EN
OJ L, 19.6.2024
(23) To ensure a consistent approach, it is necessary to clarify which entities in the investment sector are subject to
AML/CFT requirements. Although collective investment undertakings already fall within the scope of Directive (EU)
2015/849, it is necessary to align the relevant terminology with the current Union investment fund legislation,
funds might be constituted without legal personality, the inclusion of their managers in the scope of this Regulation
is also necessary. AML/CFT requirements should apply regardless of the form in which units or shares in a fund are
made available for purchase in the Union, including where units or shares are directly or indirectly offered to
investors established in the Union or placed with such investors at the initiative of the manager or on behalf of the
manager. As both funds and fund managers fall within the scope of AML/CFT requirements, it is appropriate to
clarify that a duplication of efforts should be avoided. To that end, the AML/CFT measures taken at the level of the
fund and at the level of its manager should not be the same, but should reflect the allocation of tasks between the
fund and its manager.
(24) The activities of professional football clubs and football agents are exposed to risks of money laundering and its
predicate offences due to several factors inherent to the football sector, such as the global popularity of football, the
considerable sums, cash flows and financial interests involved, the prevalence of cross-border transactions, and the
sometimes opaque ownership structures. All those factors expose football to possible abuse by criminals to
legitimise illicit funds and thus make the sport vulnerable to money laundering and its predicate offences. Key areas
of risk include, for example, transactions with investors and sponsors, including advertisers, and the transfer of
players. Professional football clubs and football agents should therefore put in place robust anti-money laundering
measures, including carrying out customer due diligence on investors, sponsors, including advertisers, and other
partners and counterparties with whom they transact. In order to avoid any disproportionate burden on smaller
clubs that are less exposed to risks of criminal misuse, Member States should be able to, on the basis of a proven
lower risk of money laundering, its predicate crimes and terrorist financing, exempt certain professional football
clubs from the requirements of this Regulation, whether in full or in part.
(25) The activities of professional football clubs competing in the highest divisions of their national football leagues make
them more exposed to higher risks of money laundering and its predicate offences compared to football clubs
participating in lower divisions. For example, top-tier football clubs engage in more substantial financial
transactions, such as high-value transfers of players and sponsorship deals, might have more complex corporate
structures with multiple layers of ownership, and are more likely to engage in cross-border transactions. Those
factors make such top-tier clubs more attractive for criminals and provide more opportunities to conceal illicit funds.
Therefore, Member States should only be able to exempt professional football clubs participating in the highest
division in cases of proven low risk and provided that such clubs have a turnover for each of the previous 2 years of
less than EUR 5 000 000 or the equivalent in national currency. Nonetheless, the risk of money laundering is not
determined solely by the division in which a football club competes. Lower-division clubs can also be exposed to
significant risks of money laundering and its predicate offences. Member States should therefore only be able to
exempt from the requirements of this Regulation football clubs in lower divisions that are associated with a proven
low risk of money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing.
(26) This Regulation harmonises the measures to be put in place to prevent money laundering, its predicate offences and
terrorist financing at Union level. At the same time, in line with the risk-based approach, Member States should be
able to impose additional requirements in limited cases where they are confronted with specific risks. To ensure that
such risks are adequately mitigated, obliged entities that have their head office located in another Member State
should apply such additional requirements, whether they operate in that other Member State through freedom of
establishment or under the freedom to provide services, provided they have an infrastructure in that other Member
State. Furthermore, in order to clarify the relationship between those internal market freedoms, it is important to
clarify what activities amount to an establishment.
(27) Consistent with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, unless specifically set out in sectorial
legislation an establishment does not need to take the form of a subsidiary, branch or agency, but can consist of an
office managed by an obliged entity’s own staff or by a person who is independent but authorised to act on
a permanent basis for the obliged entity. According to that definition, which requires the actual pursuit of an
Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009,
p. 32).
Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and
amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L 174,
1.7.2011, p. 1).
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ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj