also known as vIBANs are functionally identical to regular  
IBANs in that they can be used to send and receive payments on a global scale. They are functionally  
and visually indistinguishable from regular IBANs61.  
Whereas a regular IBAN is directly matched to a bank account (i.e., there is only one single bank account  
linked to each individual IBAN number), a vIBAN is a virtual number that is not matched to an account  
in a physical bank. They are bank-issued reference numbers that enable incoming payments to be  
rerouted to a physical IBAN, which is itself linked to a physical bank account. vIBANs cannot hold any  
57 FATF Interpol - Egmont Group, Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud, 2023, link.  
58 Europol, Internet organised crime threat assessment 2024, link.  
59 “Stablecoin” refers to a type of cryptocurrency where the value of the digital asset is supposed to be linked to a reference asset,  
which is either fiat money, exchange-traded commodities or another cryptocurrency, making it less subject to price volatility than  
other types of cryptocurrencies.  
60 FATF Interpol - Egmont Group, Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud, 2023, link.  
61 FATF Interpol - Egmont Group, Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud, 2023, link.  
27  
           
funds, and their balance is constantly zero. vIBAN holders can also have several unique vIBANs, which  
reroute and centralize all payments into a single physical bank account. Furthermore, vIBANs may be  
issued by FIs without a banking licence (e.g. Payment Service Providers, EMIs)62.  
VIBANs are often used for legitimate purposes, such as for the international management of receivables  
as payments can be received by geographical zone or currency63. They can also be used for  
reconciliation and record-keeping processes, for example in situations where big utilities companies  
manage a large number of customers and payments64. These FIs and providers can then re-issue the  
vIBANs to their own clients. If these clients are also FIs and providers of vIBANs, they can again re-issue  
the vIBANs to their clients.  
Since vIBANs are visually identical to conventional IBANs, they can make transaction monitoring and  
the detection of suspicious transactions difficult for the following reasons:  
vIBANs can be created remotely from any country around the world, and account holders can  
choose between different country codes when creating a new vIBAN. Thus, it may be  
challenging to identify where the physical account is located.  
a vIBAN can have multiple intermediaries before arriving at its final client. These multiple  
intermediaries increase the level of complexity and ambiguity as it might be challenging to  
identify the “true” issuer65.  
5.1.1.2.  
Fraud affecꢀng the EU’s financial interests expenditure fraud  
Overall, the EU budget is used to finance EU prioriꢀes and projects that most EU Member States could not  
finance on their own, either because of the project’s size or its cross-border nature. The EU adopts long-  
term spending plans, known as mulꢀ-annual financial frameworks66. This budget is financed, amongst  
others, by a proporꢀon of each EU country’s gross naꢀonal income, custom duꢀes and a porꢀon of the  
VAT collected by each EU country67.  
The current EU 2021-2027 Mulꢀannual Financial Framework (MFF) foresees a spending of EUR 1,211  
trillion topped up with an addiꢀonal EUR 806,9 billion stemming from the NextGeneraꢀonEU. These funds  
are allocated to different programs and public funds, such as the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund  
(EUR 291 billion) or the European Regional Development Fund (EUR 226 billion)68.  
The following graph depicts the level of EU spending and revenue within the MFF for years 2020 to 2023.  
62 Europol Financial Intelligence Public Private Partnership. A copy of this document can be requested from the CRF by sending a  
request via goAML.  
63 CTIF-CFI, Annual report 2021, link.  
64 EBA, EBA Report on ML/TF risks affecting the EU’s financial sector, 2023, link.  
65 Europol Financial Intelligence Public Private Partnership. A copy of this document can be requested from the CRF by sending a  
request via goAML.  
66 European Union, How the EU budget is spent, link retrieved October 2024.  
67 European Union, How the EU budget is financed, link retrieved October 2024.  
68 European Commission, EU spending and revenue 2021-2027, link retrieved October 2024.  
28  
             
Figure 5: EU budget spending, 2020-202369  
EU spending (in EUR million)  
300,000.00  
250,000.00  
200,000.00  
150,000.00  
100,000.00  
50,000.00  
-
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
Insight Box 3: The European Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)  
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) – Mission and tasks  
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is the independent prosecution office of the EU. It is  
responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment crimes against the financial  
interests of the EU. These include several types of fraud as subsidy fraud, cross-border VAT fraud with  
damages above EUR 10 million, ML, corruption, etc.  
The EPPO undertakes investigations, carries out acts of prosecution and exercises the functions of  
prosecutor in the competent courts of the participating Member States, until the case has been finally  
disposed of. Up until the EPPO started its operations, only national authorities could investigate and  
prosecute these crimes, but their powers stopped at the borders of their country. The EPPO was  
established to enhance the fight against crimes impacting the financial interests of the Union by  
addressing inter alia the fragmentation of such national prosecutions. This objective relies on the  
EPPO’s ability to proactively, comprehensively, and efficiently identify connections among ongoing  
investigations, maintaining a continuous overview of this inherently cross-border form of organised  
crime. Organisations like Eurojust, OLAF and Europol do not have the necessary powers to carry out  
such criminal investigations and prosecutions.  
What are the financial interests of the EU?  
69 EU spending and revenue Data 2000 – 2023, link retrieved on 20 September 2024.  
29  
     
All revenues, expenditures and assets covered by, acquired through, or due to the EU budget and the  
budgets of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies established under the Treaties, and budgets  
managed and monitored by them70,71  
.
By 31 December 2023, the EPPO had 1 927 acꢀve invesꢀgaꢀons for an esꢀmated damage of over EUR 19,2  
billion.  
The 2023 annual report of the EPPO notes that by the end of 2023, around one third of the offences  
invesꢀgated by the laꢁer concerned alleged non-procurement expenditure fraud. This type of fraud is  
commiꢁed via the use or presentaꢀon of false, incorrect or incomplete documents in order to receive  
funds (financial aid, subsidies) from the EU budget, which they would otherwise not be enꢀtled to. The  
EPPO detected such type of frauds in sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, infrastructure, regional  
development, healthcare, social affairs, youth and labor, research and innovaꢀon and support for small  
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Recovery funds related to the consequences of the Covid-19  
pandemic, parꢀcularly those covered by the European Commission’s Recovery and Resilience Facility, were  
also targeted by fraudsters.  
Around 8,5% of the offences invesꢀgated by the EPPO by the end of 2023 concerned suspected  
procurement expenditure fraud, which oſten consists in unlawfully manipulaꢀng tendering procedures for  
public works, and is predominantly commiꢁed via the use or presentaꢀon of false, incorrect or incomplete  
statements or documents. The following sectors were idenꢀfied as being vulnerable to this type of fraud:  
agriculture, infrastructure and regional development, educaꢀon, research and innovaꢀon, social affairs  
and human resources as well as funds related to the Covid-19 pandemic.  
The EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the cornerstone of NextGeneraꢀonEU, an EU recovery  
instrument aiming to repair the immediate economic and social damage of the COVID-19 pandemic. The  
RRF will disburse up to EUR 648 billion (in 2022 prices) in grants and loans to EU Member States. By the  
end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 acꢀve invesꢀgaꢀons related to NextGeneraꢀonEU funding, with an  
esꢀmated damage of over EUR 1,8 billion. This represents approximately 15% of all the cases of  
expenditure fraud handled by the EPPO in 2023, but in terms of esꢀmated damage, it corresponds to  
almost 25%. This shows that NextGeneraꢀonEU funding is a target for fraudster. EPPO’s invesꢀgaꢀons  
concerned a variety of projects financed under NextGeneraꢀonEU: public transport; public infrastructure;  
the green economy and technology; support to company compeꢀveness; innovaꢀon and digital  
transformaꢀon; training and development; educaꢀon and research; health; and public administraꢀon.  
Invesꢀgaꢀons into offences related to specific programmes, such as the ‘repair bonus’ and the ‘energy  
bonus, designed to support ciꢀzens in making environmentally sustainable choices were also opened. In  
2023, the main sources of detecꢀon and reporꢀng to the EPPO in this area were, by far, naꢀonal LEAs.  
Their ability to detect fraud in this area was the strongest when they took a pro-acꢀve analyꢀc approach.  
70 EPPO, Mission and task, link retrieved on 30 July 2024.  
71 The Directive (EU) 2017/1371 (the PIF Directive”) defines which crimes are considered crimes affecting the EU budget as well  
as the notion of financial interest of the EU”.  
30  
   
In several cases (especially those related to NextGeneraꢀonEU), the EPPO observed that the frauds were  
related to funds that had been wired to beneficiaries as an upfront payment, in order to cope with the  
expenses of the iniꢀal phase of a project. In fact, these beneficiaries turned out to be sham companies or  
ficꢀꢀous economic operators; the projects were not effecꢀvely carried out, and the funds were  
immediately transferred to bank accounts abroad, with a final desꢀnaꢀon in non-EU countries72.  
According to the EPPO, the Luxembourg’s office handled several assisꢀng measures in expenditure fraud  
cases invesꢀgated in other EPPO Member States.  
5.1.1.3.  
Luxembourg’s external threat exposure to fraud and forgery  
With regard to the Luxembourg context, its posiꢀon as a payments, investment and cyber hub increases  
the likelihood that criminals (in Luxembourg and abroad) commit fraud involving Luxembourg-based FIs  
(wiꢂngly or unwiꢂngly) and potenꢀally launder the proceeds of that fraud via Luxembourg.  
This is further outlined by the FATF mutual evaluaꢀon reports of Luxembourg’s key inward investment  
countries which cite fraud as a key ML threat (cf. Insight Box 1). Considering the significance and extent  
of these financial flows, some of these might be linked to fraud.  
For instance, the Grand-Ducal Police has observed that some PIs established in Luxembourg are misused  
to transfer funds originaꢀng from fraudulent acꢀviꢀes to crypto-currency exchange plaꢃorms73.  
Between 2020 and 2023, the CRF idenꢀfied around 79 000 reports with respect to fraud and around  
13 000 with regard to forgery. Among these 92 000 reports, about 86 500 were filed by enꢀꢀes operaꢀng  
online74. It should be noted that these enꢀꢀes file, in general, the most significant number of reports with  
the CRF. These enꢀꢀes use effecꢀve and highly sophisꢀcated transacꢀon monitoring tools. Besides,  
numerous of these enꢀꢀes have established their European headquarter in Luxembourg. Consequently,  
the only link with Luxembourg is the headquartered enꢀty and the Luxembourg account. The CRF  
disseminates relevant informaꢀon with their foreign counterparts through internaꢀonal cooperaꢀon  
mechanisms and froze about EUR 55 million75.  
Overall, the judicial authoriꢀes and LEAs noted that fraudsters target both natural and legal persons and  
that the prejudice may be very small or very significant, depending on the type and profile of the targeted  
person. The following case study illustrates a case of abusing assets of a foreign non-profit organizaꢀon  
(NPO):  
72 EPPO, 2023 Annual Report, link.  
73 Police Grand Ducale, Rapport d’activités 2023, link.  
74  
Please note that throughout section 5, the definition of “entities operating online” refers to the one included in the CRF’s  
annual reports (section 2.1.2 prestataires en ligne) and encompasses PIs, EMIs, VASPs, and banks operating online. The CRF’s  
annual reports can be accessed here: link.  
75 CRF, Rapport annuel 2021-2022, link and CRF, Rapport annuel 2023, link.  
31  
       
Case study 1: External threat – fraud/abuse of a foreign NPO’s assets76  
Suspicions were raised based on various wire transfers observed between a foreign NPO, a  
Luxembourgish company (hereaſter “LuxCo”) and the private account of the LuxCo’s ulꢀmate beneficial  
owner (hereaſter “Mr. X”).  
The foreign NPO paid substanꢀal sums to Mr. X’s personal bank accounts in Luxembourg and abroad, as  
well as the LuxCo’s corporate bank account. The funds received from the foreign NPO were the LuxCo’s  
sole source of income. Moreover, no apparent link existed between the foreign NPO’s acꢀvity and the  
LuxCo’s official business purpose according to which the LuxCo should be acꢀve in sales, markeꢀng and  
distribuꢀon of various objects and products to professionals.  
Furthermore, outgoing payments to accounts of Mr. X’s family were idenꢀfied. The funds were then  
used for private purposes, as for example the purchase of different real estate properꢀes or cars.  
Which was even more serious, was the fact that the inflows of the foreign NPO’s Luxembourgish bank  
account were exclusively donaꢀons paid in from foreign debit cards and relaꢀng to donaꢀons made for  
sick children. No outgoing transacꢀon in connecꢀon with the fulfillment of the foreign NPO’s purpose  
was observed.  
Red flags:  
No online presence, website or official lisꢀng of the foreign NPO.  
Circular transacꢀons between the ulꢀmate beneficial owner’s account, the LuxCo and the  
foreign NPO.  
No outgoing transacꢀons in line with the NPO’s purpose.  
No incoming and outgoing transacꢀons in line with the LuxCo’s business purpose.  
Judicial authoriꢀes received, between 2020 and 2023, over 1 200 MLA requests in relaꢀon to fraud and  
forgery. The Grand-Ducal Police observes that fraud is among the top-five crime area with regard to  
incoming and outgoing informaꢀon exchange via Europol’s secure informaꢀon exchange network  
applicaꢀon.  
Considering the above, the overall external threat level is assessed to be “Very High”.  
5.1.2. Tax crimes  
It should be noted that this section should be read in conjunction with sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.5.  
Tax crimes relate to both direct tax and indirect tax crimes.  
76 Case study provided by the CRF.  
32  
     
5.1.2.1.  
Direct taxes  
Overall, there are two main scenarios on how Luxembourg may be exposed to ML from direct tax crimes  
committed abroad77:  
A non-resident natural person may open an account in Luxembourg and place funds non-declared  
in his/her residence country. Nevertheless, this typology may be less prevalent since the EU  
adopted the Common Reporting Standards (CRS) for the automatic exchange of information  
regarding financial accounts between tax authorities. In a similar vein, it should be mentioned  
that Luxembourg has also signed numerous agreements and Memoranda of Understanding  
(MoUs) with other countries and international organisations with regard to fiscal matters and  
exchange of information. A full list of these agreements can be found on the ACD's website;  
A Luxembourg legal person (tax resident) may be misused as part of other arrangements to  
deceive foreign tax authorities or to avoid that a non-resident person pays taxes in its home  
country.  
The level of tax and banking transparency has significantly increased in recent years78. Nonetheless, there  
is a risk that Luxembourg non-residents continue trying to abuse or misuse Luxembourg FIs and DNFBPs  
(i.e., lawyers and accountants) to commit tax crimes in their residence country.  
As noted above, intra-administrative international cooperation in tax matters is an important mitigating  
measure to prevent tax crimes. The number of these exchanges (see Insight Box below) and the partner  
country involved may provide information useful for the assessment of this threat, especially with regard  
to Luxembourg’s financial centre.  
Insight Box 4: EOIR and AEOI  
Both EOIR and AEOI are cross-border information sharing mechanisms for tax purposes between tax  
administrations.  
Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR): Exchanges of tax information on request are carried out  
by a requesting tax administration that needs information or documents available in the requested  
country as part of a tax investigation when it has exhausted internal avenues and when the criterion of  
foreseeable relevance is met. When the administration does not hold the requested information, it  
sends an injunction request to the holder of the information to transmit it, after receipt, to the  
requesting country.  
Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI): Various international agreements, including Directive  
2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation (DAC), as amended, require the ACD to automatically  
exchange with other partner jurisdictions (EU Member States or OECD countries), namely:  
data relating to certain persons and income (e.g. salaries, pensions, directors’ fees) received in  
Luxembourg by non-residents;  
77  
The case of a Luxembourg legal person being misused to commit tax crimes in Luxembourg that may be laundered in  
Luxembourg or abroad is considered as domestic exposure.  
78 Access to the MoF’s thematic dossier presenting Luxembourg’s commitment with regard to tax transparency: link.  
33  
     
data relating to financial assets and accounts held in Luxembourg by non-residents;  
country-by-country reports filed by constituent entities in Luxembourg;  
tax rulings;  
cross-border arrangements filed by intermediaries or taxpayers in Luxembourg,  
declarations of platform operators.  
In a similar vein, partner jurisdictions must send the ACD, namely data relating to Luxembourg residents  
and their income or country-by-country reports/tax rulings/cross-border arrangements filed in their  
jurisdiction. This data is exchanged annually within predefined deadlines through computerized  
systems.  
Considering Luxembourg’s position as a transnational financial centre, the number of outgoing AEOI  
and the number of incoming EOIR exceeds the number of incoming AEOI and outgoing EOIR, except for  
cross-border arrangements filed by intermediaries or taxpayers where the number of incoming AEOI  
exceeds the number of outgoing AEOI.  
The following two figures evidence the number of EOIR received by the ACD as well as the number of  
outgoing AEOI sent by the ACD.  
Figure 6: Incoming requests for tax informaꢀon (EOIR), 2020 - 202379  
1200  
1109  
961  
1000  
845  
833  
800  
600  
400  
200  
0
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
Following the pandemic, the number of EOIR fell in 2020 and 2021 saw a surge in the number of requests  
(catch-up phenomenon). Overall, about two third of all requests of information related to natural persons  
and most of them originated from France (about 45% of all EOIR). This high level of requests is mainly due  
to the presence of French corporate groups and the number of bank accounts held by French residents in  
Luxembourg.  
79 ACD data.  
34  
   
Figure 7: Outgoing AEOI, 2020 - 202380  
3,839,088  
3,900,000  
3,800,000  
3,829,907  
3,700,000  
3,561,352  
3,541,988  
3,600,000  
3,500,000  
3,400,000  
3,300,000  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
The number of outgoing AEOI averages about 3,7 million per year. Most of these reports were addressed  
to the fiscal authorities of Luxembourg neighboring countries, namely Germany (about 33%), France  
(about 14%) and Belgium (about 10%).  
5.1.2.2.  
Indirect taxes  
Overall, there are two main scenarios on how Luxembourg may be exposed to ML from indirect tax crimes  
committed abroad81:  
A non-resident person may set up a Luxembourg legal person (tax resident) to commit tax crimes  
in their home country (i.e. criminal use of complex and non-transparent structures). The predicate  
offence is thus committed by abusing a Luxembourg legal person (e.g. involvement of a  
Luxembourg legal person through so-called “Missing Trader Intra Community” (MTIC) or VAT  
carousel frauds); and  
The growth of e-commerce facilitating the cross-border sale of goods and services subject to VAT  
and the presence of entities in Luxembourg processing such transactions could expose the  
country to fraudulent businesses trying to evade their VAT obligations82.  
Insight Box 5: MTIC fraud and Carousel fraud83  
MTIC fraud and carousel fraud are two forms of fraud in which a business disappears without paying  
the VAT due to the tax authorities or requesting a VAT refund from the government. In both cases the  
VAT can be seen as a profit for the missing trader” who disappears with the money. For MTIC and  
carousel fraud, cross-border trade is important as intra-community trade has a zero-rate VAT taxation.  
There are many different and complex versions of MTIC.  
MTIC fraud  
80 ACD data.  
81  
The case of a Luxembourg legal person being misused to commit tax crimes in Luxembourg that may be laundered in  
Luxembourg or abroad is considered as domestic exposure.  
82  
Council Directive (EU) 2020/284 of 18 February 2020 amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards introducing certain  
requirements for payment service providers, link.  
83 European Parliament, Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud, 2021, link.  
35  
           
The Commission describes a missing trader” as a trader registered as a taxable person for VAT  
purposes who, potentially with a fraudulent intent, acquires or purports to acquire goods or services  
without payment of VAT and supplies goods and services with VAT but does not remit the VAT due to  
the appropriate national authority. A missing trader could potentially only exist on paper and does not  
necessarily be an actual functioning company. MTIC works as follows: Company A (supplier) in Member  
State 1 sells goods or services to Company B (missing trader) in Member State 2. As this is a cross-  
border transaction, the zero-rate applies to the selling of the goods or services. Company B thereafter  
sells the goods or services to Company C (customer) in Member State 2. Now the VAT rate of Member  
State 2 applies. After the sale Company B disappears without remitting the VAT due to the authorities  
of Member State 2.  
Carousel fraud  
In the case of carousel fraud the same goods and services are sold by a group of companies in a circle.  
These companies receive and claim reimbursements of VAT that have never been paid. The main  
difference between simple MTIC and carousel fraud is that the goods and services arrive back at the  
original seller and therefore concluding the circle. This circle can be very extensive with the inclusion of  
buffer companies. These buffer companies serve to hide the fraud from the authorities. Often the  
buffer company is located in the chain behind the missing trader to make the investigations of the fraud  
scheme more difficult. Carousel fraud could extend to more than ten companies and over multiple  
Member States. VAT-registered companies are allowed to claim VAT on their cross-border purchases  
often resulting in a request for a VAT refund. ‘The purchaser not paying VAT to the supplier must declare  
an intra-community acquisition in the Member State of destination. This VAT is deductible.’  
Carousel fraud works as follows: Company A (conduit company) in Member State 1 sells goods or  
services to Company B (missing trader) in Member State 2. Here the zero-rate VAT tariff applies.  
Company B sells the goods and services to Company C (broker company) in Member State 2 and here  
the VAT rate of Member State 2 applies. Company B then disappears. Company C then sells the goods  
or services back to Company A in Member State 1. As Company C bought the products on the domestic  
market of Member State 2, it had to pay VAT to Company B. The sell between Company C to Company  
A in Member State 1 is an intracommunity sell and therefore Company C can ask for a refund of the  
VAT paid to Company B. Therefore, a double loss occurs for the budget of Member State 2 as the  
missing trader (Company B) never remit the VAT due and the broker (Company C) requests for a refund  
of the VAT paid to the missing trader.  
As for fraud and forgery (cf. section 5.1.1), most of the suspicious transaction/activity reports (STR/SAR)  
were filed by entities operating online84 (and especially those being active in relation with e-commerce  
platforms) in case they note that sales occur in circumstances raising doubts about VAT compliance.  
84 Please note that throughout section 5, the definition of “entities operating online” refers to the one included in the CRF’s  
annual reports (section 2.1.2 prestataires en ligne) and encompasses PIs, EMIs, VASPs, and banks operating online. The CRF’s  
annual reports can be accessed here: link.  
36  
 
The AED received 1 054 requests for information from foreign counterparties (mostly neighboring  
countries) between 2020 and 2023, i.e. an average of 263 per year with a pic of 452 in 2021.  
Insight Box 6: Indirect taxes – risk signals idenꢀfied by the AED  
Indirect taxes: risk signals identified by the AED  
With respect to identified risk signals, the AED notes that especially with regard to trade with cars,  
mobile phones and luxury watches, the abuse of the margin scheme was the most commonly used  
mechanism, besides the MTIC fraud schemes. The abuse of the margin scheme could be detected  
predominantly at the import (watches/mobile phones) or after acquiring intracommunity goods under  
the normal VAT regime.  
In the past few years, fictious trades in cross-invoicing schemes emerged. Traders are faking entire  
transactions including transportation and financial documentation, documents which are usually  
requested in presence of exempted intracommunity transactions. Third-party payments are a common  
pattern and despite strict AML measures, transactions paid in cash remain frequent, especially in the  
beverage sector.  
Another trend concerns trade-based ML. In such schemes, cash from very likely illegal activities (e.g.  
over-/under-invoicing of goods and services, over-/under-shipment of goods and services, multiple  
invoicing of goods and services, etc.) is being merged with a linked trader’s regular revenue on bank  
accounts in order to purchase goods such as FMCG (fast moving consumer goods), hygienic products  
or cigarettes.  
The goods are sold either in genuine B2C transaction chains or through B2B grey/black market, involving  
cross-invoicing schemes to simulate exempted intracommunity transactions. Most of the transactions  
are paid in cash, very often small amounts below EUR 2 000. The newly generated cash is used for  
instance to pay off illicit workers in labor intensive sectors, under control of a criminal group.  
Fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests – revenue fraud (VAT fraud)  
As noted earlier under section 5.1.1, the EU budget is financed from various sources such as a proportion  
of each EU Member State gross national income, custom duties and parts of the VAT collected by each  
Member State85. As already touched on in the Insight box above, VAT carousel fraud, or MTIC fraud, are  
among the most profitable crimes in the EU, costing around EUR 50 billion annually in tax losses to  
Member States.  
Investigations relating to cross-border VAT fraud involving damages of at least EUR 10 million fall within  
the remit of the EPPO. In 2022, the EPPO uncovered organised crime groups with criminal activities  
spreading through all EPPO participating Member States as well as other European and third countries,  
responsible for VAT fraud estimated at EUR 6,7 billion86.  
85 European Union, how the EU budget is financed, link.  
86 Note that EUR 2,2 billion are related to the Admiral case (see Case study below).  
37  
     
Actually, it is mainly in connection with the VAT fraud cases investigated by the EPPO that ML occurs, with  
fraudsters transferring unduly obtained funds to the bank accounts of companies set up abroad or  
managed by family members, or withdrawing the money in cash. In general, ML is also committed through  
the acquisition of real estate or luxury goods which are then resold, making it more difficult to trace the  
funds, or by reinvesting the profits from criminal activities in economic activities on licit and illicit markets,  
such as drug trafficking.  
Most VAT cases investigated by the EPPO are linked to Luxembourg due to the presence of international  
stakeholders handling market places all around Europe87.  
The two case studies below show how Luxembourg is affected by such transnational schemes  
orchestrated by organised crime groups.  
Case study 2: Invesꢀgaꢀon Admiral uncovers massive VAT fraud and ML scheme, with esꢀmated losses  
up to EUR 2,2 billion88  
In December 2023, EPPO’s office in Porto (Portugal) filed an indictment against 12 suspects and 15  
companies in the context of an invesꢀgaꢀon into a massive VAT fraud scheme spread through 30  
countries, code-named ‘Admiral’. The defendants are alleged to have used a network of companies to  
evade the payment of VAT while trading in electronic devices, by using fraudulent invoices and tax  
declaraꢀons. The fraudulent scheme took advantage of EU rules on cross-border transacꢀons between  
its Member States as these are exempt from VAT by using a chain of traders that did not fulfil their  
tax obligaꢀons. The suspects are also accused of ML, by having channeled the illicit VAT profits to bank  
accounts in non-EU countries. According to the evidence, in order to hide the criminal origin of the  
profits, the defendants invested in real estate and in the sale of luxury products in the EU, amassing  
fortunes in the process. A private banking manager is understood to have helped the group to avoid the  
AML rules in place. If found guilty, the defendants face up to 25 years imprisonment. The esꢀmated  
damage in Portugal alone amounts to over EUR 80 million. The esꢀmated losses to the EU and to the  
naꢀonal budgets under the Admiral invesꢀgaꢀon amounts to EUR 2,2 billion.  
In this case, a set of Luxembourg companies were used as conduit companies, but also acꢀvely  
intervened in the ML scheme with at least 11 bank accounts idenꢀfied. For the trade, the fraudsters  
extensively used the service of PIs based in Luxembourg, with at least 41 accounts idenꢀfied, in which  
more than EUR 500 million circulated. That amount was the product of the sales and consꢀtuted,  
ulꢀmately, the origin of the crime proceeds. It was furthermore highlighted during the invesꢀgaꢀon that  
the criminal organizaꢀon behind the fraudulent scheme managed to incorporate two Luxembourg  
companies, via Luxembourg ‘company providers’, for the purposes of bringing the illicit gains from a  
third country to Luxembourg by reinvesꢀng them in real estate and other financial products.  
The invesꢀgaꢀon of this case is sꢀll ongoing and the suspects are enꢀtled to the presumpꢀon of  
innocence.  
87 Press release 29/11/2022 of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, Operation Admiral, link.  
88 EPPO.  
38  
     
Case study 3: Invesꢀgaꢀon Admiral 2.0: Europe's biggest VAT fraud with links to organised crime89  
Taking advantage of its decentralised model and central analytical capacity, the EPPO was able to  
establish links between persons and companies under investigation Admiral, and a criminal syndicate  
based in the Baltics. The investigation revealed that this syndicate used the same modus operandi, and  
partly also the same organisation and infrastructure, as the perpetrators investigated under Admiral,  
to carry out a massive VAT carousel fraud a complex criminal scheme that takes advantage of EU rules  
on cross-border transactions between its Member States, as these are exempt from VAT.  
According to the investigation, the suspects established companies in 15 EU Member States, acting as  
legitimate suppliers of electronic goods. They sold over EUR 1,48 billion worth of popular electronic  
devices via online marketplaces to customers located in the EU. While the end customers paid VAT on  
their purchases, the selling companies would not fulfil their tax obligations. By simply disappearing,  
they would avoid transferring the amounts due to the responsible national tax authorities. Other  
companies in the fraudulent chain would subsequently claim VAT reimbursement from the national tax  
authorities, creating an estimated VAT damage of EUR 297 million. In this case, the proceeds of the  
crime were partly deposited on a number of accounts held by PIs located in Luxembourg for a total  
amount of EUR 600 million, which were, from there, laundered through different third countries. The  
EPPO suspects over 400 companies to be part of this complex fraudulent scheme, which is also believed  
to have been used for laundering proceeds stemming from drug trafficking, different types of  
cybercrime, and investment fraud.  
All persons concerned are presumed innocent until proven guilty in the competent courts of law.  
According to EPPO’s annual report 2023, by 31 December 2023, the EPPO had a total of 1 927 active  
investigations for an overall estimated damage of EUR 19,2 billion. The EPPO notes in its 2023 annual  
report that as of 31 December 2023, 339 (i.e. 18%) active investigations related to VAT fraud with a total  
estimated damage of EUR 11,5 billion. With regard to Luxembourg more precisely, the EPPO notes that  
among the 13 active investigations, two related to VAT fraud with a total estimated damage of EUR 30  
million90.  
The EPPO further indicates in its 2023 annual report that this type of fraud was predominantly committed  
through the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete VAT documents. This type of crime was  
also committed by sophisticated criminal organisations acting across borders. The EPPO identified,  
amongst others, the automotive sector, dealers selling electronic and textile merchandise, and  
pharmaceutical products, IT hardware and software, as well as dealers selling alcoholic and non-alcoholic  
beverages as sectors most exposed to this type of fraud.  
89 Investigation Admiral 2.0: Europe’s biggest VAT fraud with links to organised crime | European Public Prosecutor’s Office,  
90 EPPO, 2023 Annual Report, link.  
39  
     
Last but not least, the EPPO and the AED mentioned cases where Luxembourg legal persons were involved  
in a VAT carrousel, and served as conduits, with the origin and the final destination of the funds being in  
a foreign country.  
5.1.2.3.  
Luxembourg’s external threat exposure to tax crime  
Luxembourg legal persons may be abused to commit crimes in relation with direct and indirect tax crimes.  
Data from the LBR suggests that the number of legal persons registered with the Trade and Companies  
Register (Registre de Commerce et des Sociétés, RCS) has increased throughout the observation period.  
Considering Luxembourg’s openness to international business and risks related to tax crimes with regard  
to non-resident persons, the graph below outlines the share of Luxembourg legal persons with a beneficial  
owner (BO), respectively senior management official (SMO) (dirigeant principal”) residing in  
Luxembourg, the EU, or outside of the EU.  
Table 9: number of legal persons registered with the RCS as at 31/12, 2020-2023  
Year  
Number of legal persons registered with the  
Variaꢀon (compared to prior  
RCS  
year)  
+0,2%  
+3,6%  
+1,3%  
2021  
2022  
2023  
139 430  
144 438  
146 297  
The figures below provide a breakdown of the country of residence of Luxembourg legal persons BO91 and  
SMOs92 as registered with the LBR. Most of these enꢀꢀes are controlled, owned or managed by either a  
Luxembourg or EU resident.  
Figure 8: Share of legal persons where BOs reside in Luxembourg, EU, non-EU and high-risk countries,  
2021-202393  
2023  
2022  
2021  
0%  
10%  
20%  
30%  
40%  
50%  
EU resident person  
person residing in high-risk country  
60%  
70%  
80%  
90%  
100%  
LU resident person  
non-EU resident person  
91 Pursuant to article 1, paragraph 7, letter a), point i) of the 2004 AML/CFT Law.  
92 Pursuant to article 1, paragraph 7, letter a), point ii) of the 2004 AML/CFT Law.  
93 Please note that a legal person is assumed to be owned or controlled by a person from a high risk-country if at least one person  
resides in a high-risk country. A high-risk country is a country that was listed by FATF as jurisdiction under increased monitoring.  
40  
         
Figure 9: Share of legal persons where SMOs reside in Luxembourg, EU, non-EU and high-risk countries,  
2021-202394  
2023  
2022  
2021  
0%  
10%  
20%  
30%  
40%  
50%  
EU resident person  
person residing in high-risk country  
60%  
70%  
80%  
90%  
100%  
LU resident person  
non-EU resident person  
Between 2020 and 2023, the CRF received almost 20 000 reports in relation with tax crimes. Although the  
number of reports has more than doubled, from around 2 300 reports in 2020 to almost 5 700 in 2023,  
the CRF considers that the increase is the result of increased awareness and sensibilisation efforts among  
obliged entities. Supervisors, professional organisations and the CRF are indeed continuously organising  
and participating in trainings and conferences with the private sector in order to raise awareness on the  
latest typologies and trends with regard to tax crimes. For instance, on 3 July 2020 the CSSF issued circular  
20/744 to complement circular 17/650 with additional indicators of laundering of an aggravated tax fraud  
or tax evasion95. In addition, the increase could also be explained by the increasing vigilance of e-  
commerce platforms and their enhanced cooperation with tax authorities following the introduction of  
new rules regarding their responsibility for the correct application and remittance of VAT by foreign  
traders (e.g. EU Directive 2020/284).  
Prosecution authorities received 118 MLA requests in 2020 2023 related to tax crimes. In 2020 and 2021,  
prosecution authorities seized assets worth EUR 5,49 million (6 seizures) as a result of MLA requests  
related to tax crimes, compared to EUR 3,26 million (11 seizures) in 2018 and 201996.  
The overall external threat level is assessed to be “Very High”.  
or as a high-risk jurisdiction subject to a call for action as at year end of the analysed year. A legal person is assumed to be owned  
or controlled by a resident from a non-EU country if at least one person resides in a non-EU country. A legal person is assumed  
to be owned or controlled by a EU resident if at least one person is from an EU country, but none from a non-EU country and  
none from a high-risk country. A legal person is assumed to be owned or controlled by a resident person if all persons owning or  
controlling the legal person are Luxembourg residents.  
94 Please note that a legal person is assumed to be managed by a SMO from a high risk-country if at least one SMO resides in a  
high-risk country. A high-risk country is a country that was listed by FATF as jurisdiction under increased monitoring or as a high-  
risk jurisdiction subject to a call for action as at year end of the analysed year. A legal person is assumed to be managed by a SMO  
official from a non-EU country if at least one SMO resides in a non-EU country. A legal person is assumed to be controlled by EU  
SMOs if at least one SMO is from an EU country, but none from a non-EU country and none from a high-risk country. A legal  
person is assumed to be managed by Luxembourg resident SMOs if all SMOs are Luxembourg residents.  
95 Circular CSSF 20/744, link.  
96 Parquet Général Statistical Service.  
41  
       
5.1.3. Corrupꢀon and bribery  
This secꢀon should be read in conjuncꢀon with secꢀons 5.1.1 and 5.1.5.  
Corrupꢀon is esꢀmated to cost the EU between EUR 179 billion and EUR 990 billion per year, amounꢀng  
to up to 6% of its GDP97. Corrupꢀon is considered as one of the most significant enablers of organised  
crime in all regions of the world98.  
Europol considers that corrupꢀon is an integral element of almost every organised criminal acꢀvity taking  
place at all levels of society. It can range from peꢁy bribery to complex mulꢀ-million-euro corrupꢀon  
schemes. Many criminals use corrupꢀon only occasionally, but a smaller proporꢀon of criminal networks  
engage in frequent and proacꢀve corrupꢀon targeꢀng public servants or specific sectors as an intrinsic  
part of their business strategy. Overall Europol assessed that almost 60% of criminal networks engage in  
corrupꢀon99. Similarly, the European Commission highlights the rising use of corrupꢀon by high-risk long  
lasꢀng criminal networks100. The Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) emphasizes the use  
of crypto assets to make payments to corrupt officials and for ML-purposes101  
.
In 2023, the EPPO counts 131 acꢀve invesꢀgaꢀons into corrupꢀon related offences that damage, or are  
likely to damage, the EU’s financial interests. These relate to cases where the public officials are suspected  
of having acted illegally in favour of private beneficiaries, or in situaꢀons of a conflict of interest, and where  
the offence of abuse of official authority or power is registered. Bribery was also invesꢀgated by the EPPO,  
as an instrumental offence in awarding contracts and projects to specific subjects, both in procurement  
and in non-procurement fraud102. According to EPPO’s annual report 2023, EPPO was invesꢀgaꢀng one  
corrupꢀon case with known implicaꢀons to Luxembourg.  
In Luxembourg, the external threat exposure stemming from corrupꢀon and bribery may be impacted by  
several factors:  
Affluent and wealthy bribers or bribed individuals could invest/place proceeds generated from  
corrupꢀon and bribery in Luxembourg or use the generated returns for this type of illicit acꢀviꢀes.  
Considering this, sophisꢀcated sectors collecꢀng and invesꢀng funds for wealth and asset  
management purposes may be targeted by those persons.  
Legal and financial professionals (from Luxembourg or abroad) could provide advice, set up legal  
persons or facilitate the takeover of legiꢀmate companies in Luxembourg for the purpose of  
laundering the proceeds of corrupꢀon.  
Luxembourg legal persons could be used as companies for ML of proceeds of corrupꢀon in a wider  
scheme, i.e. complicit (or abused) legal and financial professionals seꢂng up the structure of  
holding companies.  
97 European Commission, Corruption, link retrieved on 3 May 2024.  
98 Interpol, 2022 INTERPOL GLOBAL CRIME TREND SUMMARY REPORT, link.  
99 Europol, Crime areas corruption, link retrieved on 23 September 2024.  
100 European Commission, Corruption in organised crime, link retrieved on 23 September 2024.  
101 Europol, Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2021, link.  
102 EPPO, Annual Report 2023, link.  
42  
             
Considering the limited size of the domesꢀc market, Luxembourg is an internaꢀonally oriented  
economy. Luxembourg businesses could, therefore, be misused to (wiꢂngly or unwiꢂngly)  
launder proceeds generated from corrupt acꢀviꢀes, corrupꢀon-related proceeds or act  
themselves as bribers or bribed persons.  
5.1.3.1.  
Luxembourg’s external threat exposure to corrupꢀon and bribery  
The number of reports filed with the CRF throughout the observation period regarding corruption and  
bribery is rather low (around 900 reports during the observation period) in comparison to the total  
number of reports filed103. Although entities operating online104 are, in general, those filing most reports  
with the CRF, the number of filings made by these entities with regard to corruption and bribery is quite  
limited (86 out of 166 786 reports filed by these entities). It appears that the prevalence of reports related  
to corruption is higher in the more sophisticated sectors, such as Alternative Investment Fund Managers  
(AIFMs) and PFS, with 10% and 7% of reports filed by the respective sub-sector being related to corruption.  
The CRF also observed that the number of reports filed by DNFBPs and AIFMs is increasing.  
Insight Box 7: Corrupꢀon related STR/SARs - red flags and modus operandi idenꢀfied by the CRF (non-  
exhausꢀve list)105  
Typically involved red flags are for instance:  
Open source data;  
The presence of PEPs, or persons related to sectors typically targeted by corruption such as  
transport, telecommunication, public administration, or the natural resources (i.e. oil and gas);  
or  
The use of offshore corporate nominee accounts ultimately held by foreign PEPs or individuals  
associated with corruption allegations, for investment purposes via legal persons and legal  
arrangements.  
Identified modus operandi:  
The abuse of legal persons and legal arrangements, i.e., the use of opaque arrangements  
through complex structuring with multiple legal persons in different jurisdictions;  
The use of shell companies, with or without the use of nominees, aiming at concealing the BO  
and notably diluting links with potentially illicit activities;  
The use of consultancy, loan, and shareholder contracts often without economic activity.  
Reviewing supporting documents can reveal inconsistencies that constitute new indicators of  
ML.  
103 Please note that obliged entities are not required to qualify the predicate offence. The suspected underlying predicate offence  
is identified based on the assessment of relevant elements during the case analysis and may be subject to revision as additional  
information becomes available throughout the course of the analysis. In addition, corruption and bribery offences are largely  
interconnected with other predicate offences and therefore detection might be challenging.  
104 Please note that throughout section 5, the definition of “entities operating online” refers to the one included in the CRF’s  
annual reports (section 2.1.2 prestataires en ligne) and encompasses PIs, EMIs, VASPs, and banks operating online. The CRF’s  
annual reports can be accessed here: link.  
105  
CRF data. It should be noted, that these red flags and modus operandi are often observed in cases with an international  
exposure (i.e. international financial flows are transiting through Luxembourg “in/out transfers”); use of frontmen/front  
companies; fictious consultancy agreements; fictous loan agreements; etc).  
43  
       
The use of intermediaries, professionals who are experts in legal and financial matters,  
intervening and assisting their clients at different stages of the business life cycle.  
The following is an illustrative case study provided by the CRF.  
Case study 4: External threat – corrupꢀon and bribery  
The CRF initiated an international cooperation case regarding suspicions related to three insurance  
policies valued at over EUR 100 million subscribed several years ago and held by a Luxembourg-based  
fiduciary. The BO of these policies was a PEP from country A. Additionally, information was gathered  
that the policyholder would change from the fiduciary to the BO before the total surrender of the  
policies. Furthermore, adverse media was identified indicating that the BO was under investigation in  
country A for allegations of influence peddling, false statements, attempted fraud involving public funds  
and corruption. The information collected was immediately exchanged with the concerned FIU for  
further analysis.  
Throughout the observation period, the CRF froze significant amounts with respect to corruption and  
bribery between 2020 and 2023: EUR 31,8 million in 2020 (13 freezes) and EUR 9,66 million (4 freezes) in  
2021, EUR 106,58 million in 2022 (4 freezes) and EUR 502,79 million (10 freezes) in 2023106. In this context,  
it is also interesting to mention that 65% of freezing orders between 2020 and 2023 were initiated by the  
CRF. The remaining 35% were based on international requests from foreign financial intelligence units  
(FIUs). Out of these 35%, more than half of them were requested by a foreign FIU after the CRF had  
previously sent a spontaneous information exchange to the relevant foreign FIU. Overall, 100% of frozen  
amounts between 2020 and 2023 regarding corruption related to international cases, i.e. money  
stemming from corruption that took place in other jurisdictions.  
Insight Box 8: CSSF themaꢀc review focused on PEPs and the fight against corrupꢀon  
The CSSF’s “UCI On-site Inspection” department carried out in March and April 2022 a thematic review  
focused on PEPs and the fight against corruption, the focus area of which was Investment Fund  
managers’ (IFM) adherence with PEP related legal and regulatory framework. Despite minor elements  
(e.g. lack formalization at the level of the company materializing specifically the senior management  
approval of PEPs), the main takeaway of the review was that the overall understanding of the risks  
associated with PEPs as well as the related mitigation measures put in place by the entities inspected  
were satisfactory. Due to the solid legal and regulatory framework with regards to PEPs, the awareness  
on that topic of professionals under CSSF supervision appears to be good. Where deficiencies in the  
measures taken by professionals in that regard are detected by the CSSF, this can lead to administrative  
sanctions. The awareness on the risk of laundering the proceeds of active corruption should be further  
developed, e.g. geographical risk, risk linked to certain industry sectors.  
106 CRF, Annual Report, 2019, link, 2020, link, 2021 and 2022, link, 2023, link.  
44  
     
The number of MLA requests and seizures related to corrupꢀon and bribery have decreased since the  
2020 NRA update. Between 2020 and 2023, prosecuꢀon authoriꢀes received 47 MLA requests related to  
corrupꢀon and bribery (of which 27 ML-related). The overall external threat level is assessed to be “Very  
High”.  
5.1.4. Drug trafficking  
Please note that this secꢀon should be read in conjuncꢀon with secꢀons 5.1.1 and 5.1.5.  
The European Council reports an esꢀmated yearly retail value of at least EUR 30 billion as well as ever  
larger seizures. It also notes that European markets are characterized by a high availability of various types  
of drugs, the increasing use of violence and technology107.  
According to Europol, nearly half of the reported most threatening criminal networks in the EU are  
involved in drug trafficking trade. The trade in cocaine, cannabis, syntheꢀc drugs and new psychoacꢀve  
substances are key threats to the EU due to the levels of drug-related violence (i.e. mainly used as  
retaliaꢀon for lost or un-finalised shipments, but also to gain dominance over a territory or the supply  
chain), the mulꢀbillion-euro profits generated and the substanꢀal harm caused by it108,109  
.
In Luxembourg, the external threat exposure stemming from drug trafficking (and ML of related proceeds)  
may occur through its financial centre or by cash. On the one hand, the internaꢀonal character of its  
financial centre exposes the Grand-Duchy to a considerable number of incoming and outgoing financial  
flows. Proceeds generated from drug trafficking could transit through Luxembourg’s financial centre by  
abusing services offered by Luxembourg professionals. On the other hand, naꢀonal ML/TF Risk  
Assessments from Luxembourg’s neighbouring countries consider the threat related to drug trafficking as  
significant. These reports further indicate that proceeds stemming from drug trafficking are laundered  
with cash. Considering the proximity of sizable drug markets near Luxembourg, cash proceeds stemming  
from this type of predicate offence could be laundered in or transit through Luxembourg.  
Case study 5: Members of drug trafficking network arrested for ML in Germany and Luxembourg110  
At the request of France, authorities in Germany and Luxembourg carried out a coordinated blow on a  
criminal network, which was set up to launder proceeds from drug trafficking.  
At the request of Lille’s Interregional Specialised Prosecution Service in France, LEAs in Germany and  
Luxembourg arrested four members of a criminal group suspected of laundering the proceeds from  
drug trafficking. The crime group consisted of its leader, nicknamed “the Minister”, as well as  
intermediaries and lorry drivers who were facilitating the trafficking of drugs and cash through various  
European countries.  
107 The European Council, the EU’s fight against organised crime, link retrieved April 2024.  
108 Europol, Serious and organised crime threat assessment (EU SOCTA), 2021, link.  
109 Europol, Decoding the EU’s most threatening criminal networks, 2024, link.  
110 Europol, Follow the money: members of drug trafficking network arrested for money laundering in Germany and Luxembourg,  
45  
           
The investigation began in France in 2017 after customs agents found GBP 225 990 inside a lorry owned  
by a company registered in Luxembourg. A cocaine seizure made in France in 2019, and the ensuing  
information exchange, pointed authorities to the possible links between the two seizures. The financial  
investigations were supported by Europol’s European Financial and Economic Crime Centre. This  
allowed the authorities to draw clear links between drug trafficking and the ML activities of the group.  
The operational action took place on 23 March 2021 and resulted in:  
14 searches carried out in Germany and Luxembourg;  
4 members of the crime group, including its leader, arrested on the basis of European arrest  
warrants issued by France;  
4 properties worth several million of euros and high-value vehicles seized;  
Several bank accounts frozen with a total value of EUR 187 000;  
EUR 26 000 cash seized; and  
50 mobile phones and other devices seized for further examination.  
5.1.4.1.  
Luxembourg’s external threat exposure to drug trafficking  
During the observation period, the AML section of the judicial police service (SPJ) conducted inter alia  
three parallel investigations on major cases of illicit drug trafficking where foreign proceeds were  
laundered through the abuse of the Luxembourg financial centre. In all of these cases, the involvement of  
legal persons or corporate structures was identified. Other encountered typologies were the use of forged  
documents (such as employments contracts, invoices, notarial deeds) to give a legal appearance to the  
transactions or to hide the illicit origin of large cash deposits that were likely to be linked to drug  
trafficking.  
As outlined in section 3, the FATF mutual evaluation reports of Luxembourg’s key inward investment  
countries cite drug related offences as a key ML threat. The extent and significance of these financial flows  
with these countries could contribute to the exposure linked to ML of proceed from drug trafficking  
committed abroad.  
Considering the prevalent role of cash in the laundering of proceeds generated from drug trafficking, the  
number of reports filed with the CRF is rather low (about 3 600 reports) in comparison to the total number  
of reports filed. Judicial authoriꢀes received 106 MLA requests during the observaꢀon period. The Grand-  
Ducal Police cites drug trafficking as top-five crime area with regard to incoming and outcoming requests  
through the Europol’s secure informaꢀon exchange network.  
In line with the global situaꢀon and the Luxembourg specific context, the external threat level for drug  
trafficking remains “High”.  
5.1.5. Parꢀcipaꢀon in organised criminal group and racketeering  
Please note that this secꢀon should be read in conjuncꢀon with secꢀons 5.1.1, 5.1.3, 5.1.4, and 5.2.1.  
46  
 
According to Europol, along with terrorism, serious and organised crime conꢀnues to consꢀtute the most  
pressing internal security challenge to the EU. Crime groups oſten operate across borders. It is esꢀmated  
that about 70% of criminal groups are, in fact, acꢀve in more than three EU Member States111. The  
European Council recognises organised crime as a major threat to European ciꢀzens, business and  
insꢀtuꢀons, as well as to the European economy. In 2019, criminal revenues in the main criminal markets  
amounted to 1% of the EU’s GDP, i.e. EUR 139 billion112.  
Overall, it should be noted that this predicate offence is parꢀcularly interconnected with other types of  
predicate offences as the aim of being member in an organised criminal group is generally to engage in  
criminal acꢀviꢀes.  
5.1.5.1.  
Luxembourg’s external threat exposure  
Although the number of reports filed with the CRF with regard to parꢀcipaꢀon in an organised criminal  
groups is very low (less than 180 reports filed between 2020 and 2023), the CRF disseminated a relaꢀvely  
high share of cases to foreign counterparts. Overall, it should be borne in mind that the CRF is at the very  
beginning of the invesꢀgaꢀve chain. It receives reports based on suspicious transacꢀons or acꢀviꢀes. The  
link to an organised criminal group is oſten idenꢀfied at a later stage of the analysis. This is also confirmed  
by the SPJ.  
Between 2020 and 2023, judicial authorities received 167 MLA requests related to this crime (of which 94  
ML-related), compared to 95 (of which 56 ML-related) in 2018 and 2019113  
.
In line with the global situaꢀon and the Luxembourg specific context, the external threat level for  
parꢀcipaꢀon in organised criminal groups remains “High”.  
5.1.6. Counterfeiꢀng and piracy of products  
With regard to counterfeit goods, Europol notes that seizures of intellectual-property rights materials have  
conꢀnuously increased in recent years, both at the EU’s external border and in the internal market, along  
with seizures of labels, tags and sꢀckers. In addiꢀon, the digitalizaꢀon of trade and transport has shiſted  
most of the distribuꢀon of counterfeit goods online, further distancing criminals from their commodiꢀes.  
The distribuꢀon of counterfeit goods mainly occurs on the surface web and Europol notes that China  
(including Hong Kong, and Vietnam to a lesser extent) have remained the main countries of origin in recent  
years114.  
The growing demand for online entertainment during the COVID-19 pandemic led to an increase in  
distribuꢀon of illegal IPTV. However, improved access to legal plaꢃorms and enforcement scruꢀny in some  
EU Member States, led to a drop in users for these illicit plaꢃorms. The websites illegally distribuꢀng video  
111 Europol, Serious and organised crime threat assessment (EU SOCTA), 2021, link.  
112 European Council, The EU’s fight against organised crime, link retrieved on 15 December 2022.  
113 Parquet Général Statistical Service.  
114 Europol, The Other Side of the Coin, 2024, link.  
47  
         
content are hosted on servers across Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Much of the criminal profit is  
generated by online adverꢀsing, paid subscripꢀons, and malware aꢁacks115  
.
It should also be noted that e-commerce has grown substanꢀally in the past few years, especially for low-  
value shipments (less than EUR 150) from non-EU countries and imported into the EU. While 9% of  
European residents placed orders online outside the EU in 2002, this figure rose to 70% in by 2021. The  
number of low-value imported shipments has risen from 150 million in 2015 to 2 billion in 2022116  
.
In Luxembourg, the external threat stemming from counterfeiꢀng and piracy of products is impacted by  
the presence of FIs (including MVTS) processing transacꢀons related to marketplaces where goods and  
services subject to trademarks and intellectual property are sold.  
5.1.6.1.  
Luxembourg’s external threat exposure  
The number of reports filed with the CRF related to counterfeiꢀng and piracy of products accounts for  
around 20% of total declaraꢀons received between 2020 and 2023. In fact, it is the second most  
encountered predicate offence by the CRF aſter fraud and forgery. As outlined in secꢀon 6.1.3.1,  
Luxembourg’s MVTS sector serves a considerable number of clients. Together with the sophisꢀcated  
transacꢀon monitoring tools in place, this sector files a considerable number of reports with the CRF, with  
most of them having no direct link to Luxembourg (except for the Luxembourg headquarter of the enꢀty  
and the Luxembourg account). The CRF performed 48 freezes amounꢀng to nearly EUR 3 million.  
Case study 6: External threat – counterfeiꢀng and piracy of products117  
Triggered by an internaꢀonal FIU-to-FIU cooperaꢀon, the CRF analysed a case involving suspected  
counterfeit products, specifically plagiarized IT accessories, in which a turnover exceeding EUR 195 000  
was generated within 7 months. The CRF collected all available data and informaꢀon and disseminated  
the relevant intelligence to the concerned FIU, which then coordinated with their competent Public  
Prosecutor’s Office. Based on the disseminated findings, a freeze order was requested to the CRF in  
order to secure the remaining balance of approximaꢀvely EUR 130 000, while the concerned jurisdicꢀon  
issued an MLA request to seize the funds.  
The number of foreign requests on counterfeiꢀng and piracy of products received by Luxembourg  
prosecuꢀon authoriꢀes is relaꢀvely low, with a total of 5 requests (among which 2 were ML related)  
between 2020 and 2023.  
In line with the global situaꢀon and the Luxembourg specific context and considering the above, the threat  
level for counterfeiꢀng and piracy of products remains “High”.  
115 Europol, The Other Side of the Coin, 2024, link.  
116 MoF, Annexe – Rapport d’activité 2023, 2024, link.  
117 Case study provided by the CRF.  
48  
       
5.1.7. Sexual exploitaꢀon, including sexual exploitaꢀon of children  
The following secꢀon analyses two different types of sexual exploitaꢀon namely sexual exploitaꢀon of  
adults and sexual exploitaꢀon of children.  
Internaꢀonal organisaꢀons such as Europol and Luxembourg authoriꢀes noted the increasing role played  
by social media and streaming plaꢃorms such as Snapchat, Telegram, OnlyFans, Youtube and Minecraſt.  
With regard to this predicate offence, these plaꢃorms are used:  
to iniꢀate the first contact with the vicꢀm (observed typologies: Loverboy method, grooming);  
to market services and/or generated content to potenꢀal buyers or interested parꢀes; and  
to distribute sexual abuse material such as videos, livestream or pictures.  
Luxembourg’s financial centre is exposed to the external threat stemming from sexual exploitaꢀon,  
including sexual exploitaꢀon of children as:  
proceeds generated from sexual exploitaꢀon could transit through Luxembourg’s financial centre  
(e.g. accounts from buyers or sellers located in Luxembourg);  
Luxembourg-based enꢀꢀes could process transacꢀons linked to the sale and distribuꢀon of sexual  
abuse material;  
Luxembourg legal persons (e.g. holding vehicles) could receive revenues or funds linked to the sale  
and distribuꢀon of sexual abuse material.  
5.1.7.1.  
Sexual exploitaꢀon of adults  
Sexual exploitaꢀon of adults is a form of human trafficking and generally occurs when a person induces  
another person:  
to engage in prosꢀtuꢀon or conꢀnue to do so; or  
to perform sexual acts through which they are exploited, in the presence or in front of the  
perpetrator or a third person, or to have such acts performed on themselves by the perpetrator  
or a third person.  
This offence therefore requires at least two individuals, a vicꢀm and a person who exploits the vicꢀm’s  
economic or personal situaꢀon. Depending on the social and economic situaꢀon of the vicꢀm, these  
criminals may approach their vicꢀms differently. Overall, there are two different methods on how vicꢀms  
(especially young girls) are forced into prosꢀtuꢀon:  
through the Loverboy method: the laꢁer involves creaꢀng a fake romanꢀc relaꢀonship to  
emoꢀonally manipulate the vicꢀm into prosꢀtuꢀon; and  
considering the economic crisis in their home countries and/or through false promises: vicꢀms are  
lured away from home with promises of a beꢁer life abroad (e.g. careers as models or jobs in the  
hospitality industry). Upon arrival in the desꢀnaꢀon country, vicꢀms are forced to work into  
49  
 
brothels, apartments or on the streets. Oſten, they do no longer have documents and are, thus,  
illegal in the country118  
.
5.1.7.2. Sexual exploitaꢀon of children  
Europol notes that live-distant child abuse remains a persistent threat119. Since 2020 and following the  
Covid-19 Pandemic, the CRF has indeed observed a steady increase in child sexual abuse material (CSAM)  
livestreaming. The sellers, who livestream the CSAM, are located in ML high-risk jurisdicꢀons, while their  
customers (who buy specific content and who communicate with the sellers via chat) are located within  
the EU. In some cases, the CSAM buyers themselves distribute the purchased CSAM content via specific  
websites or through social media.  
In 2021, 85 million pictures and videos depicting child sexual abuse were reported worldwide. Moreover,  
reported child sexual abuse cases increased by 64% from 2020 to 2021120. According to Europol121, CSAM  
has increased substantially. It is often self-generated by means of manipulation or blackmail and LEA  
reported a peak of online grooming cases in 2020, especially via social media and gaming platforms.  
Between 2020 and 2021, the number of self-reported recordings increased by 168%, according to the  
Internet Watch Foundation. In 2022, the number of self-reported recording continued to increase,  
although to a lower extent (increase of 6% in 2022 and 8% increase in 2023)122. The monetisation of CSAM  
is a growing threat: it is estimated that the annual revenue of CSAM sites have more than tripled between  
2017 and 2020123  
.
Arꢀficial intelligence (AI) models able to generate or alter images were also abused by offenders to create  
CSAM124. In this regard, the CRF noꢀced a rise in the sale and distribuꢀon of AI-Generated CSAM, depicꢀng  
both ficꢀonal and life-like minors. Moreover, the CRF further noꢀced a trend that CSAM distributors and  
sellers use major video streaming and social media plaꢃorms to promote CSAM content by sharing non-  
explicit but suggesꢀve videos of minors oſten portrayed in a family seꢂng.  
Insight Box 9: Red flag indicators Characterisꢀcs and acꢀvity indicators for live streaming of child  
sexual abuse and exploitaꢀon (CSAE)125  
These red flag indicators are based on a strategic analysis of several similar cases by the CRF in the past  
few years:  
personal cross-border payments;  
mostly repeated and in even amounts, usually less than EUR 70 predominantly from many  
118 Mission Freedom, Forced prostitution, link retrieved on 5 August 2024.  
119 Europol, Internet organised crime threat assessment (IOCTA) 2024, 2024, link.  
120 European Council, The EU’s fight against organised crime, link retrieved December 2022.  
121 Europol, Internet organised crime threat assessment (IOCTA) 2021, 2022, link.  
122  
Internet Watch Foundation, self-generated sexual abuse online – annual report 2021, link and Internet Watch Foundation,  
self-generated sexual abuse online – annual report 2022, link and Internet Watch Foundation, self-generated sexual abuse online  
– annual report 2023, link.  
123 Europol, Internet organised crime threat assessment (IOCTA) 2021, 2022, link.  
124 Europol, Internet organised crime threat assessment (IOCTA) 2024, 2024, link.  
125 CRF.  
50  
                 
different male senders based in Western countries;  
to receiving EMI accounts registered in a high risk CSAE jurisdicꢀon without any plausible  
business purpose or commercial explanaꢀon;  
notes relaꢀng to children and/or to other help/family help;  
suspects’ email addresses and on-line monikers idenꢀfied matching profiles on daꢀng and adult  
plaꢃorms, including for instance broadcasꢀng service plaꢃorms where users stream own live  
video content or interact with the video streams of other users in real ꢀme or plaꢃorms to meet  
people who are traveling or speak other languages, which can oſten be used by buyers to  
pursue CSAM content or meet CSAM facilitators, such as for instance: daꢀng sites, gaming sites  
etc.  
5.1.7.3.  
Luxembourg’s external threat exposure  
Obliged entities filed over 2 100 reports with the CRF, with entities operating online126 accounting for over  
99% of them. Generally, the CRF observed that transactions linked with escort services, transport services,  
hospitality services, and online renting were reported by obliged entities with respect to sexual  
exploitation of adults. In the case of sexual exploitation of children, the CRF observed transactions masked  
as “family support” and payments linked to “premium services or premium servers” on filesharing  
platforms, social media and streaming platforms. For over 90% of the reports filed with the CRF, the only  
link with Grand-Duchy is the Luxembourg PI processing the transaction. The CRF actively disseminates  
relevant information to their foreign counterparts or Europol, especially in cases where the implication of  
organised crime groups is suspected.  
Between 2020 and 2023, prosecution authorities received 33 MLA requests related to sexual exploitation  
(one was ML-related), compared to 80 (of which four ML-related) in 2018 and 2019.  
Considering the above, the external threat level for sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of  
children, remains “High”.  
5.1.8. Cybercrime  
Please note that this secꢀon should be read in conjuncꢀon with secꢀons 5.1.1, 5.1.7, and 5.2.1.  
This secꢀon analyses the external threat stemming from aꢁacks against informaꢀon systems, such as a  
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) aꢁack, hacking aꢁacks, and criminals providing malware and  
ransomware soſtware as a service to interested parꢀes. It should be born in mind that aꢁacks against  
informaꢀon system is oſten a mean to commit other predicate offences such as extorsion or fraud. Fraud  
that is enabled through or conducted in the cyber environment (i.e. CEF) is analysed in secꢀon 5.1.1 above.  
126 Please note that throughout section 5, the definition of “entities operating online” refers to the one included in the CRF’s  
annual reports (section 2.1.2 prestataires en ligne) and encompasses PIs, EMIs, VASPs, and banks operating online. The CRF’s  
annual reports can be accessed here: link.  
51  
   
Insight Box 10: Crime-as-a-service127  
Cybercrime services are widely available and have a well-established online presence (especially on the  
dark net), with a high level of specialisation inside criminal networks and collaboration between illicit  
providers. The services offered to perpetrate cybercrime are often intertwined and their efficacy is to  
a degree co-dependant. The illicit service providers cater to a large number of criminal actors by  
offering services, such as:  
Malware-as-a-service;  
Phishing-as-a-service; or  
Ransomware-as-a-service.  
Crime as-a-service providers are aware of the needs of criminals and acꢀvely adverꢀse their services on  
criminal markets.  
Europol esꢀmates that cybercrime is likely to be under-reported and that it represents an increasing threat  
for individuals, businesses, and governments. Related crimes have become more and more  
sophisꢀcated128. The criminal landscape remains wide-ranging, comprising both lone actors and networks  
with various levels of experꢀse and capability. Some cybercriminals targeꢀng the EU are EU-based, while  
others operate from abroad, concealing their illicit operaꢀons and funds in third countries129  
.
In a similar vein, the European Council130 confirms that cybercrime is set to grow further in the future,  
given that 22,3 billion devices worldwide are expected to be linked to the Internet of Things by 2024. The  
carry-over effects of the geopoliꢀcal situaꢀon could be seen by the barrage of disrupꢀve cyberaꢁacks  
against not only Ukrainian and Russian targets, but also worldwide, especially in the EU. The boost in these  
malicious acꢀviꢀes targeꢀng EU Member States is mostly due to a significant number of DDoS aꢁacks  
affecꢀng naꢀonal and regional public insꢀtuꢀons. As for CEF (see secꢀon 5.1.1), the use of crypto assets  
is prevalent131  
.
5.1.8.1.  
Luxembourg’s external threat exposure  
Considering the above, Luxembourg financial centre may be exposed to the external threat stemming from  
cybercrime via the following scenarios:  
Vicꢀms of cybercrime: funds held with Luxembourg bank or payment accounts may be transferred  
to crypto assets exchange plaꢃorms to pay the ransom; and  
Criminals: considering the range of services offered by Luxembourg’s financial centre, criminals  
may place/invest generated funds in Luxembourg or channel them to other financial centres.  
127  
Europol, Internet organised crime threat assessment (IOCTA) 2024, 2024, link and Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat  
Assessment (IOCTA) 2023, 2023, link.  
128 Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2023, 2023, link.  
129 Europol, Internet organised crime threat assessment (IOCTA) 2024, 2024, link.  
130 The European Council, the EU’s fight against organised crime, link retrieved on 15 December 2022.  
131 Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2023, 2023, link.  
52  
           
Between 2020 and 2023, enꢀꢀes operaꢀng online132 and banks filed over 99% of the around 1 400 reports  
with the CRF. STRs are usually triggered in cases in which vicꢀms transfer funds held with their Luxembourg  
bank or payment account to crypto assets exchange plaꢃorms to pay the ransom. Nonetheless, the CRF  
observed that there has been a clear shiſt of criminals using decentralized and not regulated exchanges in  
order to launder the proceedings of ransomware or offences in relaꢀon to cybercrime, such as hacking  
and DDoS aꢁacks. The perpetrators of these offences are thus not using the services of regulated  
exchanges but decentralized applicaꢀons. The laꢁer offer the benefit that the suspects do not need to  
provide any KYC informaꢀon and supporꢀng evidence and the funds can be easily swapped between  
different crypto assets. Nonetheless, this adds further complexity in terms of detecꢀon.  
The external threat level for cybercrime, remains “High”.  
5.1.9. Analysis of other external offences: medium threat exposure  
The following secꢀon resumes the external threat assessment for predicate offences where the overall  
external threat level was assessed to be “Medium”.  
5.1.9.1.  
Smuggling  
According to Europol, 80% of reported criminal networks are involved in, amongst others, excise fraud133  
.
Goods such as alcohol, cigareꢁes and fuel are subject to excise duty upon producꢀon in, or on import to,  
the EU. Large scale excise fraud (with a focus on the producꢀon and/or trafficking of illicit tobacco products  
in the EU is among one of the European Mulꢀdisciplinary Plaꢃorms Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT).  
Europol notes that the main areas of excise fraud in Europe include134  
:
the smuggling or illegal importaꢀon of excise goods;  
the illegal manufacture of excise goods; and  
diversion, which involves diverꢀng goods without paying excise duty.  
Price differences between Member States and between Member States and neighboring non-EU countries  
are the main drivers for criminals involved in this type of crime. For example, figures from Eurostat show  
that price levels for alcoholic beverages and tobacco vary among EU Member States and are more  
significant for tobacco than for alcoholic beverages135  
.
The number of reports received by the CRF in relaꢀon with this type of predicate offence is relaꢀvely low,  
with a total of 7 reports filed between 2020 and 2023. There were no related freezes. Throughout the  
observaꢀon period, judicial authoriꢀes received 3 MLA requests regarding this predicate offence. There  
were no related seizures.  
132 Please note that throughout section 5, the definition of “entities operating online” refers to the one included in the CRF’s  
annual reports (section 2.1.2 prestataires en ligne) and encompasses PIs, EMIs, VASPs, and banks operating online. The CRF’s  
annual reports can be accessed here: link.  
133 Europol, Serious and organised crime threat assessment (EU SOCTA), 2021, link.  
134 Europol, Excise fraud, link retrieved July 2024.  
135 Eurostat, Comparative price levels for food, beverages and tobacco, link retrieved June 2024.  
53  
         
Considering the size and the number of flows transiꢀng through Luxembourg’s financial centre, proceeds  
generated from excise fraud could transit through the laꢁer.  
5.1.9.2.  
Insider trading and market manipulaꢀon  
Luxembourg’s exposiꢀon stems from the presence of the financial centre, but trading acꢀvity on domesꢀc  
markets (i.e. markets operated by the Luxembourg Stock Exchange) is limited. The CRF received over 270  
reports with more than half of them being filed by banks followed by the investment sector.  
More than 250 suspicious order and transaction reports (STORs) related to potential market abuse cases  
were filed by Luxembourg based professionals from 2022 and to 2023 with the CSSF. The vast majority of  
these reports concerned transactions executed on markets operated in other Member States and were  
transmitted to the relevant competent authorities. Furthermore, the CSSF assisted other authorities in 86  
requests for cooperation in potential market abuse cases in from 2020 to 2023, which further illustrates  
the international dimension of market abuse cases and the CSSF’s extensive international cooperation in  
this context.  
5.1.9.3.  
Robbery and theſt and illicit trafficking of stolen goods  
In the context of the external threat assessment, the predicate offence is commiꢁed abroad and the  
laundering of the generated proceeds would take place in Luxembourg.  
Luxembourg is exposed to the external threat of “theſt and robbery” and “illicit trafficking in stolen and  
other goods” through the presence of enꢀꢀes processing transacꢀons of marketplaces that may be abused  
by criminals to sell or rent stolen goods.  
Throughout 2020 and 2023 the CRF received almost 200 reports with regard to robbery and theſt and 3  
reports with regard to illicit trafficking of stolen goods. Overall, it should be noted that it is quite  
challenging to differenꢀate whether a used good has been legiꢀmately sold by the proper owner or  
whether it has been a stolen good. This is especially true for low-value objects (especially those with no  
serial number or other indicators enabling the proper idenꢀficaꢀon of a good) or hard to trace goods such  
as precious metals and stones. In the same period, judicial authoriꢀes received 120 MLA requests with  
regard to “robbery and theſt” and 20 MLA requests considering “illicit trafficking in stolen and other  
goods”. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Grand-Ducal Police cites robbery as top-five crime area  
with regard to incoming and outgoing requests through the Europol’s secure informaꢀon exchange  
network.  
5.1.9.4.  
Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling  
Although analysed together for the purpose of this risk assessment, it should be noted that human  
trafficking and migrant smuggling have disꢀnct aspects. For instance, the smuggling ends with the arrival  
of the migrant in the desꢀnaꢀon, whereas human trafficking oſten involves ongoing exploitaꢀon in some  
other way. Moreover, migrant smuggling is always transnaꢀonal whereas human trafficking may not be136  
.
Nevertheless, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling are oſten linked with other forms of  
136 FATF, ML/TF Risks Arising from Migrant Smuggling, 2022, link.  
54  
 
organised crime such as drug trafficking, sexual exploitaꢀon, extorꢀon, document fraud, payment card  
fraud or money mules (cf. CEF), property crimes, cybercrime and other137  
.
Europol cites the misuse of legal persons as a frequently encountered mean to obscure acꢀviꢀes related  
to human trafficking and migrant smuggling. They are used as front organisaꢀons for ML, exploitaꢀon of  
vicꢀms, or to obtain documents enabling individuals to enter or stay in the EU. In a similar vein,  
technologies and the online environment are used to adverꢀse the criminals’ services and to recruit  
facilitators, irregular migrants and potenꢀal vicꢀms. Applicaꢀons of AI may deliver new opportuniꢀes for  
criminals to lure potenꢀal clients and vicꢀms of trafficking in human beings. Disinformaꢀon campaigns  
and deepfakes can be employed to mobilise irregular migrants and increase demand for the services of  
migrant smugglers138  
.
The number of persons vulnerable to trafficking in recent years has increased due to an unprecedented  
rise in irregular migraꢀon and the number of displaced persons, oſten caused by armed conflict or terrorist  
organisaꢀons controlling territory. According to the Global Peace Index 2024, there were 56 acꢀve conflicts  
in March 2024. This is the most since the Second World War139. Trafficking flows related to armed conflict  
can include human trafficking within and into conflict-affected areas for the purposes of sexual exploitaꢀon  
and forced labour, as well as transnaꢀonal trafficking flows linked to migrant smuggling140  
.
Human trafficking  
The European Council reports that most common forms of trafficking of human beings in the EU consist in  
labour exploitaꢀon and sexual exploitaꢀon141. Globally, profits are esꢀmated at EUR 29,4 billion in a single  
year142. Trafficking in human beings is oſten linked with other forms of organised crime such as migrant  
smuggling. Furthermore, the threat stemming from human trafficking has been flagged by two of  
Luxembourg’s neighboring countries in their recent naꢀonal ML/TF risk assessments. Europol notes that  
crypto assets are used by human traffickers to collect, move and launder illicit profits143  
.
Migrant smuggling  
According to a Europol 2023 report on migrant smuggling “the market for migrant smuggling services to  
and within the EU is reaching new heights, fuelled by emerging and deepening crises, most notably  
economic recessions, environmental emergencies caused by climate change, as well as conflicts and  
demographic pressure in many origin countries”144. The FATF report on Migrant Smuggling notes that due  
to the opaque nature of the crime, as well as the predominant use of cash, it is not possible to produce  
accurate estimates of global income derived from migrant smuggling. Nevertheless, based on the  
137 European Commission, Together Against Trafficking in Human Beings, link retrieved on 15 December 2022.  
138 Europol, Tackling threats, addressing challenges Europol’s response to migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings in  
2023 and onwards, 2024, link.  
139 Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2024, link.  
140 FATF - APG, Financial Flows from Human Trafficking, 2018 , link.  
141 European Council, the EU’s fight against organised crime, link retrieved on 15 December 2022.  
142 European Council, the EU’s work to combat human trafficking, link retrieved on 10 April 2024.  
143 Europol, Tackling threats, addressing challenges Europol’s response to migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings in  
2023 and onwards, 2024, link.  
144 Europol, Criminal networks in migrant smuggling, 2023, link.  
55  
               
estimates produced, the total proceeds generated are projected to be in excess of USD 10 billion a year145  
.
In its latest report on this matter, Europol confirms that cash payments still prevail as the preferred means  
of payment in migrant smuggling. Nonetheless, cryptocurrencies are becoming more popular among  
migrant smugglers146  
.
The two case studies below evidence how Luxembourg, and more particularly its financial centre, may be  
exposed to the external threat in relation to human trafficking and migrant smuggling.  
Case study 7: External threat – human trafficking and migrant smuggling147  
An SAR has been filed [with the CRF] regarding 69 transacꢀons made between May 2019 and September  
2020, totaling USD 21 300, and suspected to be related to human and/or sex trafficking acꢀviꢀes  
involving one potenꢀal perpetrator, six potenꢀal vicꢀms and three individuals, whose roles were unclear  
at the moment of filing the SAR.  
Suspicions that the transacꢀons and the concerned individuals could be associated with possible human  
and/or sex trafficking were raised based on the transacꢀonal behavior and shared payments  
instruments. More precisely, connecꢀons between the abovemenꢀoned individuals could be  
established based on either connected payment instruments, names, devices, phone numbers, email  
addresses, IP addresses and other idenꢀficaꢀon details provided to the reporꢀng enꢀty. Addiꢀonally,  
the potenꢀal vicꢀms were idenꢀfied due to cross-matches made between phone numbers and female  
escort adverꢀsements in Southeastern Europe. Moreover, rather than submiꢂng a full picture of the  
official ID document, subjects only provided a screenshot of the photograph on the ID cards, meaning  
that the individuals were most probably not in possession of their ID cards. Furthermore, it appeared  
that one idenꢀfied individual was already known by the reporꢀng enꢀty for being potenꢀally connected  
to human trafficking.  
Based on the informaꢀon received, the CRF informed the relevant homologues about the findings. The  
informaꢀon provided by the CRF was highly appreciated as further links and evidence were gathered in  
this way. The intelligence gathered in this case provides certainly only part of the modus operandi of  
the criminal network, but it is considered to be relevant to lead to potenꢀal new perpetrators or vicꢀms  
and idenꢀfy payment instruments, which could lead to further financial informaꢀon. In this case the  
funds were mainly transferred by credit cards. The main financial indicators were the shared payments  
instruments.  
145 FATF, ML/TF Risks Arising from Migrant Smuggling, 2022, link.  
146 Europol, Tackling threats, addressing challenges Europol’s response to migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings in  
2023 and onwards, 2024, link.  
147 Case study provided by the CRF.  
56  
       
Case study 8: External threat – human trafficking and migrant smuggling148  
The CRF received informaꢀon regarding individuals potenꢀally involved in the smuggling and/or human  
trafficking of vicꢀms from South America. Most of the perpetrators were EU ciꢀzens but with their  
original birthplace being in various South American countries. While there were some vicꢀms without  
official ID, the majority of vicꢀms were holders of a passport from a South American country. The links  
between the perpetrators and vicꢀms were made as they used shared payment instruments, as credit  
cards, bank, as well as e-money accounts and phone numbers. The perpetrators booked properꢀes  
online in which they are suspected to have forced the vicꢀms to commit sex work as shown by mulꢀple  
indicators. These indicators include, inter alia, the visits of different men in a short interval of ꢀme or  
sexual services offered by contacꢀng the phone numbers.  
Based on the informaꢀon received, further analysis about transacꢀonal and behavioral data were  
conducted. Addiꢀonally, informaꢀon was requested at different payment enꢀꢀes in Luxembourg  
leading to new IP and postal addresses, as well as other financial transacꢀons that were relevant to the  
case. Upon sharing this informaꢀon with other FIUs it became clear that the vicꢀms were likely  
smuggled from South America to one EU country where the perpetrators reside while they were sent  
to other countries in the EU to perform sex work.  
The informaꢀon helped to idenꢀfy the potenꢀal perpetrators of a migrant smuggling and human  
trafficking network, where mostly only the vicꢀms were known. Perpetrators used illegal funds on  
renꢀng of real estate properꢀes, and vicꢀms were suspected of being abused for prosꢀtuꢀon. The main  
indicators in this case were the shared payments instruments, as well as the use of money transfers  
through money remiꢁance providers.  
Between 2020 and 2023, the CRF received more than 100 reports in relaꢀon to human trafficking and  
migrant smuggling. In this context, it should be noted that the actual number might be higher, as reports  
related to sexual exploitaꢀon and suspected human trafficking are typically classified as “sexual  
exploitaꢀon”. Most (almost 90%) of these reports were filed by enꢀꢀes operaꢀng online149. As noted  
throughout the threat assessment and as evidenced in the above case studies, for most of the ꢀmes, the  
only link with Luxembourg is the European headquarter of the enꢀty processing relaꢀng payments, as well  
as the Luxembourg account. During the same ꢀme, judicial authoriꢀes received 16 MLA requests in this  
respect.  
148 Case study provided by the CRF.  
149 Please note that throughout section 5, the definition of “entities operating online” refers to the one included in the CRF’s  
annual reports (section 2.1.2 prestataires en ligne) and encompasses PIs, EMIs, VASPs, and banks operating online. The CRF’s  
annual reports can be accessed here: link.  
57  
     
5.1.10. Analysis of external predicate offences: low and very low threat exposure  
The following table resumes the predicate offences that were assessed to bear a lower threat level.  
Table 10: External threat assessment, low and very low threat levels  
Likelihood/ probability Size/ proceeds  
External threat level  
Illicit arms trafficking  
Environmental crime  
Extorꢀon  
Murder, grievous bodily injury  
Kidnapping, illegal restraint and  
hostage taking  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Counterfeiꢀng currency  
Piracy  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Illicit firearms trafficking is one of the EU’s prioriꢀes in the fight against serious and organised crime as  
part of EMPACT 2022-2025. Europol notes that arms trafficking occurs on a small scale and that trafficked  
weapons are almost exclusively a supplementary rather than a primary source of income for the small  
number of organised criminal groups involved. Weapons trafficked are intended for either personal use or  
to meet specific orders150  
.
Illegal firearms and their parts have been traded online via the surface and dark web and distributed using  
post and parcel services for some ꢀme. The online sale of illegal firearms appears to have shiſted away  
from dark web marketplaces to forums and other plaꢃorms aſter a number of marketplaces banned the  
sale of firearms. However, the scale of the online trade in illegal firearms has been assessed as limited  
compared to their offline supply. In addiꢀon, many offers for illegal firearms online are believed to be  
scams151. This being said, Luxembourg authoriꢀes confirmed that cases relaꢀng to this predicate offence  
are rather limited (in likelihood and generated proceeds). It has, therefore, been decided to lower the  
associated threat level from “Medium” in the 2020 NRA to “Low.  
With regard to environmental crime, it should be noted that it is also one of the EU’s prioriꢀes in the fight  
against serious and organised crime as part of EMPACT 2022-2025. Furthermore, the FATF 2022-2024  
Presidency aimed to raise ML/TF awareness in relaꢀon to environmental crime. Although figures provided  
by Luxembourg authoriꢀes are rather low with regard to this parꢀcular crime, it should be noted that  
global reports, such as the FATF Report on Money Laundering from Environmental Crime, esꢀmates that  
environmental crime is suggested to be among the most profitable proceeds-generaꢀng crimes in the  
world152.  
150 Europol, Illicit firearms trafficking, link retrieved on 9 April 2024.  
151 Europol, Serious and organised crime threat assessment (EU SOCTA), 2021, link.  
152 FATF, Money Laundering from Environmental Crime, 2021, link.  
58  
         
Insight Box 11: Environmental crime153  
Generally, the term “environmental crime” covers the gamut of acꢀviꢀes that breach environmental  
legislaꢀon and cause significant harm or risk to the environment, human health, or both. These offences  
can include, but are not limited to the:  
improper collecꢀon, transport, recovery or disposal of waste;  
illegal operaꢀon of a plant in which a dangerous acꢀvity is carried out or in which dangerous  
substances or preparaꢀons are stored;  
killing, destrucꢀon, possession or trade of protected wild animal or plant species; and  
producꢀon, importaꢀon, exportaꢀon, markeꢀng or use of ozone-depleꢀng substances.  
Waste trafficking demonstrates the extent of the problem. The use of legal business structures by  
criminal actors are an inherent feature of this crime area. In many cases, criminal actors and legal  
businesses are indisꢀnguishable. As part of this development, criminals involved in waste trafficking  
have moved towards the more complex business model of illicit waste management rather than simply  
illegally dumping waste.  
Waste traffickers now operate along the enꢀre waste-processing chain and rely heavily on the use of  
fraudulent documents.  
5.2. Domesꢀc exposure: money laundering of proceeds of domesꢀc crimes  
The threat from ML of proceeds of domestic crimes is estimated to be smaller (overall moderate) than  
that from foreign crimes. This is due to Luxembourg’s low crime rate.  
The Organised Crime Portfolio154 estimates that the aggregate revenue across a set of illicit markets (i.e.  
drug trafficking, fraud, counterfeiting, theft) in Luxembourg is around EUR 161 million (i.e. around 0,4%  
of GDP), which is lower than for neighbouring countries (France: around EUR 16 billion or 0,8% of GDP;  
Germany: around EUR 17 billion or 0,7% of GDP; and Belgium: around EUR 2,5 billion or 0,7% of GDP), and  
close to half the estimate for the EU as a whole (i.e. 0,9% of GDP on average). Moreover, Luxembourg’s  
ranking of particular factors by the Rule of Law Index 2023 suggests that the domestic level of crime is  
rather low: 1rst in order and security, 8th in absence of corruption, and 13th in criminal justice (out of 142  
countries)155  
.
However, the Grand-Duchy’s wealth, its economy, its high number of international institutions and its  
central location in Europe increase the threat level for certain crimes. While some crimes might be  
perpetrated domestically, this does not necessarily imply that their proceeds are exclusively laundered in  
the Grand-Duchy. Considering the border control-free Schengen Area, illicit proceeds might be taken  
153 Europol, Environmental Crime, link retrieved on 6 August 2024.  
154 Organised Crime Portfolio, From Illegal Markets to Legitimate Businesses: The Portfolio of Organised Crime in Europe, 2015,  
155 World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2023, link.  
59  
         
abroad (e.g. offences committed by foreign organised crime groups, taking robbed goods or proceeds  
outside Luxembourg).  
The following table summarises the level of likelihood/probability, size/proceeds, consequences and  
overall domestic threat level for every ML-related predicate offence.  
Table 11: Domesꢀc ML threat level, breakdown per predicate offence  
Likelihood/  
probability  
High  
Domesꢀc  
threat level  
High  
Predicate offence  
Size/proceeds  
Consequences  
Fraud and forgery  
Robbery and theſt  
Drug trafficking  
High  
High  
High  
Medium  
High  
High  
High  
High  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
Cybercrime  
Medium  
High  
Medium  
Sexual exploitaꢀon, including sexual  
exploitaꢀon of children  
Tax crimes  
Medium  
Low  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
Corrupꢀon and bribery  
Parꢀcipaꢀon in an organised criminal  
group and racketeering  
Trafficking in human beings and  
migrant smuggling  
Medium  
Low  
High  
Medium  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Medium  
Low  
High  
Low  
Medium  
Low  
Extorꢀon  
Illicit trafficking in stolen and other  
goods  
Low  
Low  
Illicit arms trafficking  
Insider trading and market  
manipulaꢀon  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Medium  
Low  
Environmental crimes  
Smuggling  
Low  
Low  
Very Low  
Low  
Medium  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Counterfeiꢀng and piracy of products  
Medium  
Very Low  
Very Low  
Very Low  
Low  
Murder and grievous bodily injury  
Kidnapping, illegal restraint and  
hostage taking  
High  
Very Low  
Very Low  
High  
Low  
Counterfeiꢀng currency  
Low  
Very Low  
Low  
Low  
Very Low  
Piracy  
Very Low  
Very Low  
Very Low  
60  
   
5.2.1. Fraud and forgery  
The Grand-Ducal Police notes in its annual reports an increase in acꢀviꢀes related to fraud, especially with  
regard to CEF.  
Figure 10: Number of registered cases with the Grand-Ducal Police, 2021-2022156  
7,000  
6,000  
5,000  
4,000  
6,143  
3,000  
2,000  
1,000  
-
4,689  
2,299  
2021  
2022  
2023  
The number of cases registered for “fraud” by the Grand-Ducal Police is the second highest aſter theſt (i.e.,  
“vols simples”). In this context, it is also interesꢀng to note that in 2022, the number of registered cases  
has more than doubled, from 2 299 cases in 2021 to 4 689 cases in 2022. In 2023, the number of registered  
cases conꢀnued to increase, but to a lesser extent (increase of +31%).  
5.2.1.1.  
Cyber-enabled fraud  
As noted in the external threat assessment on fraud and forgery, CEF is globally on the rise. Digitalisaꢀon  
and the development of new technologies serve as key drivers underpinning the scale, scope and speed  
of CEF. With regard to secꢀon 5.1.1.1, CEF is indeed a transnaꢀonal threat where vicꢀm and perpetrator  
do not have to be necessarily located within the same jurisdicꢀon. Luxembourg is, therefore, no excepꢀon.  
Hence, general observaꢀons outlined within secꢀon 5.1.1.1 apply therefore equally to the Luxembourg  
context. As noted in secꢀon 3, Luxembourg residents engage in online acꢀvity and use the internet for a  
broad range of services, such as online banking, public services, or online shopping. Considering  
Luxembourg’s connecꢀvity rate and the number of residents parꢀcipaꢀng in such acꢀvity, criminals may  
exploit these factors to commit CEF.  
The Grand-Ducal Police confirms in its annual reports that they are increasingly confronted with illicit  
banking acꢀviꢀes, phishing and investment scams related to crypto assets. Perpetrators contact vicꢀms  
remotely via social media and convince them to “invest” considerable amounts of money in virtual assets  
without ever yielding the promised returns. The anonymity offered by the internet combined with the  
inherently transnaꢀonal nature of crypto assets and the protecꢀon of non-cooperaꢀve countries hamper  
prosecuꢀon157. Europol confirms indeed that investment fraud generates millions of illicit profits and  
crypto assets remain the most reported product offered to vicꢀms in this type of fraud158  
.
156 Police Grand-Ducale, Chiffres de la délinquance 2022 et 2023, link and link.  
157 Police Grand-Ducale, Rapport d’activités 2023, link and Police Grand-Ducale, Rapport d’activités 2022, link.  
158 Europol, Internet organised crime threat assessment (IOCTA) 2024, 2024, link.  
61  
         
Case study 9: Phishing scam, money mule and crypto159  
A first report was filed with the CRF by a local retail bank indicating that based on their transaction  
monitoring unusual incoming wire transfers have been observed on individual A’s bank account. The  
suspicions raised were based on two main indicators (1) multiple incoming wire transfers that  
occurred the same day (2) amounting to approximatively EUR 50 000, which was not in line with the  
customer profile.  
The incoming wire transfers came from another Luxembourg bank account held by individual B having  
no apparent link to individual A.  
Subsequently, a total of EUR 40 000 was transferred out to a Liechtenstein bank account, unknown  
by the local retail bank at that time, and EUR 9 800 were withdrawn with individual A’s credit card.  
A few days later, a second report was filed by another local retail bank indicating that the account  
holder B has become victim of a phishing fraud. The victim received a fraudulent message via  
telephone falsely claiming to be from Luxembourg’s local digital identity independent trusted  
provider. The message required the victim to take an urgent action to renew the digital identity  
certificate, to click on a link and share personal credentials on a phishing website. In addition, the  
victim received a call from an individual pretending to be from his bank, informing the victim that his  
bank account was hacked and that the access to the e-banking platform was temporarily suspended,  
which gave the criminals the necessary time to organise the outgoing transfers.  
An international information exchange has been initiated by the CRF in order to follow the money  
trail and secure the funds transferred under fraudulent pretenses to Liechtenstein. It turned out that  
the beneficiary Liechtenstein bank account was a dedicated bank account of an Luxembourg  
registered VASP used to safekeep all fiat funds that their customer deposit with the VASP to fund their  
“crypto” trading activities. The CRF then reached out to the local Luxembourg VASP in order to have  
clarifications about the identity of the holder of the trading account and about the money trail of the  
EUR 40 000.  
Subsequently, the identified trading account and the Luxembourg bank account held by individual A  
were frozen, meaning that individual A could neither trade nor withdraw any fiat or virtual assets.  
Based on the swift actions taken at all levels and the excellent cooperation between the reporting  
entities and the FIUs, the funds which had already been converted in 25,50 Ethereum could be  
secured.  
Based on additional intelligence gathered, it turned out that individual A was recruited by criminals in  
a bar offering individual A a commission for receiving and transferring funds. More precisely, the  
criminals asked individual A to give them the two factor identification codes in order to gain access  
and take control over his bank account. In addition, the criminals asked for the credit card and made  
a photo of individual A’s ID card, as well as a photo of him. These identification items allowed the  
159 CRF.  
62  
   
criminals to open a trading account with the VASP in the name of individual A and to have full access  
to it.  
It is assumed that the criminals recruit money mules, who accept to receive and transfer funds in  
return of a commission, and use these money mule bank accounts to defraud phishing victims. By  
using local bank accounts, criminal increase their success rate, as the victims are less vigilant.  
Criminals constantly adapt their modus operandi to exploit potenꢀal vulnerabiliꢀes and loopholes. For  
instance, the Grand-Ducal Police noted in 2020 that ransomware aꢁacks increasingly targeted businesses  
and professionals to exploit vulnerabiliꢀes arising from the rapid transiꢀon to remote working. As these  
aꢁacks have decreased following the adaptaꢀon of businesses’ IT systems in 2021, the Grand-Ducal Police  
observed that criminals tailored phishing campaigns to users of some Luxembourg online banking services  
and the naꢀonal public portal “guichet.lu” in 2023. In a similar vein, the CRF notes that throughout 2022,  
the number of filings made by some banks has increased as some of their clientele fell vicꢀm to these  
aꢁacks. Overall, it should be noted that amounts involved and techniques used by fraudsters are evolving,  
as criminals adapt their modus operandi constantly. In 2023, following massive awareness raising  
campaigns on the modus operandi of these phishing campaigns from the Grand-Ducal Police, supervisors,  
FIs and the CRF, it has been observed that some of these groups no longer act remotely, but were sent to  
the vicꢀms’ homes. These actors were, most of the ꢀmes, recruited locally and via social media networks  
to recover credit card informaꢀon or steal valuables using false pretenses and/or idenꢀꢀes.  
The Grand-Ducal Police also noted that an increasing number of Luxembourg residents were targeted by  
so-called “Hi Mum” and “grand-son” scams and some of the related proceeds were laundered via money  
mules or vIBANs as outlined in the case studies below (cf. see Insight Box 2 for an in-depth explanaꢀon on  
vIBANs).  
Case study 10: vIBAN abused for CEF  
Between February and March 2023, the CRF received several reports of so-called “Hi Mum” Scams,  
where vicꢀms received WhatsApp messages from an unknown but local phone number from fraudsters  
pretending to be their child. The vicꢀms received text messages in Luxembourgish via Luxembourg  
mobile phone numbers, with the inclusion of a Luxembourg IBAN. During the invesꢀgaꢀon of this case,  
the CRF discovered that the IBANs provided by the fraudsters were vIBANs. These vIBANs were issued  
by a Luxembourg banking insꢀtuꢀon to a Luxembourg based EMI who offered credit cards to European  
customers160. These credit cards can be loaded by transferring money to the vIBANs, which the criminals  
intended to use for further laundering. Of the six idenꢀfied vIBANs used in the scam, the CRF was able  
to block or recall EUR 40 000 out of EUR 55 000 defrauded funds. The CRF’s acꢀon was facilitated by the  
co-operaꢀon with the bank issuing the vIBANs, which made it possible to quickly idenꢀfy the PI holding  
the underlying account of the end customer.  
160 At the date of approval of this report (28 April 2025), the EMI does not offer this service anymore.  
63  
   
In a similar vein, Luxembourg judicial authoriꢀes indicated in their annual report that CEF has increased  
conꢀnuously between 2020 and 2023. The following chart depicts the different types of CEF that occurred  
throughout the observaꢀon period and shows that for more than a half, CEF occurs through internet sales  
and/or involve credit card fraud161  
.
Figure 11: Number of cases per type of fraud, 2020 - 2023162  
phishing, 1,802 ,  
Fraud (false  
transfer orders),  
19%  
2,501 , 26%  
fraud ("online  
bank"), 6 , 0%  
"CEO fraud", 14 ,  
0%  
Internet sales /  
credit card fraud,  
5,167 , 55%  
The FATF-EGMONT report on illicit financial flows from cyber-enabled fraud notes that indeed the locaꢀon  
in which the CEF occurs (i.e., where the vicꢀm is) is frequently different from the locaꢀon where the  
laundering of CEF-proceeds takes place, and money mule networks may span across mulꢀple jurisdicꢀons.  
It further precises that regions that are highly cashless and digital-based (e.g. where the bulk of financial  
intermediaꢀon is done via online services) are expectedly more vulnerable to the ML risks associated with  
this crime, although the transnaꢀonal nature of CEF means that criminals can easily target vicꢀms  
regardless of internaꢀonal borders163.  
5.2.1.2.  
Luxembourg’s domesꢀc threat exposure  
Throughout the observation period of the NRA, judicial authorities have received over 1 700 cases in  
relation with fraud and forgery and convicted over 700 criminals to prison sentences164. The Grand-Ducal  
Police notes that fraud and forgery generate, together with drug trafficking, the most important proceeds  
in Luxembourg. Furthermore, the Grand-Ducal Police cites fraud as top-five crime area with regard to  
outgoing and incoming requests through the Europol’s secure information exchange network. The CRF  
transferred over 500 cases with respect to fraud and forgery to the State Prosecutors. This represented  
more than half of all CRF’s disseminations to the State Prosecutors during that period. In a similar vein, it  
161 Justice, Rapport des juridictions judiciaires 2023, link.  
162 Justice, Rapport des juridictions judiciaires 2023, link.  
163 FATF Interpol - Egmont Group, Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud, 2023, link.  
164 It should be noted that this figure includes the number of suspended prison sentences.  
64  
         
should be noted that this crime category encompasses a wide array of criminal offences, as laid out in  
Considering the above, domestic threat related to fraud and forgery is assessed to be “High”.  
5.2.2. Robbery and theſt  
From a staꢀsꢀcal point of view, theſts (“vols simples”) is the most encountered predicate offence  
considering the number of registered cases with the Grand-Ducal Police (represenꢀng around 20% of all  
predicate offences registered)165  
.
Although not exhausꢀve, there are in general two types of acꢀve actors.  
Local actors: these individuals are oſten homeless or drug-addicts and commit robbery and/or  
theſt in order to finance their survival or addicꢀon. Generated proceeds are rather low (mobile  
phones, wallets, money, bikes) compared to other offences.  
Organised crime actors operaꢀng from abroad: These actors are believed to target Luxembourg  
due to its wealth (highest real GDP per capita in the EU166) and proximity to three borders, giving  
an impression of an easy escape. Based on experience from LEAs, foreign perpetrators targeꢀng  
Luxembourg for robberies and theſts come from a variety of locaꢀons. Throughout the  
observaꢀon period, these groups have commiꢁed aꢁacks on ATMs (amounꢀng to a total of 8  
explosions between 2020 and 2023), armed robberies, burglaries, and vehicle related theſts  
(luxury vehicles and high-end SUVs). In 2021 and 2022, there also appears to be a considerable  
number of theſts and burglaries commiꢁed by repeat offenders that are minors.  
5.2.2.1.  
Luxembourg’s domesꢀc threat exposure: robbery and theſt  
Throughout the observation period of this NRA, judicial authorities have received almost 5 000 cases in  
relation with robbery and theft and convicted over 1 500 criminals to prison sentences167. The Grand-  
Ducal Police cites robbery as top-five crime area with respect to incoming and outgoing requests through  
the Europol’s secure information exchange network.  
Considering the above, the domesꢀc threat level for robbery and theſt is assessed to be “High”.  
5.2.3. Drug trafficking  
Luxembourg is exposed to the domesꢀc threat of drug trafficking through various factors:  
The border-free Schengen Area and its proximity with countries esꢀmated to have sizeable drug  
trafficking acꢀviꢀes and markets (e.g. France, Belgium, Germany and Netherlands);  
Europol reports that authoriꢀes observed a trend towards trafficking larger individual  
consignments via sea by exploiꢀng containers passing through global logisꢀc hubs168. The  
165 Police Grand Ducale, Chiffres de la délinquance, link (years: 2021 2023).  
166 Eurostat, Real GDP per capita, link retrieved June 2022.  
167 It should be noted that this figure includes the number of suspended prison sentences.  
168 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol, EU Drug Markets Analysis: Key insights for policy and  
practice, 2024, link.  
65  
           
presence of one of the leading freight airports and a mulꢀmodal hub connecꢀng Luxembourg with  
major European ports could add to this exposiꢀon.  
5.2.3.1.  
Luxembourg’s domesꢀc threat exposure: drug trafficking  
As per the Grand-Ducal Police, local offenders conꢀnue to be parꢀcularly acꢀve in the local drug market.  
The situaꢀon regarding dealers selling cocaine and marijuana at the Railway Staꢀon district in Luxembourg  
City (street dealing) and the situaꢀon regarding dealers near the “Fixerstuff” and around the ciꢀes located  
in the South of Luxembourg and the French-Luxembourg border remains unchanged. The 2023 Annual  
Report of the Grand-Ducal Police noted that traffickers from the Netherlands are also observed to be acꢀve  
in Luxembourg supplying the Luxembourg market with heroin169. Judicial authoriꢀes noted that issues  
relaꢀng to drug consumpꢀon and acquisiꢀon have risen in the past years. They also noted an increasing  
presence of dealers operaꢀng within foreign organised crime structures170  
.
Luxembourg’s customs authority seized throughout the observation period cash stemming from drug  
trafficking worth EUR 28 939,99. Overall, it should be noted that authorities estimate that cash plays a  
predominant role in the international and local drug market.  
Judicial authorities opened in the observation period over 700 cases linked to drug trafficking, and  
convicted 670 persons between 2020 and 2023. The Grand-Ducal Police notes that drug trafficking,  
together with fraud and forgery, generate the most important proceeds in Luxembourg. Furthermore, the  
Grand-Ducal Police cites drug trafficking as top-five crime area with respect to outgoing and incoming  
requests to through the Europol’s secure information exchange network.  
Considering the above, the domestic threat level for drug trafficking is assessed to be “High”.  
5.2.4. Analysis of domesꢀc predicate offences: medium and lower threat exposure  
The following table resumes the predicate offences that were assessed to bear a medium, low or very  
low threat.  
169 Police Grand-Ducale, Rapport d’activités 2023, link.  
170 La Justice, Rapports des juridictions judiciaires 2023, link.  
66  
     
Table 12: Domesꢀc predicate offences: medium and lower threat exposure  
Domesꢀc  
threat  
level  
Predicate  
Raꢀonale  
offence  
Likelihood/  
probability proceeds  
Size/  
Consequences/  
impact  
Luxembourg legal persons may be misused to commit tax crimes in  
Luxembourg. Generated proceeds thereof are laundered either in LU or  
abroad.  
It should, however, be noted that with regard to natural persons, most of  
the direct taxes are collected throughout the year via withholding by  
employers.  
With respect to legal persons, electronic filing has been mandatory since  
2018, allowing the implementaꢀon of a set of technical mechanisms that  
enable the blocking of automaꢀc taxaꢀon and thus triggering a specific  
review and taxaꢀon of legal persons.  
The CRF esꢀmates that about 75% of the total domesꢀc cases are related  
to direct taxes, with the remaining cases involving either indirect taxes or  
Tax crimes  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
a combinaꢀon of both.  
Between 2020 and 2023, Luxembourg direct tax authority (ACD) sent out  
209 requests of informaꢀon to foreign authoriꢀes. Most of these requests  
were addressed to Luxembourg neighboring countries.  
In 2023, most VAT fraud cases in Luxembourg emerged from the  
automoꢀve sector. Prominently represented were cases involving mobile  
phones and their accessories (mostly Airpods) or IT components  
(memory cards, hard disks). Due to intensive cooperaꢀon at internaꢀonal  
level, both commodiꢀes have slightly lost in importance and volume over  
the past 2-3 years.  
67  
 
Domesꢀc  
threat  
level  
Predicate  
offence  
Likelihood/  
probability proceeds  
Size/  
Consequences/  
impact  
Raꢀonale  
The CRF disseminated 44 cases with regard to suspicions of tax crimes to  
the State Prosecutors in 2020-2023, most of them relate to domesꢀc  
cases.  
With respect to the Luxembourg’s context (cf. secꢀon 3), the high level of  
digital connecꢀvity of Luxembourg may be exploited by criminals.  
Luxembourg is ranked 4th best connected country in the EU in 2022 and a  
considerable share of Luxembourg residents use the Internet at least  
once a week.  
Medium  
Medium  
High  
Medium  
Cybercrime  
The CRF transferred 8 cases with respect to cybercrime to the State  
Prosecutors in 2020 - 2023.  
Cybercrime can have consequences on data protection, confidentiality  
and availability, with important social and economic costs.  
The level of domestic criminality related to corruption and bribery is  
deemed to be relatively low in Luxembourg. The 2023 Corruption  
Perception Index allocates Luxembourg a total score of 79 out of 100  
points (i.e. 9th lowest score among 180 countries)171. The World Bank  
Controls of Corruption Index assessed ranked Luxembourg 8th best  
country with regard to controls against corruption (out of 193  
countries)172. Moreover, the Rule of Law Index 2023 ranks Luxembourg  
8th (out of 140) by absence of corruption173.  
Corrupꢀon and  
bribery  
Medium  
Medium  
High  
Medium  
171 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 2023, link. Note that a country scoring 100 points, is considered to be very clean. A country scoring 0 points is deemed  
to be highly corrupt.  
172 World Bank, Data Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators, Control of Corruption, 2023, link.  
173  
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2023, link. Note that the first country in the ranking is presumed to have the lowest degree of corruption in government. The last  
country in the ranking is presumed to have the highest presence of corruption in government.  
68  
     
Domesꢀc  
threat  
level  
Predicate  
offence  
Likelihood/  
probability proceeds  
Size/  
Consequences/  
impact  
Raꢀonale  
Luxembourg is home to a number of European insꢀtuꢀons, including the  
Secretariat of the European Parliament, the Court of Jusꢀce of the  
European Union, the European Investment Bank and some Directorate  
Generals of the European Commission, the heightened presence of PEPs  
might increase the likelihood of corrupꢀon and bribery. As a result, there  
are some PEPs residing in Luxembourg, although their absolute number  
(14 000 EU public officials on the territory) is sꢀll relaꢀvely low.  
Nonetheless, this exposure should sꢀll be considered.  
Corrupꢀon could lead to erosion of trust in economic and poliꢀcal  
insꢀtuꢀons.  
In the Rapports juridicꢀons judiciaires, judicial authoriꢀes noted the  
presence of foreign groups commiꢂng serial burglaries, luxury vehicle  
theſts, ATM theſts using explosives, “shock calls”174  
.
Parꢀcipaꢀon in  
organised  
criminal group  
and  
As noted in its annual reports, the Grand-Ducal Police is aware of  
organised criminal groups commiꢂng predicate offences in Luxembourg  
(e.g. robbery and theſt). Some individuals believed to be affiliated to  
organised/mafia criminal structures have been idenꢀfied and their  
accounts were blocked. This demonstrates that Luxembourg is not spared  
Medium  
Medium  
Low  
Low  
High  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
racketeering  
from the risks associated with organised crime175  
.
The parꢀcipaꢀon in organised crime groups may promote violence, social  
disrupꢀon and an increased cost of living.  
Sexual  
exploitaꢀon  
The Grand-Ducal Police observed in its Annual Report of 2023 the  
increase of a more discreet pracꢀce of prosꢀtuꢀon, mainly taking place  
174 La Justice, Rapports des juridictions judiciaires 2023, link.  
175 Police Grand-Ducale, Rapport d’activités 2023, link.  
69  
   
Domesꢀc  
threat  
level  
Predicate  
offence  
Likelihood/  
probability proceeds  
Size/  
Consequences/  
impact  
Raꢀonale  
in private locaꢀons (e.g. apartments). Adverꢀsements offering escort  
services published on the internet facilitate the rotaꢀon of prosꢀtutes in  
apartments for limited stays. These individuals conꢀnue their acꢀviꢀes  
throughout Europe following the same paꢁern. South American naꢀonals  
are more represented among those engaging in paid sexual services.  
including sexual  
exploitaꢀon of  
children  
The Grand-Ducal Police also noted an increase in the sharing of inꢀmate  
photos and videos. Vicꢀms are led to share such photos on social media,  
either voluntarily or through deceit or false trust. The perpetrators are  
minors or adults posing as minors176  
.
The CRF transferred 7 cases with regard to sexual exploitaꢀon to the State  
Prosecutors in 2020-2023.  
Sexual exploitaꢀon has a high economic and social cost, with vicꢀms  
subjected to long-lasꢀng physical and emoꢀonal impact. It can also have  
some impact on the aꢁracꢀveness for business due to the nature of crime  
and broader concerns around labour exploitaꢀon and modern slavery  
associated with this offence.  
The Global Organised Crime Index ranked Luxembourg 171th out of 191  
Trafficking in  
human beings  
and migrant  
smuggling  
for human trafficking (lowest rank in the EU after Finland) and 173th out  
of 189 for human smuggling (lowest rank in the EU)177  
.
Low  
Low  
High  
Medium  
Luxembourg is considered a country of destination and transit for victims  
of trafficking in human beings178  
.
176 Police Grand-Ducale, Rapport d’activités 2023, link.  
177 Global OC Index, retrieved on 30 December 2023 link and link. Note that the first ranking is reserved to countries being presumed to have significant level of human trafficking  
and migrant smuggling.  
178 Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Evaluation Report Luxembourg, 2022, link.  
70  
     
Domesꢀc  
threat  
level  
Predicate  
offence  
Likelihood/  
probability proceeds  
Size/  
Consequences/  
impact  
Raꢀonale  
The most common form of exploitation in Luxembourg is labour  
exploitation (in the HORECA and construction sectors)179  
.
In 2022, Luxembourg reported 50 identified victims and 15 presumed  
victims of human trafficking. In 2021, Luxembourg reported 20 identified  
victims of human trafficking and 30 presumed victims of human  
trafficking180. Judicial authorities noted that the number of cases relating  
to human trafficking and migrant smuggling have risen181. The CRF  
disseminated 1 case to the State Prosecutors between 2020 and 2023.  
Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling generates significant  
social and human harm.  
As noted earlier, extorꢀon may occur through cyber-enabled crime. The  
Grand-Ducal Police noted that the number of cases related to  
ransomware reached its peak in 2020. In these cases, vicꢀms were oſten  
extorted to pay a ransom in crypto-currency in order to recover their  
Extorꢀon  
Low  
Low  
Medium  
Low  
Low  
Low  
data182  
.
The threat level from insider trading and market manipulation is assessed  
as low due to the low volume and complexity of domestic trading, the  
type of financial instruments admitted to trading (mostly debt  
instruments), the likely low proceeds and the enhanced transparency of  
the activity in Luxembourg (members and participants of the  
Luxembourg Stock Exchange are exclusively regulated firms).  
Insider trading  
and market  
manipulaꢀon  
Low  
Medium  
179 Commission consultative des Droits de l’Homme du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Rapport sur la traite des êtres humains au Luxembourg années 2021-2022, 2024, link.  
180 Commission consultative des Droits de l’Homme du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Rapport sur la traite des êtres humains au Luxembourg années 2021-2022, 2024, link.  
181 La Justice, Rapports des juridictions judiciaires 2023, link.  
182 Grand-Ducal Police, Rapport d’activités 2021, link.  
71  
       
Domesꢀc  
threat  
level  
Predicate  
offence  
Likelihood/  
probability proceeds  
Size/  
Consequences/  
impact  
Raꢀonale  
The CRF transferred 3 cases to the State Prosecutors with respect to  
insider trading and market manipulation during the observation period.  
Factors such as the border control-free Schengen Area coupled with  
Luxembourg’s geographical locaꢀon, the presence of one of the leading  
freight airports and a mulꢀmodal hub connecꢀng Luxembourg with major  
European hubs could potenꢀally increase the likelihood that  
counterfeited and pirated goods are transiꢀng through Grand-Duchy.  
Luxembourg customs authority (ADA) is responsible for customs control  
and supervision of goods entering or leaving the customs territory of the  
European Union. The majority of detected counterfeited goods came  
from China and Hong-Kong and entered Luxembourg via airfreight. Most  
of these goods were clothes, shoes and “maroquinerie” (such as, bags,  
wallets, belts) intended for private usage of people residing outside of  
Luxembourg (and within the EU internal market). It should be noted in  
this context that, with respect to the infringements detected by  
Luxembourg customs authority, trademark holders are informed of the  
detected infringements and may decide to file a complaint with judicial  
authoriꢀes.  
Counterfeiꢀng  
and piracy of  
products  
Medium  
Very Low  
Low  
Low  
It should be noted that similar to the conclusions drawn in secꢀon 5.1.6  
and considering Luxembourg’s online acꢀvity (see secꢀon 3), online  
shopping has grown with over 80% of Luxembourg internet users having  
bought or ordered something online.  
The CRF disseminated 9 cases with respect to counterfeiꢀng and piracy of  
products to the State Prosecutors between 2020 and 2023.  
72  
Domesꢀc  
threat  
level  
Predicate  
offence  
Likelihood/  
probability proceeds  
Size/  
Consequences/  
impact  
Raꢀonale  
Proceeds of environmental crimes (e.g. related to waste management  
services, emission schemes, environment standards or wildlife) are  
deemed low due to the small geographical size and populaꢀon of  
Luxembourg. Nonetheless environmental/wildlife harm can have long-  
lasꢀng effects.  
Environmental  
crimes  
Low  
Very Low  
Medium  
High  
Low  
Low  
Murder,  
grievous bodily It is esꢀmated that Luxembourg has a low domesꢀc murder rate.  
Very Low  
Very Low  
injury  
There are very few reported cases of kidnapping (54 naꢀonal cases  
between 2020-2023), illegal restraint, and hostage taking. These crimes  
are generally carried out by individuals rather than as a result of  
organised crime. Hence, there are very liꢁle proceeds to be laundered.  
Kidnapping,  
illegal restraint,  
Very Low  
Very Low  
High  
Low  
Low  
Low  
and hostage  
taking  
The CRF disseminated one case with regard to kidnapping, illegal restraint  
and hostage taking throughout the observaꢀon period to the State  
Prosecutors.  
Luxembourg ranked among the countries with the lowest arms trafficking  
Illicit arms  
trafficking  
rate (ranked as 175th out of 192 for arms trafficking in the Global  
Low  
Low  
Organised Crime Index)183  
.
Illicit trafficking  
in stolen and  
other goods  
There are few cases in Luxembourg of trafficking in stolen or other goods  
(e.g. precious metals, gems, cultural goods and radioacꢀve material).  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
Low  
There is limited smuggling of goods into Luxembourg due to lower  
domesꢀc prices (for instance on cigareꢁes, fuel and alcohol) with respect  
Smuggling  
183 Global OC Index 2024, link.  
73  
 
Domesꢀc  
threat  
level  
Predicate  
offence  
Likelihood/  
probability proceeds  
Size/  
Consequences/  
impact  
Raꢀonale  
to neighbouring countries. Taking legally purchased goods out of the  
country is not a predicate offence in Luxembourg. There has been a low  
number of cases of undeclared cash at borders184 (cf. secꢀon 6.6.2)185.  
Through the observation period:  
-
Luxembourg ranked 22nd in the EU for counterfeiting currency in  
2020-2022 and 25th in 2023. An annual average of 539 banknotes  
Counterfeiꢀng  
currency  
Low  
Very Low  
Low  
Low  
Very Low  
worth EUR 23 865 were detected in Luxembourg186  
;
-
The CRF disseminated 4 cases with regard to counterfeiting currency  
throughout the observation period to the State Prosecutors.  
Luxembourg has no open sea access and no known river piracy making  
this predicate offence very unlikely for ML.  
Piracy  
Very Low  
Very Low  
Very Low  
184 Note that since the entry into force of the 2021 Cash Control Law, there is an obligation to declare cross-border transports of cash when traveling to or from Luxembourg, from  
or to third countries (extra-EU) and from or to EU Member States (intra-EU). For unaccompanied cash, sent in parcels, containers or freight across the border of Luxembourg, there  
is a disclosure obligation in place.  
185 CRF data.  
186 BCL data.  
74  
     
5.3. Emerging and evolving threats: restricꢀve measures in financial maꢁers  
The Law of 20 July 2022 establishing an interinsꢀtuꢀonal commiꢁee in charge of monitoring the  
implementaꢀon of restricꢀve measures in financial maꢁers, within the meaning of the Law of 19  
December 2020 on the implementaꢀon of restricꢀve measures in financial maꢁers (the Law of 19  
December 2020”) added the failure to comply with such measures, to Luxembourg’s predicate  
offences of ML further to arꢀcle 506-1 of the penal code. More specifically, failure to comply with the  
restricꢀve measures as adopted by way of a grand-ducal regulaꢀon pursuant to arꢀcle 4(1) of the Law  
of 19 December 2020, or by way of an act by the EU or United Naꢀons pursuant to arꢀcle 4(2) of the  
Law of 19 December 2020, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of eight days to five years  
and a fine of between EUR 12 500 and EUR 5 million or by one of these penalꢀes only. Where the  
offence has resulted in substanꢀal financial gain, the fine may be increased to four ꢀmes the amount  
of the offence.  
Pursuant to arꢀcle 3 of the Law of 19 December 2020, the adherence to the restricꢀve measures is a  
legal obligaꢀon that does not only apply to the professionals of the financial sector but to all  
Luxembourgish natural and legal persons, residing or operaꢀng in or through the Grand-Duchy of  
Luxembourg territory or abroad; to legal persons having their head office, or a permanent  
establishment or their centre of main interests in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg territory and that  
operate in or through the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg or abroad; to branches of Luxembourg legal  
persons as well as to branches of foreign legal persons established in Luxembourg; and to all other  
natural or legal persons operaꢀng in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg.  
Notwithstanding the limited observaꢀon period for the purposes of this assessment (from July 2022  
unꢀl December 2023), Luxembourg acꢀvely monitors this evolving threat considering the geopoliꢀcal  
context as well as the fast-paced environment in which restricꢀve measures are developing.  
Further informaꢀon on the implementaꢀon of restricꢀve measures can be found on the MoF’s website.  
In July 2023, the CRF also issued via goAML a Typology Report on the Circumvenꢀon of Financial  
Restricꢀve Measures to all registered persons187. The “Financial crime” secꢀon of CSSF’s website  
contains as well useful informaꢀon on this subject. The following is an illustraꢀve case study provided  
by the CRF.  
Case study 11: Circumvenꢀon of financial restricꢀve measures  
A case of a suspicious sale of shares by a sancꢀoned individual who indirectly owned more than 50%  
of the voꢀng shares and of the share capital of an EU-based company was reported to the CRF. This  
company fully owned two non-EU based companies which both had bank accounts in Luxembourg.  
The deposits thereon were frozen by the reporꢀng bank which also duly reported it to the MoF  
under Council Regulaꢀon (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restricꢀve measures in  
respect of acꢀons undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and  
independence of Ukraine.  
The circumstances which triggered the suspicions were changes to the shareholding structure of the  
abovemenꢀoned enꢀꢀes around the ꢀme their BO was designated by the EU sancꢀons list. By an  
187 Note that obliged entities can request a copy of this report via goAML.  
75  
     
amendment agreement to the prenupꢀal contract between the BO and his spouse, a percentage of  
his share interest was transferred to his wife.  
In addiꢀon, a trusted person of the BO purchased a percentage of his shares well below their market  
value via a sale and purchase agreement (“SPA”) a few days prior to the designaꢀon. The BO also  
stepped down from all management posiꢀons in the group of companies.  
As a result of these changes, the BO stated holding not more than 50% of the shares in the group of  
companies and that the freeze on the deposits of the two non-EU based companies should thus be  
liſted.  
The following elements were considered as suspicious:  
ꢀming of the transacꢀons,  
shares sold significantly under market value,  
simplisꢀc text and terms of the SPA,  
inconsistency with previous transacꢀons,  
desꢀnaꢀon of the purchase price etc.  
As a consequence, considering the circumstances of the changes made to the shareholding  
structure of the companies involved, the CRF was not in a posiꢀon to exclude that the companies  
remain under the control and ownership of said BO by more than 50%.  
Supervision and enforcement acꢀviꢀes by supervisors contribute to further miꢀgate such threats as  
demonstrated in the case study below.  
Case study 12: Adequate applicaꢀon of European financial sancꢀons and restricꢀve measures  
against Russia and Belarus observed through themaꢀc ad-hoc AML/CFT on-site inspecꢀons188  
In order to ensure that the professionals comply with European financial sancꢀons and restricꢀve  
measures against Russia and Belarus with respect to the war in Ukraine, a set of themaꢀc on-site  
inspecꢀons was carried out in 2023 with twelve professionals presenꢀng a significant exposure  
towards Russia/Belarus. In this context, the CSSF verified, in parꢀcular, the sound funcꢀoning of the  
name matching system (applied to the customer base payment systems and assets under  
management), ensured that the processing of the generated alerts was efficient and adequate and  
verified that the professionals had put in place mechanisms allowing, on the one hand, to verify that  
the transacꢀons linked to Russia or Belarus did not breach the sancꢀons specific to certain business  
areas and, on the other hand, to idenꢀfy potenꢀal circumvenꢀons or circumvenꢀon aꢁempts of the  
European sancꢀons. It also ensured that the professionals have in place controls allowing them to  
idenꢀfy potenꢀal circumvenꢀon of financial sancꢀons (such as idenꢀficaꢀon of potenꢀal strawmen,  
unjusꢀfied changes of BOs, etc.) and verified the proper applicaꢀon of restricꢀve measures and  
sound coordinaꢀon of the professionals with the MoF.  
As a whole, these on-site inspecꢀons allowed confirming that the professionals addressed financial  
sancꢀons with due care. However, in certain cases, professionals blocked transacꢀons but did not  
188 Case study provided by the CSSF.  
76  
   
report them to the MoF or the CRF at all or at a late stage. The CSSF therefore reiterated that where  
restricꢀve financial measures are applied, the MoF must be noꢀfied without delay.  
It also drew the professionals’ aꢁenꢀon to the risk of circumvenꢀon of sancꢀons, such as through  
transacꢀons from or to countries that are not subject to European regulaꢀons or by changing the  
role of shareholder to creditor of certain persons likely to appear on the sancꢀons lists.  
77  
6. Inherent ML risk- vulnerabiliꢀes assessment  
As in the 2020 NRA, the sectors falling within the scope of the vulnerabilities assessment are mapped  
on the basis of supervisory structure rather than on the basis of activity. The resulting inherent ML  
risk levels do not take into account the effects of existing mitigating measures. In fact, the impact of  
mitigating measures in reducing inherent risks for the different sub-sectors is assessed in the section  
on mitigating factors.  
6.1. CSSF supervised sectors  
The table below shows the inherent risk outcomes for the sectors falling within the AML/CFT  
supervision of the CSSF.  
In order to account for more granularity, the analysis of the retail and business banks sub-sector  
encompasses the analysis of both retail and business banks, as well as entities operating online.  
Furthermore, VASPs were included within the vulnerabilities assessment, as the Law of 25 March 2020  
amending the 2004 AML/CFT Law added VASPs within the scope of the CSSF AML/CFT supervision.  
The Law of 21 July 2021 amended the Law of 5 April 1993 on the financial sector (1993 LFS). Taking  
this into account, the taxonomy and definition of investment firms were adapted.  
Table 13: Inherent ML risk by sub-sectors (CSSF supervised sectors)  
2025 NRA:  
Sector  
Sub-sectors  
Inherent risk  
High  
Retail and business banks  
Entities operating online  
High  
Banks  
Wholesale, corporate and investment banks  
Private banking  
High  
Very High  
Medium  
Custodians and sub-custodians (incl. Central Securities Depositories)  
Investment firms authorized to carry out the services of investment  
advice and portfolio management189  
High  
Investment firms authorized to carry out the services of reception  
and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial  
instruments and of execution of orders on behalf of clients190  
High  
Investment sector Investment firms authorized to carry out activities of dealing on own  
account, of underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of  
financial instruments on a firm commitment basis and of placing  
financial instruments without a firm commitment basis191  
Medium  
Collective investments  
Medium  
Low  
CSSF-supervised pension funds  
Payment institutions (PIs)  
High  
189 In the 2020 NRA: “Wealth and asset managers”.  
190 In the 2020 NRA: “Brokers and broker-dealers (non-banks)”.  
191 In the 2020 NRA: “Traders / market-makers”.  
78  
           
2025 NRA:  
Inherent risk  
Sector  
Sub-sectors  
E-money institutions (EMIs)  
High  
Money value or  
transfer services  
(MVTS)  
Agents and e-money distributors acting on behalf of PIs/EMIs  
established in other European Member States  
Medium  
VASPs  
High  
High  
Specialised PFSs providing corporate services  
Professional depositaries  
Specialised PFSs  
Medium  
Support PFSs and Support PFSs  
other specialised  
Very Low  
Other specialised PFSs  
PFSs192  
Market operators  
Low  
6.1.1. Banks193  
This sector includes the analysis of entities with a banking license (chapter 1 of the 1993 LSF) and  
includes retail and business banks, entities operating online, wholesale, corporate and investment  
banks, private banking and custodians and sub-custodians (including Central Securities Depositories  
(CSDs)).  
AT A GLANCE  
Overarching key risk drivers for the banking sector are the sector’s size, the risks associated with  
products and activities, and the volume of transactions/clients handled.  
As in the case for the 2020 NRA, private banking activities represent a “Very High” inherent risk  
level whereas custodians and sub-custodians are assessed to pose “Medium” risk. The remaining  
banking sub-sectors (i.e. retail and business banks, entities operating online, wholesale, as well as  
corporate and investment banks) pose a “High” inherent risk.  
Luxembourg’s banking sector is large in terms of size. The Grand-Duchy counted 120 entities in 2023  
from over 20 different countries and managed assets worth around EUR 929 billion in 2023. The  
criteria “ownership/legal structure” posed high ML risks for the whole banking sector (with the  
exception of retail and business banks and custodians and sub-custodians), as only around 7% of banks  
were domestically owned and the remaining were foreign-owned (with about 50% EU and 50% non-  
EU ownership throughout the observation period).  
Vulnerabiliꢀes linked to the products and acꢀviꢀes were assessed high for the whole banking sector,  
in line with the 2022 SNRA (see boxes in subsequent sub-secꢀons related to the banking sub-sectors).  
192 Analysis covered in NRA vulnerability section; Support PFSs & other specialised PFSs assessed on aggregate due to very  
low risk.  
193 Please note that the terms “client account” or “clients” refer to number of “client root accounts as defined in the CSSF  
Financial crime questionnaire (Extract of the “Completion Notes” of the annual survey: “The term "account" refers to the  
root account number (Kontostammnummer, racine du compte bancaire) under which several different sub-accounts (current  
accounts, FX accounts, loan accounts, custody accounts etc.) may be maintained. Whenever data is collected on the number  
of accounts, solely the number of the root accounts should be reported and not the number of sub-accounts. Internal  
technical accounts are exempted from this definition”).  
79  
     
6.1.1.1.  
Retail & business banks and enꢀꢀes operaꢀng online194  
AT A GLANCE  
At the product level (SNRA, NRA)  
Products and activities assessed in the 2022 SNRA related to retail & business banks are “retail  
deposits on accounts (excluding private banking)”, “business loans” and “consumer credits and low-  
value loans”. The 2022 SNRA concludes the following regarding the whole EU:  
ML risks of retail deposits on accounts are assessed “Very high”;  
Business loans are, in most cases, not tailored to ML needs given their high-value nature.  
Furthermore, abusing business loans for ML purposes requires expertise and knowledge.  
Thus, ML risks are assessed “Medium”;  
Consumer credits and low value loans are assessed to bear “Medium” ML risks.  
The 2025 NRA assesses associated inherent risk of these products under “products/activities”. In  
the context of Luxembourg retail & business banks and entities operating online, the resulting  
associated ML risks are considered “High” (in line with the findings of the 2022 SNRA).  
Products and activities related to entities operating online are mainly e-money activities. They are  
in most instances equivalent to products and activities related to retail & business banks notably  
the offer of current accounts. These entities do not offer products and services under the  
anonymous prepaid card model. However, a bank account is always used for loading the e-money  
products.  
At the sub-sector level (NRA)  
In Luxembourg, these sub-sectors’ inherent risk level are “High”. Whereas the 2020 NRA assessed  
“traditional” retail and business banks and entities operating online together, this update of the  
NRA assesses these two types of banks separately in order to account for their specific and diverging  
characteristics in some dimensions (e.g. international clientele and distribution channels):  
Key risk drivers for retail & business banks identified in the previous 2020 NRA continue to  
be relevant: sub-sector size (although highly concentrated) and volume, followed by  
products and activities, international business, and channels.  
ML vulnerabilities associated to size, international business (even though low exposure to  
high-risk countries), volume of clients and transactions and distribution channels are  
considered key risk drivers for entities operating online followed by ownership and  
products and activities.  
194  
Some data regarding retail & business banks and entities operating online apply to both sub-sectors. Therefore, the  
assessment of these two sub-sectors is included in this sub-section.  
80  
   
Retail and business banks  
Overall, Luxembourg counted nine retail and business banks managing EUR 173,1 billion of assets and  
generating a total gross income of EUR 8,5 billion as of end 2023195. Entities of this sub-sector  
employed between 2020 and 2022 the largest number of employees among the banking sub-sectors  
(8 269 in 2020, 8 266 in 2021 and 8 154 in 2022). In 2023, however, employment in the private banking  
sub-sector (8 299 employees) exceeded the number of employees within the retail and business banks  
sub-sector (7 785 employees). In this context it should be noted that the number of retail and business  
banks has decreased throughout the observation period (from 15 entities in 2020 to 9 entities in  
2023).  
Considering the decreasing and limited number of entities (among which most have a long-standing  
presence within the country), ML risks related to ownership are assessed to be less significant. The  
sub-sector became more concentrated with top-five entities generating over 95% of the market’s total  
assets in 2023 (in comparison to almost 90% in 2020).  
The number of client accounts remained significant throughout the observation period (more than 1,3  
million client accounts in 2023). This said, most account holders were natural persons (about 90% in  
2023), which are less vulnerable to ML than legal persons and arrangements and most of their clientele  
was based in the EU. In fact, on average between 2020 and 2023, only 1,5% of the retail and business  
banking clientele resided in non-EU countries. As such, 99% of consolidated flows were with European  
countries and 0,1% of consolidated flows were with high-risk countries in 2023196  
.
As this sub-sector offers a range of different products, the following outlines how these could  
potentially be abused by criminals:  
As already noted in the 2020 NRA, payment service acꢀviꢀes carried out by retail and business  
banks are potenꢀally vulnerable to ML risks, as they can experience layering and extracꢀon  
techniques used by criminals which are comparaꢀvely more sophisꢀcated than in other sub-  
sectors, for instance, by funding of a product using one method and withdrawal using another.  
In a similar vein, and as already noted previously (secꢀons 3 and 5.1.1.1), an increasing share  
of transacꢀons and payments occurs online. In this regard, it should be noted that in  
Luxembourg, cards consꢀtute the preferred mean of payments for online transacꢀons.  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that electronic payment soluꢀons and wire transfers are also  
widely used197. Considering this, threats stemming from fraud, and CEF are relevant for retail  
and business banks;  
Products offered by the sub-sector (i.e. basic financial services) may also be abused by money  
mules seeking to transfer proceeds out of the banking sector using personal accounts, either  
scamming, fake banking websites (for example) or through money value transfer services198  
;
195 CSSF data.  
196 As per CSSF internal rating list.  
197 ABBL/CSSF, Retail banking survey 2023, link.  
198 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council  
on the assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-  
border activities, 2022, link.  
81  
       
Business loans give criminal funds an appearance of legiꢀmacy and perpetrators may use  
criminal funds to reimburse the laꢁer. Criminals may also opt for loan fraud (i.e. using  
strawmen, false documentaꢀon) to transfer funds199  
;
Consumer credits offer less money laundering potenꢀal than other financial products, but  
criminal organisaꢀons may use them to finance the purchase of goods and then redeem the  
loans by cash200. According to the ABBL/CSSF Retail Banking Survey, the volume of consumer  
credits granted by Luxembourg retail banks in comparison to the total volume of credits is  
limited, represenꢀng 4% of total volume of loans granted in 2022201  
;
Criminals may abuse mortgage credits and high-value asset-backed credits to disguise and  
invest the proceeds of crime by way of real-estate investment. The proceeds are used for  
deposits, repayments and early redempꢀon of the credit agreement. The 2022 SNRA notes  
that organised crime organisaꢀons have frequently used this method. They are well equipped  
to provide false documentaꢀon and the structure of the mortgage (with third-party  
involvement) helps them to hide the real beneficiary of the funds. Mortgage credit consꢀtutes  
an easy way to enable criminals to own several properꢀes and to hide the true scale of their  
assets. This method is sꢀll used for the integraꢀon phase (mostly for lower amounts, as it does  
not require sophisꢀcated operaꢀons). However, it is more oſten used in combinaꢀon with  
concealment of the BO of real estate behind a complex chain of ownership.  
Banks were predominantly involved in face-to-face contact with their clients. Although the  
Luxembourg branch network was relatively dense (compared to other EU countries), banking  
transactions have become more and more digital and require less direct client contact. This might  
increase ML risks.  
Entities operating online  
Although the number of establishments in the sub-sector of entities operating online was very limited,  
with a total number of five entities as of December 2023, they served a considerable number of client  
accounts (~89 million in 2023). This exposes the sector to ML risks stemming from the volume of  
clients served, even though most of them (95%) were natural persons. The share of high-risk clients  
was low decreasing ML risks stemming from clients.  
As shown in the graph below, the client-base served by these entities has changed throughout the  
observation period, and especially between 2022 and 2023. In fact, the arrival of one significant entity  
explains the volatility relating to the presented figures.  
199 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council  
on the assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-  
border activities, 2022, link.  
200 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council  
on the assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-  
border activities, 2022, link.  
201 ABBL/CSSF, Retail Banking Survey 2023, link.  
82  
     
Figure 12: Breakdown of client residency (enꢀꢀes operaꢀng online), indicaꢀve data, 2020-2023202  
2023  
2022  
2021  
2020  
0%  
10%  
20%  
30%  
40%  
50%  
60%  
70%  
80%  
90%  
100%  
% of clients residing in EU countries  
% of clients residing in non-EU countries  
Products and activities provided by entities operating online do not substantially differ to those  
offered by retail and business banks (especially with regard to payment services and basic financial  
services). Therefore, the analysis regarding products and activities outlined in the retail and business  
banking section above also applies to entities operating online.  
Distribution channels of entities operating online contribute to the ML exposure, as 100% of  
customers were interacting through online/non-face-to-face channels as the name suggests.  
6.1.1.2.  
Wholesale, corporate and investment banks  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
The 2022 SNRA assesses the corporate banking sector as “High” risk for ML. Key risk drivers  
identified by the 2022 SNRA are the nature of customers and geographical areas.  
NRA  
In Luxembourg, the sub-sector inherent risk level remains “High”.  
Overall, the key risk drivers for wholesale, corporate and investment banks are sub-sector size  
followed by the sub-sector’s fragmentation/complexity, ownership structure, products and  
activities, international business and clients/transactions (volume and risk).  
The sub-sector’s size remained more or less stable in terms of number of entities and total assets  
between 2020 and 2023, as shown in the following figure. Total gross income has, however, increased.  
202 CSSF data.  
83  
   
Figure 13: Number of enꢀꢀes, total income and assets of wholesale, corporate and investment  
banks, 2020-2023  
12.9  
300  
250  
200  
150  
100  
50  
14  
12  
10  
8
252.6  
252.6  
7.2  
250.1  
214.4  
6
4.5  
4.5  
4
2
44  
2021  
42  
42  
40  
0
0
2020  
2022  
2023  
total number of entities  
total assets of the sub-sector (in EUR billion)  
total gross income (in EUR billion)  
The international nature of the business continued to drive the ML risks of the sub-sector, with 82%  
of both assets and liabilities related to account holders not based in Luxembourg in 2023. Nonetheless,  
it should be noted that the sub-sector is mainly oriented towards a European clientele. Indeed, only  
17% of clients resided in non-EU countries.  
The sub-sector counted a limited number of clients (between 29 000 and 24 000 throughout the  
observation period). The important volumes and average value per transactions that are processed by  
this sub-sector as well as the share of high-risk and PEP clients (mostly foreign) increase, however, ML  
risks with regard to the sub-sector’s transaction volumes and client risk.  
According to the 2022 SNRA, corporate banking may be exposed to trade-based transactions linked to  
corporate bank accounts, which could increase ML risk, especially when high-risk jurisdictions are  
involved. The share of consolidated flows with high-risk countries varied between 0,2% and 1,5%  
during the observation period203. This puts the ML risks exposed in the 2022 SNRA into perspective to  
some extent.  
6.1.1.3.  
Custodians and sub-custodians (incl. CSDs)  
AT A GLANCE  
The sub-sector inherent risk level remains “Medium”.  
Overall, key risk drivers for this sub-sector are sub-sector size, followed by the number (volume) of  
clients.  
203 As per CSSF internal rating list.  
84  
   
In Luxembourg, the sub-sector consisted of 29 entities resulting in a total gross income of EUR 14,8  
billion and assets worth EUR 251 billion in 2023. The sub-sector remained concentrated with top-five  
entities accounting for more than 70% of the market’s assets in 2023.  
In 2023, the sector counted around 170 000 client accounts (around 200 000 in 2020), of which 2,5%  
were flagged as being high-risk. The majority of the sub-sector’s clientele were natural persons,  
although in a decreasing share since 2020. Among the clients that were legal persons (which constitute  
on average ~25% of the clients), most of the clients were Luxembourg investment funds driven by the  
requirements applicable for the vast majority of investment funds to appoint a Luxembourg bank for  
the custody of their investments. During the observation period, the share of PEP clients has doubled  
in relative terms, which may partly be explained by the decrease of the number of client accounts  
since 2020.  
Custodians’ and sub-custodians’ clientele resided predominantly in EU countries. Between 2020 and  
2023, only 1% of its clientele resided in high-risk countries204. The European nature of the business  
and the limited exposure of the sub-sector to geographies having weak AML/CFT measures limit  
associated ML risks to some extent.  
Services offered by custodians and sub-custodians were mostly commoditised and standardised (e.g.  
custody of financial instruments, dividend and interests payment collection and distribution).  
Although ongoing client interaction was indirect, client contact for new account services was direct.  
Consequently, products and services offered by the sub-sector, as well as the channels used to do so,  
pose moderate ML risks.  
6.1.1.4.  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
Private banking  
The 2022 SNRA notes that the combination of sophisticated financial services and products, as well  
as the wealthy customer base often with complex ownership structures, makes the sub-sector  
highly vulnerable for ML purposes.  
NRA  
In Luxembourg, the sub-sector inherent risk level remains “Very High”.  
Overall, key risk drivers for this sub-sector are sub-sector size, products/activities and risks related  
to clients and transactions, followed by sub-sector fragmentation, international nature of business  
(even though mainly European), clients/transactions’ volumes and channels.  
Please note that the 2023 update of the Private Banking Sub-Sector Risk Assessment on the  
CSSF’s website should be consulted for an in-depth assessment of the private banking sub-  
sector’s ML risks: link  
204 As per CSSF internal rating list.  
85  
 
Luxembourg’s private banking sector is large and remained fragmented despite the consolidation  
process initiated over the past few years. During the observation period, the number of private  
banking entities has decreased from 54 entities in 2020 to 37 in 2023. Nonetheless, assets under  
management (AuM) grew substantially.  
Figure 14: Number of enꢀꢀes and AuM in the private banking sub-sector, 2020 - 2023  
700  
600  
500  
400  
300  
200  
100  
0
60  
50  
40  
30  
20  
10  
0
54  
48  
37  
36  
628  
599  
585  
508  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
AuM (in EUR billion)  
number of entities  
The number of clients served by this sub-sector has increased uninterruptedly from 2020  
(approximately 166 000) to 2023 (slightly over 191 000). According to the ABBL/KPMG Banking Survey  
2024, and their specific scope, about 21% of customers came from Luxembourg, 24% from Belgium,  
France and Germany and 40% from the rest of Europe205. Typical motivations for foreign investors to  
hold their assets in Luxembourg are the stable political, economic and juridical environment, the  
strong property protection, the well-regulated and stable financial sector providing numerous  
investment opportunities, the central European location including membership of the Eurozone, the  
diverse and high-quality services, the concentration of experts and the international, multi-lingual  
workforce206. The majority of the clientele were natural persons, although a slight shift towards an  
increasing part of clients being legal persons could be observed (39% in 2020, 41% in 2021, 43% in  
2022 and 47% in 2023).  
Europe remained the core market of the Luxembourg private banking sector with on average 96% of  
consolidated flows being with European countries during the observation period. Nevertheless, the  
share of high-risk clients (on average 10,5% during the observation period) was higher than in other  
banking sub-sectors (with the exception of wholesale, corporate and investment banks), thereby  
increasing the ML vulnerability with regard to client risk.  
Luxembourg’s private banking sub-sector also specialised in specific types of clients, such as affluent  
or Ultra-High-Net-Worth Individual (UHNW) clients. According to the ABBL Private Banking survey  
205 ABBL/KPMG, Private Banking Survey 2024, link.  
206 CSSF, Private Banking Sub-Sector Risk Assessment (Update 2023), link.  
86  
     
2024, clients with assets exceeding EUR 20 million represented around 60% of total AuM throughout  
the observation period (2020-2023).207  
Overall, private banking activities can be split into two core categories of asset management services  
(custody of financial assets, investment services) and four categories of ancillary services (current  
account banking, credit solution, wealth structuring, insurance solutions). According to the 2023  
Private Banking Sub-Sector Risk Assessment, private banks are particularly exposed to the layering  
and integration stages of ML. Criminals may abuse or misuse sophisticated investment services to  
obscure the audit trail and sever the link with the original crime. During these stages, funds are  
typically transferred electronically from one investment or account to another and potentially across  
several geographies. Eventually, funds are returned in one form or other to the criminal, from what  
seem to be legitimate sources. The 2023 Private Banking Sub-Sector Risk Assessment also notes that  
tax crimes, fraud, and corruption and bribery appear as relevant threats for this sub-sector. As access  
to private banking services is limited and reserved to persons with sufficient funds, large value  
transactions are likely to occur more frequently in private banking than in other banking sectors,  
making an unusual and illicit nature of large transfers more difficult to detect and facilitating the  
introduction of large sums into the financial system.  
In general, banks predominantly had physical contact with their clients. However, in private banking,  
intermediaries such as business introducers, power of attorney and third-party managers were used  
in addition to the face-to-face contact with the client. This increases the sub-sector’s ML vulnerability  
in relation to channels.  
6.1.2. Investment sector  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
The 2022 SNRA assesses ML risks linked to the retail and institutional investment sector as “High”,  
with the main vulnerability being the intermediation of services (distribution channels).  
NRA  
Investment firms (with the exception of investment firms authorized to carry out activities of  
dealing on own account, of underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial  
instrument on a firm commitment basis and of placing of financial instruments without a firm  
commitment basis) are assessed as having high ML risks. Collective investments are assessed as  
posing moderate ML risks and the CSSF supervised pension funds are assessed as low risk.  
6.1.2.1.  
Investment firms  
The Law of 21 July 2021 amended the 1993 LFS. Taking this into account, the taxonomy and definition  
of investment firms have been adapted.  
“Investment firms authorized to carry out the services of investment advice and portfolio  
management” encompasses investment firms having the authorisation for the provision of  
“portfolio management” (article 24-4 of the 1993 LSF) and “investment advice” (article 24-5  
207 ABBL/KPMG, Private Banking Survey 2024, link.  
87  
   
of the 1993 LSF). In the 2020 NRA, this sub-sector was referred to as “wealth and asset  
managers”.  
“Investment firms authorized to carry out the services of reception and transmission of orders  
in relation to one or more financial instruments and of execution of orders on behalf of clients”  
encompasses investment firms authorized to carry out the services of reception and  
transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments (article 24-1 of the  
1993 LSF) and of execution of orders on behalf of clients (article 24-2 of the 1993 LSF). In the  
2020 NRA, this sub-sector was referred to as “brokers and broker dealers”.  
“Investment firms authorized to carry out activities of dealing on own account, of  
underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm  
commitment basis and of placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis”  
encompasses investment firms authorized to carry out activities of dealing on own account,  
of underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing financial instruments on a firm  
commitment basis and of placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis  
(article 24-3, 24-6, and 24-7 of the 1993 LSF). In the 2020 NRA, this sub-sector was referred to  
as “traders/market-makers”.  
AT A GLANCE  
Whereas “investment firms authorized to carry out the services of investment advice and portfolio  
management clients” and “investment firms authorized to carry out the services of reception and  
transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments and of execution of orders  
on behalf of clients” pose high inherent risk, “investment firms authorized to carry out activities of  
dealing on own account, of underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial  
instruments on a firm commitment basis and of placing of financial instruments without a firm  
commitment basis” pose moderate inherent risk.  
Risks related to the sector’s products and activities, international business, client/transaction risk  
and distribution channels impact all investment firms’ inherent risk score.  
The total number of investment firms decreased slightly during the observation period with 92 entities  
in 2023 (in comparison to 98 in 2020).  
Regarding clients, the number has increased by 51%. This is also mirrored in the number of high-risk  
clients, which rose by 90% in the same period, representing 4,95% of total client base. Taking this into  
account, and in comparison to other sub-sectors, ML exposure stemming from clients risk is assessed  
to be high.  
Although investment firms’ clientele was mainly made up of natural persons (on average 92% between  
2020 and 2023), most clients resided outside of Luxembourg (on average 96%). More precisely, 91%  
resided in 2023 within the EU and less than 3% in high-risk countries208. Considering this, ML  
vulnerability of investment firms with respect to international business is assessed to be high.  
208 As per CSSF internal rating list.  
88  
 
The following figure presents a breakdown on how clients were acquired in investment firms.  
Although the majority of investment acquired new clients through face-to-face meetings, about a third  
of investment firms acquired new clients through remote communication channels.  
Figure 15: Breakdown of client acquisiꢀon in investment firms, average figures for 2020 - 2023  
2%  
13%  
only by face-to-face meetings  
combination of face-to-face meetings  
and remote communication channels  
12%  
remote communication channels only  
52%  
did not acquire new clients  
data not available  
21%  
Investment firms authorized to carry out the services of investment advice and porꢂolio management  
AT A GLANCE  
In the 2025 NRA, investment firms authorized to carry out the services of investment advice and  
portfolio management remain “High”. Key risk drivers are the sub-sector’s size, products/activities,  
international business (analysed above for all investment firms), clients/transactions volume, and  
client/transactions risk and distribution channels (both analysed above for all investment firms).  
This sub-sector encompasses investment firms having the authorisation for the provision of “portfolio  
management” (article 24-4 of the 1993 LSF) and “investment advice” (article 24-5 of the 1993 LSF). In  
the 2020 NRA, this sub-sector was referred to as “wealth and asset managers”. Whereas the sub-  
sector counted 91 entities in 2020, there were 84 investment firms with relevant services in 2023:  
84 investment firms were authorised to carry out the activity of investment advice, with 33 of  
them exercising those activities. Top-five firms captured nearly 80% of the total revenues, and  
about 64% of portfolio advised; and  
73 investment firms were authorised to carry out the activity of private portfolio  
management, with 65 of them exercising those activities. Top-five firms captured just over  
half of total revenues, and managed about 62% of AuM.  
On average, the entities of the sub-sector had almost 70 000 assigned mandates per year, with 97%  
stemming from private portfolio management (and the rest from investment advisers). Around seven  
entities had omnibus accounts and about 21% provided execution services only.  
More than half (on average 53%) of the entities were domestically owned, decreasing exposure  
stemming from foreign ownership. EU and non-EU ownership represented an equal proportion (about  
25% each). Most relevant non-EU ownership countries were Switzerland and the USA.  
89  
 
Investment firms authorized to carry out the services of recepꢀon and transmission of orders in  
relaꢀon to one or more financial instruments and of execuꢀon of orders on behalf of clients  
AT A GLANCE  
In the 2025 NRA, investment firms authorized to carry out the services of reception and  
transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments and of execution of orders  
on behalf of clients remain “High”. Key drivers are size followed by products/activities, international  
business (analysed for all investment firms above), client risk (analysed for all investment firms  
above) and distribution channels (analysed for all investment firms above).  
This sub-sector encompasses investment firms authorized to carry out the services of reception and  
transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments (article 24-1 of the 1993 LSF)  
and of execution of orders on behalf of clients (article 24-2 of the 1993 LSF). In the 2020 NRA, this sub-  
sector was referred to as “brokers and broker-dealers”.  
In 2023:  
Brokers: 88 investment firms were authorized to carry out the activities of reception and  
transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments, with 33 of them  
exercising the activity. They generated transactions worth EUR 2 208 billion; and  
Broker-dealers (non-bank): 80 investment firms were authorized to carry out the activity of  
execution of orders on behalf of clients, with 18 exercising this activity. They generated  
transactions worth EUR 174,6 billion.  
Altogether, the number of assigned mandates within this sub-sector amounted to approximately  
77 500 in 2023, slightly above the average of 74 000 observed during the observation period of this  
NRA. These investment firms processed an impressive number of transactions, both in volume (15  
billion) and in value (EUR 2 383,5 billion).  
Market fragmentation is assessed to be moderate, as over 60% of the number transactions and over  
22% of the volume of transactions were carried out by one investment firm acting as an intermediary  
in the context of fund distribution between asset managers and sub-distributors. Moreover, this firm  
exclusively contracted with institutional clients and it did not perform reception and transmission of  
orders).  
Just over half (53%) of the entities were domestically owned during the observation period, decreasing  
exposure stemming from foreign ownership. EU and non-EU ownership represented an equal  
proportion (about 25% each). Most relevant non-EU ownership countries were Switzerland and the  
USA.  
90  
Investment firms authorized to carry out acꢀviꢀes of dealing on own account, of underwriꢀng of  
financial instruments and / or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis and of  
placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis  
AT A GLANCE  
In the 2025 NRA, investment firms authorized to carry out activities of dealing on own account, of  
underwriting of financial instruments and / or placing of financial instruments on a firm  
commitment basis and of placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis  
continue to pose moderate ML risk. Key risk drivers are the relative higher foreign ownership,  
followed by products/activities and the international nature of business (analysed above for all  
investment firms).  
This sub-sector encompasses investment firms authorized to carry out activities of dealing on own  
account, of underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing financial instruments on a firm  
commitment basis and of placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis (articles  
24-3, 24-6, and 24-7 of the 1993 LSF). In the 2020 NRA, this sub-sector was referred to as  
“traders/market-makers”.  
In 2023, firms in the sub-sector traded EUR 40,2 billion of assets. As of end 2023, there were seven  
investment firms providing relevant services. More precisely:  
five investment firms were authorized to carry out the activity of dealing on own account,  
with three exercising this activity;  
two investment firms were authorized to carry out the activity of underwriting financial  
instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis, with none  
of them exercising this activity; and  
three investment firms were authorized to carry out the activity of placing of financial  
instruments without a firm commitment basis, with two of them exercising this activity.  
Although the number of mandates has increased continuously between 2020 and 2023, their overall  
number remained limited, decreasing the related vulnerability to ML risk. Furthermore, no  
professional carried out the activity of a wealth manager or broker and no broker dealer had omnibus  
accounts during the observation period.  
Out of the seven investment firms authorised to provide the relevant services in 2023, none were  
domesꢀcally-owned. Non-EU ownership remained prevalent throughout the observaꢀon period with  
71,43% in 2023 increasing the exposure to ML risk. Most relevant jurisdicꢀons were the USA,  
Switzerland and Monaco.  
91  
6.1.2.2.  
Collecꢀve investments  
AT A GLANCE  
Collective investments were assessed to bear a “Medium” inherent ML risk. Key risk drivers are the  
sub-sector structure (in terms of size) and international nature of business.  
Please note that the 2025 update of the Collective Investment Sub-Sector Risk Assessment  
on the CSSF’s website should be consulted for an in-depth assessment of the collective  
investment sub-sector’s ML risks: link  
The below analysis covered Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (UCITS),  
Management Companies (ManCo) and AIFMs.  
Although the number of authorised and registered investment fund managers has slightly decreased  
from 1 248 as of December 2019 to 1 212 in 2023, net assets of UCIs increased from EUR 4 718 billion  
in December 2019209 to EUR 5 285 billion in December 2023210.  
Between 2020 and 2023, around 96% of UCI initiators (by net assets) were foreign. More precisely,  
the origin of the main foreign UCI initiators in Luxembourg by net assets were the USA (20%), the UK  
(17%), Germany (15%) and Switzerland (14%), which are considered lower-risk in terms of ML for the  
origin of the products managed by both UCITs Manco and AIFMs in these countries 211. Nonetheless,  
most investors in the collective investment sub-sector were foreign and Luxembourg is characterized  
by global cross-border distribution of funds.  
6.1.2.3.  
CSSF supervised pension funds  
AT A GLANCE  
The sub-sector inherent risk level remains “Low”, with no significant change in risk scores with  
respect to the 2020 NRA.  
The ML risk of pension funds supervised by the CSSF remains limited because of the small sector size,  
high concentration, limited international exposure and provision of standardised products.  
As of end 2023, 11 entities registered as pension funds fell under CSSF supervision. Together, they had  
EUR 1,26 billion AuM with a yearly average of around approximately 16 000 affiliates and, the top-five  
entities concentrated about 80% of AuM. Ownership by entities from foreign countries decreased  
during the observation period and represented EUR 0,023 billion in 2023 (in comparison to 0,665  
billion in 2020). In addition, they offer standardised products with low ML risks and had no flows with  
geographies with weak AML/CFT measures, as most sponsors were EU-based corporates.  
209 CSSF, Annual Report 2019, link.  
210 CSSF, Annual Report 2023, link.  
211 CSSF, ML/TF Sub-sector Risk Assessment – Collective Investment Sector (2025 Update), link.  
92  
     
6.1.3. Money value or transfer services  
AT A GLANCE  
At the product level (SNRA, NRA)  
The 2022 SNRA assesses ML risks related to payment services. First and foremost, it is to be noted  
that payment services are not exclusively offered by the MVTS sector but also by the banking sector  
(see section 6.1.1.1). The 2022 SNRA concludes that ML risks of payment services are high  
considering their cash-intensive nature, the prevalence of occasional transactions on established  
business relationships, the large volume and speed of transactions, the possible involvement of  
high-risk jurisdictions in which entities operate and the use of new technologies to facilitate the  
onboarding of customers remotely as well as the distribution channels used.  
On top of the risks associated with payment services, the 2022 SNRA also analyses ML risks linked  
to transfers of funds and money remittance. Due to their ease of use, the 2022 SNRA considers the  
latter as bearing high ML risks.  
Within the scope of the 2025 NRA, risks related to products and services of the MVTS sector were  
assessed under the “products/activities” dimension.  
At the sub-sector level (NRA)  
In Luxembourg, MVTS inherent ML risk levels remain overall the same as the 2020 NRA levels.  
Whereas the inherent risk level for both PIs and EMIs remains “High”, agents and e-money  
distributors acting on behalf of PIs/EMIs established in other EU Member States continue to pose  
a moderate ML inherent risk.  
6.1.3.1.  
Payment insꢀtuꢀons  
AT A GLANCE  
The 2025 NRA assesses the inherent ML risk level as “High”. Key risk drivers identified are the  
products and services offered by the sub-sector, the volume of transactions processed and  
distribution channels followed by the sector’s size, ownership structure (which was reassessed  
upwards to account for new data about foreign ownership of these entities) and international  
business.  
The number of PIs in Luxembourg slightly increased in comparison to 2020, with 15 entities in 2023,  
as shown in the figure below.  
93  
   
Figure 16: Number of payment insꢀtuꢀons and branches in Luxembourg, 2020 - 2023  
20  
2
3
15  
10  
5
2
2
15  
14  
13  
12  
0
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
number of entities  
branches operating in Luxembourg  
Following the increasing number of players in the market, concentration decreased through the  
observation period. In 2020, top-five entities generated about the totality of the market’s revenues.  
In 2023, the subsector remains still concentrated, although at a lesser extent (87% of the market’s  
revenue generated by top-five entities).  
Figure 17: Breakdown of ownership (domesꢀc, EU-ownership and non-EU ownership), 2020 - 2023  
100%  
80%  
60%  
40%  
20%  
0%  
2020  
2021  
domestic ownership  
2022  
2023  
EU ownership  
non-EU ownership  
As depicted in the figure above, ownership structure of the Luxembourg sub-sector has evolved and  
the share of non-EU owners has increased, contributing to the ML risk exposure.  
As noted by the European Banking Authority (EBA), ML risks linked to products and services depend  
on the individual institutions’ business models. Nonetheless, products allowing anonymity through  
new technologies, the use of innovative products, the high speed of transactions, the use of cash and  
the one-off type transactions without an associated payment account are presumed to amplify risk212  
.
With regard to the payment services, these services may be used to layer and withdraw illicit funds  
from one’s accounts (i.e. deposits on accounts and use of these accounts), especially if they allow the  
deposit and withdrawal of cash). They may also be abused by money mules213  
.
212 EBA, Report on ML/TF risks associated with payment institutions 2023, link.  
213 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council  
on the assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-  
border activities, 2022, link.  
94  
       
In Luxembourg, most PIs offer online payment services. Luxembourg’s sub-sector risks related to cash-  
based services (i.e. allowing the withdrawal of cash from an ATM) was assessed to be very limited,  
representing on average 0,09% of the total outflows processed by these PIs. Nonetheless, the risks  
outlined in relation to the high speed of transactions, one-off transactions and the general risks that  
apply in an online environment (cf. CEF) are also valid for this particular sub-sector.  
The number of clients served by Luxembourg PIs reached its peak in 2022 with 21 million clients. In  
2023, the number of clients has decreased by 37% (to 13,2 million) due to the transfer of a significant  
number of clients of one PI to another entity of the group outside of Luxembourg. This remaining  
important volume, combined with the still significant number and value of transactions processed  
drives ML risks. However, this is partially compensated by the low proportion of high-risk clients in the  
sub-sector. Indeed, on average, only 0,7% of clients were considered as high risk by those entities  
during the observation period.  
Most of PI’s clients were natural persons, although their share has decreased throughout the  
observation period (96% in 2020 and 2021 in comparison to 91,3% in 2023). According to the EBA, it  
is presumed that PIs’ focusing on cross-border outlooks present a higher ML risk than those focusing  
on a local market. Overall, it can be said that the clientele of Luxembourg’s PIs was mainly foreign. The  
share of clientele from EU countries is volatile over the observation period, ranging from 54% to 96%.  
Considering that consolidated flows followed a similar trend, risks with regard to international  
business was considered to be significant.  
Table 14: Consolidated flows (EU and non-EU countries), indicaꢀve data, 2020 - 2023  
Consolidated flows  
Consolidated flows with  
with EU countries  
non-EU countries  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
91%  
75%  
71,4%  
83%  
9%  
25%  
28,6%  
17%  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that exposure towards high-risk geographies remains limited (on  
average 1,35% of consolidated flows214), decreasing the overall ML risk score of PIs.  
Almost all Luxembourg PIs onboarded their clients via non-face-to-face channels in 2023. This is  
assessed to bear significant ML risks.  
6.1.3.2.  
E-money insꢀtuꢀons  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
The 2022 SNRA assesses the ML risks related to the e-money sector as high. The main contributing  
factors are the distribution channels (use of intermediaries). Other risk factors mentioned in the  
2022 SNRA are the sector’s extensive reliance on non-face-to-face identification processes  
214 As per CSSF internal rating list.  
95  
   
(increasing risks of computer fraud and use of false documents), the anonymity of the customer for  
some of the products as well as the ease and speed of e-money transactions.  
NRA  
The 2025 NRA assesses the inherent risk level as “High”. EMIs share the same key risk drivers as PIs:  
volume of transactions performed, products and activities and distribution channels, followed by  
size, ownership/legal structure, size and international business.  
In Luxembourg, the sub-sector was similar in size and activities to the PIs sub-sector, and thus shares  
similar inherent vulnerability to ML risk. As evidenced in the table below, EMIs experienced significant  
growth over the last couple of years.  
Table 15: Comparison of staꢀsꢀcs related to EMIs, 2018 and 2023 data  
2018 figures  
(2020 NRA)  
2023 figures  
(2025 NRA)  
Variation  
(in %)  
Number of EMIs operating in Luxembourg  
Balance sheet total (in EUR billion)  
Number of inflow transactions (in billion)  
Number of outflow transactions (in billion)  
Total value of inflow transactions (in EUR billion)  
Total value of outflow transactions (in EUR billion)  
6
1,8  
1,3  
0,05  
38,4  
27,4  
10  
7
2,5  
0,17  
107  
78,7  
+66%  
+289%  
+92%  
+240%  
+179%  
+187%  
In comparison to the total volume and value of transactions within the EU, Luxembourg’s EMI sub-  
sector accounts for a decreasing, but a significant share of these transactions215;216  
.
However, exposure to ML risks were partially reduced by the very high concentration rate within the  
Luxembourg sub-sector. Throughout the observation period, top-five entities generated on average  
99% of the market’s revenue.  
The Luxembourg EMI sub-sector served an increasing number of customers throughout the  
observation period (25 million in 2020, 38,3 million in 2021, 47 million in 2022 and 82,8 million in  
2023). It should be noted that the arrival of new players on the market partly explains this surge. With  
this in mind, ML risks related to the criteria size and client (volume) are assessed to be respectively  
high and very high.  
Overall, both the 2022 SNRA and the EBA note that prepaid cards and, especially those that may be  
loaded by cash, are particularly vulnerable to ML. The products’ inherent features, such as the ease  
and speed of transactions contribute to these risks217. In this context, it should be noted that  
215  
Eurostat, Total number of e-money payment transacꢀons all, sent from: euro area (changing composiꢀon), Euro area  
(Member States and Insꢀtuꢀons of the Euro Area) changing composiꢀon, Annual, retrieved January 14 2025, link and  
Eurostat, Total number of e-money payment transacꢀons all, sent – from: Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Annual, link retrieved  
on 14 January 2025.  
216  
Eurostat, Total value of e-money payment transactions all, sent - from: euro area (changing composition), link and  
Eurostat, Total value of e-money payment transactions all, sent - from: Luxembourg, link retrieved on 14 January 2025.  
217 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council  
on the assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-  
border activities, 2022, link and EBA, Opinion of the European Banking Authority on money laundering and terrorist financing  
risks affecting the EU's financial sector, 2023, link.  
96  
       
Luxembourg EMIs offered e-money accounts and wallets. Cards linked to e-money accounts allowed  
cash withdrawals. Those withdrawals amounted to EUR 430 million (i.e. 0,54% of the total outflows  
processed by EMI) in 2023. None of the Luxembourg EMIs offered prepaid cards, limiting exposure to  
ML risks to some extent.  
Between 2020 and 2023, most clients resided in the EU although their share decreased continuously  
with 90% in 2020, 83% in 2021, 81,5% in 2022 and 76,4% in 2023. This increases ML risks and the  
proportion of clients residing in high-risk countries averaged 5% between 2020 and 2023218  
.
As already noted previously, the sub-sector counts an important number of customers, with most  
being natural persons (about 90%). The number of clients being marked as high-risk by the entities is  
in line with the other banking sub-sectors providing payment and basic account services, namely  
around 1%. Client risk is, therefore, considered to be moderate.  
Similar to PIs, EMIs operated mainly online. Consequently, channels employed were 100% non-face-  
to-face, increasing ML risks.  
6.1.3.3.  
Agents and e-money distributors acꢀng on behalf of PIs/EMIs established in other EU  
Member States  
AT A GLANCE  
Based on the 2025 NRA, the inherent risk level of agents and e-money distributors acting on behalf  
of PIs/EMIs established in other EU Member States remains “Medium”.  
Key risk drivers for agents and e-money distributors acting on behalf of PIs/EMIs established in  
other EU Member States are products and activities followed by geography.  
In 2023, the market size for agents and e-money distributors remained limited, with 19 agents working  
on behalf of six PIs established in other EU Member States. Fragmentation complexity is considered  
to be low as all agents were Luxembourg-based companies/persons with a simple structure acting on  
behalf of an EU-regulated PI/EMI.  
Payments through agents are attractive, as cash transactions can be easily made, transfers are quickly  
processed, and transaction fees being usually lower. Intrinsic to the business model, many  
transactions are one-off/occasional, preventing the agents from establishing a durable relationship  
with their customers. Hence, there is often no possibility to assess the customer’s behaviour and  
monitor its transactions.  
As regards e-money distributors219, the main funding payment method was payment cards (94%). The  
remaining 6% were cash-based (gift cards)220. Globally, e-money distributors are mainly distributing  
prepaid cards and vouchers that can be used to buy goods and services from a wide range of  
merchants. These prepaid cards and vouchers might offer a degree of anonymity when they are used  
as the buyer of the goods and services is not identified by the merchants. In addition, customers can  
buy the prepaid cards and vouchers which in turn can be used by another person to whom the  
218 As per CSSF internal rating list.  
219 It has to be noted that the e-money distributor is no longer active since beginning of 2022.  
220 CSSF, Agents/e-money distributors Guidance for the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing, 2022, link.  
97  
     
customers have given the prepaid card or voucher as gift. This makes it difficult to obtain information  
from the parties involved221  
.
Considering the above, the ML risks related to the criterion “products and activities” for agents and  
EMI distributors are assessed to be very high.  
Most (99,9%) of their customers were natural persons, with 8% being marked as high-risk (based on  
entities’ internal risk assessment in 2021). Around a quarter of total consolidated flows in 2021 were  
within high-risk countries (as per CSSF internal rating) and 64% of consolidated flows were with EU  
countries222. In comparison to the other sectors, the share of high-risk clients and flows with third  
countries were considered to be high.  
Both agents and distributors typically meet their clients face-to-face223. This had a positive impact on  
the risk scoring allocated to distribution channels.  
6.1.4. Virtual assets service providers  
AT A GLANCE  
At a product level (SNRA, NRA)  
The 2022 SNRA assesses the risks associated with crypto assets and virtual currencies as very high,  
due to their characteristics (internet-based, cross-border, …).  
In the NRA, risks related to the products and services offered by VASPs are assessed under the  
dimension “products/activities”. For the case of Luxembourg VASPs, these products and activities  
are assessed as having high ML risks.  
At a sub-sector level (NRA)  
In Luxembourg, the 2025 NRA assesses the inherent risk of VASPs as “High”, with key risk drivers  
being volume of clients/transactions and distribution channels, followed by size, ownership/legal  
structure, products/activities and the international nature of the business.  
VASPs were identified and assessed as an emerging risk in the 2020 NRA. They were analysed in a  
dedicated VRA, including a detailed assessment of ML inherent risks emerging from virtual assets (VAs)  
and VASP activities as well as a description of the mitigating factors. The 2025 NRA integrates VASPs  
in the NRA taxonomy, updates and completes the assessment of VASPs following the NRA  
methodology.  
The number of entities registered with the CSSF as VASPs has increased steadily since 2021, although  
total number remains still relatively low. Whereas the sub-sector counted 6 entities in 2021, it was  
composed of 11 entities in 2023:  
two were already operating under the licence of a PI;  
one under the licence of an EMI;  
221 CSSF, Agents/e-money distributors Guidance for the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing, 2022, link.  
222 CSSF data.  
223 CSSF data related to 2021.  
98  
       
two under the licence of a bank; and  
six were exclusively providing VA services in Luxembourg.  
Whereas the sub-sector was entirely controlled by foreign entities/persons in 2021 and 2022, foreign  
ownership decreased in 2023 and amounted to 88% (with the majority remaining under non-EU  
control).  
With respect to products and services offered by Luxembourg VASP:  
Most (10 out of 11) entities registered with the CSSF offered safekeeping of VAs and/or  
administration of instruments enabling control on VAs. These services were assessed to bear  
“medium” risk in the VASP dedicated risk assessment.  
The transfer of VAs was also offered by 9 out of the 11 entities. This service is known to bear  
“high” risk as VAs inherent product features (pseudo-anonymity, and speed of transactions)  
make them attractive for ML abuse.  
The 2022 SNRA concludes that criminal organisations use virtual currencies and VAs to transfer value,  
to purchase goods anonymously or to access “clean cash” (i.e. paying in and out). In this respect, the  
2022 SNRA highlights that corruption and bribery, child sexual exploitation, investment fraud, and  
counterfeit goods are related predicate offences that may be encountered with regard to the transfer  
of virtual currencies and VAs.  
The number of clients has fluctuated heavily during the observation period. Whereas the number of  
clients surged by 56% between 2021 and 2022, it fell by 63% between 2022 and 2023. This significant  
decrease is linked on one side to the change of the business model of one entity for the services  
offered to the UK market to comply with UK requirements, and on the other side to the difficult market  
conditions observed in 2022 and 2023 (crypto-winter).  
Whereas in 2021 and 2022 most deposits were from EU countries (77%) with the remainder coming  
from the UK, the situation has changed in 2023 with almost all deposits being from the EU (92%). With  
respect to transfers, the shift towards a more European market may also be observed with around  
65% being from EU countries in 2021 and 2022, in comparison to 84% in 2023. Here, Switzerland was  
the most encountered non-EU country. Overall, and considering the sub-sector’s fluctuations with  
regard to its international outlook, inherent ML risks are considered to be significant.  
The volume and value of transactions of the exchange of VA against fiat currencies and the exchange  
of VA against another type of VA processed by the Luxembourg sector decreased heavily between  
2021 and 2023, as depicted in the figure below. This strong decrease is linked to the change of business  
model of one entity mentioned above as well as to the market situation. Nonetheless, analysed  
indicators (i.e. value and number) remained high.  
99  
Figure 18: Number and value of transacꢀons of the exchange of VA against fiat currencies and the  
exchange of VA against another type of VA, 2021 – 2023  
35  
30  
25  
20  
15  
10  
5
120  
100  
80  
60  
40  
20  
0
0
2021  
2022  
2023  
number of transactions (in mio.) (left scale)  
value of transactions (in EUR billion) (right scale)  
Overall, Luxembourg registered VASPs generated 30,2 million of transactions of exchange of VA  
against fiat currencies and the exchange of VA against another type of VA worth EUR 106,8 billion in  
2021. The total number of transactions and associated value fell sharply in 2022 (16,7 million of  
transactions worth EUR 28,9 billion) and 2023 (19,7 million of transactions worth EUR 22,6 billion). A  
similar picture could be drawn for the volume and associated value of transfers of VAs. However,  
safekeeping services of VAs (activity concentrated on one VASPs which is also a PI) increased through  
the observation period from EUR 2,6 billion equivalent in 2021 to 5,9 billion equivalent in 2023. This  
said, the VASP sector processed a still significant number of transactions likely to contribute to the  
exposure to ML risk.  
Almost all clients (99%) were natural persons, and the number of PEPs remained very limited,  
decreasing exposure to ML risk.  
Risks linked to distribution channels are considered significant, as the vast majority of VASPs offered  
their services online.  
6.1.5. Specialised PFSs  
AT A GLANCE  
The inherent ML risk level of Specialised PFSs providing corporate services remains “High”, whereas  
the inherent ML risk level of professional depositaries remains “Medium”.  
The specialised PFSs sub-sector can include various licenses, each offering different services. These  
licenses include registrar agents, corporate domiciliation agents, professionals providing company  
incorporation and management services, and family offices.  
100  
   
6.1.5.1.  
Specialised PFSs providing corporate services  
AT A GLANCE  
The inherent ML risk level of Specialised PFSs providing corporate services remains “High”. Overall  
key risk drivers continue to be fragmentation/complexity, international nature of business followed  
by products/activities and client risk.  
Luxembourg counted 85 specialised PFSs (out of a total of 100 entities) providing corporate services  
with over 6 400 employees as of December 2023, with balance sheet assets of EUR 1,02 billion and  
profits reaching EUR 90 million. The sector remained quite fragmentated with top-five entities  
accounting for 40% of the market’s revenues in 2023.  
Vulnerabilities stemming from foreign ownership are assessed to be moderate, as 55% of specialised  
PFSs providing corporate services were under Luxembourg ownership, 19% under EU ownership  
(excluding Luxembourg) and 26% under non-EU ownership.  
In Luxembourg, the ML risk remains driven by the fact that these PFSs offer TCSP activities (cf. section  
6.6.1). They are often involved in the establishment and administration of legal persons and  
arrangements, playing a key role as gatekeepers of the financial sector.  
Specialised PFSs providing corporate services’ clientele were almost entirely made up of legal persons  
(99%). More than half (61%) of the client companies’ BOs resided in non-EU countries and 1,46%  
resided in a high-risk country224. Exposure to a non-EU clientele remains a significant vulnerability to  
ML for this sub-sector.  
With the overall number of clients of specialised PFS providing corporate services being rather limited  
(with over 30 000 client companies in 2023 and 20 000 in 2020), exposure to ML risks is considered to  
be moderate. Nevertheless, specialised PFSs providing corporate services have identified one in five  
client companies as high risk and around 4% of client relationships involve PEPs (e.g. a PEP being the  
BO, legal representative, etc.). Although this share has decreased over the observation period, this  
figure remains high, driving ML client risk.  
Channels used by the sub-sector pose moderate ML risks. Most players have direct relationships with  
clients and intermediaries are business providers (accountants, ...) including the group to which the  
PFS belongs.  
6.1.5.2.  
Professional depositaries  
AT A GLANCE  
The inherent risk level of professional depositaries is assessed as “Medium”. Key risk drivers are the  
sub-sector’s size and client risk.  
The 2020 NRA identified that the main vulnerabilities of the specialised PFSs sector stem from the  
large size of the professional depositaries sub-sector. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the  
number of professional depositaries of assets other than financial assets has remained stable since  
224 As per CSSF internal rating list.  
101  
 
the 2020 NRA. Nevertheless, the sub-sector’s AuM and number of client funds experienced a  
significant increase, as evidenced in the figure below.  
Figure 19: Increase of AuM and number of client funds of professional depositaries of assets other  
than financial instruments225  
500  
450  
400  
350  
300  
250  
200  
150  
100  
50  
2,000  
1,800  
1,600  
1,400  
1,200  
1,000  
800  
430  
1,779  
1,545  
291  
1,255  
AuM (EUR billion)  
213  
884  
number of client funds  
140  
600  
400  
200  
-
-
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
Luxembourg counted 16 professional depositaries of assets other than financial assets and one  
professional depositary of financial assets with 2 567 employees in 2023.  
Ownership complexity was assessed to bear moderate risk, as 53% was under Luxembourg ownership  
and 47% under non-EU ownership (Jersey, UK and USA).  
In 2023 (2020), 98% (97%) of professional depositaries’ clients were Luxembourg funds. The share of  
PEPs served in this sub-sector was relatively high, with more than 2% of the client relationship  
involving PEPs (e.g. as BO, legal representative). In addition, client funds included illiquid assets  
categorised as high-risk.  
Risks posed by channels were assessed to be moderate as a high number of investment funds are set  
up/initiated by an entity belonging to the same group as the depositary.  
6.1.6. Support PFSs and other specialised PFSs  
AT A GLANCE  
Support PFSs and other specialised PFSs continue to have a very low exposure to ML activities, due  
to the limited financial services client interaction and the low-risk nature of their activities (that is,  
IT related and other support services).  
6.1.6.1.  
Support PFSs  
Support PFSs include client communication agents (article 29-1 of the LSF), administrative agents of  
the financial sector (article 29-2 of the LSF), IT system communication network operators in the  
225 CSSF data.  
102  
     
financial sector (article 29-3 of the LSF), dematerialisation service providers (article 29-5 of the LSF)  
and e-archiving service providers (article 29-6 of the LSF).  
As of 2023, there were 60 (vs. 71 in 2020) support professional service providers operating in  
Luxembourg, employing 7 716 people (vs. 8 987 in 2020). Of these 60 entities, 12 were client  
communication agents and administrative agents, and 30 were IT system operators. Two of these 30  
entities had additional agreements for dematerialisation or e-archiving service provision. A few  
professionals hold licenses to offer activities both as Specialised PFS and Support PFS. In such cases,  
they are taken into account under both categories.  
6.1.6.2.  
Other specialised PFSs  
Some specialised professional service providers, which have been included under this section, are less  
exposed to ML risks compared to the wider specialised PFS sector due to the nature of the services  
provided. In 2023, four professionals perform lending operations (article 28-4 of the LSF) and two  
debt-recovery services providers (article 28-3 of the LSF). This “other specialised PFSs” sub-sector also  
includes professionals performing securities lending (article 28-5 of the LSF) and mutual savings funds  
administrators (article 28-7 of the LSF), none of which are present in Luxembourg and thus cannot be  
misused for ML purposes in Luxembourg.  
6.1.7. Market operators  
AT A GLANCE  
Market operators’ inherent risk level remains “Low”.  
Exposure to ML risks is limited due to the presence of only one market operator the Luxembourg  
Stock Exchange (LSE). A certain inherent risk exists due to the significant volume of issuance activities  
(EUR 1 218 billion of debt issued via instruments admitted to trading on the LSE in 2023) and the  
international nature of the transactions executed on the LSE markets. However, the vulnerabilities  
associated with LSE clients and transactions remain low because the small number of members to  
which the LSE is open are all investment firms or banks subject to AML/CFT obligations and due to the  
low transactions volume (trading volume of EUR 135,43 million and equity trading volume of EUR 38  
million in 2023).  
103  
 
6.2. CAA supervised sectors  
The inherent risk levels for the sectors falling within the AML/CFT supervision of the CAA are shown  
in the table below.  
Table 16: Inherent ML risk of the insurance sector - overview by sub-sectors (CAA supervised  
sectors)  
Sector  
Sub-sectors  
2025 NRA: Inherent risk  
Life insurance  
Non-life insurance  
Reinsurance  
High  
Low  
Low  
Insurance  
Intermediaries  
Medium  
Low  
Professionals of the insurance sector  
(PSAs)  
CAA-supervised pension funds  
Very Low  
Globally, the insurance sector is typically regarded as less vulnerable with regards to ML risks than  
other financial products or other sectors226. Insurance products are less flexible than other financial  
products, such as loans or payment services, limiting their attractiveness for ML activities by criminals.  
Furthermore, insurance products are complex for ordinary criminals, requiring some specific  
knowledge. In addition, pay-outs from insurance undertakings are unpredictable and/or risky as they  
are dependent on the incident that has been insured actually taking place (e.g. death or tail events).  
Despite this, certain features of insurance products can add to sectorial inherent risks for the insurance  
sector and make them particularly vulnerable to ML, namely, when they have flexibility of payment  
and investment, ease of access to accumulated funds, negotiability (i.e. can be used as collateral),  
involve early termination, changes in beneficiaries and payment forms.  
6.2.1. Life insurance  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
Overall, the SNRA assesses the ML risks related to the life insurance sub-sector as moderately  
significant” (Medium) with the ML risk mainly stemming from the investment related components,  
such as paying a high one-off premium or capital accumulation. In addition, life policies could be  
redeemed early to generate lump sums and the proceeds can be transferred to beneficiaries with  
whom life insurance undertakings often do not have client relationships. Nonetheless, ML abuse  
in this sub-sector is generally the result of sophisticated schemes, requiring a considering level of  
expertise and planning.  
NRA  
226 FATF, Guidance for a risk-based approach for the life insurance sector, 2018, link.  
104  
       
The 2025 NRA assesses the ML risks related to the life insurance as “High” (unchanged to 2020  
NRA), with key risk drivers stemming from sub-sector size and volume of clients. Nature of  
products/activities (in line with the EBA opinion227 and the SNRA), orientation towards foreign  
residents and the relative share of high-risk clients and distribution channels (see also the EBA  
opinion) are other risk drivers still relevant.  
The life insurance sub-sector remained large between 2020 and 2023. As of end 2023, this sub-sector  
showed a balance sheet total of EUR 234 billion, EUR 234 billion in technical provisions, EUR 21 billion  
in premiums and 3 102 employees across 36 undertakings falling within the AML/CFT scope228. Slightly  
more than half of gross written premiums were generated by five entities229  
.
Overall, the EBA noted in its opinion that tax-related crime is still considered an important threat to  
the sub-sector. A case study related to tax fraud linked to life insurance policies is provided below.  
Case study 13: Tax fraud case230  
A case was iniꢀated based on an MLA request from country A concerning two naꢀonals from country  
A (a couple) residing in country B. The request sought to search and seize funds in Luxembourg bank  
accounts idenꢀfied as belonging to them. The alleged offenses were aggravated tax fraud and ML.  
Besides that, the couple was also reported to the CRF. Informaꢀon was provided about two life  
insurance policies subscribed by the suspects with an insurance company based in Luxembourg. The  
CRF’s analysis revealed that several addiꢀonal payments had been made to these policies since their  
subscripꢀon amounꢀng to approximately EUR 3 million. It was further idenꢀfied that the iniꢀal  
payments were made through an account in country A held by the husband.  
According to available informaꢀon, the funds used for the life insurance policies came from the sale  
of a company based in country A, run by the husband’s family, as well as from his professional  
income. The CRF could not dismiss the suspicion that the funds invested in the insurance policies  
might have originated from aggravated tax fraud and consequently issued a freezing order.  
The CRF’s counterparts, as well as the State Prosecutor’s Office, were informed of the existence of  
addiꢀonal assets in Luxembourg which were not covered by the iniꢀal MLA request.  
An addiꢀonal MLA request was received by the General State Prosecutor’s Office and the insurance  
policies were subsequently seized in Luxembourg.  
Furthermore, the EBA assessed that the types of products and operations representing the main ML  
risks are products with a short maturity period, like insurance-based investment products with a  
minimum holding period of 5 years, and those with the possibility of early termination of the policy.  
Other products with higher ML risks are investments associated with large life insurance policies. The  
most exposed insurance contracts, both single premium and regular premium, are unit-linked  
227  
EBA, Opinion of the European Banking Authority on money laundering and terrorist financing risks affecting the EU’s  
financial sector, 2023, link.  
228 CAA data 2023. The numbers also include six Luxembourg branches of foreign FIs.  
229 CAA data 2023.  
230 Case study provided by the CRF.  
105  
         
products with a high financial component and a low insurance component where the repayment of  
capital and interest is basically agreed.  
In 2023, the Luxembourg life insurance sub-sector continued to be oriented towards foreign residents,  
increasing the sector’s exposure to ML activities and high-risk clients. The majority (94%) of premiums  
were linked to foreign countries, among which 9% from non-EEA countries (mostly the UK and  
Switzerland). About 0,95% of clients were PEPs.  
The average holding period of insurance-based investment products ranges between 8 to 12 years  
depending on the characteristics of the products, its clients and geographical area. As at the end of  
2023, unit linked products represented around 79% of the total amount of the technical provisions of  
the life insurance sub-sector.  
Other ML risk factors included the high volume of transactions and the usage of intermediary  
distribution channels. In 2023, over 295 000 new contracts were sold. With regard to distribution  
channels, 94% (in terms of premiums) were sold through intermediaries231, which can increase  
exposure to ML risk.  
Case study 14: Source of funds (non-Luxembourg case)232  
A husband and wife took out a life insurance policy each in their own name with annual premiums.  
In the event of the death of one of the spouses, the other spouse would become the beneficiary of  
the insurance. The holder of the account through which the premiums had been paid was found not  
to be the policyholders but a company abroad of which they were directors. However, this was a life  
insurance policy taken out privately by the couple and not by the company. Invesꢀgaꢀon revealed  
that the scenario set up had been intended to conceal the illicit origin of the funds which originated  
from serious and organised tax fraud for which the couple involved was known.  
6.2.2. Non-life insurance  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
The 2022 SNRA notes that the non-life insurance sector is quite unattractive for ML purposes due  
to the high level of planning and expertise required.  
NRA  
The 2025 NRA assesses the sub-sector inherent risk level as “Low”.  
In Luxembourg, the non-life insurance sub-sector is smaller than the life insurance sub-sector. As of  
2023, it had EUR 60 billion in total balance sheet, EUR 40 billion in technical provisions, EUR 19 billion  
in premiums and 9 511 employees across 43 undertakings. With around 64% of written gross  
premiums generated by five entities, the sector was more concentrated than the life-insurance sub-  
sector233. Around 92% of premiums were linked to foreign countries among which 67% were linked to  
231 CAA data 2023.  
232 IAIS, Application Paper on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, November 2021, link.  
233 CAA data 2023.  
106  
         
EU countries. Premiums linked to non-EU countries mainly concerned the UK, the USA and  
Switzerland.  
The low ML risk is explained by the low-risk nature of products, as products offered are not inherently  
risky. Indeed, they pay out against a pre-defined event, have no surrender value, no investment  
elements and the premiums are generally of lower value. Moreover, only 18 undertakings offered  
classes 14 (credit) and 15 (suretyship) and thus fell within the AML/CFT scope234. Out of those 18  
undertakings, 7 were EU owned and the remaining 11 were non-EU owned. They generated EUR 1 237  
million of gross premium in 2023.  
6.2.3. Reinsurance  
AT A GLANCE  
The 2025 NRA assesses the sub-sector’s inherent risk level as “Low”.  
As of end 2023, the reinsurance sub-sector counted 51 traditional reinsurance undertakings and 144  
reinsurance captives (i.e. 195 entities in total). This sub-sector was relatively concentrated with almost  
71% of written gross premium generated by five entities.  
The business of the reinsurance sub-sector remained highly international. Nearly 27% of accepted  
premiums were written through ceding companies located in the UK, 12% in France, 14% in Germany,  
5% in Spain and 17% in other EEA countries, limiting business with riskier geographies.  
Compared to the sub-sector of life insurance, ML risks are reduced by the low-risk nature of products  
as reinsurance is available by insurance undertakings acting as customers.  
Moreover, less than 22% of the reinsurance sub-sector (i.e. 42 entities) fell within the AML/CFT scope  
as they reinsure credit and suretyship risks.  
Among those 42 entities, most of them (37, i.e. 88%) were EU owned in 2023 and the remaining 5 had  
non-EU ownership.  
6.2.4. Intermediaries  
AT A GLANCE  
The 2025 NRA assesses the sub-sector’s inherent risk level as “Medium”.  
The following risk drivers are relevant: sub-sector size, international nature of business and volume  
of clients/transactions. The sub-sector’s inherent ML risk has been assessed “Medium” (compared  
to “High” in 2020 NRA) taking into account enhanced concentration of brokerage firms and the low  
number of PEP clients.  
As of end 2023, the intermediaries sub-sector counted 90 brokerage firms, 119 brokers, 462 insurance  
sub-brokers and 258 insurance agencies. Ownership was mostly from the EU (85%, including 30% of  
234 CAA data 2023. The numbers also include two Luxembourg branches of foreign entities.  
107  
     
shareholders from Luxembourg) and the remaining 15% ownership were primarily from the UK and  
from Switzerland.  
The high volume of transactions is a key vulnerability driver in this sub-sector. The new premium flows  
in 2023 amounted to EUR 1,95 billion for life and EUR 1,1 billion for non-life. More than half (60%) of  
the life insurance premium flows were distributed by five intermediaries. Among these five  
intermediaries, three are also banks under double supervision with the CSSF, one is a subsidiary of a  
bank also supervised by the CSSF and one is a “traditional” brokerage firm. The ML risk is also driven  
by the high international nature of the business. As such, brokers had mainly international clients (93%  
of premiums from foreign countries for life and 85% for non-life) mostly focused on the EEA market  
(non-EEA represents 9% of life and 17% of non-life premia). However, there was no premium written  
with a life insurance undertaking situated in a high-risk geography. Also, 92% of premia were written  
with Luxembourg-based life insurance undertakings. The share of new contracts with PEPs as clients  
only totaled 0,12% in 2023.  
6.2.5. Professionals of the insurance sector (PSAs)  
AT A GLANCE  
The 2025 NRA assesses the sub-sector inherent risk level as “Low”.  
PSA include authorized service providers of corporate governance and management companies for  
insurance and pension funds. They typically do not manipulate money flows and play an advisory role  
to the respective insurance undertakings or pension funds, and thus have limited exposure to ML risk.  
As of end 2023, Luxembourg counted 26 PSAs, out of which 13 were falling under AML/CFT scope235  
.
The sub-sector was relatively concentrated with 87% of market-share being generated by five entities.  
Moreover, Luxembourg PSAs only served Luxembourg-based clients (insurance and reinsurance  
undertakings under the supervision of the CAA or companies linked to these undertakings).  
6.2.6. CAA supervised pension funds  
AT A GLANCE  
The 2025 NRA assesses the sub-sector’s inherent risk level as “Very low”.  
Luxembourg counted three pension funds supervised by the CAA with EUR 661 million in balance sheet  
total. The total number of affiliates amounted to 10 088 in 2023. The ML risk is limited due to the very  
small sub-sector size, the low fragmentation and the low-risk products offered by these pension funds.  
235 CAA data 2023.  
108  
     
6.3. AED supervised sectors  
The AED supervised sectors are presented together in a dedicated section and the level of inherent  
risk is shown in the table below.  
Table 17: Inherent ML risk by sub-sectors (AED supervised sectors)  
2025 NRA: Inherent  
Sector  
Sub-sectors  
risk  
High  
Real estate agents (agents immobiliers)  
Real estate agents and  
developers  
Real estate developers (promoteurs immobiliers)  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
High  
Freeport operators  
Precious metals/jewellers/clocks  
Car dealers  
Dealers in goods  
Art/Antiques  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Low  
Luxury goods (e.g. “maroquinerie”)  
Casino  
Gambling service providers  
National lottery  
Legal and accounting  
professions supervised by  
the AED  
Accountants  
High  
Professional directors and business centres  
High  
6.3.1. Real estate agents and developers  
AT A GLANCE  
At the product level (SNRA)  
The 2022 SNRA analysed risks associated to investments in the real estate sector and concludes  
that its ML risks are very significant. The 2022 SNRA notes that with prices being generally stable  
and likely to appreciate over time, real estate is as attractive to criminals as it is to any investor.  
Criminals often get back to complex financing techniques and/or corporate structures via  
professionals when investing in property in order to conceal the proceeds generated by illegal  
activities, and/or the BO. The 2022 SNRA further notes that investments in the real estate sector is  
mostly used in combination with other professionals, such as TCSPs or legal advice.  
At the sub-sector level (NRA)  
The inherent risk associated with Luxembourg’s real estate agents and developers is assessed as  
being “High” with key vulnerabilities stemming from the products and services offered by these  
professionals.  
In Luxembourg, the real estate and construction sector remains large. Real estate activities accounted  
for around 8% to Luxembourg’s gross value added between 2020 and 2023236  
.
236 STATEC, Gross value added by activity (NaceR2)(at current prices) (in millions EUR) 1995 – 2023, code L, link.  
109  
       
Generally, Luxembourg’s real estate market is focused on residential property attracting mostly a local  
clientele aiming to acquire real estate not for investment but for residential purposes. For instance,  
the split of deeds containing a tax credit clause (“bëllegen Akt”) and a reselling clause are as follows:  
Table 18: Notarial deeds of sale and sales in future state of compleꢀon237  
Deeds including a tax credit clause Deeds including a reselling clause  
(“clause de revente”)  
(“bëllegen Akt”)  
8 181  
2020  
2021  
2022  
1 335  
1 453  
1 135  
8 801  
6 970  
Insight Box 12: Tax credit clauses applying to real estate transacꢀons  
“Bëllegen Akt” – tax credit on notarial instruments  
Natural persons who wish to acquire property for residenꢀal purposes may apply for a tax credit on  
notarial instruments. A tax credit can only be used once per buyer and the buyer has to occupy  
personally, as owner, the property acquired within a ꢀme limit of:  
two years from the date of the notarial deed of acquisition; or  
four years in the event of the acquisition of a building plot or a building under construction.  
The buyer has to live in the property for at least two years. This tax credit is limited to EUR 30 000  
per property buyer238  
.
Notarial deeds including a “clause de revente” in the case of real estate transactions  
The buyer of real estate may acquire the property with the intention/aim to resell it afterwards. In  
this case, (s)he may decide to add a “clause de revente” into the notarial deed of purchase. Although  
registration tax is higher with a “clause de revente” (i.e., 7,2% instead of 6%), the buyer of the  
property receives:  
a refund of 6% of the registration tax paid if the property has been resold within two years;  
and  
a refund of 4,8% of the registration tax paid in case the property has been resold within  
four years.  
It should be noted that where the property was sold after four years, there is no refund of the  
registration tax.  
In a similar vein, most persons registered with the notarial real estate deeds are natural persons:  
237 Chambre des Députés, Réponse à la question parlementaire n°7781, 2023, link.  
238 It should be noted that the tax credit increased from EUR 20 000 to EUR 30 000 per property buyer pursuant to the Law  
of 16 May 2023. For notarial deeds signed in 2024, the tax credit increased from EUR 30 000 per property to EUR 40 000  
pursuant to the Law of 22 May 2024.  
110  
       
Table 19: Breakdown between natural and legal persons regarding notarized deeds of sales and  
sales in future state of compleꢀon239  
Natural persons  
11 262  
Legal persons  
1 542  
2020  
2021  
2022  
11 328  
1 694  
9 167  
1 403  
6.3.1.1.  
Real estate agents  
Luxembourg counted 2 528 real estate agents (REA) in 2023240. Overall, the sub-sector remains  
fragmented with 50% of REA generating a turnover less than EUR 120 000 during the observation  
period, 33% generating a turnover between EUR 120 000 and EUR 620 000 and about 17% generating  
a turnover exceeding EUR 620 000. Indeed, top-five real estate agents generated 24% of total market  
turnover in 2023.  
On the basis of the entity-assessment performed by the AED, most entities were assessed to bear  
medium-high risk.  
6.3.1.2.  
Real estate developers  
The number of real estate developers (REDs) has risen by around 9,5% in 2023 (1 799 REDs) in  
comparison to 2020 (1 496). In 2022 and 2023, approximately 42% of REDs had a turnover below EUR  
120 000, 25% between EUR 120 000 and EUR 620 000 and 34% over EUR 620 000. Top-five REDs  
accounted for 16% of the market’s turnover in 2023. Although the REDs’ sub-sector is relaꢀvely less  
concentrated than the REAs sub-sector, it sꢀll remains fragmented.  
6.3.2. Freeport operators  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
The 2022 SNRA assesses the risk related to free-trade zones as “Very high” for ML purposes. The  
2022 SNRA notes that Luxembourg has the only freeport within the EU (i.e., free trade zone  
specialising in the storage of high-value luxury goods) and that it is simultaneously the only one  
where information on the BO is available.  
NRA  
In the 2025 ML risks with regard to freeports are assessed as “Medium” inherent risk.  
The Luxembourg High Security Hub (LHSH; free zone) is located in Luxembourg Findel airport and  
encompasses 22 000 m² of building structure. It is specifically designed for storage of high value goods  
(such as artwork, vintage cars and fine wines). Humidity, temperature and other storage conditions  
are adapted. It has direct tarmac access to the cargo runway to reduce package manipulations as much  
239 Chambre des Députés, Réponse à la question parlementaire n°7781, 2023, link.  
240 AED data.  
111  
       
as possible. Its fire system is designed to protect artwork (vacuuming oxygen in the rooms). Strong  
rooms are up to 300 m². Gold and cash storage is allowed, but only for cash stored by local banks.  
In 2023, five licensed freeport operators rented space at the LHSH. One operator mainly worked for  
galleries and a local museum, one for art intermediaries, one was specialised in gold storage, one  
worked for banks (e.g. gold), and the last one was a local art museum.  
ML risks are driven by the high-risk nature of activities (i.e. the storage of all kinds of high-value goods)  
although it should be noted that there were few transactions relating to the goods stored in the LHSH.  
In a similar vein, the number of clients remained stable throughout the observation period (between  
90 and 100 clients). In 2023, the share of Luxembourg resident clients, EU resident clients (excluding  
Luxembourg) and non-EU resident clients was evenly distributed as shown in the pie chart below.  
Figure 20: Breakdown per country of residence of LHSH clients, 2023  
27%  
33%  
30%  
Luxembourg resident clients  
EU resident clients  
non-EU resident clients  
It should be noted that Luxembourg freeport operators are required to identify the BOs of the goods  
that were brought in by their clients. Clients cannot use offshore companies, trusts, lawyers, nominees  
or galleries to shield their ownership of goods in the Luxembourg freeport. Consequently, these types  
of clients may prefer using other freeports where information on BO is not required241. Hence, the  
Luxembourg freeport may be less attractive for criminals, reducing exposure to ML risks.  
6.3.3. Dealers in goods  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
Although an emerging risk, the 2022 SNRA assesses ML risks related to looted artefacts and antiques  
and high value assets (precious metals and stones and others) as “High”.  
NRA  
241 See for instance, European Parliamentary Research Service, Money laundering and tax evasion risks in free ports, October  
2018.  
112  
     
In the 2025 NRA, car dealers are assessed as having “High” ML risk due to the sub-sector’s products  
and activities followed by the sub-sector’s structure (i.e., size and fragmentation), international  
business and clients/transactions (volume and risk). ML risks related to the other dealers in goods  
(i.e., precious metals/jewellers/clocks, art/antiques and luxury goods) are assessed to be  
“Medium”, with key risk driver stemming from these sub-sectors’ products.  
In Luxembourg, dealers in goods are defined in the 2004 AML/CFT Law as entities dealing with and  
accepting cash equivalent to EUR 10 000 or more. These include dealers in precious metals, clocks and  
jewellers, car dealers, art/antiques dealers and luxury goods retailers (e.g. ”maroquinerie”).  
Overall, Luxembourg counted 130 dealers in precious metals, jewellers and clocks, 136 art and  
antiques dealers and 650 car dealers in 2023.  
As evidenced in the figure below, the overall generated turnover has increased during the observation  
period and was predominantly (about 95%) generated by car dealers.  
Figure 21: Total turnover generated by dealers in goods, AED data (in EUR million)  
2023  
2022  
2021  
2020  
0
1000  
2000  
3000  
4000  
5000  
6000  
precious metals, jewellers, clocks  
art/antiques  
luxury goods  
car dealers  
Concentration rate amongst the different dealers in goods sub-sectors varies, as shown in the graph  
below. Dealers in luxury goods are the most concentrated sub-sector (although the share of turnover  
generated by top-five entities has plummeted in 2022) followed by dealers in precious metals,  
jewellers and clocks. In a similar vein, the sub-sector of car dealers presented the highest degree of  
concentration among the dealers in goods studied for the purpose of this report.  
113  
 
Figure 22: Concentraꢀon rates: share of revenues generated by top-five enꢀꢀes (per category)242  
100%  
90%  
80%  
70%  
60%  
50%  
40%  
30%  
20%  
10%  
0%  
precious metals, jewellers,  
clocks  
art/antiques  
luxury goods  
car dealers  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
Although there is no limit on cash payments, the AED noted during its interactions with the private  
sector (through their supervisory activity and enforcement measures) that the professionals’ risk-  
appetite with regard to cash transactions has considerably decreased. As such, the share of  
professionals limiting, or even restricting cash transactions has increased throughout the observation  
period. This is especially the case for dealers in goods where the AED has conducted systematic  
controls, such as the dealers in precious metals, jewellers and clocks as well as car dealers.  
Insight Box 13: AED study on dealers in precious metals, jewellers and clocks’ cash transacꢀons  
The AED launched in 2023 a study on dealers in precious metals, jewellers and clocks’ cash  
transactions for the years 2020 2022. This study is based on a review and analysis on all cash  
transactions performed by 29 professionals.  
For these three years cash payments for these 29 professionals amounted to around EUR 40 million.  
Key findings of this study:  
Cash payments have decreased by 8,8% between 2020 and 2022 (from around EUR 14  
million in 2020 to EUR 12,78 million in 2022).  
816 cash transactions were recorded between 2020 and 2022 with 68% (553 transactions)  
of them being related to transactions below EUR 10 000, thus falling out of the scope of the  
2004 AML/CFT Law. The remaining 263 (32%) transactions were related to cash transactions  
exceeding EUR 10 000.  
Among these 263 transactions, most transactions were recorded in 2020. The number of  
cash transactions exceeding EUR 10 000 has continuously decreased since 2020 (113 in  
2020, 96 in 2021 and 54 in 2022).  
242 AED data.  
114  
     
The clientele’s BO resided in 42,5% in Luxembourg. Residents from Luxembourg’s  
neighbouring countries represented 44,8% of the BOs.  
In terms of value, cash transactions exceeding EUR 10 000 has decreased by 4,4% between  
2020 and 2022 represented a total value of around EUR 3 million in 2020, EUR 2,4 million  
in 2021 and EUR 1,7 million in 2022.  
6.3.4. Gambling service providers  
In Luxembourg, professionals providing gambling services are limited and mostly concentrated around  
the casino and the National Lottery. Between 2020 and 2023, there were no authorised domestic  
online gambling companies or sports betting firms and offline sports/horse betting is only offered by  
the National Lottery243,244  
.
6.3.4.1.  
Casinos  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
The 2022 SNRA notes that the main ML risk posed by casinos is the risk of infiltration or ownership  
of organised crime groups. The document also notes that this risk is decreased in cases where  
regulations are in place imposing the transparency of beneficial ownership. Taking this into account,  
ML risks are assessed as “Medium”.  
NRA  
The 2025 NRA assesses casino’s inherent ML risk as “Medium”.  
Luxembourg counts one privately owned casino with over 300 000 visitors in 2023. Many visitors enter  
the casino area in order to go to the casino’s restaurant or to attend shows. The casino counted 148  
employees in 2023 and generated revenues of EUR 56 million (of which EUR 50 million in gross gaming  
revenue (GGR)). With regard to products and activities, it should be noted that activities related to  
gambling are regulated. Slot machine were to be the most popular gambling activity.  
The casino’s client base was mostly a regional one, as shown in the next figure.  
243 PMU for horse betting, Oddset for sports betting.  
244  
To note that the National Lottery has launched a sports betting site to contribute to combat illegal online gambling in  
September 2024. The vulnerabilities relating to this new offer will be analysed in the next NRA.  
115  
     
Figure 23: GGR broken down by country of residence, 2023 figures  
Belgium  
other countries  
4%  
1%  
Germany  
10%  
France  
50%  
Luxembourg  
35%  
It should be noted that all gambling activities required face-to-face interaction with casino staff. This  
made them less attractive for criminals for ML abuse.  
6.3.4.2.  
Naꢀonal Loꢁery  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
The 2022 SNRA assessed the ML risks of lotteries as “moderate”. Similar to casinos, there is a risk  
of infiltration or ownership by organised crime groups. Furthermore, a perpetrator may purchase a  
lottery ticket from the winner (possibly through collusion with the sales agent) and cash the price  
with the receipt. The 2022 SNRA also notes that this scenario is minimal in case of State-owned  
lotteries but increases at a retailer level.  
NRA  
The ML risks related to the National Lottery continue to be “Low”.  
As for the 2020 NRA, the ML risks of the National Lottery are very limited because of public  
ownership245. The National Lottery is operated by the “Œuvre Nationale de Secours Grande-Duchesse  
Charlotte”, which is an “établissement public” (public entity) under the Law of 22 May 2009246. It is  
run by a dedicated general manager and the management team. Its profits are redistributed to  
charities in various fields (e.g. healthcare or culture) through the “Œuvre Nationale de Secours Grande-  
Duchesse Charlotte. The “Œuvre Nationale” manages the annual profits generated by the National  
Lottery.  
It should be noted that sales, GGR, points of sale and number of employees have increased since the  
2020 NRA. The GGR amounted to EUR 76,8 million in 2023, EUR 63,6 million in 2022, EUR 54,7 million  
245 Note that private lottery operators are possible by Luxembourg law, but none are currently present.  
246  
“Loi du 22 mai 2009 relative à l’Œuvre de Secours Grande-Duchesse Charlotte et à la Loterie Nationale", with article 2  
stating that “L'Œuvre a pour missions : […] d'organiser et de gérer la Loterie Nationale.”  
116  
     
in 2021 and EUR 50,5 million in 2020. Around 97% of GGR stemmed from lottery type games (e.g.  
instant games such as scratch cards) and the remaining 3% from sports/horse betting. Consequently,  
most of revenues stemmed from jackpot-driven games further reducing ML vulnerabilities linked to  
the product criterion.  
The National Lottery counted 54 employees as of end 2023 (compared to 46 in 2020). As per 2020  
NRA, revenues generated were split among a large customer base (mostly residents or residents of  
neighbouring countries) averaging 35 000 to 50 000 customers per week (which could go up to 80 000  
– 90 000 customers during busy weeks).  
The vast majority of customers are from Luxembourg or neighbouring countries, as sales are limited  
to the Luxembourg territory. For its draw-based games, the National Lottery has established  
collaborations with foreign/international lotteries (e.g. Euro Millions, Lotto), in order to offer larger  
potential winning pools to its customers. The instant games (in the form of scratch-cards) are all  
domestic only.  
Points of sale have increased at the same time of GGR. In 2023, the National Lottery counted more  
than 530 points of sale (e.g. supermarkets, kiosks, petrol stations) and one point of online sale (the  
National Lottery’s website). Through the observation period, around 90% of revenues were generated  
from tickets sold via those intermediaries (points of sales) and 10% were generated via the National  
Lottery’s website247  
.
Insight Box 14: Ad hoc loꢁeries  
Ad hoc lotteries are organised in Luxembourg at the municipal and national levels according to  
article 2 of the 1977 Gambling Law. All lotteries must be dedicated, partially, or entirely, to charity  
purposes.  
Most lotteries are organised at the local level and approved by one of the 100 municipalities, if  
they are expected to generate less than EUR 12 500. They are unlikely to generate significant  
proceeds given the low threshold in place. Assuming conservatively that each municipality  
authorizes three ad hoc lotteries a year for average revenues of EUR 6 000, total revenues  
generated by local ad hoc lotteries would reach EUR 2 million per year.  
Above the expected revenue level of EUR 12 500, lotteries must be approved by the MoJ. Between  
2020 and 2023, 20 lotteries were authorized at the national level. Overall, the amounts involved  
for these national ad hoc lotteries are likely to be limited: They each generated on average  
between EUR 40 000 and EUR 60 000, leading to an expected annual total of about EUR 260 000  
amongst all of them. Furthermore, authorisations granted by the MoJ provide that 40% of the  
generated revenue is distributed as wins to the participants.  
247 National Lottery data.  
117  
     
6.3.5. Legal and accounꢀng professionals supervised by the AED  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
The 2022 SNRA considers the ML risks related to legal and accounting professions as “High” due to  
the nature of services they may offer and their sector of expertise (create, register and/or manage  
LPAs, use of clients’ accounts, prepare financial statements, provide assurance and guarantees, etc).  
These services may be misused by organised crime groups to disguise their identity, to commit  
predicate offences and to launder the proceeds of these crimes. These experts may be unwittingly  
involved in the ML but may also be complicit or willfully negligent in conducting their customer due  
diligence obligations.  
NRA  
The 2025 NRA assesses the ML risks of services offered by legal and accounting professionals for  
each category of professionals under the “products/activities” dimension. The inherent risk of legal  
and accounting professionals under AED supervision is assessed to be “High” with key  
vulnerabilities stemming in particular from fragmentation, ownership/legal structure and products  
and activities offered by those professionals.  
6.3.5.1.  
Accountants  
The total number of accountants remained stable, averaging 649 accountants per year between 2020  
and 2023. Whereas top-five players generated 20% of the market turnover in 2023 (i.e., EUR 270  
million), top 100 players accounted for 74% of the said turnover. Considering the important number  
of players and the moderate degree of market concentration, the sector is assessed to bear some  
fragmentation.  
6.3.5.2.  
Professional directors and business centres  
In 2021 (2020), the AED registered 688 (627) certified directors for VAT purposes. The market became  
more fragmented with top-five players generating 59% of total market turnover in 2020 compared to  
20% in 2021. The turnover linked to those professionals amounted to EUR 38 million (EUR 54 million)  
in 2021 (2020)248.  
With respect to business centres, the AED identified over 65 business centres, with top-five players  
generating more than 40% of total turnover between 2020 and 2023. Overall, business centres  
supervised by the AED accounted for a total turnover of EUR 58 million (EUR 52 million) in 2023  
(2020)249  
.
248 AED data.  
249 AED data.  
118  
     
6.4. Legal and accounꢀng professions supervised by SRBs  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
The 2022 SNRA considers the ML risks related to legal and accounting professions as “High” due to  
the nature of services they may offer and their sector of expertise (create, registrate and/or manage  
legal persons and arrangements, use of clients’ accounts, prepare financial statements, provide  
assurance and guarantees, etc). These services may be misused by organised crime groups to  
disguise their identity, to commit predicate offences and to launder the proceeds of these crimes.  
These experts may be unwittingly involved in the ML but may also be complicit or willfully negligent  
in conducting their customer due diligence obligations.  
NRA  
The 2025 NRA assesses the ML risks of services offered by legal and accounting professionals for  
each category of professionals falling under the “products/activities” dimension. As evidenced in  
the table below, the inherent risk levels for the sub-sectors falling within the AML/CFT supervision  
of the different SRBs:  
Table 20: Inherent ML risk of legal and accounꢀng professions supervised by SRBs  
2025 NRA: Inherent  
Sector  
Sub-sectors  
risk  
Legal and accounting Lawyers  
High  
professions  
supervised by SRBs  
Notaries  
High  
Court bailiffs (huissiers de justice)  
Medium  
Medium  
High  
Audit profession250  
Chartered professional accountants (experts-comptables)  
6.4.1. Lawyers  
AT A GLANCE  
The sub-sector inherent risk level remains “High”.  
Size remains the main risk factor of this sub-sector. Although ML vulnerabilities associated to the  
sub-sector’s products/activities have been reassessed downwards, they continue to be key risk  
drivers together with sub-sector’s fragmentation, exposure to international business, including  
from risky countries, as well as the volume and risks related to the sector’s clientele.  
The number of lawyers registered with the Barreau du Luxembourg is large and has increased  
continuously since the 2020 NRA. In 2023, 3 296 lawyers (2 936 in 2020) spread across 758 lawyers  
offices (533 as of 2020) were registered with the OAL.  
250  
In this document, the term “audit profession” covers statutory auditors (réviseurs d’entreprises), approved statutory  
auditors (réviseurs d’entreprises agréés), audit firms (cabinets de révision) and approved audit firms (cabinets de révision  
agréés).  
119  
       
Figure 24: Number lawyers and lawyers’ offices registered with the OAL 2020 - 2023251  
3296  
3500  
3000  
2500  
2000  
1500  
1000  
500  
3129  
3078  
2936  
758  
626  
554  
533  
0
2020  
2021  
Lawyers  
2022  
Lawyers' offices  
2023  
About 38% of the lawyers were employed by the 10 largest law firms in 2023. It should be noted that  
600 law firms counted less than 10 lawyers and, among those, 348 were represented by one lawyer252  
.
Consequently, the important sector size and the fragmentation continue to be relevant for the studied  
purpose.  
With respect to activities, the share of lawyers performing activities falling within the scope of the  
2004 AML/CFT has also increased since 2020. Whereas 61% of OAL members indicated in 2020 to  
perform (from time to time) activities falling within the scope of the 2004 AML/CFT Law, 72% indicated  
to do so in 2023253. Nonetheless, most OAL lawyers focused predominantly on litigation and legal  
services and on legal mandates to a lesser extent. Those activities generally represent a lower risk for  
ML. Due to Luxembourg’s important financial sector, Luxembourg’s largest law firms are specialised  
in banking, corporate tax, mergers and acquisitions, private equity, investment funds and litigation  
legal services.  
As outlined in the 2020 NRA, TCSP activities are particularly vulnerable to ML abuse. In 2023, 13% of  
total lawyer’s offices provided TCSP services in 2023. Among those, most of them offered domiciliation  
and directorship services.  
Most of the profession’s clientele resided in European countries254 and North America. In both 2022  
and 2023, around 10% of lawyer’s offices had clients that had higher customer risk factors.  
Nonetheless, more than 80% of them noted that those clients represented less than 10% of their  
global volume of clients.  
Findings from the OAL “annual mandatory AML/CFT general questionnaire” suggested that the higher  
the turnover linked to activities in scope of the 2004 AML/CFT Law, the higher their estimated risk.  
251 OAL data.  
252 OAL data.  
253 OAL data. 61,2% in 2020, 57% in 2021, 71% in 2022.  
254  
Note that this term includes member states of the EU and 31 territories / countries such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein,  
UK, Monaco, Ukraine, Iceland, Norway, Albania, Andorra, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro,  
Moldova, Serbia and territories (even outside of Europe) administered by these countries (mainly the UK).  
120  
         
Among the lawyer offices falling within the scope of the 2004 AML/CFT Law, most of them declared  
generating between 1% and 10% of their turnover from the said activities.  
Finally, the majority of contacts and entry into business relationships were made through direct  
contacts, decreasing the ML vulnerability linked to distribution channels.  
6.4.2. Notaries  
AT A GLANCE  
The ML inherent risk related to notaries is “High”, with key risk drivers stemming from the size,  
products and activities, and international business.  
The number of notaries is fixed at 36 by the Law of 9 December 1976 on the organisation of the  
notarial profession. Although the number of notaries has remained unchanged since the 2020 NRA,  
nine new notaries were appointed between 2020 and 2023 due to an equivalent number of  
retirements. It was estimated that the number of employees in these 36 notarial offices fluctuated  
between 250 and 350255  
.
As touched on in the 2020 NRA and as further detailed in the VRA on ML/TF risks of legal persons and  
legal arrangements256, some legal acts can only be performed by notaries. For instance, a notarial deed  
is required to incorporate some types of legal persons and most real estate transactions require the  
intervention of a notary. Some of these activities are considered high-risk by the FATF (e.g. real estate  
transactions, purchase of shares and other participations).  
The following graph represents the total number of entities registered with the RCS throughout the  
observation period of this NRA.  
Figure 25: Number of legal persons registered with the RCS, situation as of end 2020 - 2023257  
2023  
2022  
2021  
2020  
-
20,000  
40,000  
60,000  
80,000  
100,000  
120,000  
140,000  
160,000  
Number entities without mandatory notarial deed Number entities with mandatory notarial deed  
Although the share of entities created by notarial deed has slightly decreased during the observation  
period, two thirds of Luxembourg legal persons were registered by notarial deed.  
255 CdN data.  
256 MoJ, ML/TF vertical risk assessment on legal persons and legal arrangements, 2022, link.  
257 LBR data.  
121  
         
Compared to 2019, the number of total real estate mortgage transcriptions with the AED remained  
relatively stable at around 29 600 transcriptions258,259. In view that most real estate transcriptions  
required the intervention of a notary, it is considered that this is a fair indicator of notaries’ activities  
in terms of volume.  
Generally speaking, it is considered that corporate law activities tend to be more international than  
real estate or family law related activities. As highlighted in the 2020 NRA, most notarial deeds set up  
in Luxembourg concerned private individuals residing in Luxembourg with international companies  
playing a minor role. Consequently, these notaries primarily serve local and national clients within a  
variety of civil law fields. The initial ML risk of these professionals is considerably lower than those of  
offices showing predominant activities in areas which are more exposed to ML risks, as is the case, for  
example, in the context of international corporate activities, transactions implying larger cash flows  
etc. From 2020 to 2022 between five and seven notaries out of 36 indicated that corporate law  
accounts formed the largest part of their activities. In 2023, the number of notaries reporting that  
corporate law forms the largest part of their activities increased further. However, corporate law  
activities remained unchanged in terms of number of transactions performed. In fact, this shift is  
explained by the decrease in real estate activities. Nevertheless, there is a significant portion of  
international clientele in some notarial offices, especially in the ones that are specialized in business  
acts260. Hence, a conservative scoring for the “international business” criterion was applied.  
6.4.3. Court bailiffs  
AT A GLANCE  
The sub-sector inherent risk level remains “Medium”.  
The number of Court bailiffs is capped at 19 by the Law of 4 December 1990 on the organisation of  
Court Bailiffs.  
Court bailiffs are subject to the 2004 AML/CFT Law when conducting public actions. The number of  
bailiffs active in this activity remains stable since 2018 at around 12. Most public actions are forced  
auctions following a legal decision or bankruptcy, whereas voluntary auctions by individuals or  
companies continue to be rather unusual. Given the limited number of auctions (74 in 2023, 58 in  
2022, 84 in 2021, 55 in 2020) and the significant price range of goods sold during such events (for  
instance, from EUR 5 to EUR 63 000 in 2023 but from EUR 5 to EUR 1 million261 in 2021), statistics  
related to average prices are subject to high volatility. Considering that the inherent nature of the  
court bailiff’s profession (i.e. the recovery of funds), payments in cash are not unusual. However, they  
are capped at EUR 12 000.  
ML exposure to geographical factors remains limited, in view that the clientele is mostly made up of  
Luxembourg residents and commuters working in the Grand-Duchy. Transacꢀons occurred essenꢀally  
face-to-face, with the excepꢀon of well-known bidders (where transacꢀons were occasionally  
258 AED, Rapport d’activité 2021 de l'Administration de l'enregistrement, des domaines et de la TVA, 2021, link, 2022, link and  
2023, link.  
259 At present, a more granular breakdown of notaries’ activities is not available to determine which acts relate to real estate  
transactions with monetary consideration and which do not.  
260 CdN data.  
261 The EUR 1 million listed item corresponded to a highly specialised industry machine.  
122  
         
performed over the phone). If intermediaries were used during aucꢀons, proxy and BO verificaꢀon  
were performed.  
6.4.4. Audit profession262,263  
AT A GLANCE  
The sub-sector inherent risk level is assessed as “Medium”.  
Sub-sector size, international exposure and significant number of audit clients are the key vulnerabilities  
driving ML inherent risk for the audit profession. With respect to the 2020 NRA, more detailed data  
available for the 2025 NRA update have shown that, for instance, TCSPs activities represent a minor share  
of total activities of the audit profession, and flows with weak AML/CFT measures geographies and  
exposure to clients that are PEP are rather limited.  
The following table provides an updated overview of the Luxembourg audit profession landscape.  
Figure 26: Evolution Luxembourg audit landscape264  
450  
394  
400  
342  
320  
350  
300  
250  
200  
150  
100  
50  
261  
251  
242  
55  
55  
52  
23  
audit firms  
15  
11  
0
approved audit firms  
2020 NRA  
statutory auditors  
approved statutory  
auditors  
2021  
2023  
As depicted in the figure above, the sector remained sizable at end 2023. Over 90% of the total  
turnover of the audit profession is generated by the four largest audit firms with 55% of statutory  
auditors and 71% of statutory auditors in public practice working for these firms. The remaining 140  
professionals in public practice work in 62 audit firms or are sole practitioners (8 of them).  
Consequently, the sector continued to be moderately fragmented throughout the observation period.  
With respect to the ownership structure of (approved) audit firms, BOs and board members of the  
audit firms were resident in Luxembourg or in another EU country. In 2021 and 2023, none had a BO,  
262  
In this document, the term “audit profession” covers statutory auditors (réviseurs d’entreprises), approved statutory  
auditors (réviseurs d’entreprises agréés), audit firms (cabinets de révision) and approved audit firms (cabinets de révision  
agréés).  
263 Statistics collected by the IRE based on 2023 RBA questionnaire referring to the situation as at year end of 2023, unless  
stated otherwise.  
264 IRE data. ”2020 NRA” data at 21 February 2020. As the last RBA questionnaire was communicated by statutory auditors  
at the end of 2023 / beginning 2024, 2023 figures (instead of 2022 statistics) were reported in the last RBA questionnaire.  
123  
         
shareholder or board member residing in a jurisdiction under increased monitoring by the FATF or a  
high-risk jurisdiction subject to a call for action265  
.
Auditors’ core activities relate to assurance services such as audit and review of annual accounts.  
These activities are considered to be low ML risk. Furthermore, auditors generally intervene at a  
second stage in the process (post facto review of annual accounts or historical data). In a similar vein,  
assurance and related services (e.g. accounting, compliance and regulatory services) represented 81%  
of the total turnover and 83% of their clients as a whole in 2023. TCSP activities, which are deemed to  
be higher risk from a ML point of view, represented a minor share of total activities (0,83% of auditors  
total turnover; provided to 1,4% of their clients in 2023 and 0,10% of total turnover and 1,4% of total  
clients in 2021). This decreases audit profession’s vulnerability to ML related to products and services.  
Auditors predominantly served a regional clientele with 92% (91%) of them being registered or  
residing in the “Grande region” in 2023 (2021). In a similar vein, BOs of audit firm clients were mainly  
resident in EU countries (68% in 2023, 72,5% in 2021), the UK (9,4% in 2023, 8% in 2021), the USA (8%  
in 2023, 6,5% in 2021) and Switzerland (6% in 2023 , 5% in 2021).  
The number of clients amounted to around 34 700 in 2023 (34 600 in 2021) for the whole profession.  
(Approved) audit firms’ clients were mainly represented by Luxembourg sociétés commerciales (84%  
in 2023 83% in 2021) from both the financial and non-financial sector266. Throughout the observation  
period, less than 0,5% of audit firms’ clientele had a business activity which is related to one of the  
riskier business sectors listed in Appendix IV of the 2004 AML/CFT Law. The number of BOs of legal  
persons clients of the audit profession who were PEPs represented 3,4% of the total number of BOs  
reported by the audit profession in 2023.  
6.4.5. Chartered professional accountants  
AT A GLANCE  
Inherent risk related to CPAs remains high, with key risk drivers stemming from the profession’s  
size, products and activities, international business as well as from their clientele.  
During the observation period of this NRA, the sector remained large in size and fragmented, with on  
average around 1 200 of CPAs natural persons spread across 560 legal entities and 66 independent  
professionals. Around 30% of the professionals were employed by one of the six biggest firms.  
Although the sub-sector also included a significant number of small entities, their share of total  
revenue was limited and reserved to bigger entities. The number of large chartered professional  
accounting firms falling under the OEC AML/CFT supervision remained limited (with less than 2% of  
registered legal entities employing more than 250 persons). Most entities under the OEC supervision  
were small legal entities with around ¾ of them employing less than 11 persons267  
.
Compared to the 2020 NRA, CPAs conꢀnued to play a key gatekeeper and intermediary role for many  
transacꢀons presenꢀng a high ML risk. Indeed, CPAs provide a significant amount of TCSPs acꢀviꢀes,  
which are considered high risk from a ML perspecꢀve. However, a downward trend may be observed  
265 CSSF data.  
266 IRE data.  
267 OEC data.  
124  
       
through the observaꢀon period, notably among sole pracꢀꢀoners. Whilst the share of registered legal  
enꢀꢀes under OEC providing TCSP acꢀviꢀes has slightly decreased from 71% in 2020 to 68% in 2023,  
the share of sole pracꢀꢀoners providing TCSP acꢀviꢀes has diminished more significantly, from 51% in  
2020 to 26% in 2023268. CPAs’ high share of internaꢀonal business and volume and risk profile of clients  
further adds to this risk.  
6.5. Legal persons and legal arrangements  
The 2018 NRA and its 2020 update included a specific section on legal persons and legal arrangements.  
In both exercises, legal persons and legal arrangements as a whole were considered as highly  
vulnerable for ML/TF purposes. Luxembourg obtained a more granular understanding of Luxembourg  
legal persons and legal arrangements vulnerabilities through the LPs/LAs VRA269, finalised and  
published in February 2022. The 2022 LPs/LAs VRA constitutes the common understanding of  
Luxembourg’s legal persons and legal arrangements vulnerabilities for being abused for ML/TF  
purposes.  
Table 21: Inherent ML risk of legal persons and legal arrangements – overview by sub-sector  
Sector  
Sub-sectors  
2025 NRA: Inherent risk  
Very High  
Legal persons  
and legal  
arrangements  
Sociétés commerciales  
Sociétés civiles  
Medium  
NPOs (as per FATF definition) carrying out primarily  
international activities ASBLs and Fondations270  
High  
Low  
Low  
NPOs (as per FATF definition) carrying out local activities  
ASBLs271  
NPOs (as per FATF definition) carrying out local activities  
Fondations272  
Other legal persons  
Domestic Fiducies  
Foreign trusts  
High  
Very High  
Very High  
268 OEC data.  
269 MoJ, Legal persons and legal arrangements ML/TF vertical risk assessment, 2022, link.  
270 This category corresponds to “Associations sans but lucrative (ASBL) and fondations with Non-governmental organisations  
(NGO) status” in NRA 2020.  
271 This category corresponds to “Other associations sans but lucratif (ASBL)” in NRA 2020. Note than in NRA 2020, it included  
ASBLs in and out of the FATF NPO definition (i.e. 8 000 vs. 100 ASBLs falling in FATF NPO definition). In this respect, NRA 2020  
noted that “most ASBLs are estimated to have a low exposure to ML/TF threats; but given their relatively high number, the  
inherent risk is evaluated as medium for the local ASBL sector as a whole until a national assessment of their activities will  
permit a more granular assessment, in line with a conservative approach”.  
272 This category corresponds to “Other fondations” in NRA 2020. Note that in NRA 2020, it included Fondations in and out  
of the FATF NPO definition.  
125  
             
6.5.1. Legal persons  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
Overall, the SNRA assesses the ML risks related to legal persons as very significant, with the ML risk  
mainly stemming from the misuse of complex structures and control structures, often using shell  
and front companies273, as well as misusing off-shore companies274. The SNRA also notes that the  
majority of cases that involved tax evasion, fraudulent investment schemes and fraud also utilized  
complex structures to conceal beneficial ownership.  
The SNRA provides other key techniques that have been identified allowing legal persons to be  
exploited to hide beneficial ownership information, such as using individuals and financial  
instruments to obscure the relationship between the BO and the asset, including bearer shares,  
nominees, and professional intermediaries; falsifying activities through the use of false loans, false  
invoices, and misleading naming conventions, fictitious turnover; misuse of cash-intensive business  
to provide cover for the source of otherwise inexplicable quantities of cash, facilitating the mixing  
of illicit funds with legal proceeds; and use trade-based money laundering to justify the movement  
of criminal proceeds through banking channels, for example, via letters of credit and invoices, or  
through the use of global transactions, often using false documents for the trade of goods and  
services.  
In connection to organised crime (see section 5.1.5), the SNRA suggests that where organised  
criminal groups have connections to a jurisdiction, they may seek to move illicit proceeds to and  
from that jurisdiction to facilitate offending, often in relation to drug offences.  
NRA  
The 2018 and 2020 NRA assessed the legal persons sector as “High” risk, with Sociétés  
commerciales, followed by some NPOs bearing the highest inherent risk. Following the 2025 NRA,  
the inherent risk levels remain roughly the same for all categories of legal persons (with the  
excepꢀon of “Other legal persons”, assessed as High risk, in line with the 2022 LPs/LAs VRA, and  
ASBLs falling under FATF NPO definiꢀon carrying out local acꢀviꢀes, that have been assessed as Low  
risk). Indeed, leveraging on the methodology developed in the 2022 LPs/LAs VRA and updated data,  
this NRA provides a more detailed, nuanced and data-based assessment.  
All legal persons incorporated in Luxembourg must be registered with the RCS as per the 2002 RCS  
Law. With respect to the situaꢀon at the end of the observaꢀon period, the total number of legal  
persons has risen to 146 373 (5% increase from 139 430 legal persons as of 31 December 2021), but it  
is sꢀll below the number observed in the years before the NRA 2020.  
By broad category of legal persons, Sociétés commerciales increased the most, with 6 349 addiꢀonal  
enꢀꢀes. Within this category, SARLs and SCSpé contributed the most to this increase with respecꢀvely  
273  
Shell companies and front companies feature prominently in most complex structures identified by FIUs and other  
competent authorities, according to FAFT and Egmont Group, Concealment of Beneficial Ownership, 2018, link.  
274 According to the SNRA, offshore companies are often lacking real economic activity in the jurisdiction of incorporation.  
This, together with the high number of intra-affiliated-companies transactions, could increase the risk for such companies of  
being abused for ML.  
126  
     
4 071 and 3 234 addiꢀonal enꢀꢀes. On the other hand, SAs decreased by 2 598 enꢀꢀes. Sociétés civiles  
increased by 223 to reach 6 068 enꢀꢀes. Within the non-profit sector, the number of ASBLs (out of  
which only a porꢀon fall within the FATF NPO definiꢀon) increased by 349 to reach 8 806, while the  
number of Fondaꢀons remained stable at around 200. Other legal persons also remained fairly stable  
(just below 3 000, 2% of the total).  
In terms of structure of the Luxembourg legal persons landscape, the situaꢀon has been rather stable  
for the last years with around 87% of Sociétés commerciales, 4% of Sociétés civiles, 6% of non-profit  
legal persons (ASBLs and Fondaꢀons) and 2% of other legal persons.  
Table 22: Luxembourg legal persons by category 2017-2023  
The ability to be used as complex structures is a key vulnerability of legal persons. In this regard, the  
presence of corporate shareholders and corporate managers/directors in legal persons may contribute  
to this complexity and thus pose obstacles to transparency and enhance exposure to ML risk.  
Basic informaꢀon registered in the RCS shows that corporate owners were more prevalent in Sociétés  
commerciales than in Sociétés civiles275.  
Evidence from the RCS suggests that the presence of corporate managers/directors in Luxembourg  
legal persons is less common. Corporate managers/directors were more prevalent in Sociétés  
commerciales and much more limited in other categories of legal persons (Sociétés civiles, Other legal  
275 RCS data as of 31 December 2023 provided by the LBR.  
127  
   
persons) and specially in ASBLs and Fondaꢀons, where the number of legal persons with only natural  
persons as managers/directors was very close to 100%276  
.
Non-resident shareholders/partners: as analysed in the 2022 LPs/LAs VRA, and according to the  
informaꢀon on addresses for registered shareholders/partners within the corporate structure, it  
appears that Sociétés commerciales bear a higher vulnerability than Sociétés civiles277  
.
BO informaꢀon278 of legal persons must be registered with the Registre des bénéficiares effecꢀfs (RBE)  
as per the 2019 RBE Law. As of end 2023, the compliance rate with this obligaꢀon was close to 100%  
for Sociétés commerciales, Fondaꢀons, and “Other legal persons” and slightly lower for ASBLs but  
concerns the whole populaꢀon of ASBLs and not only those falling under the FATF definiꢀon of NPO –  
and Sociétés civiles279  
.
Informaꢀon registered with the RBE as of 31 December 2023 confirms the internaꢀonal nature of BOs  
in the corporate environment in Luxembourg (see secꢀon 3), specifically with regards to Sociétés  
Commerciales and “Other legal persons”.  
From the legal person point of view:  
o
By category of legal person, the higher percentage of legal persons with all Luxembourg  
residents are ASBLs, Fondaꢀons and Sociétés civiles. Sociétés commerciales and “Other  
legal persons” appear to have the least percentage of legal persons with all BOs being  
Luxembourg residents.  
From the BO point of view:  
o
Altogether, 51% of registered BOs were Luxembourg residents, 29% were EU residents and  
the remaining 20% were residents outside the EU.  
o
The “Other legal persons” category is shown to have the highest level of non-resident BOs,  
mostly explained by the presence of non-residents in Fonds commun de placements  
(FCPs280).  
o
o
Non-resident BOs in Sociétés commerciales represented a significant share, driven by the  
presence of non-resident BOs and Sociétés anonymes (62% of non-residents) and in  
Sociétés à responsabilité limitées (47% of non-residents), which were the most prevalent  
legal forms of Société commerciale in Luxembourg.  
For the remaining types of legal persons, BOs are mostly naꢀonal residents.  
With respect to products and acꢀviꢀes, the following table summarises the sectoral acꢀvity split per  
category of legal person.  
276 RCS data as of 31 December 2023 provided by the LBR.  
277 MoJ, Legal persons and legal arrangements ML/TF vertical risk assessment, 2022, link.  
278 Note that in the following section, SMOs are included in BO statistics unless otherwise specified.  
279 Data provided by the LBR. Closed bankruptcies are not taken into account.  
280 Although FCPs have no legal personality, they are registered as “Other legal persons” in the RCS. Please note that FCPs  
can be created through private deed.  
128  
         
Table 23: Sectoral split of legal persons as of 31 December 2023 (registered with RCS and NACE code allocaꢀon) – top-three sector per category  
highlighted in orange281  
Sector  
Sociétés commerciales Sociétés civiles  
ASBLs  
Fondaꢀons  
Other legal enꢀꢀes  
33  
Agriculture, forestry and fishing  
Mining and quarrying  
189  
13  
121  
-
7
-
-
-
-
3
Manufacturing  
922  
3
3
1
2
-
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Condiꢀoning supply  
Water supply  
204  
141  
-
-
8
67  
-
14  
3
Construcꢀon  
7 005  
9 772  
1 655  
3 652  
3 475  
70 915  
36  
7
-
Wholesale and retail trade  
2
1
-
17  
3
Transportaꢀon and storage  
Accommodaꢀon and food service acꢀviꢀes  
Informaꢀon and communicaꢀon  
Financial and insurance acꢀviꢀes  
Real estate acꢀviꢀes  
4
-
5
19  
-
-
1
93  
1
1
2
4
-
18  
2 177  
12  
43  
14  
46  
12  
45  
15  
28  
-
437  
8
5 411  
9 060  
3 348  
2
3 442  
5
Professional, scienꢀfic and technical acꢀviꢀes  
Administraꢀve and support service acꢀviꢀes  
Public administraꢀon and defence  
Educaꢀon  
70  
710  
-
74  
79  
35  
3
10  
39  
7
82  
567  
522  
486  
1 303  
1
3
145  
533  
2 074  
4 610  
1
Human health and social work acꢀviꢀes  
Arts, entertainment and recreaꢀon  
Other service acꢀviꢀes  
14  
33  
-
Acꢀviꢀes of extraterritorial organisaꢀons and bodies  
-
281 Note that as of Q3 2024, the NACE Code allocation for some legal persons (about 8%) was pending. Consequently, the total of number of entities shown in this table is inferior to the total  
number of legal persons registered as of 31 December 2023 (i.e. 146 373) with the RCS. Nonetheless, it is considered that this does not impact the overall structural split shown above.  
129  
   
From the table above, it can be concluded that more than 55% of Sociétés commerciales are acꢀve in the  
financial and insurance sector, which is in line with Luxembourg’s context (see secꢀon 3). Sociétés  
commerciales are far less acꢀve in other sectors in percentage terms (wholesale and retail trade: 7,6%);  
professional, scienꢀfic and technical acꢀviꢀes: 7%; construcꢀon acꢀviꢀes: 5,5%) but sꢀll important in  
terms of number of enꢀꢀes282  
.
More than half of Sociétés civiles are largely acꢀve in real estate acꢀviꢀes283, which is globally considered  
high risk from a ML perspecꢀve.  
With regard to the non-profit sector, it is worth noꢀng that the informaꢀon in the table above concerns  
all ASBLs and Fondaꢀons registered with the RCS. Taking into consideraꢀon those idenꢀfied to fall under  
FATF Recommendaꢀon 8 definiꢀon as “NPOs”, it can be observed that those that were engaged in  
internaꢀonal acꢀviꢀes were mainly acꢀve in development (economic, social, educaꢀon, etc.) and  
humanitarian relief aid; whereas those that were engaged primarily naꢀonally were primarily acꢀve in  
social work without accommodaꢀon, religious (although most of them related to the financing of buildings  
or church organs in Luxembourg), and cultural acꢀviꢀes. Those NPOs engaging both domesꢀcally and  
abroad were mostly acꢀve in social work without accommodaꢀon, development and humanitarian works,  
and cultural acꢀviꢀes284  
.
Other legal persons were mostly acꢀve in the financial and insurance sector285, which is explained by the  
fact that FCPs and SICAVs used in the collecꢀve investment industry are included in this broad category.  
6.5.2. Legal arrangements  
AT A GLANCE  
SNRA  
Overall, the SNRA assesses the ML risks related to legal arrangements as very significant.  
Similar to legal persons, trusts and similar legal arrangements may be misused in order to increase  
opacity within ML. Moreover, the SNRA points out that in the case studies presented, almost all of the  
cases involving the use of legal arrangements also involve company or other legal entities, indicating  
that trusts and similar legal arrangements are rarely used in isolation to hold assets and obscure BOs,  
but they are generally part of a wider scheme, often involving tax crimes (see for instance section 5.1.2).  
NRA  
The 2018 and 2020 NRA assesses legal arrangements as “Very High” risk. Following the 2025 NRA, the  
inherent risk levels remain roughly the same for both domestic fiducies and foreign trusts. However,  
282 Note that for 7,6% of Sociétés commerciales as of 31 December 2023 NACE codes are unknown.  
283 Note that for 17% of Sociétés civiles as of 31 December 2023 NACE codes are unknown.  
284  
Outcomes from the desktop analyses performed as of end 2022 and end 2023 by the LBC/FT Directorate of the Ministry of  
justice to identify NPOs that fall within the FATF NPO definition and classify the resulting subset into risk categories. The analysis  
was based on the review of the NPOs legal forms, additional statutes and accreditations and sector of activity and geographical  
scope as deferred from their statutory purpose.  
285 Note that for 16% of Other legal persons as of 31 December 2023 NACE codes are unknown.  
130  
         
leveraging on the methodology developed in the 2022 LPs/LAs VRA, the 2025 NRA provides a more  
detailed, nuanced and data-based assessment.  
Key risk drivers are ownership/legal structure (referring to beneficial ownership and legal features of  
legal arrangements) and product and services, followed by sub-sector structure (size).  
With regards to products and acꢀviꢀes, Fiducies and other similar legal arrangements are inherently asset  
holding enꢀꢀes as they separate legal ownership from the beneficial ownership of the assets286. However,  
this characterisꢀc of legal arrangements may be abused for ML purposes. As explained above, legal  
arrangements have been idenꢀfied as a recurring vehicle used in ML schemes globally287  
.
In Luxembourg, legal arrangements comprised domesꢀc fiducies and foreign trusts288. Except for the  
number of enꢀꢀes, both fiducies and foreign trusts shared the same key vulnerabiliꢀes to ML.  
The register of fiducies and trusts (RFT) went live in the second half of 2020. The graph below shows the  
evolution of legal arrangements registered “actes enregistrés” and ceased “actes cessés” during the year  
and the following table and shows the number of legal arrangements active at year end. The below figure  
shows that the population process is ongoing and dynamic as legal arrangements are subject to multiple  
revisions throughout their life cycle. The regular number of legal arrangements registered and ceased  
evidence that users are well informed about their obligations.  
Figure 27: RFT registraꢀons over the period 2020 - 2024  
2500  
1959  
2000  
1500  
1132  
1121  
936  
1000  
500  
0
655  
616  
156  
150  
53  
2021  
4
2020  
2022  
2023  
2024  
Actes enregistrés  
Actes cessés  
286 MoJ, Legal persons and legal arrangements ML/TF vertical risk assessment, 2022, link (section 5.1.2.2).  
287 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the  
assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border  
activities, 2022, link.  
288 A detailed description, examples and related key legislation is provided in the LPs/LAs VRA, section 3.4 (pages 23-25), link.  
131  
       
Table 24: RFT registraꢀons over the period 2020 - 2024289  
Actives as of 31  
December  
Actives as of 31  
December (cumulative)  
Year  
Registered  
Ceased  
Modified  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
156  
936  
4
2
152  
883  
505  
838  
516  
152  
53  
26  
1 053  
1 540  
2 378  
2 894  
655  
150  
1 121  
616  
89  
1 959  
1 132  
238  
134  
Total as of 31  
December 2024  
4 838  
1 944  
489  
2 894  
2 894  
There were 2 894 active fiducies and trusts managed in Luxembourg registered with the RFT as of 31  
December 2024 (152 as of end 2020; 1 035 as of end 2021; 1 540 as of end 2022; 2 378 as of end 2023)  
As of end 2024, 85% of registered legal arrangements were domestic fiducies and 15% were trusts  
(managed by regulated trustees/fiduciary)290  
.
Generally, it is allowed acknowledged that these arrangements can have very complex structures, as they  
usually do not have (legal) owners, but parꢀes with different roles, rights and obligaꢀons291. From a  
geographical point of view, beneficial ownership structure is diverse292. Nevertheless, there were no BO  
resident in a high-risk jurisdicꢀon subject to a call for acꢀon by FATF293  
.
6.6. Cross-cuꢃng vulnerabiliꢀes  
6.6.1. Trust and corporate service providers (TCSPs)  
The 2004 AML/CFT Law (as amended by the Law of 29 July 2022) defines TCSPs as any natural or legal  
person which by way of a business relationship provides any trust and corporate services to third parties.  
There is no specific license for TCSPs. Instead, TCSPs are defined by the activities they perform.  
The table below maps the five TCSP services as described in the 2004 AML/CFT Law to the description of  
the respective service as per the FATF definition described in FATF’s “Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach  
for Trust & Company Service Providers (TCSPs)”.  
289 AED.  
290 AED.  
291 OECD IDB, A beneficial Ownership Implementation Toolkit, 2019, page 12.  
292 Data from the RFT as of 31 December 2024.  
293 FATF, High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 25 October 2024, link.  
132  
               
Table 25: Mapping of TCSP acꢀviꢀes described in the 2004 AML/CFT Law to the FATF Guidance on  
TCSPs  
TCSP services described in the 2004 AML/CFT Law294  
Mapping to the FATF definition295  
a) Forming companies or other legal persons  
Incorporation: Acting as a formation agent of legal  
persons  
b) Acting as or arranging for another person to act as a Directorship and secretarial services: Acting as (or  
director, manager, member of the board of arranging for another person to act as) a director or  
directors, member of the Executive Board or secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or  
secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, a similar position in relation to other legal persons  
or a similar position in relation to other types of  
legal persons  
c) Providing a registered office, business address, Domiciliation: Providing a registered office, business  
correspondence or administrative address or address or accommodation, correspondence or  
business premises and, where applicable, other administrative address for a company, a partnership  
related services for a company, a partnership or any or any other legal person or arrangement  
other legal person or legal arrangement  
d) Acting as, or arranging for another person to act as, Fiducie/trust: Acting as (or arranging for another  
a fiduciaire in a fiducie, a trustee of an express trust person to act as) a trustee of an express trust or  
or an equivalent function in a similar legal performing the equivalent function for another form  
arrangement  
of legal arrangement  
e) Acting as, or arranging for another person to act as, Nominee shareholder: Acting as (or arranging for  
a nominee shareholder for another person  
another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for  
another person  
A range of professions in Luxembourg conduct at least one (or more) of the activities defined by the 2004  
AML/CFT Law as TCSP activities (as described above). Entities that act as TCSPs include, amongst others,  
banks, investment firms, specialised PFSs, IFMs, PSAs, lawyers, audit professionals296 and CPAs.  
Luxembourg notaries and bailiffs do not provide TSCP services297. The activity of domiciliation is regulated  
by the Law of 31 May 1999 governing the domiciliation of companies, as amended (1999 Domiciliation  
Law), and restricted to credit institutions, PFSs, PSAs, lawyers, auditors and CPAs. TCSPs are thus a broad  
and diverse category in Luxembourg, given the range of professionals that are legally authorised to  
conduct such activities.  
The table below describes the professions authorised to carry out TCSP activities in Luxembourg, the  
relevant laws that underpin them and their respective AML/CFT supervisor.  
294 Article 1(8) of the 2004 AML/CFT Law, as amended by the Law of 29 July 2022.  
295 FATF, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Trust & Company Service Providers (TSCPs), 2019, link.  
296  
In this document, the term "audit professionals" covers statutory auditors (réviseurs d'entreprises), approved statutory  
auditors (réviseurs d'entreprises agréés), audit firms (cabinets de révision) and approved audit firms (cabinets de révision agréés).  
297 MoJ, ML/TF vertical risk assessment on legal persons and legal arrangements, 2022, link (section 5.4.1.).  
133  
         
Table 26: Professionals authorised to carry out TCSP acꢀviꢀes in Luxembourg  
AML/CFT  
Professionals authorised to carry out  
Relevant laws  
supervisor  
TCSP activities  
CSSF  
Banks and credit institutions  
Investment firms  
1993 LSF, Part I, Chapter 1  
1993 LSF, Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2, Subsection 1  
2010 OPC Law298 and 2013 AIF Law299  
Investment Fund managers  
2004 Securitisation Law300, 2004 AML/CFT Law, Art. 2(1) 6b  
Securitisation undertakings  
Three types of specialised PFSs301,  
including with the following licenses:  
Family Offices  
1993 LSF, Art. 28-6  
1993 LSF, Art. 28-9  
1993 LSF, Art. 28-10  
Corporate domiciliation agents  
Professionals providing company  
incorporation and management  
services  
2015 Insurance Law302, Art. 264, 265 and 266  
CAA  
OEC  
Professionals of the insurance sector  
CPAs  
1999 Chartered Professional  
1999 Domiciliation Law,  
Art. 1(1)304  
Accountants Law303  
2016 Audit Profession Law305  
IRE  
(Approved) statutory auditors and  
(approved) audit firms  
OAL/OAD  
Lawyers (list I and IV of the Bar)  
1991 Lawyers Law306  
Other professions offering TCSP  
services:  
2004 AML/CFT Law, Art. 2-1, para. 8  
Professional directors supervised  
by the AED  
Business centres  
298 Law of 17 December 2010 relating to undertakings for collective investment.  
299 Law of 12 July 2013 on alternative investment fund managers.  
300 Law of 22 March 2004 on securitisation.  
301 Including support professionals of the financial sector providing TCSP services.  
302 Law of 7 December 2015 on the insurance sector.  
303 Law of 10 June 1999 organising the profession of Chartered Professional Accountant.  
304 Based on the professionals listed in the Law of 31 May 1999 (1999 Domiciliation Law), Art. 1(1): “Only a registered member of  
one of the following regulated professions established in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg may act as a domiciliation agent of  
companies: a credit institution or another professional of the financial sector and the insurance sector, an lawyer at the Court  
(avocat à la Cour) included in list I and a European lawyer practising under his home-title professional title included in list IV  
referred to in Art. 8(3) of the amended Law of 10 August 1991 on the profession of avocat, réviseur d’entreprises (statutory  
auditor), réviseur d’entreprises agréé (approved statutory auditor) or accountant”.  
305 Law of 23 July 2016 concerning the audit profession.  
306 Law of 10 August 1991: List I lawyers defined as lawyers at the Court (avocat à la Cour) who are fully qualified Luxembourg  
lawyers; List IV lawyers defined as EU admitted lawyers (avocat de l‘UE exerçant sous son titre d’orgine) who are foreign lawyers  
from the European Union practising under their original professional title.  
307 These other professions have business associations Association luxembourgeoise des centres d’affaires (ALCA) and Institut  
luxembourgeois des administrateurs (ILA) but membership is optional and these associations are not SRBs.  
134  
                     
As noted in the 2020 NRA, the nature of the services offered may also differ significantly between different  
types of professionals. The nature of domiciliation services performed by asset managers differs from  
those of specialised PFSs (i.e., the former focusing on the creation of special purpose vehicles to separate  
investments from client assets). Investment Fund managers only provide domiciliation services to entities  
linked to them. They do not provide third-party domiciliation. Similarly, PSAs can only provide  
domiciliation services to insurance undertakings under the CAA supervision or to companies belonging to  
the same group as the latter.  
In addition, while many professions can offer TCSP activities, not all of them do so in practice (some only  
offer or conduct a subset of activities). As shown in the Insight Box below, even though (approved)  
statutory auditors are legally authorised to conduct TCSP activities, only a minor share does so in practice.  
Insight Box 15: TCSP acꢀviꢀes provided by IRE members  
The activity of the IRE’s members is predominantly focused on audit and assurance services. Some IRE  
members may provide TCSP activities presenting higher risks from an ML perspective. In order to gain  
a better understanding of the nature and extent of those activities, the IRE included specific questions  
in their annual risk-based approach questionnaire (RBA questionnaire).  
Table 27: Breakdown of TCSP services offered by the audit profession (2023 RBA Quesꢀonnaire  
data)  
Services rendered by IRE members  
Number of clients for which Turnover generated by  
those services were rendered (% these services (% for the  
for the audit profession)  
audit profession)  
Incorporation of companies and trusts308  
Board of Directors’ mandates  
Domiciliation services  
0,62%  
0,20%  
0,59%  
<0,83%  
Companies’ management and services 0%  
rendered to trusts or fiduciaries  
Carrying shareholder  
0%  
Considering the figures above, among the IRE members that perform TCSP activities, most of them offer  
domiciliation services and assistance for the setting-up of companies including assistance provided for  
licensing or registering companies with authorities. Nevertheless, the extent (number of clients  
serviced and turnover generated) is very limited.  
The Insight Box below provides a detailed view about TCSPs activities conducted by OEC members.  
308 Including the assistance for the setting-up of companies, the assistance provided for licensing or registering companies with  
authorities.  
135  
     
Insight Box 16: TCSP acꢀviꢀes provided by OEC member firms  
While some OEC member firms might also offer TCSP services, their number is relatively small as shown  
in the table below (2024 RBA questionnaire regarding 2023 data).  
Table 28: Breakdown of TCSP services offered by OEC member firms  
% of turnover  
% performing  
Services rendered by OEC member firms  
Not  
applicable  
this activity  
>75%  
10–75%  
<10%  
Company formaꢀon services or other legal  
enꢀty services  
29,41%  
0%  
0,71%  
10,35% 88,94%  
Director or a similar funcꢀon in respect to  
other legal enꢀꢀes  
36%  
1,88%  
9,41%  
16,94% 71,76%  
Domiciliaꢀon without director’s mandate  
Domiciliaꢀon with director’s mandate  
Office rental-business centre  
Fiduciary contracts  
41,41%  
33,65%  
17,65%  
0,24%  
0%  
7,53%  
6,82%  
3,29%  
0%  
22,59% 69,88%  
19,29% 73,65%  
10,59% 85,65%  
0,24%  
0,47%  
0%  
0%  
100%  
Trustee in an express trust  
0,71%  
0,71%  
0,24%  
0%  
0%  
0%  
0,24%  
0%  
99,53%  
100%  
Other309  
Given the relatively low number of sole practitioners offering TCSP services, the table above only  
highlights the respondent firms providing TCSP services. At first glance, domiciliation services seem to  
be the most prevalent TCSP offering; however, for the firms who do provide this service, the revenue  
generated from it is relatively minor, often representing less than 10% of their total turnover. CPA firms  
generally do not provide TCSP activities as a stand-alone service, but rather in combination with core  
CPA activities, which provides them broader oversight of their clients’ activities.  
The following table provides an overview of the TCSP landscape in Luxembourg.  
309 For instance, equivalent function (as fiduciary or trustee) in a similar structure, etc.  
136  
     
Table 29: TCSPs – Overview of professions performing TCSP acꢀviꢀes, 2023  
TCSP activity that may be performed (as defined in the 2004 AML/CFT Law)  
Supervisor  
CSSF  
Professionals  
Sector size: # of  
entities310  
Sector size: # of entities  
offering TCSP services  
Directorship  
and secretarial  
Incorporation  
Domiciliation  
Fiducie/trust311  
Banks and credit institutions  
Investment firms  
120  
92  
28  
13  
2
Investment Fund managers  
1 212  
Regulated Securitisation  
undertakings317  
2
Specialised PFSs: Professionals  
providing company incorporation and  
management services  
Specialised PFSs: Corporate  
domiciliation agents  
310 Where no disctinction can be made between professionals that do and those that do not perform TCSP activities, this number reflects the total number of professionals in the  
sub-sector as indicated in section 6; otherwise, it is specified.  
311 Acting as, or arranging for another person to act as a fiduciaire in a fiducie, a trustee of an express trust or an equivalent function in a similar legal arrangement.  
312 An investment firm must hold a “Professionals providing company incorporation and management services” license to provide incorporation services.  
313 An investment firm must hold a “Professionals providing company incorporation and management services” license, a “Domiciliation agent” license or a “Family Office” license  
to provide directorship and secretarial services.  
314 An investment firm must hold a “Domiciliation agent” license to provide domiciliation services.  
315 Only for entities which are related to them (e.g. Special Purpose Vehicle for Private equity funds). No third party domiciliation.  
316 The Management companies only provide domiciliation services to entities linked to them. No third party domiciliation.  
317 Undertakings when they perform TCSP activities (refer to Art. 2(1) 6b) of the 2004 AML/CFT Law).  
318 Including all entities under the AML/CFT supervision of the Specialised PFS department.  
319 Including one support PFS providing TCSP services.  
320 Specialised PFSs are authorised to provide trust services, but cannot act as fiducie under Law of 27 July 2003 on Fiducies and Trusts, Art. 4.  
321 Specialised PFSs are authorised to provide trust services, but cannot act as fiducie under Law of 27 July 2003 on Fiducies and Trusts, Art. 4.  
137  
                         
TCSP activity that may be performed (as defined in the 2004 AML/CFT Law)  
Supervisor  
Professionals  
Sector size: # of  
entities310  
Sector size: # of entities  
offering TCSP services  
Directorship  
and secretarial  
Incorporation  
Domiciliation  
Fiducie/trust311  
Specialised PFSs: Family offices  
CAA  
OEC  
IRE  
PSAs  
26  
1 232  
66  
13  
CPAs  
382  
Audit firms  
Sole practitioners  
13  
8
Lawyers  
3 296 (OAL)  
758 (OAL)  
66  
OAL/OAD  
AED  
Lawyers’ offices  
Business centres  
Professional directors  
98  
66  
220-230  
220-230  
322 A Family Office must also hold a “Professionals providing company incorporation and management services” to provide incorporation services.  
323 A Family Office must also hold a “Domiciliation agent” license to provide domiciliation services.  
324 Specialised PFSs are authorised to provide trust services, but cannot act as fiducie under Law of 27 July 2003 on Fiducies and Trusts, Art. 4.  
325 Based on annual declarations as at December 31, 2023.  
326 Note that in practice this activity is not provided, as reported in Table 27.  
327 Based on annual declarations as at December 31, 2023.  
328 Can assist clients being fiduciaries or managing a fiducie themselves.  
138  
             
In order to have a more granular view of the risks stemming from services provided by TCSPs, the following  
sub-sections provide a more granular analysis on the different types of services.  
6.6.1.1.  
Incorporaꢀon services  
Professionals that provide services to third parties relating to the formation of companies or any other  
legal person are considered to provide incorporation services.  
As noted in the Concealment of Beneficial Ownership joint report of FATF and the Egmont Group329  
,
criminals often misuse legal persons as a vehicle to hide the origin of their funds or/and their real identity.  
Under Luxembourg’s law, there is no requirement for a TCSP to be directly involved in a company’s  
incorporation. The nature of ML risks relating to the provision of these services is related to the ways in  
which a criminal may abuse or misuse this service to set up a complex network of structures that permits  
the concealment of their identity and the source of the funds.  
As noted previously in 6.4.2, around two thirds of all Luxembourg legal persons were registered by notarial  
deed during the observation period of this analysis. Regardless of whether the transactions were prepared  
by other professionals (such as TCSPs), the scope and the rationale of the AML/CFT checks carried out by  
the Luxembourg notaries do not change. Indeed, professionals subject to the 2004 AML/CFT Law are  
required to perform CDD and BO controls in an independent manner and they should not rely on  
information conveyed by other professionals. This decreases ML risks related to incorporation services to  
some extent.  
Insight Box 17: CSSF enꢀꢀes providing incorporaꢀon services  
As of 31 December 2023, incorporation services were provided by the following CSSF supervised  
entities:  
6 out of 120 banks (5%);  
58 out of 100 specialised PFS (58%);  
5 out of 92 investment firms (5%); and  
92 out of 1 212 Investment Fund managers (8%) offer incorporation services.  
6.6.1.2.Directorship and secretarial services  
Secretarial services are typically less vulnerable to ML. They generally involve the execution of back-office  
activities that have limited overlap with actions typically carried out with the purpose of laundering illicit  
funds. Nevertheless, clients maintain responsibility over decisions and actions executed by the structure.  
As such, clients or their BOs will be recorded as the originator or approver of decisions, hence limiting the  
opportunities to conceal their identity. Therefore, potential for administration services to be abused or  
misused for ML purposes is limited, compared to setup and management services. Still, while relatively  
329  
Egmont-FATF Joint Report, Concealment of Beneficial Ownership, 2018. See section 1 for an overview and section 3 with  
regards to incorporation services, particularly paragraphs 121 to 125, 130 to 135, 141 to 145 and 152 to 156, link.  
139  
     
limited, there may be instances, such as the use of administrative services to give substance to the  
company, in which criminals are able to abuse or misuse administration services provided by TCSPs330  
.
As stated in the 2022 LPs/LAs VRA any appointed director (natural or legal persons acting on its own  
account or on behalf of a client) must be registered with the RCS331. As a consequence, the registered  
director is fully liable under Luxembourg civil and criminal law, and thus has the incentive to ensure an  
appropriate level of controls are applied over actions and transactions they are approving. This drastically  
reduces the level of exposure to ML risk.  
Insight Box 18: CSSF enꢀꢀes providing directorship and secretarial services  
As of 31 December 2023, the following CSSF supervised entities offered directorship and secretarial  
services:  
17 out of 120 banks (14%);  
74 out of 100 specialised PFS (74%);  
9 out of 92 investment firms (10%); and  
139 out of 1 212 Investment Fund managers (11%).  
6.6.1.3.Domiciliaꢀon services  
Whereas the 2004 AML/CFT Law defines a range of professionals that can carry out TCSP activities, the  
activity of domiciliation services is further regulated by the 1999 Domiciliation Law. More precisely, this  
law allows a company (the “domiciled company”) to establish a seat (a registered office) with a third party  
(the “domiciliation agent”) in order to carry out an activity within the framework of the domiciled  
company’s corporate purpose. The same law states that the domiciliation agent may also provide other  
services related to the activity of the domiciled company (the “domiciliation services”). Finally, the law  
requires that the domiciled company and the domiciliation agent should conclude a written agreement  
called a domiciliation contract.  
As such, domiciliation services are a type of business that provides third parties with a seat and ancillary  
services (directorship services, corporate secretariat, accounting services, holding of general meetings,  
provision of office space, etc.) for a company.  
Domiciliation services respond to a broad number of needs and they are often used together with other  
corporate services. For instance, TCSPs may offer domiciliation services complementing their specialised  
advice services in legal, commercial and tax matters. Furthermore, not all companies may find it cost  
effective to own or rent private premises. A company can therefore be “domiciled” at a lower cost on the  
premises of a domiciliation agent.  
However, this particular possibility for establishing a registered office is not suitable for operational  
companies with a commercial, craft or industrial activity. Indeed, any operational company established in  
Luxembourg is required to obtain a business license from the MoE in accordance with the Law of 2  
330 MoJ, National risk assessment on money laundering and terrorist financing, 2020, link.  
331 MoJ, Legal persons and legal arrangements ML/TF vertical risk assessment, 2022, link.  
140  
     
September 2011 regulating the access to different professions of craftsman, trader, industrialist, as well  
as to certain liberal professions (2011 Business Licenses Law), which specifically states that domiciliation  
within the meaning of the 1999 Domiciliation Law does not constitute an establishment332, and therefore  
cannot use such domiciliation services.  
Pursuant to articles 100-2 and 1300-2 of the Law of 10 August 1915 (1915 Companies Law), domiciled  
companies (provided the domiciliation contract offers a registered office to the company) must make key  
decisions (e.g. strategic, financial or investment) in Luxembourg. Furthermore, pursuant to article 100-2  
of the 1915 Companies Law, the domicile of a company is located at its central administration.  
The 1999 Domiciliation Law is strict and only allows registered members of one of the following regulated  
professions established in Luxembourg to act as a domiciliation agent of companies: a credit institution  
or another professional of the financial sector and the insurance sector, a lawyer at the Court (avocat à la  
Cour) registered with List I and a European lawyer practising under the professional title of their home  
country registered with List IV, an (approved) statutory auditor or a CPA.  
The IRE and the OEC require (approved) statutory auditors and CPAs to perform at least one of the  
following services, as required by professional standards, should they provide domiciliation services to  
another company:  
bookkeeping;  
preparaꢀon of financial statements and/or consolidated accounts;  
preparaꢀon of tax returns;  
mandate of Commissaire according to arꢀcle 443-2 of the 1915 Companies Law; or  
directorship services.  
In such situaꢀons, these TCSPs are registered as directors or managers at the RCS and thus become liable  
under the 1915 Companies Law, as well as under civil and criminal law (cf. secꢀon 6.6.1.2).  
Furthermore, the CSSF for example issued different circulars dealing, amongst others, with the  
professional obligaꢀons of domiciliaꢀon agents, the minimum content required for a domiciliaꢀon  
agreement and precisions concerning the concept of “seat”333  
.
All persons who can carry out domiciliaꢀon of companies are subject to the 2004 AML/CFT Law. As such,  
domiciliaꢀon agents are required to strictly comply with all the obligaꢀons set out in said law (e.g.  
idenꢀficaꢀon of the client, applicaꢀon of a risk-based approach). The supervisory authoriꢀes and SRBs are  
responsible for verifying whether the professionals under their supervision comply with these obligaꢀons.  
Pursuant to article 2 of the 1999 Domiciliation Law and as already touched on before, any person  
exercising the profession of domiciliation agent is subject to a number of obligations. For example,  
332 2011 Business Licenses Law, article 5.  
333  
CSSF, Circular CSSF 01/47 on Professional obligations of domiciliation agents of companies and general recommendations,  
amending Circular CSSF 01/28, 2001, link, Circular CSSF 02/65 on Law of 31 May 1999 governing the domiciliation of companies,  
precisions as regards to the concept of “seat”, 2002, link. Communiqué: Domiciliation activity exercised when operating a business  
centre or a co-working space, 2021, link.  
141  
   
domiciliation agents must ensure that the domiciled company complies with the provisions of the 1915  
Companies Law. Failure to comply with their obligations carries criminal sanctions. Article 4 of the 1999  
Domiciliation Law provides for criminal penalties which include imprisonment ranging from eight days up  
to five years and a fine of between EUR 1 250 and EUR 12 000.  
Insight Box 19: OAL 2021 study on TCSP acꢀviꢀes among their members  
The OAL published in September 2021 a detailed analysis of the TCSP activities performed by their  
members (data extracted from the off-site AML/CFT inspection in December 2020). The analysis  
revealed that TCSP activities accounted for less than 5% of their members’ activities, with most of them  
providing domiciliation services.  
With regard to domiciliation activities, 146 members stated that they performed such activities. More  
precisely,  
66% of them indicated that they perform these services for less than 10 clients (i.e., legal  
persons);  
22% of them indicated that they perform these services for 11 to 25 clients (i.e., legal persons);  
8% of them indicated that they perform these services for 26 to 50 clients (i.e., legal persons);  
and  
4% of them indicated that they perform these services for more than 50 clients (i.e., legal  
persons) with only one lawyer stating that he domiciled more than 100 clients.  
The analysis concluded that the share of the members’ turnover related to domiciliation activities was  
rather limited. More precisely:  
45% stated that the turnover related to these activities did not reach EUR 10 000;  
33% stated that the turnover related to these activities was situated between EUR 10 000 and  
EUR 50 000;  
9% stated that the turnover related to these activities was situated between EUR 50 000 and  
EUR 100 000;  
7,5% stated that the turnover related to these activities was situated between EUR 100 000  
and EUR 200 000; and  
5,5% stated that the turnover related to these activities exceeded EUR 200 000.  
Based on the analysis performed, the OAL concluded that TCSP activities were rather limited and that  
domiciliation services provided were generally overestimated. As revealed in the OAL annual AML/CFT  
questionnaires, the number of lawyers offering such services is decreasing.  
The complete study can be found on the OAL’s website (barreau.lu): link  
142  
 
6.6.1.4.Nominee shareholder services  
As the FATF explains in its Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Trusts and Company Service Providers334  
,
a nominee shareholder is a “[…] natural or legal person who is officially recorded in the Register of  
members (shareholder) of a company as the holder of a certain number of specified shares, which are  
held on behalf of another person who is the beneficial owner”335  
.
Generally, the role of the nominee shareholder is to legiꢀmately protect the idenꢀty of the BO and/or the  
controller of a company or asset. From a transparency standpoint, the involvement of nominee  
shareholders may contribute to obfuscate the idenꢀty of the BOs or, in excepꢀonal cases, be used to  
circumvent jurisdicꢀonal controls on company ownership336  
.
The Anglo-Saxon concept of “nominee shareholder” does not exist in Luxembourg civil and commercial  
.
6.6.1.5. Acꢀng as a fiduciaire in a fiducie or as a trustee in a trust  
The use of professional intermediaries or TCSPs is considered a key feature of the ML and broader  
organised crime environment339. As for professionals providing directorship or secretarial services, TCSPs  
acting as a fiduciaire in a fiducie or as a trustee in a trust might, un- or wittingly, be abused by criminals.  
Furthermore, the 2022 LPs/LAs VRA assessed both the inherent and residual risk of legal arrangements  
(and more specifically of fiducies) as “Very high”340.  
Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that Luxembourg requires fiduciaries and trustees, as defined in the  
Law of 10 July establishing a Register of Fiducies and Trusts (2020 RFT Law), to obtain and keep at the  
place of administration of the express trust or fiducie, information on the BOs of any express trust  
administered in Luxembourg and of any fiducie for which they act as trustee or fiduciaire (article 2 of the  
2020 RFT Law). On top of this requirement, article 13 of the 2020 RFT Law requires every fiducie or express  
trust of which a trustee or fiduciaire is established or resides in Luxembourg to submit detailed  
information on all BOs to the RFT. This register is maintained by the AED. The registration requirement  
also extends to legal arrangements whose trustees or fiduciaires are not established in Luxembourg or in  
any other EU Member State, but who enter into a business relationship or who acquire real estate in the  
334 FATF, TCSP Guidance, 2019, link.  
335 FATF, TCSP Guidance, 2019, paragraph 198, link.  
336 Egmont-FATF Joint Report, Concealment of Beneficial Ownership, 2018, paragraph 5, link.  
337 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Luxembourg 2019 (Second Round), 2019,  
paragraph 61, link.  
338 While the term of “nominee investor” is used by some professionals in the collective investment sector, the more adequate  
terminology would be “intermediated position”/ “intermediaries”/ “omnibus accounts”/“segregated accounts”, in line with/as  
detailed in the FATF RBA Guidance on the Securities Sector published in October 2018. To be noted that the main rationale for  
using such intermediaries in the collective investments sector is twofold. First, the dilution of transaction fees and second, to  
grant a larger access to investment products for retail investors. Moreover, professionals must assess the quality of the AML/CFT  
framework of the “intermediary” and the latter must in turn apply adequate due diligence on the investor. In addition, specific  
enhanced mitigation measures on cross-border intermediaries’ relationships are applied by CSSF supervised Luxembourg  
investment funds or their delegates. Thus, the use of “intermediaries” is a common practice to enable economies of scale within  
the retail sub-sector.  
339 Egmont-FATF Joint Report, Concealment of Beneficial Ownership, 2018, link.  
340 MoJ, Legal persons and legal arrangements ML/TF vertical risk assessment, 2022, link.  
143  
             
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg. For the legal arrangements that have a fiduciaire or a trustee registered in  
an EU Member State, they must provide the AED with an equivalent registration certificate or an extract  
of the BO information kept in a comparable registry.  
In order to make sure that the RFT’s information is up-to-date, the 2020 RFT Law foresees that the  
professionals and persons who have access to the registry shall report any discrepancies found between  
the data in the RFT and the information in their own records to the AED.  
The RFT went live during the second half of 2020. By 31 December 2024, 4 838 trusts and fiducies (out of  
which 2 894 were active at that date) had registered their BO information341. As stated in section 6.5.2,  
the population process is ongoing and dynamic as legal arrangements are subject to multiple revisions  
throughout their life cycle. The regular number of legal arrangements registered and ceased evidence that  
users are well informed about their obligations.  
Pursuant to the 2020 RFT Law, the AED has the power to order fiduciaries and trustees to register or  
update their information. The relevant supervisory authority or SRB can monitor whether the  
professionals acting as a trustee or fiduciaire are accurately reporting to the RFT. The AED has the capacity  
to refuse a registration when it is not complete or accurate and the trustee or fiduciaire has up to 15 days  
to update the information. Additionally, the AED can monitor the compliance by accessing any document  
related to the fiducie or express trust and by requesting information from the supervisory authorities or  
SRBs. The AED can also instruct the trustee or fiduciaire to update the information held with registry or to  
provide accurate information. When failing to do so, the AED can impose a fine of up to EUR 25 000 for  
non-compliance (article 21 of the 2020 RFT Law).  
As analysed in the 2022 LPs/LAs VRA342, the information gathered by the RFT shows that TCSPs offering  
trust services are mostly legal persons, with the remainder being natural persons (17,5% as of end  
2023343). Additionally, there is a high concentration of legal arrangements managed by TCSPs. Most of  
these TCSPs are either FIs supervised by the CSSF or professionals controlled by an SRB. Either way, these  
actors (i.e. trustees and fiduciaries) must apply robust AML/CFT measures. Consequently, these  
safeguards suggest that the information registered with the RFT is reliable.  
Insight Box 20: Regulated securiꢀsaꢀon vehicles supervised by CSSF  
Regulated securitisation vehicles are securitisation undertakings governed by the Law of 22 March 2004  
on securitisation that issue financial instruments to the public on a continuous basis (more than three  
issues per year) and are then supervised by the CSSF. They fall within the scope of the 2004 AML/CFT  
Law when they perform TCSP activity.  
End of 2023, Luxembourg counted two CSSF regulated securitisation undertakings acting as a fiduciaire  
in a fiducie. AuM of those two regulated securitisation undertakings decreased from EUR 2,4 billion as  
of 31 December 2020 to EUR 1,6 billion as of 31 December 2023 (with a peak AuM amounting to EUR  
341 AED.  
342 MoJ, Legal persons and legal arrangements ML/TF vertical risk assessment, 2022, section 4.4.3.2, link.  
343 Updated data from AED.  
144  
       
3,5 billion in 2021). The market leader accounted for 98% of market share in 2023. Ownership of these  
regulated securitisation undertakings was 100% international, but from European countries (Dutch and  
Swiss).  
Products were mainly distributed in the EU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), but some  
products were also distributed in Asian markets. Targeted investors were retail and institutional  
investors and all regulated securitisation vehicles had a Luxembourgish banking institution providing  
custody for liquid assets and securities, which ensured indirect AML/CFT supervision.  
6.6.2. Cash  
Overall, cash (or euro banknotes) can be (i) used for transactional purposes, (ii) stored domestically and  
(iii) demanded outside the euro area for both transactional and store of value purposes344. In spite of a  
steady growth in non-cash payments and a moderate decline in the use of cash for payments, the total  
value of euro banknotes in circulation worldwide continues to rise year-on-year beyond the rate of  
inflation within the Eurozone. This trend is referred to as “the paradox of banknotes”: the demand for  
euro banknotes has constantly increased while the use of banknotes for retail transactions seems to have  
decreased. According to the European Central Bank (ECB), this seemingly counterintuitive paradox can be  
explained by demand for banknotes as a store of value in the euro area (e.g. euro area citizens holding  
cash savings) coupled with demand for euro banknotes outside the euro area345  
.
Generally, typologies related to cash as identified in the 2020 NRA remained relevant. It is, however, to  
be noted that the ML risks linked to counterfeiting currency is at an historically low level. The total number  
of counterfeit banknotes withdrawn from circulation was 467 000, which means only 16 counterfeits were  
detected in one year per 1 million genuine banknotes in circulation in 2023346. In line with the above,  
Luxembourg ML threats stemming from counterfeiting currency are assessed as “Low” (see section 5).  
6.6.2.1.  
High value banknotes (store of value)  
As shown in the table below, the net issuance in the Eurozone was abnormally high during 2020. The  
COVID-19 pandemic intensified the euro area demand for cash for precautionary purposes (i.e., as a store  
of value), whereas the transactional demand seems to have further decreased347. In 2023, net issuance of  
euro notes has decreased both in Luxembourg and the Eurozone.  
344 Alejandro Zamora-Pérez, The paradox of banknotes : understanding the demand for cash beyond transactional use, 2021, link.  
345 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the  
assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border  
activities, 2022, link.  
346 ECB, Annual report 2023, link.  
347 Alejandro Zamora-Pérez, The paradox of banknotes : understanding the demand for cash beyond transactional use, 2021, link.  
145  
         
Table 30: Annual issuance of euro notes in Luxembourg (LU) and other Eurozone countries  
2018  
+1  
2019  
+0,7  
2020  
+0,36  
+141,8  
2021  
+0,17  
+109,9  
2022  
-0,1  
2023  
-0,1  
-4,8  
Net issuance LU (in EUR billion)  
(values)348  
+60,4  
+61,6  
+27,6  
Eurozone (in EUR  
billion)  
The BCL noted in its 2020 and 2021 annual reports that demand at euro area for high-value bank notes  
has increased considerably, especially with regard to the EUR 200 banknote. More precisely, demand for  
EUR 200 banknotes increased by 34% in the Eurozone in 2021. Nonetheless, this demand has decreased  
slightly since (-2,3% in 2022 in comparison to 2021 and -1% in 2023 in comparison to 2022). Although no  
longer issued since the end of 2018349, the EUR 500 banknote accounted for a significant proporꢀon of the  
value of all banknotes in circulaꢀon in the Eurozone (14,1% in 2020 and 8,5% in 2023) throughout the  
observaꢀon period of this report. In a similar vein, and as noted above, the circulaꢀon of the EUR 200  
banknote has increased and is supposed to replace the EUR 500 banknote350,351. Considering the above, it  
is assumed that a significant amount of cash is being hoarded.  
In this context it should be noted that the Study on the payment aꢂtudes of consumers in the euro area  
(SPACE) of 2024 reports that 43% of the Luxembourg surveyed individuals keep extra cash reserves. This  
is slightly above the euro area average (35%)352.  
In this context, it should also be noted that according to the SPACE of 2024, Luxembourg residents had  
the highest amount of cash in their wallet (median of EUR 82) among the surveyed individuals.  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that this amount has decreased as well, as SPACE of 2022 reported that  
Luxembourg surveyed individuals reported more than EUR 110 cash in their wallets.  
Importantly, SPACE of 2024 also indicates that 69% of the surveyed Luxembourg residents reported that  
cards or other cashless payments are their preferred payment instrument whereas 13% indicated having  
a preference for cash, the lowest percentage in the Euro zone after Finland.  
The SPACE of 2024 observed that cash payments are most of the times made in case of low-value  
transactions. More than 60% of payments below EUR 5 were made in cash while only 27% of transactions  
above EUR 100 were paid in cash in the Eurozone in 2021353.  
348 BCL, Rapport Annuel, 2018-2021, link with being the difference of net issuance of year N and the net issuance of year N-1.  
349 ECB, ECB ends production and issuance of €500 banknote (press article: May 4, 2016), link.  
350 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the  
assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border  
activities, 2022, link.  
351 BCL, Rapport Annuel, 2021, link.  
352 ECB, Study on the payment attitudes of consumers in the euro area (SPACE) – 2024, link. Note that surveys with Luxembourg  
individuals took place in the second half of 2023 and the first half of 2024.  
353 ECB, Study on the payment attitudes of consumers in the euro area (SPACE) – 2024, link.  
146  
             
Concerning high denomination banknotes, the 2022 SNRA concludes that related ML risks were “Very  
high”354 (cf. section 6.6.2.4). The 2022 SNRA notes that perpetrators could misuse these banknotes to  
make cash transportation easier as the larger the denominations, the more funds can be shrunk to take  
up less space. In addition, the 2020 SNRA describes a scenario where counterfeit euro banknotes are sold  
via online platforms. Although not in relation with counterfeit currency, the following case study describes  
how individuals may try to abuse even central bank services to introduce banknotes of illicit origine into  
circulation.  
Case study 15: Reimbursement of damaged banknotes355  
In 2019 a first person handed in 15 damaged €200 banknotes to the BCL public counter for  
reimbursement (EUR 3 000). Then in 2020, a second person first handed in 2 damaged €200 banknotes,  
and a few days later deposited 24 €100 banknotes and 11 €200 banknotes. This second person's total  
deposit amounted to EUR 5 000.  
In accordance with BCL’s procedures for AML and for banknote exchange or refund requests, the two  
depositors were asked to provide explanaꢀons as to the economic origin of the funds and the  
circumstances that had damaged the notes. Aſter several tedious exchanges with the depositors, the  
explanaꢀons given by the two depositors as to the economic origin and causes of the deterioraꢀon of  
the notes remained unconvincing. In parꢀcular, the damage to the deposited banknotes raised serious  
doubts. These suggested that all the banknotes deposited were linked to the case of the so-called  
“Libyan” banknotes stolen by terrorist groups from the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank  
of Libya. This suspicion was confirmed by an analysis of the notes. Both cases were reported to the CRF  
and to the State Prosecutor.  
In 2024, the depositors were convicted of money laundering, one to a six-month suspended prison  
sentence and a fine of EUR 4 000, sentences upheld on appeal, and the second to a fine of EUR 2 500.  
The courts ordered the definiꢀve confiscaꢀon of the banknotes seized.  
6.6.2.2.  
Payments in cash (transacꢀonal)  
Data from the BCL on the value and location of ATM withdrawals from Luxembourg accounts suggests  
that the total value of ATM withdrawals performed has increased between 2020 and 2023. Whereas the  
total value of ATM withdrawals reached EUR 3,355 billion in 2020, withdrawn amounts on ATMs rose by  
14% in 2023, reaching EUR 3,821 billion. As depicted in the graph below, the majority of withdrawals were  
performed on machines located in Luxembourg (60%). Withdrawals from other European countries  
remained considerable (about 35%). Furthermore, withdrawals in non-EU countries accounted for the  
least significant share (about 5%), although this proportion has slightly increased during the observation  
period of this report.  
354 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on  
the assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border  
activities, 2022, link.  
355 Case study provided by the BCL.  
147  
     
Figure 28: Locaꢀon of ATM withdrawals from Luxembourg accounts (value of withdrawals), 2020 –  
2023, BCL data  
100%  
90%  
80%  
70%  
60%  
50%  
40%  
30%  
20%  
10%  
0%  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
LU  
non-EU countries  
other EU countries (excl. LU, FR, DE, BE)  
FR  
DE  
BE  
Taking a closer look at the geographic distribution of ATM withdrawals performed in EU and non-EU  
countries, it seems that withdrawals occurring in foreign countries remain quite concentrated around  
Luxembourg’s neighbouring countries. Other relevant EU countries are for instance Portugal, Austria, Italy  
and Spain (among the 7% of total ATM withdrawals in “other EU countries”, these countries accounted  
for 80% of these withdrawals in 2023). Withdrawals in non-EU countries occurred predominantly in the  
UK, Switzerland, and Türkiye. Nonetheless, fragmentation within this category was higher as these 3  
countries represented 22% of total withdrawals within this category in 2023.  
Overall it seems that the geographical distribution of these ATM withdrawals is in line with Luxembourg’s  
geographical context, demographic structure (see section 3) and Luxembourg’s residents frequented  
travel (leisure and business) countries356.  
6.6.2.3.  
Cash-intensive businesses  
The 2022 SNRA notes that cash-intensive businesses may be abused by criminals to launder large amounts  
of cash that are proceeds of crime by jusꢀfying its origin from (ficꢀꢀous) economic acꢀviꢀes357  
.
356 STATEC, Tourisme en chiffres – édition 2024, link.  
357 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the  
assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border  
activities, 2022, link.  
148  
     
Globally, money remiꢁance providers, dealers in goods and casinos have, amongst others, tradiꢀonally  
been exposed to ML risks associated with cash due to specific characterisꢀcs of the sector (e.g. being cash-  
intensive).  
Casinos and other enꢀꢀes associated with gambling are typically also cash-intensive, oſten operaꢀng 24  
hours per day with high volumes of large cash transacꢀons taking place very quickly. However, in  
Luxembourg there is only one casino (operaꢀng from 10 am to 3 am, respecꢀvely 4 am during the  
weekend) and other gambling acꢀviꢀes are deemed low risk (cf. secꢀon 6.3.4).  
As noted under secꢀon 6.3.3, key risks with regard to product and services by these professionals is the  
cash usage in the sector (although it should be noted that it has generally declined, see for instance  
Case study 16: Cash payment  
The case started with a traffic offence commiꢁed by the driver of a luxurious Italian car. During the  
preliminary invesꢀgaꢀon, the State Prosecutor found out that the car had been acquired and paid for  
by a French company, whose BO was the driver’s wife. The suspicion of abuse of company assets was  
referred to the French authoriꢀes and to the AED. In this respect, the AED carried out an in-depth  
inspecꢀon of the car dealership and discovered suspect cash transacꢀons, which it reported back to the  
State Prosecutor.  
Based on the AED’s findings, the State Prosecutor opened a preliminary invesꢀgaꢀon against the car  
dealership. It came out that the car had been purchased, in July 2014, by a local businessman for  
EUR 49 500. In order to negoꢀate a beꢁer price (EUR 48 000), the businessman paid EUR 48 000 in cash.  
Despite the fact that the amount of EUR 48 000 was paid in a single instalment, it was recorded in the  
cash book as five successive payments of amounts ranging from EUR 8 000 to EUR 10 000, each below  
the threshold defined by the 2004 AML/CFT Law.  
When interviewed, the managing director explained that the employees of the car dealership had not  
received any AML/CFT training but were only given documentaꢀon from the Chamber of Commerce on  
the fight against ML. The managing director further admiꢁed that there were no internal AML/CFT  
procedures in place. He explained that his father accepted the EUR 48 000 in cash and presented him  
with the fait accompli. He acknowledged that, at the ꢀme of the facts, he was the sole managing director  
of the car dealership. The statements made by the defendant also showed that the car dealership no  
longer accepted cash payments exceeding EUR 15 000 and that customers making cash payments must  
provide a proof of their idenꢀty.  
Both the legal enꢀty operaꢀng the car dealership and the managing director were convicted by the  
District Court for misdemeanour maꢁers. The legal enꢀty was sentenced to a fine of EUR 5 000 and its  
director to a fine of EUR 2 500. As the AED had already applied an administraꢀve sancꢀon, the District  
Court declared that, in this specific context, the principle of non bis in idem did not apply, leading to the  
conclusion that criminal and administraꢀve sancꢀons can coexist. The decision is final.  
149  
 
6.6.2.4.  
Cash couriers  
As noted in the 2022 SNRA, criminals who generated cash proceeds usually seek to aggregate and move  
these ill-gotten gains from their source by either repatriating or moving them to locations where access  
to placement is easier. Cash can be transported by a courier (i.e. “accompanied” cash) or by a post parcel  
service (i.e. “unaccompanied” cash). Overall, the physical transportation of cash is estimated to be one of  
the oldest and most basic forms of ML.  
As noted above, high value bank notes make cash transportation easier as the larger the denominations,  
the more funds can be shrunk to take up less space. Couriers may use road, rail or air transport to move  
those funds cross-border. In addition, criminals may use sophisticated concealment methods of cash (for  
example, cash that is hidden within goods).  
The 2022 SNRA further notes that cash smuggling may occur at other stages and is also used by non-cash  
generating offences. For example, CEF make use of money mules to receive and withdraw sums  
fraudulently obtained from victims’ bank accounts in cash (cf. see section 5). These funds are thereafter  
sent via wire transfer to other jurisdictions where they are collected in cash by a select number of  
individuals, likely for onward transportation. Nevertheless, the 2022 SNRA concludes that drug trafficking  
is supposed to be the most relevant crime area with regard to illicit cash movements.  
During the observation period, the ADA detected 34 infringements in the context of its cash controls.  
Considering the limited size of the country and its geographical position (i.e., in the middle of Europe),  
detected cash flows were most of the times in transit (25 cases).  
Figure 29: Nature of cash flows in the context of infringements established by ADA, 2020 - 2023  
3
1
LU transit country  
5
LU destination country  
LU destination country and country  
of residence of the perpetrator  
LU country of residence of the  
perpetrator  
25  
All Member States of the EU reported over 8 700 infringements with respect to cash declarations between  
June 2023 and June 2024, respectively over 8 100 between June 2022 and June 2023. Associated values  
amount to EUR 199 000 and EUR 220 450 000 respectively. Taking into consideration the number and the  
150  
   
amounts related to infractions to the law on entering and leaving the EU, it seems that the average  
amount of cash related to infringements was situated between EUR 20 000 and EUR 30 000 in these two  
years358. In Luxembourg, the average amount of ADA interceptions amounted to EUR 34 000 in 2023.  
6.7. Emerging and evolving vulnerabiliꢀes  
6.7.1. Crowdfunding  
Crowdfunding is an alternative form of financing that connects those who can give, lend or invest money  
directly with those who need financing for a specific project. It usually refers to public online calls to  
contribute to the financing of specific projects. Several crowdfunding models have emerged within the EU  
over the past couple of years, such as the donation-based, lending-based, investment-based, or reward-  
based crowdfunding359  
.
The vast majority of crowdfunding activities is legitimate and a licit way of gathering funds from masses  
of people. However, it has been globally observed that these platforms could be exposed to ML risks.  
According to the 2022 SNRA, ML risks linked to crowdfunding activities varied in accordance with the  
models employed by the platforms. For instance, crowdfunding platforms focusing on activities that  
collect funds for later onward transmission (and are thus stored on the investor’s account) are particularly  
vulnerable for ML abuse. Lending and securities platforms are considered to have a higher inherent risk  
than donations platforms, as they allow to raise larger amounts360  
.
The 2022 SNRA further indicates that the risks with regard to crowdfunding platforms rise if those  
platforms allow the use of virtual currencies or (anonymous) electronic money. Furthermore, risks may  
also vary depending on whether the platform is directly linked to a FI or left to private initiatives on the  
web. In this case, they would fall out of the scope of the AML/CFT framework. The complexity linked to  
crowdfunding services (cross-border nature of transactions, number of people and intermediaries  
involved) further increases ML risks.  
The European Commission adopted Regulation (EU) 2020/1503 of the European Parliament and of the  
Council of 7 October 2020 on European Crowdfunding Service Providers for business and, since 10  
November 2021, the provision of investment and lending-based crowdfunding services from Luxembourg  
is subject to the procurement of a license as a European Crowdfunding Service Provider (ECSP), which  
thus entails falling under the prudential supervision of the CSSF. This regulation requires all payments to  
be carried through an authorised Payment Service Provider (PSP) and introduces other safeguards to  
mitigate some of the risks. Nevertheless, this regulation does not apply to all crowdfunding models.  
Donation- or reward-based platforms do not fall under the above-mentioned regulation. Furthermore,  
358  
Cash Controls Statistical Data 3 June 2022-2 June 2023 (inclusive) according to Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 on  
controls on cash entering or leaving the Union, link and Cash Controls Statistical Data 3 June 2023-2 June 2024 (inclusive)  
according to Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 on controls on cash entering or leaving the Union, link.  
359 CSSF, Crowdfunding service providers, link.  
360 European Commission, [Working Document] - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the  
assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border  
activities, 2022, link  
151  
         
the regulation only applies to crowdfunding services provided to non-consumer project owners and to  
offers which do not exceed EUR 5 million calculated over a period of twelve months. In Luxembourg, no  
entity has been granted a license as an ECSP yet. Should an ECSP intend to provide payment services in  
addition to the crowdfunding services, a separate licence under the Law of 10 November 2009 on payment  
services may be required361  
.
In Luxembourg, the most significant ML risks with regard to crowdfunding platforms stem from financial  
services offered to global crowdfunding platforms. While the overall crowdfunding market in Luxembourg  
is considerable (the market volume has been estimated at between USD 10 million and USD 100 million  
in 2019362), a significant part of global crowdfunding uses payment methods such as bank transfers, credit  
and debit cards, and internet payment services363. Luxembourg banks, PIs and EMIs offer such services to  
other professionals abroad. However, only one bank was offering this service as of 31 December 2023364  
,
as was also one MVTS provider (which concerned only very few platforms). In this context, it is also  
important to note that this latter professional reviewed its strategy and has dwindled its client-base in  
order to focus on “high-quality platforms”.  
6.7.2. Hawala and other service providers  
Although there is no evidence that hawala and other similar service providers (HOSSPs) operate in  
Luxembourg, the following section describes and illustrates the purpose and function of these providers.  
Hawala payments are informal funds’ transfers that are made without the involvement of authorised FIs.  
In principle, the money does not physically move from the payer to the payee. Instead, as is also often the  
case for money remittances, the transfer is done by offsetting balances between the hawaladar (those  
that operate hawala) of the payer and the hawaladar of the payee. The term HOSSPs is often used to  
describe a number of different informal value transfer systems which have similar properties and operate  
in similar ways, although they are not strictly hawala.  
Insight Box 21: Hawala – illustraꢀon  
A hawaladar from country A (HA) receives funds in one value (cryptocurrency, gold, goods, etc.) from  
the payer and, in return, gives the payer a code for authentication purposes. He then instructs his  
counterpart in country B (HB) to deliver an equivalent amount in the local currency to a designated  
beneficiary, who must disclose the code to receive the funds. After the remittance, HA has a liability to  
HB, and the settlement of their positions is made by various means, either financial or goods and  
services.  
HOSSPs are not only cheaper (with margins as low as 1% for international transfers), but also quicker than  
transactions in the regular financial system. In addition, customers do not need to prove their identity or  
361 CSSF, Crowdfunding service providers, link.  
362 Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, The 2nd Global Alternative Finance Market Benchmark report, 2021.  
363  
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and Middle East and North Africa FATF (MENAFATF), Social Media and Terrorist  
Financing, 2019.  
364 Information provided by the CSSF.  
152  
           
give reasons for why the money is being sent. This explains why it is essential in countries where large  
parts of the population do not have identity documents. In countries where access to basic financial  
services (such as a bank account) is limited, HOSSPs often enable people to send or receive legitimate  
remittances.  
At the same time, the implementation of stricter AML/CFT regulations in mainstream FIs has also made  
informal value transfer systems and HOSSPs increasingly attractive to organised crime groups, who  
frequently use them to transfer illegitimate remittances, i.e. transfer large amounts of criminal proceeds  
or to launder such criminal proceeds, providing layering and remittance services. The opacity provided by  
HOSSPs is another key risk driver with regard to ML. As there are no direct money/value flows between  
sender and receiver, tracing the money/value flow is a challenge.  
6.8. Unintended consequences resulꢀng from the FATF standards and its  
implementaꢀon: de-risking and financial exclusion  
De-risking is the phenomenon of FIs terminaꢀng or restricꢀng business relaꢀonships with clients or  
categories of clients in order to avoid, rather than to manage, their risks in line with a risk-based approach.  
In this respect, it is important to highlight that de-risking is, by definiꢀon, inconsistent with a proper  
applicaꢀon of the risk-based approach. Consequently, de-banking, or the loss of any financial services, may  
or may not consꢀtute de-risking depending on the reasons for it365. The phenomenon of de-risking has  
been observed in many jurisdicꢀons, especially in those where compliance with internaꢀonal AML/CFT  
standards is high. Overall, it is quite challenging to strike the right balance between financial inclusion and  
the ever-growing AML/CFT requirements.  
Unwarranted de-risking is a significant issue across the EU, with a potential adverse impact on its financial  
system’s stability and integrity. Furthermore, impacted customers may resort to alternative, unregulated  
payment channels (e.g. HOSSP, see section 6.7.2) to meet their financial needs. Consequently,  
transactions may no longer be subject to monitoring, which makes detection and the reporting of  
suspicious transactions difficult. Ultimately, this may have an adverse impact on the prevention of ML366  
.
The Law of 13 June 2017 on payment accounts (2017 Law on payment accounts) grants natural persons  
residing in the EU access to a payment account with basic features. The CSSF has highlighted via different  
communicaꢀon channels the obligaꢀon applicable to several Luxembourg FIs to provide consumers with  
payment accounts with basic features. The names of these FIs are publicly available on its website367. This  
right extends to natural persons who do not dispose of a residence permit but whose expulsion is  
impossible and who are not acꢀng for business purposes. In this respect, it is also important to note that  
all types of social benefits and aids (e.g. social benefits, unemployment benefits) from the Luxembourg  
State are sent to natural persons via bank transfer. In 2017, the World Bank reported that 99% of  
Luxembourg’s adult populaꢀon held a bank account368. Consequently, financial inclusion with respect to  
365 FATF, High-Level Synopsis of the Stocktake of the Unintended Consequences of the FATF Standards, 2021, link.  
366 EBA, Consumer trends report, 2024/25, link.  
367 CSSF, Basic payment account/payment account with basic features, link.  
368 World Bank, Global Findex Database, 2017, link.  
153  
         
natural persons is assessed to be very high in Luxembourg. De-risking therefore impacts Luxembourg  
natural persons to a lesser extent.  
Whereas natural persons in Luxembourg are less affected by the consequences from de-risking,  
Luxembourg identified different categories of legal persons that may be impacted by de-risking:  
Entrepreneurs residing in Luxembourg that emigrated from countries with weak AML/CFT  
frameworks;  
Due to the complexity of their business model and transactions, entities active in VAs, FinTechs  
and Start-ups;  
SMEs that are active in higher risk sectors (e.g. the legal CBD market) or maintain business with  
higher risk countries;  
Some private equity structures; and  
NPOs active in jurisdictions with a weak AML/CFT framework or with an active terrorist threat.  
The EBA identified three main key drivers of de-risking. These drivers are not mutually exclusive and, in  
practice, are very often combined369  
:
ML/TF risks exceed institutions' ML/TF risk appetite: Over the last decades, AML/CFT  
requirements have become more and more complex and stringent. FIs risk severe penalties for  
any detected AML/CFT shortcomings by the relevant supervisor. Consequently, ML/TF risk  
appetite has decreased for many institutions considering the legal, financial and reputational  
risks;  
Lack of expertise by institutions in specific customers’ business models: Some institutions lack the  
expertise necessary to understand the way NPOs operate (i.e., a model based on trustees and  
beneficiaries located in multiple jurisdictions, etc.), or do not have requisite knowledge to deal  
with entities active in VA or FinTech firms; and/or  
Cost of compliance: For instance, dealing with customers with links to jurisdictions presenting  
higher ML/TF risks will entail enhanced due diligence in the monitoring of cross-border  
transactions, including enhanced scrutiny of customers’ relationships and their network of  
transactions.  
Considering the challenges faced by these types of legal persons (e.g. SME, FinTech firms, Start-ups), the  
ABBL, the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce and the House of Entrepreneurship published a guide in  
English, French and German in order to help entrepreneurs open and maintain a bank account370  
.
The publication of this general guidance document was followed by the publication of specific guides to  
the attention of particular segments of clients, starting with Sociétés commerciales371 and ASBLs372  
.
Additional publications will follow in the coming months so as to cover other segments, such as trusts,  
Fondations and investment funds.  
369 European Banking Authority, Opinion of the European Banking Authority on de-risking, 2022, link.  
370 ABBL, Open a professional bank account, link.  
371 ABBL, Commercial businesses: Your path to a successful bank account opening, link.  
372 ABBL, Non-profit associations: Opening a bank account for non-profit associations, link.  
154  
       
In addition, the ABBL has approached its members to compile a list of dedicated contact persons within  
banks and other providers of banking services in Luxembourg potentially interested in onboarding  
particular segments of corporate clients. Relevant listings are publicly available on the ABBL website and  
are updated on a regular basis373. These publications are part of a broader effort of the ABBL and its  
members to make the opening of a bank account and access to banking services as simple and transparent  
as possible.  
Furthermore, within the working groups of the NPC, public and private actors engaged in outreach  
sessions and activities in order to bridge the needs of those concerned with the requirements of the FIs.  
This helped raise awareness of the challenges encountered by both sides and to collectively find ways on  
how to remedy, to the extent possible, the phenomenon of de-risking.  
373 ABBL, Bank account opening: dedicated contacts for AIFs, FinTechs and SMEs, link.  
155  
 
7. Miꢀgaꢀng factors assessment  
Luxembourg’s AML/CFT regime is based on a solid legal framework consistent with the FATF  
recommendations and the 4th and 5th EU AML/CFT directives. A comprehensive institutional set-up,  
involving a wide range of competent authorities to prevent, supervise, detect, investigate and prosecute  
ML/TF and to recover related assets, is in place and is recognised as delivering good results, as evidenced  
by the FATF 4th round mutual evaluation of Luxembourg. The national AML/CFT framework effectively  
mitigates the inherent risks detailed in the previous sections, as reflected in the resulting residual risk.  
Luxembourg’s national strategy encompasses both ML and TF and is informed by the NRAs and the SNRAs.  
The first NRA was adopted in 2018 by the NPC and updated in 2020, whereas the first SNRA on the risks  
of ML/TF affecting the internal market was conducted by the European Commission in 2017 and updated  
in 2019 and 2022. To further enhance its understanding of high-risk sectors, the NPC conducted various  
VRAs, such as on VASPs, legal persons and legal arrangements and on TF. They are published on the MoJ’s  
website in both English and French374  
.
Following a risk-based approach, the CSSF further conducted and published sub-sectoral risk assessments  
for particular sub-sectors, such as on private banking375 (published in 2019 and updated in 2023),  
collective investments376 (published in 2020, then updated in 2022 and lastly in 2025) and specialised PFSs  
providing TCSP activities377 (published in 2020). These risk assessments are freely available on the CSSF’s  
website.  
In a similar vein, the CRF disseminated via goAML a number of typology reports and red flag indicators,  
such as the typology report on the real estate sector, the typology report on the circumvention of financial  
restrictive measures and the yearly typology report on the investment sector.  
Detailed statistics on Luxembourg’s AML/CFT measures were also consolidated on the MoJ’s website.  
7.1. Naꢀonal coordinaꢀon and the AML/CFT strategy  
The Grand-Ducal Decree of 10 November 2021 established the Inter-ministerial Steering Committee for  
the Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (ISC). The ISC is chaired by the national  
AML/CFT coordinator and gathers representatives of the MoJ, MoF, MoE, the Ministry of Internal Security  
and the MoFA.  
The ISC sets the high-level national policy and draws up a multi-annual AML/CFT strategy that sets out the  
main guidelines for combating ML/TF and defines high-level strategic objectives. The multi-annual  
AML/CFT strategy is presented to the Government Council for validation, showing a political commitment  
to combat ML and TF at the highest level.  
374 MoJ’s webpage, link  
375 CSSF, ML/TF Sub-Sector Risk Assessment - Private Banking (2023 update), link.  
376 CSSF, ML/TF Sub-Sector Risk Assessment - Collective Investment Sector (2025 update), link.  
377CSSF, ML/TF Sub-Sector Risk Assessment - Specialised Professionals of the Financial Sector providing Corporate Services (Trust  
and Company Service Provider activities), link.  
156  
           
The ISC elaborated the 2023-2024 AML/CFT strategy. It was adopted by the Government Council in  
October 2022 and consisted of the following four priorities:  
Priority 1: Ensure reliable information on the transparency of legal persons, including non-profit  
organisations, and legal arrangements, and monitor the evolution of ML/TF typologies in this area;  
Priority 2: Optimise the supervision and enforcement through efficient allocation of resources  
using the risk-based approach;  
Priority 3: Strengthen the operational capacity and effectiveness of the authorities responsible  
for the detection, investigation, prosecution of economic and financial crime and asset recovery  
and management; and  
Priority 4: Mitigate the ML/TF risks associated with new technologies and support the digital  
transformation of AML/CFT authorities.  
The NPC is chaired by the national AML/CFT coordinator and is composed of operational members, such  
as representatives of the supervisory authorities (CSSF, CAA and AED), SRBs (OAL, OAD, CdN, CdH, IRE and  
OEC), the CRF, the investigation and prosecution authorities and of the private sector. The high-level  
strategic objectives of the AML/CFT strategy are implemented by these operational actors in different  
working groups in accordance with their respective competences and areas of expertise.  
The NPC also allows the gathering of institutional players on the one hand and representatives of the  
private sector on the other around a multidisciplinary round table.  
The Executive Secretariat of the NPC and the ISC supports these two Committees in coordinating the  
implementation of the AML/CFT national strategy. The national AML/CFT coordinator reports to the  
Government on the progress made in implementing the national AML/CFT strategy.  
The following chart provides an overview of Luxembourg’s national coordination set up:  
157  
Figure 30: Luxembourg’s naꢀonal coordinaꢀon set up  
158  
 
7.2. Naꢀonal cooperaꢀon  
Naꢀonal coordinaꢀon and cooperaꢀon on AML/CFT issues is a recognised strength of Luxembourg  
AML/CFT system378  
.
At a strategic level, arꢀcle 9-1 of the 2004 AML/CFT Law provides for the strategic cooperaꢀon between  
the members of the NPC (see secꢀon above).  
At an operaꢀonal level, arꢀcle 9-1 of the 2004 AML/CFT Law provides for the cooperaꢀon between the  
CRF and the supervisors. The supervisory authoriꢀes and the SRBs cooperate closely with the CRF and  
amongst themselves. They are authorised to exchange informaꢀon that is necessary for the fulfilment of  
their respecꢀve duꢀes within the framework of the fight against ML and TF.  
Addiꢀonally, arꢀcles 74-2 and 74-4 of the 1980 Judiciary Organisaꢀon Law provide for close cooperaꢀon  
between the CRF and competent AML/CFT stakeholders.  
Moreover, arꢀcle 16 of the modified 2008 Tax Authoriꢀes Cooperaꢀon Law foresees the cooperaꢀon  
between judicial authoriꢀes and the CRF on the one hand, and the AED and ACD on the other hand.  
The Code of Criminal Procedure foresees cooperaꢀon mechanisms between judicial and invesꢀgaꢀve  
authoriꢀes.  
In the field, this cooperaꢀon between AML/CFT actors at the naꢀonal level is facilitated by a series of  
MoUs, the parꢀcipaꢀon in each other’s technical commiꢁees and the establishment of expert group  
meeꢀngs in specific areas.  
7.3. Prevenꢀon and supervision: supervisory authoriꢀes, SRBs and other relevant  
authoriꢀes  
Luxembourg supervisors continue to ensure that the private sector effectively implements its AML/CFT  
obligations by following a risk-based approach.  
Luxembourg counts three supervisory authorities (CSSF, CAA and AED) and six SRBs (OAL, OAD, CdN, CdH,  
IRE and OEC) in charge of AML/CFT supervision covering the different types of professions falling within  
the scope of the 2004 AML/CFT Law.  
Through regular training of their AML/CFT staff, participation in (inter)national working groups and  
outreach activities with the private sector, supervisors have a good understanding of ML risks in their  
supervised sectors. This understanding leverages the implementation of the risk-based approach within  
their supervisory activities. Usually, those encompass both off-site supervisory measures and on-site  
inspections. Identified deficiencies are subject to follow-up actions and breaches are subject to  
enforcement measures.  
378 FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures. Luxembourg. Mutual Evaluation Report, 2023, link.  
159  
     
Case study 17: Improvement of Compliance culture379  
Following an on-site inspecꢀon, a professional was enjoined to remediate several deficiencies by i.a.  
conducꢀng regular reviews of clients’ risk raꢀngs and KYC files including tax aspects.  
The professional started a remediaꢀon plan and aꢁended a face-to-face meeꢀng with the CSSF. As the  
professional was not on track with the remediaꢀon plan due to a lack of resources, the CSSF decided to  
closely follow-up on this maꢁer and meet the professional every quarter. In parallel, an on-site  
inspecꢀon started on a related subject and led to an administraꢀve fine. The professional realized that  
its Compliance culture had to be improved. The professional increased its resources dedicated to the  
KYC remediaꢀon plan, reorganised its Compliance funcꢀon and hired addiꢀonal experienced persons.  
At the end of the remediaꢀon plan, several members of the team joined the professional.  
In addiꢀon to the strong prevenꢀve and supervisory acꢀons performed by the supervisors, market entry  
controls add an addiꢀonal layer to Luxembourg's AML/CFT framework, as evidenced in case study below.  
Case study 18: Individual implicated in various money laundering scandals discouraged from taking  
over a bank380  
In 2022, the CSSF was informed that the owner of a bank under its supervision had negoꢀated, subject  
to regulatory approval, the sale of his majority stake to an individual as reference shareholder.  
Preliminary research completed by the CSSF revealed that the said individual was implicated in various  
ML scandals during his prior roles in other European countries. Suspicions regarding his suitability were  
reinforced through consultaꢀons with the CRF and the supervisory authoriꢀes of the two countries  
concerned.  
CSSF successfully prevented the proposed acquirer from taking a stake in the bank.  
7.3.1. Financial sector supervisory authoriꢀes  
The CSSF ensures the prudenꢀal and the AML/CFT supervision of Luxembourg’s financial sector. The CAA  
is in charge of the prudenꢀal and the AML/CFT supervision of Luxembourg’s insurance sector.  
In March 2020, during the observaꢀon period of this NRA update, Luxembourg created a central electronic  
data retrieval system related to IBAN accounts and safe-deposit boxes held by credit insꢀtuꢀons in  
Luxembourg (amended Law of 25 March 2020 establishing a central electronic data retrieval system  
related to IBAN accounts and safe-deposit boxes). This central register is a key miꢀgaꢀng factor allowing  
to perform searches and invesꢀgaꢀons on the holders of IBAN accounts or safes in Luxembourg. Several  
authoriꢀes, such as the CRF and the Asset Recovery Office (ARO), have direct access to the register,  
whereas other naꢀonal authoriꢀes and SRBs have an indirect access via the CSSF, which is the current  
manager of the central register.  
379 Case study provided by the CSSF.  
380 Case study provided by the CSSF.  
160  
         
Insight Box 22: Central register of bank accounts  
The Direcꢀve 2024/1640 (AMLD6) of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mechanisms  
to be put in place by the Member States for the prevenꢀon of the use of the financial system for the  
purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing Direcꢀve (EU) 2015/849 (AMLD6)  
foresees that centralised automated mechanisms (in Luxembourg, currently the central register of bank  
accounts) shall include informaꢀon on bank accounts, including vIBANs, and payment accounts,  
securiꢀes accounts, crypto-asset accounts and safe deposit boxes, and those centralised automated  
mechanisms shall be interconnected at EU level, to enable Financial Intelligence Units to obtain swiſtly  
cross-border informaꢀon on the idenꢀty of holders of bank accounts and payment accounts, securiꢀes  
accounts, crypto-asset accounts and safe deposit boxes in other Member States, which would reinforce  
their ability to effecꢀvely carry out financial analysis and cooperate with their counterparts from other  
Member States.  
This text should be transposed by July 2027 at latest by EU Member States.  
As noted previously, the Law of 25 March 2020 amending the 2004 AML/CFT Law added VASPs within the  
scope of the CSSF AML/CFT supervision.  
7.3.2. Non-financial sector supervisory authoriꢀes and SRBs  
Legal professions, CPA and auditors in Luxembourg are supervised by SRBs for AML/CFT purposes:  
The IRE is in charge of ensuring AML/CFT supervision among (approved) statutory auditors and  
(approved) audit firms;  
The OEC is in charge of ensuring AML/CFT supervision among CPAs;  
The CdN is in charge of ensuring AML/CFT supervision among notaries;  
The OAL and OAD are in charge of ensuring AML/CFT supervision of lawyers carrying out services  
subject to the 2004 AML/CFT Law; and  
The CdH is in charge of ensuring AML/CFT supervision of bailiffs.  
The AED is Luxembourg’s AML/CFT supervisory authority for professionals subject to the 2004 AML/CFT  
Law but that are not supervised by another supervisory authority or SRB. This includes AML/CFT  
supervision for REAs and REDs, accountants, some TCSPs, gambling service providers, freeport operators  
and some dealers in high value goods.  
7.3.3. Legal persons and legal arrangements  
Mitigating factors to prevent the misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements include licensing, VAT  
registration and tax controls, the registers (RCS for basic information, RBE and the RFT for BO information),  
and supervision of obliged entities involved in the creation and maintenance of legal persons and legal  
arrangements.  
Luxembourg follows a multi-pronged approach to obtain accurate, adequate and up-to-date basic and BO  
information on legal persons through three sources: (i) the registers (RCS and RBE for basic and beneficial  
161  
     
ownership information), (ii) the obliged entities with whom they enter into a business relationship or with  
whom they have an occasional business relationship and (iii) the legal persons themselves.  
The law of 7 August 2023, on non-profit associations and foundations (2023 NPAF Law) has replaced the  
law of Law of 21 April 1928 on non-profit associations and foundations (1928 NPAF Law). The main  
ambitions of the 2023 NPAF Law were to:  
increase financial and organizational transparency of associative entities;  
impose an annual filing of accounts to ensure clear and rigorous financial monitoring; and  
implement meticulous record-keeping of members, thus facilitating quick access to information  
in case of official requests.  
Overall, the 2023 NPAF Law seeks to meet international standards, in line with Recommendation 8 of the  
FATF, and on the other hand, to prevent any misuse of organisations for malicious purposes, such as for  
ML and for TF.  
In line with the provisions set out in the 1915 Companies Law, the 2023 NPAF Law also established a  
simplified administrative dissolution procedure without liquidation, allowing for efficient updating of data  
in the RCS, in line with international requirements. Nonetheless, while strengthening transparency,  
Luxembourg has ensured that the new measures do not hinder the enthusiasm and passion that drive the  
actors of Luxembourg’s non-profit sector.  
Insight Box 23: Launch of website myasbl.lu  
To raise awareness on the modifications stemming from the implementation of the 2023 NPAF Law,  
the MoJ launched the website https://myasbl.lu/.  
This website provides useful information on the raison d’être of this new and revised legal framework,  
an overview of the main changes and more detailed information on, for example accounting and filing  
obligations.  
The website also includes a dedicated section on ML and TF risks in order to prevent the misuse of NPAF  
for ML and TF purposes.  
Explanatory videos and guidance help to provide the reader with further useful information in order to  
comply with the new framework.  
In this regard, the MoJ has organised and participated in a number of different workshops, conferences  
and trainings in order to raise awareness about this new legal framework and the potential ML/TF risks  
with regard to NPOs.  
162  
 
7.4. Detecꢀon  
7.4.1. Cellule de renseignement financier  
The “Cellule de renseignement financier” (CRF) is the national authority responsible for receiving and  
analyzing suspicious transactions and activity reports (STR/SAR) and other information on events that  
could involve ML, associated predicate offences or TF. The CRF is an independent agency headed by  
magistrates who operate independently and autonomously381  
.
In particular, it receives and analyses:  
Suspicious transaction and activity reports transmitted by a professional subject to the AML/CFT  
legislation as provided by article 5, paragraph 1, a) of the 2004 AML/CFT Law; and  
Information communicated by other AML/CFT competent authorities pursuant to article 74-2 (4)  
of the amended law of March 7, 1980 on the judiciary organisation.  
The CRF disseminates, spontaneously and upon request, the results of its analysis and any other relevant  
information when there are reasonable grounds to suspect ML, associated predicate offences or terrorist  
financing, to the national judicial authorities, to the national AML/CFT competent authorities, as well as  
to its foreign counterparts.  
The CRF cooperates with its foreign counterparts in accordance with the principles developed by the  
Egmont Group and, for cooperation at the European level, in accordance with the requirements of the  
Fourth Directive (Directive EU 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015).  
The CRF’s analytical function is twofold:  
1. The operational analysis which focuses on individual cases and specific targets or on appropriate  
selected information, depending on the type and volume of information received and the  
expected use of the information after their dissemination; and  
2. The strategic analysis which focuses on identifying ML/TF related typologies, trends and patterns  
based on the exploitation of data in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the ML/TF risks,  
threats and vulnerabilities faced by Luxembourg and secondly to share the strategic intelligence  
gathered with relevant parties at national and international level.  
With the amendment of the Law of 16 July 2016 on the organisation of controls on the cross-border  
transportation of cash (2021 Cash Control Law), magistrates of the CRF have the power to freeze funds  
upon suspicion (for instance, following receipt of a STR or following cooperation with other FIUs) for an  
unlimited period of time. The CRF has also direct and indirect access to a wide range of databases and  
have significant IT capabilities (including a secure channel for STR filing and various analytical tools).  
381 Note that the CRF is under the administrative authority of the General State Prosecutor’s Office.  
163  
     
As per the 2004 AML/CFT Law, all professionals, their directors and employees have the obligation to  
report suspicious transactions and activities, including attempted suspicious transactions, regardless of  
the amount of the transaction, to the CRF382  
.
The figure below illustrates the number of STRs received during the observation period of this NRA.  
Overall, the number of filings made by obliged entities remained at an overall high level. Due to the  
optimisation of filing processes of some entities (especially with regard to electronic STRs/SARs), the  
number of filings has slightly decreased in 2023 (by around 16%). In this context, it should also be said  
that filings of “traditional” STR/SAR have almost doubled between 2020 and 2023, with 6 215 STR/SAR in  
2020 and 12 395 in 2023.  
Figure 31: Breakdown of ML reports filed by obliged enꢀꢀes with the CRF, 2020 – 2023  
60000  
50000  
40000  
30000  
20000  
10000  
0
2020  
2021  
2022  
STRe  
2023  
SAR  
STR  
SARe  
During 2020 and 2023, most reports originated from PIs/EMIs, the banking, the investment and VASP  
sectors, with most of the reports referring to fraud, counterfeiting and piracy of products and tax crimes  
as underlying predicate offences. This is in line with the threats and risks assessed earlier in this report.  
Compared to the 2020 NRA, the number of STRs received from DNFBPs increased. During the 2020 NRA  
observation period, the CRF received around 300 STRs from those actors. This number increased  
continuously to around 500 reports in 2023, with most of them emanating from CPAs. The quality and the  
volume of these reports continued to increase as well considering the ever-increasing awareness  
initiatives conducted by supervisors, the CRF and other AML/CFT authorities.  
National and international cooperation is essential for Luxembourg’s competent authorities. Indeed, one  
of the core functions of the CRF is the exchange with its (inter)national authorities in AML/CFT matters.  
382 Note that in 2020, 3 049 obliged entities were registered with goAML, 5 048 in 2021, 7 720 in 2022 and 10 417 in 2023. The  
increase is due to enhanced supervisory actions and awareness raising activities of supervisors and the CRF.  
164  
   
Relevant information held by the CRF is made available to competent authorities and foreign authorities  
through spontaneous or formal requests for information.  
The CRF continues to regularly meet with national AML/CFT authorities to exchange on relevant AML/CFT  
matters and the reports received. It participates in meetings of the Egmont Group and in multiple national  
and international fora. To raise awareness on ML/TF matters and typologies among the private sector  
actors, the CRF also participates extensively in conferences and training sessions. Furthermore, it provides  
typology reports and strategic analysis products to obliged entities.  
7.4.2. Administraꢀon des douanes et accises  
As noted in the 2020 NRA, the “Administration des douanes et accises(ADA) is Luxembourg’s customs  
administration. Since the entry into force of the 2021 Cash Control Law, the ADA has the power to detain  
undeclared or undisclosed cash equal to or greater than EUR 10 000, or cash suspected as crime proceeds  
or instrumentalities, transported across the borders of Luxembourg for 30 days. Upon assessing  
proportionality and necessity, the 30 days may be prolonged to 90 days. With the 2021 Cash Control Law  
and Regulation (EU) 2018/1672383, cross-border cash transport equal to or greater than EUR 10 000 covers  
highly liquid stores of value as defined in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2018/1672. Furthermore, extra-EU  
and intra-EU cross-border cash transports are handled identically, meaning a cash declaration is  
mandatory in both cases. For unaccompanied cash (e.g. sent via courier express or postal consignments),  
the sender, the recipient or the representative thereof must submit a disclosure declaration within 30  
days, at the latest upon invitation by the customs officer when the cash has been detected. When  
establishing an infringement against the cash control legal framework, the ADA’s officers draw up a penal  
report and emit an administrative decision to detain the cash for 30 days. This decision is subject to an  
appeal at the Administrative Tribunal. The penal report is submitted to the Prosecutor’s Office and to the  
CRF. The Prosecutor’s Office may request a seizing order by the investigative judge, which once granted,  
overrides the administrative decision to detain.  
The number of cross-border cash declarations (relating to currency and bearer negotiable instruments)  
submitted to the ADA were quite stable over the past three years.  
7.4.3. Administraꢀon des contribuꢀons directes  
The “Administration des contributions directes(ACD), Luxembourg’s direct tax administration plays an  
important role in supporting detection efforts. The ACD has relevant tax review processes in place and  
information sharing with national and international authorities that contributes to reducing the likelihood  
of tax crimes and increase the probability of detection should these occur. Requests from its foreign  
counterpart relate to BO information, bank information, accounting records, and legal ownership.  
Moreover, the ACD established an international cooperation department to facilitate international  
cooperation.  
383 Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on controls on cash entering or  
leaving the Union and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005.  
165  
     
7.5. Prosecuꢀon, invesꢀgaꢀon, asset recovery and asset management  
During the observation period, the majority of investigations, prosecutions and convictions concerned  
fraud and forgery, drug trafficking, and robbery and theft.  
Explanations relating to the role and mandate of prosecution authorities, and investigative judges  
explained in 2020 NRA continue to be relevant for the observation period of this NRA.  
Insight Box 24: Extract of the 2020 NRA (Secꢀon 7.1 “Overview of miꢀgaꢀng factors”)  
Prosecution authorities conduct all necessary actions to investigate and prosecute criminal offenses  
and recover crime-related assets. The General State Prosecutor (“Procureur général d’Etat”) represents  
the prosecution authorities in person or through his or her deputies before the Court of Cassation and  
the Court of Appeal. The State Prosecutors represent in person or through their substitutes the  
prosecution authorities before the District Courts and the Police Courts. The State Prosecutors receive  
complaints and denunciations (including dissemination reports from the CRF) and assess the action to  
be taken on them. They take or cause to be taken all necessary steps to ascertain the truth and to  
prosecute violations of criminal law. The State Prosecutors supervise to this end the activities of the  
Judicial Police Service (SPJ) in preliminary investigations and may transfer the case to an investigative  
judge to conduct a judicial inquiry if coercive measures are required or if the offence is a crime that  
cannot be decriminalised (based on a “requisition”).  
Investigative judges are not part of the prosecution authorities and, as such, remain independent.  
investigative judges may order measures that restrict individual freedoms (i.e. coercive measures) such  
as provisional detention, searches and seizures. The SPJ executes the investigations as per orders of  
State prosecutors or investigative judges, and can use a wide range of investigative techniques  
(including undercover operations, intercepting communications, accessing computer systems, etc.), if  
ordered to do so. Investigative judges have the means to access or request relevant information within  
inquiries, including to the financial sector. The powers of investigative judges, when providing major  
mutual legal assistance, and State Prosecutors, when providing ancillary mutual legal assistance, are  
identical for both domestic and foreign cases. In fact, given Luxembourg’s open economy and significant  
share of international funds, a considerable part of their activities relates to mutual legal assistance  
(MLA) and other forms of international cooperation (such as among asset recovery offices).  
Moreover, it is worth noting that the SPJ has a dedicated AML unit specialized in ML, TF, circumvention of  
financial restrictions and the identification and tracing of criminal assets, that is distinct from the units in  
charge of either organised crime or drug trafficking cases. Upon request or in major/complex cases, a  
parallel financial investigation regarding the ML and asset recovery component is done by the AML unit,  
in close collaboration with the other unit that investigates the predicate offence.  
It should be highlighted that due to the increasing complexity of ML/TF cases, it is crucial to continue to  
equip these authorities with the necessary resources to effectively tackle these cases.  
166  
   
Insight Box 25: Law of 24 July 2024  
The Law of 24 July 2024 created 94 vacancies and set up a three-year recruitment plan for magistrates  
in Luxembourg. Among those 94 vacancies:  
32 additional vacancies were created for judges within the Luxembourg District Court;  
22 additional vacancies were created for judges within the State Prosecutor’s Office of the  
Luxembourg District Court;  
11 additional vacancies were created for judges within the Diekirch District Court;  
5 additional vacancies were created for judges within the State Prosecutor’s Office of the  
Diekirch District Court;  
6 additional vacancies were created for magistrates for the CRF.  
The same law foresees the creation of 20 vacancies for “attachés de justice”.  
As for the SPJ, the 2023-2028 Coalition Agreement384 emphasizes the need to strengthen its ressources  
as to ensure (i) the effective enforcement of AML laws and of supranational recommendations following  
the FATF mutual evaluation exercise in 2023. The government thus grants to the department in charge of  
the fight against economic and financial crimes of the SPJ an extraordinary recruitement plan amounting  
to 40 civilian investigators from the A1/A2 career until the year 2026, in addition to the ordinary  
recruitment of civilian or police investigators and staff385.  
During the observation period, the Asset Management Office (“Bureau de Gestion des Avoirs”, AMO) was  
established and the powers of the Asset Recovery Office (Bureau de Recouvrement des Avoirs”, ARO)  
have been strengthened, in line with Luxembourg’s “crime does not pay” policy, which aims to combat  
economic crime by depriving criminals of the benefits of their offenses. These changes are outlined in the  
sub-sections below.  
7.5.1. Asset Management Office  
The Law of 22 June 2022 on the management and recovery of seized or confiscated assets established the  
Asset Management Office (AMO), whose mission includes the mandatory management of all sums,  
whether cash or credited account balances, credit or VAs seized in the course of domesꢀc or foreign  
criminal proceedings. The judicial authoriꢀes may also entrust the AMO with the management of all other  
property, whatever its nature, whose conservaꢀon in kind is not necessary for the determinaꢀon of the  
truth and which requires management acts for its conservaꢀon or valuing, seized in the course of naꢀonal  
or foreign criminal proceedings. At the request of the State Prosecutor, it also manages confiscated assets.  
Furthermore, the AMO also ensures, on the instrucꢀons of the judicial authoriꢀes, the disposal or  
destrucꢀon of seized property. It is also in charge of the centralizaꢀon and computerized management of  
data relaꢀng to all seized and confiscated goods, and which do not consꢀtute evidence.  
384 Luxembourg Government, Accord de coalition 2023-2028, link.  
385 To be eligible for an A1 or A2 career, a university degree is required.  
167  
       
The AMO organizes training and informaꢀon acꢀviꢀes striving to raise awareness on its tasks and to  
promote good pracꢀces with regard to seizures and confiscaꢀon in criminal maꢁers.  
Lastly, the AMO negoꢀates agreements with foreign authoriꢀes for the sharing of property confiscated on  
the basis of a foreign decision.  
Since the AMO became operaꢀonal on 1 October 2022, it has negoꢀated 13 agreements with foreign  
authoriꢀes. The table below provides staꢀsꢀcs relaꢀng to seized credit accounts, security accounts and  
cash386  
:
Table 31: Seized amounts managed by the AMO. Amounts in million euros  
Amounts as at:  
Credit balances  
Securiꢀes accounts  
Sum of credit balances (cash) and  
securiꢀes accounts  
Foreign  
cases  
Domesꢀc  
cases  
Foreign  
cases  
Domesꢀc  
Total  
Total  
foreign  
(% total)  
587,435  
(73%)  
Total  
domesꢀc  
(% total)  
219,806  
(27%)  
cases  
143,825  
0
01/10/2022387  
31/12/2022  
31/12/2023  
299,095  
7,746  
75,981  
1,476  
288,340  
807,241  
11,030  
1,808  
9,544  
1,476  
(87%)  
72 670  
(49%)  
(13%)  
74 442  
(51%)  
55,481  
69,217  
17,189  
5,225  
147,112  
7.5.2. Asset Recovery Office  
As noted in the 2020 NRA, the Asset Recovery Office (ARO) is part of the State Prosecutor’s Office at the  
Luxembourg District Court and is responsible for idenꢀfying and tracing assets linked to foreign crimes,  
facilitaꢀng the exchange of informaꢀon with foreign authoriꢀes and advising prosecuꢀon authoriꢀes,  
invesꢀgaꢀve judges and the SPJ on measures to take within invesꢀgaꢀons of foreign crimes.  
In 2023, the ARO concluded in 2023 a cooperaꢀon agreement with the CSSF concerning the ARO’s access  
to the register of IBAN accounts and safe-deposit boxes held by credit insꢀtuꢀons in Luxembourg. As a  
result, the ARO now has direct and effecꢀve access to this register.  
7.6. Internaꢀonal cooperaꢀon  
International cooperation remains at the centre of Luxembourg’s AML/CFT approach given its open  
economy and diverse working population. This is ensured at the level of each competent authority (via  
membership in relevant international groups, as well as through information sharing mechanisms), law  
enforcement agencies (police cooperation), prosecution authorities and investigative judges (MLA  
requests and European Arrest Warrants (EAW), European Investigation Orders (EIO)), the MoJ  
(extraditions) and exchanges with other Asset Management and Asset Recovery Offices, as well as  
international conventions and bilateral and multi-lateral treaties.  
386 AMO, Rapport d’activité 2022-2023, link.  
387 The AMO started operations on 1 October 2022.  
168  
         
During the observation period, Luxembourg received over 2 700 MLA requests regarding coercive  
measures and over 3 800 MLA requests regarding non-coercive measures. About 90% of MLA requests  
requiring coercive measures originated from other EU countries. Luxembourg’s most frequent  
counterparts were Germany, France, and Belgium. Luxembourg also received and executed many  
additional/subsequent MLA requests aiming at gathering additional evidence. Between 2020 and 2023,  
Luxembourg received over 900 additional requests.  
For MLA requests that concern economic or financial crimes, the execution of coercive measures (e.g.  
searches, seizures, etc.) upon decision of the prosecution authorities or the investigative judge is generally  
assisted by a dedicated unit within the SPJ. The aforementioned unit employs 16 experienced  
investigators by 2023, each of which processes on average 50 incoming MLA requests per year.  
As shown in the table below, the CRF actively seeks and receives requests from and to foreign  
counterparts:  
Table 32: CRF number of incoming and outgoing requests for informaꢀon, 2020 - 2023  
2020  
1 174  
567  
2021  
1 098  
694  
2022  
1 130  
631  
2023  
757  
643  
643  
Number of outgoing requests for information  
Number of incoming requests for information  
Number of executed incoming requests for information  
567  
694  
631  
In addition to the number of cases that have been disseminated to the CRF’s foreign counterparts (see  
the table above), the following table summarizes the number of international cross-border disseminations  
(XBD) and cross-border reporting (XBR) exchanges for the years 2020 to 2023 between the CRF and FIUs  
of other EU Member States. It should be noted that the number of these cross-border exchanges can be  
used be used in parallel with traditional international cooperation.  
Table 33: Exchanges XBD and XBR, 2020 - 2023388  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
Exchanges “cross border reporting” (XBR)  
Exchanges “cross border dissemination” (XBD)  
26 557  
1 222  
24 216  
1 460  
24 339  
3 377  
24 371  
2 412  
In a similar vein, the CRF implemented 633 freezing measures for a total amount of over EUR 1 billion.  
Table 34: CRF freezing measures, 2020 - 2023389  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
Number of freezing orders  
Amounts frozen (in EUR)  
291  
96  
93  
153  
609 407 048  
223 924 013,14  
38 221 309,28  
180 220 553  
388 La Justice en chiffres, 2021, link, 2022, link and 2023, link.  
389 CRF, Rapport annuel, 2021-2022, link and CRF, Rapport annuel, 2023, link.  
169  
         
8. Residual risk  
The residual risk level is used to identify areas where Luxembourg remains exposed to ML risk once the  
effect of mitigating measures are taking into account. It thus serves as a basis to develop and prioritize  
strategic actions, which can be undertaken to further strengthen Luxembourg’s AML framework and  
further reduce the ML risk. The table below provides an overview of the inherent residual risk by sub-  
sector assessed in this NRA update.  
Table 35: Residual ML risk assessment at the sub-sector level  
2025 NRA:  
Inherent risk  
2025 NRA:  
Residual risk  
Sector  
Sub-sector  
Retail and business banks  
Entities operating online  
High  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Wholesale, corporate and investment banks  
Private banking  
High  
Banks  
Very High  
Custodians and sub-custodians (incl. Central Securities  
Depositories)  
Medium  
High  
Low  
Investment firms authorized to carry out the services of  
investment advice and portfolio management390  
Medium  
Investment firms authorized to carry out the services of  
reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or  
more financial instruments and of execution of orders on  
behalf of clients391  
High  
Medium  
Low  
Investment  
sector  
Investment firms authorized to carry out activities of  
dealing on own account, of underwriting of financial  
instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a  
firm commitment basis and of placing financial instruments  
without a firm commitment basis392  
Medium  
Collective investments  
Medium  
Low  
Medium  
Very Low  
Medium  
Medium  
CSSF-supervised pension funds  
Payment institutions (PIs)  
E-money institutions (EMIs)  
High  
Money value or  
transfer  
High  
services  
(MVTS)  
Agents and e-money distributors acting on behalf of  
PIs/EMIs established in other European Member States  
Medium  
Medium  
VASPs  
High  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
Specialised PFSs providing corporate services  
390 In the 2020 NRA: “Wealth and asset managers”.  
391 In the 2020 NRA: “Brokers and broker-dealers (non-banks)”.  
392 In the 2020 NRA: “Traders / market-makers”.  
170  
         
2025 NRA:  
Inherent risk  
2025 NRA:  
Residual risk  
Sector  
Sub-sector  
Specialised  
PFSs  
Professional depositaries  
Support PFSs  
Medium  
Low  
Support PFSs  
and other  
specialised  
PFSs393  
Very Low  
Very Low  
Other specialised PFSs  
Market operators  
Low  
High  
Low  
Medium  
Low  
Life insurance  
Non-life insurance  
Low  
Reinsurance  
Low  
Low  
Insurance  
Intermediaries  
Medium  
Low  
Low  
Professionals of the insurance sector (PSAs)  
CAA-supervised pension funds  
Very Low  
Very Low  
Medium  
Very Low  
High  
Real estate  
agents and  
developers  
Real estate agents (agents immobiliers)  
Real estate developers (promoteurs immobiliers)  
High  
Medium  
Freeport operators  
Precious metals/jewellers/clocks  
Medium  
Medium  
High  
Low  
Low  
Car dealers  
Medium  
Low  
Dealers in  
goods  
Art/Antiques  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Luxury goods (e.g. “maroquinerie”)  
Medium  
Very Low  
Gambling  
service  
Casino  
National lottery  
Accountants  
Low  
Very Low  
providers  
Legal and  
High  
High  
accounting  
professions  
supervised by  
the AED  
Professional directors and business centres  
High  
High  
Lawyers  
High  
High  
Medium  
Medium  
Medium  
Legal and  
accounting  
professions  
Notaries  
Court bailiffs (huissiers de justice)  
Medium  
393 Analysis covered in NRA vulnerability section; Support PFSs & other specialised PFSs assessed on aggregate due to very low  
risk.  
171  
 
2025 NRA:  
Inherent risk  
2025 NRA:  
Residual risk  
Sector  
Sub-sector  
Audit profession394  
Medium  
High  
Low  
Medium  
Medium  
Low  
supervised by  
SRBs  
Chartered professional accountants (experts-comptables)  
Sociétés commerciales  
Very High  
Medium  
Sociétés civiles  
NPOs (as per FATF definition) carrying out primarily  
High  
Low  
Low  
High  
Low  
international activities ASBLs and Fondations395  
NPOs (as per FATF definition) carrying out local activities –  
ASBLs396  
Legal persons  
and legal  
arrangements  
NPOs (as per FATF definition) carrying out local activities –  
Fondations397  
Very Low  
Other legal persons  
Domestic Fiducies  
Foreign trusts  
High  
Medium  
Very High  
Very High  
Very High  
Very High  
394 In this document, the term “audit profession” covers statutory auditors (réviseurs d’entreprises), approved statutory auditors  
(réviseurs d’entreprises agréés), audit firms (cabinets de révision) and approved audit firms (cabinets de révision agréés).  
395  
This category corresponds to “Associations sans but lucrative (ASBL) and fondations with Non-governmental organisations  
(NGO) status” in NRA 2020.  
396  
This category corresponds to “Other associations sans but lucratif (ASBL)” in NRA 2020. Note than in NRA 2020, it included  
ASBLs in and out of the FATF NPO definition (i.e. 8 000 vs. 100 ASBLs falling in FATF NPO definition). In this respect, NRA 2020  
noted that “most ASBLs are estimated to have a low exposure to ML/TF threats; but given their relatively high number, the  
inherent risk is evaluated as medium for the local ASBL sector as a whole until a national assessment of their activities will permit  
a more granular assessment, in line with a conservative approach”.  
397 This category corresponds to “Other fondations” in NRA 2020. Note that in NRA 2020, it included Fondations in and out of the  
FATF NPO definition.  
172  
       
Appendix A.  
List of predicate offences to ML398  
Relevant arꢀcle(s) within the  
law (and actual designaꢀon in  
Luxembourg law, in French)  
Predicate offence (as per  
threat assessment)  
ML predicate  
offence  
Law(s) defining the predicate offence, in French  
Insider trading and  
Loi modifiée du 23 décembre 2016 relaꢀve aux abus de 18  
506-1, ꢀret 24 CP  
market manipulaꢀon  
marché  
Abus de marché, délit d’iniꢀé  
(L-23.12.2016)  
Smuggling  
Loi générale sur les douanes et accises (LGDA) modifiée 220 et 231  
506-1, ꢀret 23 CP  
du 18 juillet 1977  
Contrebande  
(L-18.07.1977)  
Counterfeiꢀng and piracy Loi modifiée du 18 avril 2001 sur le droit d’auteur  
82 à 85  
Droits d’auteur  
309  
Violaꢀon du secret d’affaires  
240  
Détournement de deniers  
publics  
506-1, ꢀret 17 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 8 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
of products  
(L-18.01.2001)  
Code pénal (CP)  
Corrupꢀon and bribery  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
243  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Concussion à l’aide de violences  
et menaces  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
246 à 253  
506-1, ꢀret 6 CP  
Corrupꢀon acꢀve et passive  
363, 364 et 365  
Crimes et délits relaꢀfs aux  
mineurs  
Kidnapping, illegal  
restraint and hostage  
taking  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Code pénal (CP)  
368 à 370  
506-1, ꢀret 3 CP  
398 CRF, Rapport annuel, 2023, link.  
173  
   
Relevant arꢀcle(s) within the  
law (and actual designaꢀon in  
Luxembourg law, in French)  
Enlèvement de mineurs  
436, 437 et 438  
Predicate offence (as per  
threat assessment)  
ML predicate  
offence  
Law(s) defining the predicate offence, in French  
Code pénal (CP)  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Détenꢀon illégale et arbitraire  
de plus d’un mois : sur faux  
ordre de l’autorité publique,  
faux costume ; menace de mort  
442-1, 442-1bis et 442-1 ter  
Prise d’otages  
372 alinea 3, 372bis, 372ter  
Aꢁentat à la pudeur : avec  
violence ou menaces ; sur  
enfant de moins de 16 ans  
379  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Sexual exploitaꢀon  
(including sexual  
exploitaꢀon of children)  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
506-1, ꢀret 3 CP  
Exploitaꢀon de la prosꢀtuꢀon  
379bis, 380, 381 et 382-7  
Proxénéꢀsme  
506-1, ꢀret 3 CP  
383, 383bis, 383ter, 384 et 385- 506-1, ꢀret 4 CP  
2
Outrages publics aux bonnes  
mœurs et disposiꢀons  
parꢀculières pour protéger la  
jeunesse  
Extorꢀon  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
470  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Extorsion  
194 à 197  
Faux en écritures  
Fraud and forgery  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
174  
Relevant arꢀcle(s) within the  
law (and actual designaꢀon in  
Luxembourg law, in French)  
208  
Predicate offence (as per  
threat assessment)  
ML predicate  
offence  
Law(s) defining the predicate offence, in French  
Code pénal (CP)  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Faux cerꢀficat commis par un  
foncꢀonnaire dans l’exercice de  
sa foncꢀon ; usage de faux  
cerꢀficat  
Code pénal (CP)  
210-1  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Praꢀques illicites eu égard aux  
documents de voyage ou  
d’idenꢀté  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
211 et 212  
Faux commis dans les dépêches  
télégraphiques  
215 et 216 ; 221 ; 223  
Faux témoignage et faux  
serment  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Loi modifiée du 10 août 1915 concernant les sociétés  
commerciales (L-10.08.1915)  
Loi modifiée du 10 août 1915 concernant les sociétés  
commerciales (L-10.08.1915)  
1500-8  
Faux bilans  
1500-9  
Usage de faux bilans  
241  
Destrucꢀon d’actes et de ꢀtres  
489 et 490  
Banqueroute frauduleuse  
491 et 492  
Abus de confiance  
493  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 10 CP  
505-1, ꢀret 10 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 10 CP  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
175  
Relevant arꢀcle(s) within the  
law (and actual designaꢀon in  
Luxembourg law, in French)  
Abus de faiblesse  
494  
Predicate offence (as per  
threat assessment)  
ML predicate  
offence  
Law(s) defining the predicate offence, in French  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
506-1, ꢀret 10 CP  
Usure  
495  
506-1, ꢀret 10 CP  
Producꢀon frauduleuse d’une  
pièce en jusꢀce  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
496  
506-1, ꢀret 10 CP  
Escroquerie et tentaꢀve  
d’escroquerie  
496-1 à 496-6  
Escroquerie à la subvenꢀon  
1500-11  
Abus de biens sociaux  
506  
506-1, ꢀret 5 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Loi modifiée du 10 août 1915 concernant les sociétés  
commerciales (L-10.08.1915)  
Code pénal (CP)  
Recel de biens obtenus à l’aide  
d’un crime ou délit  
507  
Destrucꢀon ou détournement  
frauduleux d’objets immobiliers  
161 ; 166 ; 167 ; 169 ; 170 ;  
173 et 176  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Counterfeiꢀng currency  
Tax crimes  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 8 CP  
Fausse monnaie  
Loi générale des impôts modifiée (LGI) du 22 mai 1931  
(L-22.05.1931)  
§ 396 alinéas (5) et (6)  
Fraude fiscale aggravée et  
escroquerie fiscale en maꢀère  
d’impôts directs  
506-1, ꢀret 25 CP  
176  
Relevant arꢀcle(s) within the  
law (and actual designaꢀon in  
Luxembourg law, in French)  
29, alinéa 1 et 2  
Fraude fiscale aggravée et  
escroquerie fiscale en maꢀère  
de droit d’enregistrement  
Predicate offence (as per  
threat assessment)  
ML predicate  
offence  
Law(s) defining the predicate offence, in French  
Loi modifiée du 28 janvier 1948 tendant à assurer la  
juste et exacte percepꢀon des droits d’enregistrement  
(L-28.01.1948)  
506-1, ꢀret 26 CP  
Loi modifiée du 12 février 1979 concernant la taxe sur la 80, paragraphe 1er  
506-1, ꢀret 27 CP  
valeur ajoutée  
Fraude fiscale aggravée et  
(L-12.02.1979)  
escroquerie fiscale en maꢀère  
de TVA  
Environmental crime  
Loi modifiée du 18 juillet 2018 concernant protecꢀon de 75  
la nature et des ressources naturelles  
(L-18.07.2018)  
506-1, ꢀret 18 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 19 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 20 CP  
Loi modifiée du 21 juin 1976 relaꢀve à la luꢁe contre la  
polluꢀon de l’atmosphère  
9
(L-21.06.1976)  
Loi modifiée du 10 juin 1999 relaꢀve aux établissements 25  
classés  
(L-10.06.1999)  
Loi modifiée du 19 décembre 2008 relaꢀve à l’eau  
(L-18.12.2008)  
Loi modifiée du 21 mars 2012 relaꢀve à la gesꢀon des  
61  
47  
506-1, ꢀret 21 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 22 CP  
déchets  
(L-21.03.2012)  
Code pénal (CP)  
Murder, grievous bodily  
injury  
101 à 112  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Des aꢁentats et des complots  
contre le (Roi) Grand-Duc,  
contre la famille royale grand-  
177  
Relevant arꢀcle(s) within the  
law (and actual designaꢀon in  
Luxembourg law, in French)  
ducale et contre la forme du  
Gouvernement  
Predicate offence (as per  
threat assessment)  
ML predicate  
offence  
Law(s) defining the predicate offence, in French  
Code pénal (CP)  
112-1  
506-1, ꢀret 1 CP  
Aꢁentat contre les personnes  
jouissant d’une protecꢀon  
internaꢀonale  
Code pénal (CP)  
136bis à 136 quinquies  
Violaꢀons graves du droit  
humanitaire internaꢀonal  
260-1 à 260-4  
Torture  
348 et 352  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Avortement  
356-357 ; 360  
Exposiꢀon et délaissement  
d’enfant  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
375 et 376  
Viol  
393 à 397  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Meurtre, assassinat, parricide,  
infanꢀcide, empoisonnement  
400 et 401  
Code pénal (CP)  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Coups et blessures volontaires :  
maladie incurable ; incapacité  
permanente ; perte organe ;  
muꢀlaꢀon ; mort  
178  
Relevant arꢀcle(s) within the  
law (and actual designaꢀon in  
Luxembourg law, in French)  
401bis  
Predicate offence (as per  
threat assessment)  
ML predicate  
offence  
Law(s) defining the predicate offence, in French  
Code pénal (CP)  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Coups et blessures volontaires  
sur enfant moins 14 ans  
accomplis  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
403 et 404  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Empoisonnement : maladie  
incurable ; incapacité  
permanente ; perte organe ;  
mort  
406, 407 et 408  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Entrave à convoi ferroviaire :  
maladie ; incapacité de travail ;  
maladie incurable ; incapacité  
permanente ; perte organe ;  
muꢀlaꢀon grave  
Code pénal (CP)  
409 paragraphes 2 à 5 et 409 bis 506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
paragraphes 1,3 et 4  
Coups et blessures sur conjoint :  
préméditaꢀon ; maladie ;  
incapacité temporaire ; maladie  
incurable ; incapacité  
permanente ; perte organe ;  
muꢀlaꢀon grave ; mort  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
430  
Duel  
438  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
179  
Relevant arꢀcle(s) within the  
law (and actual designaꢀon in  
Luxembourg law, in French)  
Séquestraꢀon illégale-torture-  
maladie incurable-mort  
474 et 475  
Predicate offence (as per  
threat assessment)  
ML predicate  
offence  
Law(s) defining the predicate offence, in French  
Code pénal (CP)  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Vol commis à l’aide de violences  
et menaces : mort ; meurtre  
commis pour faciliter le vol ou  
l’extorsion ou pour en assurer  
l’impunité  
Code pénal (CP)  
510 à 513, 518, 521, 525, de  
529 à 532 et 547  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
Destrucꢀon volontaire d’objets  
mobiliers d’autrui : violences ou  
menaces ; maladie ; lésion  
corporelle ; meurtre  
Loi modifiée du 25 novembre 1982 réglant le  
prélèvement de substances d'origine humaine  
(L-25.11.1982)  
506-1, ꢀret 16CP  
506-1, ꢀret 2 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 7 CP  
18  
Parꢀcipaꢀon in an  
organised criminal group  
and racketeering  
Piracy  
Code pénal (CP)  
322 à 324quater  
Associaꢀon de malfaiteurs et  
organisaꢀon criminelle  
65-1  
Loi modifiée du 14 avril 1992 insꢀtuant un code  
disciplinaire et pénal pour la marine  
(L-14.04.1992)  
Loi modifiée du 15 mars 1983 sur les armes et  
muniꢀons  
Illicit arms trafficking  
28  
(L-14.03.1983)  
180  
Relevant arꢀcle(s) within the  
law (and actual designaꢀon in  
Luxembourg law, in French)  
118 et 119  
Predicate offence (as per  
threat assessment)  
ML predicate  
offence  
Law(s) defining the predicate offence, in French  
Illicit trafficking in stolen  
and other goods  
Loi du 25 février 2022 relaꢀve au patrimoine culturel  
(L-25.02.2022)  
506-1, ꢀret 14 CP  
Drug trafficking  
Loi modifiée du 19 février 1973 concernant la vente de  
substances médicamenteuses et la luꢁe contre la  
toxicomanie  
8.1 a) et b)  
8-1 L-19.02.1973  
(L-19.02.1973)  
Loi du 11 janvier 1989 réglant la commercialisaꢀon des  
substances chimique à acꢀvité thérapeuꢀque  
(L-11.01.1989)  
5
506-1, ꢀret 15 CP  
Trafficking in human  
beings and migrant  
smuggling.  
Code pénal (CP)  
382-1 et 382-2  
Traite des êtres humains  
382-4 et 382-5  
Trafic illicite des migrants  
463 ; 464  
Vol simple, vol domesꢀque  
467 à 469 ; 471 à 476  
Vol qualifié  
506-1, ꢀret 3 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 3 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 9 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 28 CP  
506-1, ꢀret 11 CP  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
Code pénal (CP)  
Robberies or theſt  
Cybercrime  
509-1 à 509-7  
Certaines infracꢀons en maꢀère  
informaꢀque  
Loi du 14 août 2000 relaꢀve au commerce électronique 48  
506-1, ꢀret 12 CP  
(L-14.08.2000)  
Spam  
11  
Loi modifiée du 30 mai 2005 relaꢀve au traitement  
illicite des données à caractère personnel dans le  
secteur des communicaꢀons électroniques  
(L-30.05.2005)  
506-1, ꢀret 13 CP  
181  
Appendix B.  
Methodology  
B.1.  
Vulnerabiliꢀes methodology  
Table 36: Scorecard of assessment criteria for sectorial vulnerabiliꢀes  
Dimension  
Structure  
Sub-dimension  
Examples of indicators/data  
Size  
Revenue/turnover and profit  
Assets  
Assets under management  
Fragmentation/complexity  
Number of institutions  
Level of concentration (e.g. top-five  
entity assets as a % of the market)  
Ownership/  
legal structure  
Ownership/  
legal structure  
% ownership by foreign BOs (of which  
from risky countries based on FATF  
lists)  
% of entities with foreign mother  
Products/ activities  
Geography  
Products/activities  
% of high-risk products (e.g. % revenue  
from products/activities)  
International business  
% of international business (e.g. in  
clients revenue, assets, transactions)  
Flows with weak AML CFT  
measures geographies  
% of high-risk geographies based on  
FATF list of geographies with weak  
AML/CFT measures (e.g. in clients  
revenue, assets, transactions)  
Clients/ transactions  
Volume  
Risk  
Number of clients  
Total number (stock)  
New clients per year (flow)  
% high-risk clients (based on supervised  
entities’ internal models)  
% PEPs (over time): domestic vs.  
foreign  
Channels  
Channels  
Type of interaction: % face-to-face,  
indirect (e.g. online), via intermediaries  
182  
     
Table 37: Inherent risk scorecard – individual risk raꢀngs  
Risk rating against criteria  
Risk levels  
1
2
3
4
5
Very Low  
Low  
Medium  
High  
Very High  
Table 38: Inherent risk scorecard risk – overall inherent risk outcome  
Average between  
Lower bound  
1,00  
Higher bound  
1,80  
Risk levels  
Very Low  
Low  
1,80  
2,60  
2,60  
3,40  
Medium  
High  
3,40  
4,20  
4,20  
5,00  
Very High  
183  
   
B.2.  
Miꢀgaꢀng factors and residual risk methodology  
Table 39: Scorecard of impact criteria for miꢀgaꢀng factors  
Dimension  
Criteria  
Information/data used (examples)  
Market entry controls  
Market entry  
Licenses/registrations number of  
applications received, processed, approved,  
rejected  
Breaches  
Number of licenses/registrations breaches  
identified/remediated  
Understanding of ML/TF risks  
and AML/CFT obligations  
Understanding of ML risks and  
AML/CFT obligations  
Annual questionnaires  
Risk assessments (e.g. entity level, sub-sector  
risk assessments)  
Internal trainings  
Supervisors’ publications on ML/TF risks in the  
sector  
Regulation & information  
Type of supervisor (e.g. association, ministry,  
dedicated supervisor)  
Regulation communication to the sector (e.g.  
circulars)  
Education to private sector (e.g. publications,  
trainings, etc.)  
Prevention / Private sector  
controls  
ML controls in place  
CDD/KYC approach, aligned with risk level,  
number of customers declined based on CDD  
Transaction monitoring approach, aligned with  
risk level, number of alerts generated, handled  
and STRs reported  
Internal supporting structures  
Formalised policies, procedures and controls,  
clearly articulating the risk-based AML/CFT  
approach  
Member of management body responsible for  
compliance with AML/CFT obligations  
Supervision & Enforcement  
Level of supervision  
Enforcement  
Number and type of inspections (on-sites and  
off-sites)  
Supervisor procedures formalised and up to  
date  
Remedial actions imposed (i.e. number of  
sanctions and other actions)  
Outcomes of remedial actions (i.e. number of  
deficiencies remediates)  
Detection, Prosecution &  
Asset recovery  
STRs/SARs  
Number of STRs and SARs issued by subsector  
and predicate offences  
Quality of STRs and SARs issued by subsector  
and predicate offences  
184  
   
Figure 32: Residual risk calculaꢀon  
As an example, a given sub-sector “X” could have:  
Inherent risk score of 3,8 (average across the inherent risk criteria). This corresponds to a level of  
“High” inherent risk;  
Mitigating factors score: 2,1 (average across the residual risk criteria). This corresponds to an  
outcome of “some mitigating factors in place” and hence to a reduction of inherent risk by -0,5.  
Residual risk score: 3,8-0,5 = 3,3, which corresponds to a residual risk outcome of “Medium”.  
These residual risks outcomes are presented in the residual risk assessment section further below.  
185  
 
Appendix C.  
List of tables, figures, case studies and insight boxes  
C.1.  
List of tables  
186  
   
C.2.  
List of figures  
187  
 
C.3.  
List of case studies  
C.4.  
List of insight boxes  
188  
   
189  
Appendix D.  
Glossary  
Acronym  
ABBL  
ACD  
ADA  
AED  
Definiꢀon  
The Luxembourg Bankers’ Associaꢀon  
Adminisraꢀon des Contribuꢀons Directes  
Administraꢀon des Douanes et Accises  
Administraꢀon de l’enregistrement et des domaines et de la TVA  
Automaꢀc exchange of informaꢀon  
Arꢀficial intelligence  
AEOI  
AI  
AIFM  
AML/CFT  
AMO  
ARO  
ASBL  
ATM  
AuM  
BCL  
Alternaꢀve investment fund manager  
anꢀ-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing  
Asset Management Office  
Asset Recovery Office  
Associaꢀon sans but lucraꢀf  
Automated teller machines  
Assets under management  
Banque centrale du Luxembourg  
Beneficial owner  
BO  
CAA  
Commissariat aux Assurances  
CDD  
CdH  
CdN  
Customer due diligence  
Chambre des Huissiers de Jusꢀce  
Chambre des Notaires  
CEF  
Cyber-enabled fraud  
CPA  
CRF  
CRS  
Chartered professional accountants  
Cellule de renseignement financier  
Common Reporꢀng Standard  
CSAE  
CSAM  
CSD  
CSSF  
DDoS  
DESI  
DNFBP  
EAW  
EBA  
Child sexual abuse and exploitaꢀon  
Child sexual abuse material  
Central Securiꢀes Depositories  
Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier  
Distributed denial of service  
Digital Economy and Society Index  
Designated non-financial businesses and professions  
European Arrest Warrant  
European Banking Authority  
ECB  
European Central Bank  
ECSP  
EFTA  
EIO  
European Crowdfunding Service Provider  
European Free Trade Associaꢀon  
European Invesꢀgaꢀon Order  
EMI  
E-money insꢀtuꢀon  
EMPACT  
EOIR  
EPPO  
EU  
European Mulꢀdisciplinary Plaꢃorms Against Criminal Threats  
Exchange of informaꢀon on request  
European Public Prosecuꢀon Office  
European Union  
FATF  
FCP  
Financial Acꢀon Task Force  
Fonds commun de placement  
190  
 
Acronym  
FDI  
Definiꢀon  
Foreign direct investment  
FI  
Financial insꢀtuꢀon  
FIU  
Financial intelligence unit  
FMCG  
GDP  
GGR  
HOSSP  
IMF  
Fast moving consumer goods  
Gross domesꢀc product  
Gross gaming revenue  
Hawala and other similar service providers  
Internaꢀonal Monetary Fund  
Insꢀtut des Réviseurs d’Entreprises  
Inter-ministerial Steering Commiꢁee for the Fight against Money Laundering and  
Terrorist Financing  
IRE  
ISC  
KYC  
Know your customer  
LBR  
LEA  
LGX  
LHSH  
LPs/LAs VRA  
LuxSE  
ManCo  
MFF  
Luxembourg Business Registers  
Law enforcement authoriꢀes  
Luxembourg Green Exchange  
Luxembourg High Security Hub  
Legal persons and legal arrangements ML/TF verꢀcal risk assessment  
Luxembourg Stock Exchange  
Management Companies  
Mulꢀannual Financial Framework  
Money laundering  
ML  
MLA  
Mutual legal assistance  
MoE  
Ministry of Economy  
MoF  
Ministry of Finance  
MoFA  
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Development Cooperaꢀon and  
Foreign Trade  
MoJ  
MoU  
MTIC  
MVTS  
NPC  
NPO  
NRA  
OAD  
OAL  
OEC  
PEP  
Ministry of Jusꢀce  
Memorandum of Understanding  
Missing Trader Intra Community  
Money value or transfer service  
Naꢀonal Prevenꢀon Commiꢁee on money laundering and terrorist financing  
Non-profit organisaꢀons  
Naꢀonal Risk Assessment  
Ordre des Avocats de Diekirch  
Ordre des Avocats de Luxembourg  
Ordre des Experts-Comptables  
Poliꢀcal exposed person  
PFS  
PSA  
PSP  
Professional of the financial sector  
Professional of the insurance sector  
Payment Service Provider  
RBE  
RCS  
REA  
RED  
RFT  
Registre des bénéficiaires effecꢀfs  
Registre de Commerce et des Sociétés  
Real estate agents  
Real estate developers  
Register of fiducies and trusts  
191  
Acronym  
RRF  
SA  
Definiꢀon  
Recovery and Resilience Facility  
Société anonyme  
SARL  
SCSpé  
SICAV  
SME  
SMO  
SNRA  
Société à responsabilité limitée  
Sociétés en commandite spéciale  
Société d’invesꢀssement à capital variable  
Small and medium-sized enterprises  
Senior management official  
Supranaꢀonal assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing  
affecꢀng the internal market and relaꢀng to cross-border acꢀviꢀes  
Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment  
Study on the payment aꢂtudes of consumers in the euro area  
Self-regulatory body  
SOCTA  
SPACE  
SRB  
STOR  
STR  
Suspicious order and transacꢀon report  
Suspicious transacꢀon report  
TCSP  
TF  
Trust and corporate service provider  
Terrorist financing  
UCITS  
UHNW  
VA  
Undertaking for collecꢀve investment in transferable securiꢀes  
Ultra-High-Net-Worth Individual  
Virtual asset  
VASP  
VAT  
Virtual asset service provider  
Value added tax  
vIBAN  
Virtual IBAN  
192